AHMC San Gabriel Valley Medical Center LP v. Nancy Batista

(Stanley Mosk Courthouse: Dept. 316) August 31, 2026 DEPARTMENT 316 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

This case is an appeal of the Labor Commission's order, decision, or award. On February 19, 2026, Appellant AHMC San Gabriel Valley Medical Center LP filed a Notice of Appeal. Appellant is appealing the Labor Commission's judgment and award entered in favor of Respondent Nancy Batista. On May 21, 2026, the Court issued a Minute Order dismissing the appeal. On May 29, 2026, Respondent filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees. On June 29, 2026, the Court entered judgment in Respondent's favor. On August 18, 2026, Appellant filed an opposition. On August 24, 2026, Respondent filed a reply.

Respondent's Motion for Attorney's Fees GRANTED. Respondent is awarded $25,200 in attorney's fees. LEGAL STANDARD A prevailing party is entitled to recover costs, including attorney's fees, as a matter of right. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1032, subds. (a)(4), (b); see also id. at Sec. 1033.5.) Furthermore, attorney's fees are allowable as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) If the party seeking review by filing an appeal of a Labor Commissioner award is unsuccessful, "the court shall determine the costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the other parties to the appeal, and assess that amount as a cost upon the party filing the appeal.

An employee is successful if the court awards an amount greater than zero." (Labor Code, Sec.98.2, subd. (c).) DISCUSSION I. Reasonable Attorney's Fees "The determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his or her court." (Rey v. Madera Unified School Dist. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1223,

1240.) a. Hourly Rate The Court finds that counsel Eugene Lee's hourly rate is reasonable. "[I]n assessing a reasonable hourly rate, the trial court is allowed to consider the attorney's skill as reflected in the quality of the work, as well as the attorney's reputation and status." (MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Gorman (2006) 147 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 13.) Here, Respondent's counsel, Eugene Lee, has an hourly rate of $900/hr. (See Lee Decl., P. 9.) Lee attended law school at the University of Michigan and is a duly barred attorney in the State of California and New York.

Lee began his career at law and consulting firms in New York. Thereafter, Lee worked as in-house counsel for a Silicon Valley tech company and then as a legal consultant for a large Asian law firm. In 2004, Lee began his own employment firm here in California. (See Lee Decl., P. 17.) Since beginning his own employment practice, Lee has secured large awards for his clients, both in state and federal court. (See Lee Decl., P. 14.) Lee has also handled multiple labor commissioner appeals and appeals before the California Court of Appeal. (See ibid.)

Given Lee's academic background and legal experience, the Court believes his $900 hourly rate is reasonable. (See MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Gorman (2006) 147 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 13.) b. Hours "In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice." (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v.

California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.) Here, Lee claims he spent 28 hours working on this matter over a span of 3 months. (See Lee Decl., Exh. 1.) In opposition, Appellant contends that Lee's hours are inflated, not reasonably necessary, and incorrectly calculated. After analyzing Lee's hour log, the Court finds the listed hours reasonable. Accordingly, the Court will award fees for 28 hours at the rate of $900 per hour for a total fee award of $25,200. c. Lodestar Analysis The Court will decline to

utilize a lodestar multiplier. The "lodestar figure may. . . be adjusted [according to a multiplier enhancement] based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided." (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) Relevant multiplier factors include "(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award." (Ketchum v.

Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) "[T]he party seeking a fee enhancement bears the burden of proof." (Ibid.) Here, Respondent is requesting a 2.0 lodestar multiplier given the contingency nature of the case, preclusion of other employment, the skill displayed, and novelty/difficulty of questions involved. The Court is not convinced that a lodestar multiplier is appropriate here. Fees are awarded due to the appeal, not the entire underlying litigation. The appeal was flawed from the outset and while the Court recognizes counsel Lee's work and is prepared to award the full requested hours and rate for that work, the Court does not find a basis for a multiplier based on the above factors.

CONCLUSION ¿ For the foregoing reasons, Respondent's Motion for Attorney's Fees GRANTED. Respondent is awarded $25,200 in attorney's fees. Case Number: 26STCV06333 Hearing Date: August 31, 2026 Dept: 316 BACKGROUND This is a lemon law action. On February 26, 2026, Plaintiffs Casey and Caleb Hardy filed a complaint against Defendant General Motors, LLC ("GM"). The complaint alleges five causes of action stemming from Plaintiffs' purchase of an allegedly defective vehicle. On April 22, 2026, GM filed a demurrer to the fourth and fifth causes of action in Plaintiffs' complaint.

On August 17, 2026, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On August 20, 2026, GM filed a reply. TENTATIVE RULING GM's demurrer is SUSTAINED. Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend as specified below. LEGAL STANDARD "[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint." (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v.

Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (See Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (See Hahn v.

Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) ¿ Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy ¿ (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.; ¿ see also Lewis v. YouTube, LLC ¿ (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, "[i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a