KREDELL V ZOREF

(Van Nuys Courthouse East: Dept. T) September 1, 2026 DEPARTMENT T LAW AND MOTION RULINGS If ALL parties submit on the tentative, then no appearance is necessary unless some other matter (i.e., Case Management Conference) is on calendar. It is not necessary to call the court to request oral argument. Oral argument is permitted on all tentative rulings.

Case Number: 21VECV00692 Hearing Date: September 1, 2026 Dept: T 21VECV00692 Akhoundzadeh v Khatibi Ex parte application to continue hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment. GRANTED. Good cause is shown. The court will continue the hearing to ________ 2026 at 8:30 a.m.. Opposition and Reply per Code. Any further continuance will require a doctor's note explaining the medical need for a further continuance. The TSC will be continued to the same date and time. The motion to release fund was previously withdrawn and is no longer on calendar.

Case Number: 25VECV02234 Hearing Date: September 1, 2026 Dept: T 25VECV02234 KREDELL V ZOREF [TENTATIVE] ORDER: Defendant Joy Zoref's Motion for Summary Judgment and the alternative Motion for Summary Adjudication as to Issue nos. 1, 2, 4, are DENIED. The Motion for Summary Adjudication as to Issue no. 3 is CONTINUED to _______________, 2026 for further briefing. Defendant Joy Zoref's Evidentiary Objections are SUSTAINED as to nos. 1 and 6; OVERRULED as to nos. 2 and 4, and are NOT CONSIDERED as to nos. 3, 5, 7-10.

Introduction

Defendant Joy Zoref (Defendant) moved for summary judgment (MSJ) against Plaintiff Dale Kredell's (Plaintiff) Complaint. Alternatively, Defendant moved for summary adjudication (MSA) and placed into issue the first cause of action (COA) for negligence (Issue 1), the second COA for premise liability (Issue 2), the request for punitive damages (Issue 3), and the third COA for retaliatory eviction (Issue 4). [NOTE: Plaintiff's Opposition has a typo in a citation. Plaintiff cited to "Brantley v. Pisaro, 42 Cal. 4th 1591, 1601 (Cal.App. 1996)". (Oppo pg. 12:11.)

The correct citation should be "42 Cal.App. 4th 1591". It is apparent that the mistake is a typo because Plaintiff correctly cited "(Cal.App. 1996)" at the end of the citation. Defendant's Reply made a mistake in citing to the MSJ statute. Defendant identified the MSJ statute as " Civil Code section 437c(b)(3)", when it should have been the Code of Civil Procedure. (Reply pg. 2:6.)] Counsel is advised to be more careful on citations.

Procedure

Plaintiff's opposing separate statement included objections. However, Plaintiff's objections failed to comply with the requirement to submit written objections separately from other papers in support of the opposition to the MSJ/MSA. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b).) Further, Plaintiff's objections in the separate statement failed to comply with the formatting requirements to assert an objection within the separate statement because the objection did not reference the objection by number. (Id.)

The Court further noted that Plaintiff's objections included a reference to "California Rule of Court, Rule 31.1650(d)", which is a non-existent rule. (See Plaintiff's Statement of Disputed Facts (PSDF) nos. 3-14 as to the MSJ; nos. 3-7 as to the MSA Issue 1 and 2; nos. 7-14 as to MSA Issue 3; and nos. 7-14 as to MSA Issue 4.) In any event, because Plaintiff failed to comply with the rules for submitting and formatting objections, the Court exercised its discretion and did not consider Plaintiff's objections asserted in Plaintiff's separate statement.

Defendant's evidentiary objection nos. 3, 5, 7-10 were not considered because the format of the objection failed to quote or set forth the objectionable statement or material. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(b).) Defendant's objections merely identified the name of the document in which the material is located and the exhibit, title, page and line number of the material. Without quoting the actual statement, the Court was not provided with sufficient materials to rule upon the objections. The Court did not consider Defendant's evidentiary objection nos. 3, 5, 7-10.

