Jeremy Licon v. Pearce Services, LLC

Jeremy Licon v. Pearce Services, LLC, 25CVP-0059

Hearing: Motion to Compel Production

Date: September 1, 2026

In February 2025, Jeremy Licon filed this employment action against Pearce Services, LLC. Licon filed a first amended complaint in early April 2025.

On April 2, 2026, Pearce served Licon with a Deposition Subpoena for the Production of Business Records directed to Licon’s subsequent employer, SOLV Energy LLC. Pearce also served a Notice to Consumer/Employee with the Subpoena. On April 9, 2024, Pearce served SOLV with the Subpoena. Licon served a written objection to the Subpoena five days later on April 14, 2026. Licon’s objection stated he intended to prepare a motion to quash. (Pearce Ex. C.) The date for production was April 24, 2026. SOLV did not produce any documents.

Pearce now seeks to compel compliance with the Subpoena, which seeks “documents, including but not limited to: job applications, resumes, cover letters, interview notes, disciplinary records, attendance records, payroll records, personnel records, and termination records. Please also provide any and all workers’ compensation deposition transcripts for Jeremy Licon relating to any workers’ compensation case while working at SOLV Energy, LLC.” (Pearce Ex. A.) The Subpoena seeks documents from January 2024 through the present.

Pearce argues the requested information is relevant to the mitigation of damages issues and Licon’s alleged economic losses, i.e. whether his current employment is comparable to his former position. Two days before this motion was filed, Licon conceded in supplemental discovery responses (after previously taking a contrary position) that his employment with SOLV is comparable employment. In light of that subsequent concession, the Subpoena is overbroad.

Licon asks that if the Court is inclined to require production, that the Court limit production to his initial wage statements from November 2024 to December 2024, his job application, resume, and other hiring documents. The parties should come prepared to discuss limited production.

Licon also argues the motion to compel is untimely relying on Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3(g). 1 That section provides, “Any consumer whose personal records are sought by a subpoena duces tecum and who is a party to the civil action ... may, prior to the date for production, bring a motion under Section 1987.1 to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum.” (§ 1985.3(g).) Nonparties, on the other hand, are only required to file a written objection placing the onus on the propounding party to move to enforce the subpoena within 20 days of the written objection. (Ibid.) Thus, the 20-day deadline applies to an objection from a nonparty. A similar procedure is set forth in section 1987.1(f) for employment records, i.e., the 20-day deadline applies to a written objection

1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

from a nonparty. 2

In addition to the 20-day deadline, section 2025.580(b) sets forth a 60-day deadline when a nonparty deponent fails to appear for his or her deposition or fails to produce a requested document. (Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1192.) That 60-day period is mandatory. (Ibid.) Sixty days after the April 24, 2026 production deadline was June 23, 2026. On that date, Pearce and SOLV agreed to extend the deadline to file a motion to compel to July 23, 2026. (Pearce Ex. D.) Pearce filed this motion on July 23, 2026.

Licon argues there is no statutory authority permitting a nonparty deponent to agree to extend the deadline. (See Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1035, fn. 5 [because no such agreement existed, the court declined to address the issue].) Licon notes that unlike the sections setting out the 45-day deadline for filing a motion to compel further responses for interrogatories and requests for production (§§ 2030.300(c), 2031.310(c)), section 2025.480(b) does not include language allowing the parties to agree to a later deadline.

On the other hand, reading section 2025.480 as prohibiting such an agreement would undermine a central precept of the Civil Discovery Act that discovery be essentially self-executing with limited judicial involvement. (Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 402; see also § 2016.030 [“parties may by written stipulation modify the procedures provided by this title for any method of discovery”].) The parties should come prepared to address these issues. This appears to be a dispute that can be resolved without further motion practice.

Finally, Pearce seeks sanctions of $5,074 against Licon and/or Licon’s counsel. “A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against who the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.040.) Pearce did not include the request for sanctions in the notice of motion; nor did the motion title state sanctions were being sought. Pearce’s request for monetary sanctions is therefore denied.

ORDER (PROPOSED)

The parties should come prepared to discuss the issues outlined above. Pearce’s request for sanctions is denied.

2 Unlike section 1985.3(g), section 1987.1(f)(1) allows any employee (not just a party) to file a motion to quash or modify. However, section 1987.1(f)(2) limits written objections to nonparty employees.

2