Nancy Cain v. Kia America, Inc.

provision, "counsel need not show that his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect was excusable. No reason need be given for the existence of one of these circumstances. Attestation that one of these reasons existed is sufficient to obtain relief unless the trial court finds that the dismissal did not occur because of these reasons." (Graham v. Beers (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1656, 1660.) "The six-month time limit for granting statutory relief is jurisdictional and the court may not consider a motion for relief [under Section 473] made after that period has elapsed." (Manson, Iver & York v. Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 36, 42, emphasis added.)

Discussion

Here, the court dismissed JCP Properties on June 29, 2026 based Hernandez's failure to serve it. (See 6/29/2026 Min. Order, p. 1.)

Hernandez filed this motion on July 22, 2026, before the six-month jurisdiction deadline. (See Mot., p. 1; see also Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 473, subd. (b).)

Hernandez's counsel attests in her sworn declaration that she did not serve JCP Properties because she attempted service at the wrong address, which she did not discover until after the dismissal. (See Mot., Javid Decl., P.P. 9-10.)

The court finds that counsel has submitted a sufficient basis to grant the motion under Code of Civil Procedure 473, subdivision (b). (See Graham, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at 1660, stating, "No reason need be given for the existence of [mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect]. Attestation that one of these reasons existed is sufficient to obtain relief. . . .")

Therefore, the motion to vacate dismissal is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the motion to set vacate dismissal is GRANTED.

Kia America, Inc.'s Motion for Protective Order

Respondent: Plaintiff Nancy Cain

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Kia America, Inc.'s Motion for Protective Order is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

This is a Song-Beverly action arising out of the purchase of an allegedly defective motor vehicle.

On June 11, 2023, plaintiff Nancy Cain (Cain) allegedly purchased a crossover SUV manufactured by defendant Kia America, Inc. (KA).

On December 1, 2025, Cain filed the Complaint, alleging causes of action for (1) breach of express warranty obligations, (2) breach of implied warranty obligations, (3) failure to repair in a good and workmanlike manner, and (4) failure to timely repair.

On June 3, 2026, the court conducted an informal discovery conference.

On July 1, 2026, KA filed this motion for protective order.

On August 19, 2026, Cain filed the opposition, and on August 25, 2026, KA filed the reply.

This case is set for an order to show cause re: status of discovery and a hearing on the motion on September 1, 2026.

ANALYSIS

KA moves for a protective order preventing the public disclosure of proprietary, commercially sensitive, and confidential business information.

For the following reasons, the motion for protective order is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Legal Standard

In accordance with the liberal policies underlying the discovery procedures, California courts are broad-minded in determining whether discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. (Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Super. Ct. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 172; Pettie v. Super. Ct. (1960) 178 Cal.App.2d 680, 687.)

As a practical matter, it is difficult to define at the discovery stage what evidence will be relevant at trial, so the party seeking discovery is entitled to substantial leeway. (Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra, at 172.)

Courts resolve any doubt in favor of permitting discovery. (Id. at 173; Norton v. Super. Ct. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1750, 1761, stating, "if an error is made in ruling on a discovery motion, it is better that it be made in favor of granting discovery of the nondiscoverable rather than denying discovery of information vital to preparation or presentation of the party's case or to efficacious settlement of the dispute.")

That being said, "The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2017.020, subd. (a).)

"The court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person." (Ibid.)

A protective order cannot be granted ex parte, and the motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration showing a good faith attempt at an informal resolution to each issue presented by the motion. (St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 82, 85-86; Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2017.020, subd. (a).)

Generally, the burden of proof is on the party seeking the protective order to show "good cause" for the order they seek. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255.)

The exception to this general rule is if the responding party argues "the number of specially prepared interrogatories is unwarranted, [then] the propounding party shall have the burden of justifying the number of these interrogatories." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2030.040, subd. (b).)

A court may make any order with respect to interrogatories, requests for production of documents, requests for admissions, and depositions that justice requires to protect a party from "unwanted annoyance, embarrassment or oppression[,] or undue burden and expense." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec.Sec. 2025.420, 2030.090, 2031.060, 2033.080.)

A discovery request is "oppressive" when there is "some showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought." (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Super. Ct. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.)

The court shall restrict the frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods if it determines either (1) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; or (2) the selected method of discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2019.030, subd. (a).)

The court may then make any order as may be appropriate to protect the parties, the witness, or the consumer from unreasonable or oppressive demands including unreasonable violation of a witness's or consumer's right of privacy. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1987.1.)