Discussion

Defendant asserted that the MSJ and/or MSA Issues 1 and 2 regarding the first and second COAs should be granted in Defendant's favor because there is no triable issue of fact as to the elements of duty and causation. Defendant provided that no duty of care or causation arose because Defendant had no actual or constructive notice of the defective garage door. A property owner is to use "ordinary care or skill in the management" of their property. They are responsible for injuries proximately caused by their failure to exercise such due care, except to the extent that injured persons, "willfully or by want of ordinary care," brought the injury upon themselves. (Civ.

Code sec. 1714(a); Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Ctr. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 674-675.) The liability of owners to maintain and repair is predicated on a duty of care that extends not to any dangerous condition, but to dangerous conditions of which they are aware or reasonably should be aware. (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1205-1207.) Defendant provided that she was not aware of or made aware of any dangerous condition related to the garage door. (Defendant's Separate Statement of Fact (DSSF) 5 and 7.)

The facts are sufficient to show that there is no triable issue of material fact as to Defendant's lack of actual notice because there is no evidence as to notice of the dangerous condition (i.e., defective garage door) given by Plaintiff and because Defendant is not in possession of the property. Defendant met their initial burden on the MSJ/MSA as to the actual notice pleading element.

However, actual notice is not the only basis to impose a duty of care upon Defendant. As argued by Defendant, constructive notice is an alternative basis to impose a duty of care. Constructive notice is established when that condition, under all the circumstances, existed long enough such that the defendant "had sufficient time to discover it," and using reasonable care, repair the condition, protect against harm from the condition, or adequately warn of the condition. (CACI no. 1011.) Defendant's separate statement of facts did not present any facts related to when the defect in the garage door was discovered or that the amount of time the defect in the garage door existed was a short period of time so that Defendant could not, with the use of reasonable care, discover the defect in the garage door.

Defendant also did not present any facts as to what reasonable care was performed to discover the dangerous conditions at the property. Without any facts in Defendant's separate statement related to constructive notice, Defendant failed to meet their initial burden on the motion to show that no triable issue of fact exists as to constructive notice.

Further, a review of Plaintiff's deposition testimony and the attached exhibits, as submitted with the motion, show that facts may exist to present an inference that the dangerous condition with the garage door may have existed for a longer amount of time to allow Defendant to have discovered the defect if reasonable care had been exercised. Plaintiff's deposition testimony, as submitted by Defendant, showed that the ORB (or Operator Reinforcement Bracket), required three screws to attach to the garage door panel but two of the three screws were missing.

Further, the only screw that attached the ORB to the garage door panel was loose. (See Jake Zicarelli Decl., Exh. A: Plaintiff's Deposition Testimony at pg. 70:16 - 71:2.) The fact that two of three screws on a bracket were missing and the remaining screw attaching the bracket was loose provides facts that could lead to an inference that the defect was present for a long time since screws do not go missing or fall out of place or become loose instantaneously. Further, attached to Plaintiff's deposition testimony is an email from Plaintiff to Defendant which shows that the garage door previously would shake and on the day of the incident the garage door shook "more than normal" when it was opening. (See Jake Zicarelli Decl., Exh.

A: Plaintiff's Deposition Testimony, Exh. 6: Email dated December 26, 2024, at 4:11 PM.) The evidence showing that the garage door shook when opening and the evidence showing that two screws that attached the ORB to the garage door panel were missing and one screw being loose provides evidence to support the inference that the ORB detaching from the garage door panel was in existence for a longer period. With the inference of the existence of the dangerous condition for a longer period, Defendant's evidence submitted with the motion provides a triable issue of fact as to one part of constructive notice.

The other part of constructive notice requires evidence to show reasonable care. Defendant's evidence fails to present any evidence that Defendant acted with reasonable care in maintaining the property. With the inference that the dangerous condition existed for a longer period of time and that Defendant failed to act with reasonable care, Defendant failed to meet their initial burden as to constructive notice. Because Defendant failed to meet their initial burden as to constructive notice, the burden to present facts to show that a triable issue of fact exists as to constructive notice did not transfer to Plaintiff.

Defendant's MSJ and MSA as to Issues 1 and 2 based upon duty and causation are unpersuasive.

Defendant then argued as to MSA Issues 1 and 2 that Plaintiff had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition and assumed the risk of climbing the ladder to inspect and document the alleged defect. Defendant asserted that the defect was open and obvious because Plaintiff saw the defect when he opened the garage door, removed his vehicle from the garage, and went up a ladder to inspect/document the defect. (DSSF 3-4.) However, the facts reviewed above showing that there is evidence to support the inference that the defect with the garage door was long standing is in direct contravention to Defendant's contention that the defect with the garage door was open and obvious.