Discussion

KA argues that the court should issue a protective order preventing the public disclosure of the Service Policies and Procedures Manual, Customer Care Case Report, Warranty History Inquiry and Warranty Claim Inquiry, and Vehicle Specification Sheet because they include trade secrets or other confidential research, development, or commercial information. (KA does not seek to prevent the private disclosure of these documents to Cain in this litigation.)

The court agrees.

In 2024, California reformed the Song-Beverly Act to reduce court congestion and facilitate early resolution by mandating initial disclosures and requiring the parties to participate in mediation shortly after the pleadings are filed. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 871.26, subd. (b).)

The Song-Beverly Act requires parties to exchange initial disclosures and documents within 60 days of the filing of an answer or other responsive pleading. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 871.26, subds. (b), (d).)

Manufacturers may affirmatively opt into the statutory scheme. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 871.30, subd. (a).)

Under the scheme, a vehicle buyer must provide to the vehicle manufacturer the sales or lease agreement, current registration, finance information, repair orders, pre-suit communications with the vehicle manufacturer, current mileage, primary drivers, vehicle location and possession, collision or accident history, and aftermarket modifications. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 871.26, subds. (f)-(g).)

A vehicle manufacturer must provide to the vehicle buyer all vehicle-specific manuals, warranties, sales or lease documents, technical and service bulletins, warranty and service histories, internal communications, and policies or evaluations related to restitution or replacement requests. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 871.26, subd. (h).)

The documents and information must be produced without awaiting a discovery request and without the need for a protective order. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 871.26, subd. (b).)

Here, the parties agree that the documents in question are encompassed by the Song-Beverly Act initial disclosure requirement. (See Opp., p. 3, 5-7; see also Reply, p. 2.)

KA does not seek to prevent the disclosure of those documents to Cain in this litigation; instead, KA seeks to prevent the disclosure of those documents to the public. (See Mot., p. 8; see also Reply, p. 3.)

The moving party bears the burden to show good cause for a protective order. (See Emerson Electric Co. v. Super. Ct. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1101, 1110.)

The declaration of KA's counsel, however, does not establish an evidentiary foundation for KA's arguments against disclosure to the public based on trade secrets or other confidential research, development, or commercial information, as counsel does not claim to have personal knowledge of KA's manufacturing business or customer care. (See generally Sniderman Decl.; cf. Stadish v. Super. Ct. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1145, finding that a party could not obtain a protective order for supposed trade secrets based on affidavits that were "conclusory in nature.")

Therefore, on this record, the court finds that KA fails to establish good cause and a proper foundation for the protective order.

Accordingly, the motion for protective order is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Additionally, the court determines that monetary sanctions are inappropriate.

The court shall impose monetary sanctions against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion for a protective order, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of sanctions unjust. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2017.020, subd. (b).)

"Substantial justification means that a justification is clearly reasonable because it is well grounded in both law and fact." (See Evilsizor v. Sweeney (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1312, cleaned up.)

As stated above, KA did not seek to prevent Cain from obtaining the subject documents through the Song-Beverly Act's initial disclosure provisions.

As such, the court finds it would be unjust to impose sanctions against KA.

Therefore, the court declines to impose monetary sanctions for the unsuccessful motion for protective order.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the motion for protective order is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Case Number: 25PSCV04436

Hearing Date: September 1, 2026

Dept: G

Defendant Cesar Daniel Vallejo's Motion to Vacate Judgment and Set Aside Default

Respondent: Plaintiff California Business Bureau Inc.

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Cesar Daniel Vallejo's Motion to Vacate Judgment and Set Aside Default is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

BACKGROUND

This is debt collection action.

On February 3, 2023, defendant Cesar Daniel Vallejo (Vallejo) allegedly became indebted to nonparty Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center.

On March 11, 2025, Pomona Valley Hospital Medical Center allegedly assigned the underling debt to plaintiff California Business Bureau Inc. (California Business Bureau) for collection.

On December 11, 2025, California Business Bureau filed the Complaint, alleging causes of action for (1) open book account, (2) account stated, and (3) quantum meruit.

On February 3, 2026, the court entered default against Vallejo.

On April 24, 2026, the clerk issued a default judgment in California Business Bureau's favor.

On August 3, 2026, Vallejo filed this motion to set aside entry of default and vacate default judgment.

On August 10, 2026, California Business Bureau filed the opposition, and on there is no reply.

The motion is set for hearing on September 1, 2026.

ANALYSIS

Vallejo moves to set aside the entry of default and vacate the resulting default judgment.

For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Legal Standard

Whenever an application for relief from default is made no more than six months after entry of default, is in proper form, and is accompanied by the moving party's sworn affidavit attesting to their mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, the court may vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against the moving party or (2) resulting default judgment or