The fact that Plaintiff noticed the defect at or near the time of the incident is insufficient to show that the defect was open and obvious. The Court is not convinced that sufficient facts are presented to show that there is no triable issue of fact as to whether the dangerous condition was open and obvious.

Further, Defendant's argument failed to present any evidence to show that the events at issue involved a primary assumption of risk. It is only the primary assumption of risk doctrine that operates as a complete defense to a negligence claim. The secondary assumption of risk doctrine operates only as mitigation of damages (i.e., comparative negligence). (Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 489, citing Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 304-308.) At most, the facts showing Plaintiff was on a ladder when the garage door released would provide evidence of the secondary assumption of risk and would not be a complete bar to Plaintiff's claims.

Because Defendant's contention failed to differentiate between primary and secondary assumption of risk and failed to present facts to apply the primary assumption of risk doctrine as a complete defense to the two COAs, Defendant failed to meet their initial burden of persuasion as to the assumption of risk defense. Because Defendant did not meet their initial burden on the assumption of risk defense, the burden did not transfer to Plaintiff to show that a triable issue of fact exists. Defendant's MSJ and MSA as to Issues 1 and 2 are not persuasive.

Defendant's MSJ and MSA as to Issues 1 and 2 are DENIED.

Defendant's MSA as to Issue 3 moved against Plaintiff's request for punitive damages made in the third COA for retaliatory eviction. Defendant's MSA as to Issue 4 moved against the third COA for retaliatory eviction. Because the two issues are interrelated, the Court reviewed the arguments as to MSA Issue 4 and against the third COA first. As to MSA Issue 4, Defendant argued that there is no triable issue of fact because Plaintiff does not have evidence to show actual damages. (Civ. Code, sec. 1942.5(h).)

Plaintiff's grounds for the retaliatory eviction COA are that Defendant wrongfully issued a 60-day notice to quit and wrongfully increased the security deposit. (Compl. pg. 6 of 6.) Defendant asserted that Plaintiff cannot show actual damages because Plaintiff still resides at the property and the eviction notice was withdrawn. (DSSF 2, 10.) Preliminarily, the withdrawal of the notice to quit is irrelevant because the statute provides that "it is unlawful for a lessor to increase rent, decrease services, cause a lessee to quit involuntarily, bring an action to recover possession, or threaten to do any of those acts". (Civ.

Code, sec. 1942.5(d).) The service of the 60-day notice to quit is seen as a threat to bring an action to recover possession. With service of the notice to quit, prohibited retaliatory conduct as defined by the statute is not disputed. Further, actual eviction is not a prerequisite for a statutory retaliatory eviction COA. Actual eviction is seen as only a prerequisite for a common law retaliatory eviction COA. (Winslett v. 1811 27th Avenue, LLC (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 239, 257.) However, actual damages were placed into issue.

Without an actual eviction, Defendant asserted that there is no triable issue of fact as to actual damages because Plaintiff was not evicted. However, Defendant's Reply submitted that emotional distress damages, as asserted by Plaintiff, can support a claim for actual damages. Despite Defendant's contention that Plaintiff failed to present evidence or facts to support emotional distress damages, Plaintiff's declaration attached to the opposition expressly stated that the service of the 60-day notice to quit caused Plaintiff stress for a month. (Plaintiff's Decl. par. 11.)

A tenant's actual damages need not be more than nominal to entitle tenant to maintain the COA. (Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 278, 281.) With Plaintiff's declaration attesting to stress caused by the 60-day notice to quit, Plaintiff sufficiently provided that a triable issue of fact exists as to actual damages. Defendant's argument as to actual damages against the third COA is not persuasive. The MSA as to Issue 4 is DENIED.

As to MSA Issue 3, Defendant asserted that there is no triable issue of fact as to punitive damages requested in the third COA for retaliatory eviction. A "lessor who violates this section shall be liable to the lessee in a civil action for ... punitive damages in an amount of not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than two thousand dollars ($2,000) for each retaliatory act where the lessor or agent has been guilty of fraud, oppression, or malice with respect to the act." (Civ. Code, sec. 1942.5(h)(2).)

Preliminarily, an MSA may be granted as to a claim for punitive damages pursuant to Civil Code, section 3294. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 437c(f)(1).) Nothing in the summary adjudication statute allows the Court to summarily adjudicate "punitive damages" under Civil Code, section 1942.5(h). It is noted that the retaliatory eviction statute makes no reference to Civil Code, section 3294 - punitive damages statute. The retaliatory eviction statute only used the "punitive damages" and "fraud, oppression, or malice" language.

Based upon the Court's own research, there does not appear to be any case law to show that the "punitive damages" language in the retaliatory eviction statute is to be reviewed under Civil Code, section 3294. The reference to "punitive damages" and "fraud, oppression, or malice" was interpreted by the Court as a statutory penalty or statutory damages, especially because the Legislature placed express minimums and maximums on the amounts to be awarded. (Rich v. Schwab (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 803, 816 (Rich).)

Further, the Rich opinion provided that the "punitive damages" award under the retaliatory eviction statute need not consider a defendant's financial condition, which is a factor to be considered for punitive damages in Civil Code, section 3294. (Id. at p. 817.) Without consideration of defendant's financial condition and the delineated minimums and maximums, the "punitive damages" in the retaliatory eviction statute is not considered to be relief found under Civil Code, section 3294. Because the "punitive damages" in the retaliatory eviction statute is not considered a Civil Code, section 3294 punitive damages award, the MSA as to Issue 4 is procedurally improper.

The MSA statute does not authorize the Court to summarily adjudicate the retaliatory eviction statute's "punitive damages". The MSA is not persuasive on this procedural defect.

To the extent that Defendant could argue that the issues regarding "malice, oppression, or fraud" as found in the retaliatory eviction statute could be grounds to dispose of the entire third COA (rather than just punitive damages), the Court does not find the issue persuasive because the elements of "malice, oppression, or fraud" as referenced in the retaliatory eviction statute only apply to the statutory penalty/punitive damages award. Even if there is no triable issue of fact as to "malice, oppression, or fraud", the third COA would survive the MSA since punitive damages is only a part of the authorized remedies for violating the retaliatory eviction statute.

The Court is inclined to DENY the MSA as to Issue 3. However, because the procedural defect was first raised by the Court, the Court CONTINUES the hearing only as to this specific issue to provide notice and opportunity to be heard on the newly raised issue. The Court ORDERS the briefs to be limited to five pages. Defendant's opposition to the issue is to be filed and served no less than 20 calendar days prior to the new hearing date. Plaintiff's reply in support of the issue is to be filed and served no less than 11 calendar days prior to the new hearing date. (See Code Civ.

Proc., sec. 437c(b)(2) and (4).) IT IS SO ORDERED, CLERK TO GIVE NOTICE.

Case Number: 25VECV03776 Hearing Date: September 1, 2026 Dept: T 25VECV03776 Palm Drive v Bryant The court has signed the stipulation. Therefore, the ex parte application requires no appearance.

Case Number: 25VECV05163 Hearing Date: September 1, 2026 Dept: T 25VECV05163 Diaz v Lopez Tentative ruling: Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery Request for Admissions: GRANT. Defendant Defendant Hector Lopez is to serve verified (under oath) further answers the request for admissions nos. 3, 5, 16, 23, 24, 33, 37, 38 23, 24, without objection, by ____. Form Interrogatories: GRANT Defendant Hector Lopez is to serve verified answers to Interrogatory 17.1 without objection as to each Request for Admission nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8-33, 35-40, 43 and 46 (example) 17.1 (a) RFA 1 (b) (c) (d) (a) RFA 2 (b) (c) (d) etc.

Defendant Hector Lopez is to serve verified answers to Interrogatory 15.1 without objection by _____. Request for Production of Documents: GRANT. Defendant Hector Lope is to serve verified responses without objection and production of the documents requested by ______. Special Interrogatories: GRANT. Defendant Hector Lopez is to serve verified (under oath) answers to the special interrogatories, without objection, by ____. IT IS SO ORDERED. CLERK TO GIVE NOTICE. | Home -->