Arthur Tsatryan v. Polina Tsatryan

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER The Court GRANTS the motion in part. The Court finds that Plaintiff violated the Stipulated Protective Order by publicly filing confidential information in its Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, and Declaration of Kevin J. Cole.

Because Plaintiff filed corrected, redacted versions of those documents on August 11, 2026, no further corrective filing is required. The Court orders that the original unredacted versions filed on July 14, 2026, be removed from public access and maintained under seal.

The Court further GRANTS Defendant's request for monetary sanctions in the reduced amount of $3,000,payable within 30 days of this order. The Court GRANTS Park's motion to seal. Park is to give notice. Dated: August 31, 2026 JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

appearing pro per, alleges that he and Defendant Polina Tsatryan (Defendant), also in pro per, were married on August 5, 1987. The parties purchased community property in the city of Tarzana in 1999. Plaintiff alleges that he filed a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage on September 23, 2009, in LASC ("Dissolution Action"). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in actions to bankrupt him and that she did not make mortgage payments on the Tarzana property, did not pay legal fees, etc. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant's attorneys engaged in fraudulent acts relating to the Dissolution Action.

On May 18, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for an order directing that damages against Defendant be assessed by a jury pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 585(b), or, alternatively, for entry of judgment in the amount of $1,936,748.35. The matter was subsequently reassigned to this Department.

Analysis: Plaintiff moves for an order directing that damages against defaulted Defendant Polina Tsatryan be assessed by a jury pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 585(b), or, alternatively, for entry of judgment in the amount of $1,936,748.35. Plaintiff maintains that the Court has favored Defendant, delayed and obstructed justice, intimidated Plaintiff, and improperly assisted Defendant in attempting to obtain relief from her default. Plaintiff further contends that the Court's prior rulings and handling of his default judgment requests demonstrate bias and warrant having a jury assess damages. (Motion, pp. 7-13.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 585 permits entry of a default judgment after a party has failed to timely respond or appear. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 585.) A party seeking judgment on the default by the court must file a Request for Court Judgment and: (1) a brief summary of the case; (2) declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) interest computations as necessary; (4) a memorandum of costs and disbursements; (5) declaration of nonmilitary status; (6) a proposed form of judgment; (7) a dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) exhibits as necessary; and (9) a request for attorneys' fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800, subd. (a).)

Here, Plaintiff has not submitted a complete default judgment package from which the Court can determine his entitlement to the requested judgment. In particular, Plaintiff has not submitted a Request for Court Judgment (CIV-100), a proposed judgment, or a declaration and supporting evidence establishing the calculation and evidentiary basis for the $1,936,748.35 in damages presently requested. Indeed, the Court previously advised Plaintiff that the evidence then before it did not support his substantially larger request for $3,958,800 and directed Plaintiff either to submit admissible evidence supporting the requested damages or reduce the amount to one supported by the existing evidence.

Although a defendant's default admits the material allegations of a well-pleaded complaint, default does not relieve Plaintiff of the burden of proving his entitlement to the amount of damages sought. Plaintiff now seeks $1,936,748.35--a substantial monetary judgment--but the present filing primarily challenges the Court's prior rulings rather than supplying competent evidence establishing how that amount was calculated and how the claimed damages were caused by Defendant.

Plaintiff's assertions that the Court is biased, has obstructed justice, or has improperly favored Defendant do not substitute for the evidentiary showing necessary to support entry of a default judgment. Thus, the Court cannot enter judgment for $1,936,748.35. Therefore, the motion is DENIED. Dated: August 31, 2026 JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT Case Number: 23AHCV02008 Hearing Date: August 31, 2026 Dept: P [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING SPECIALLY APPEARING DEFENDANT ZEMING QI TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT

I. INTRODUCTION This action arises from the alleged unauthorized sale of two commercial warehouse properties belonging to Plaintiff Lightking America Technology (L.A.) Ltd. ("Lightking") by Defendant Zeming Qi ("Qi") to Defendants Ovoda, LLC ("Ovoda") and XHK Investment 3, LLC ("XHK"). Plaintiffs allege that on March 1, 2022, Qi transferred Lightking's Chino warehouse to Ovoda by executing a grant deed on Lightking's behalf as its purported CEO/CFO, despite allegedly holding no such position and having no authority from Lightking or Plaintiff Yuan Sun ("Sun"), Lightking's sole shareholder, to make the transfer. Plaintiffs allege that Qi similarly transferred Lightking's Rancho Cucamonga warehouse to XHK on March 15, 2022, without authorization.

On May 14, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), asserting causes of action for: (1) quiet title; (2) fraud; (3) breach of fiduciary duty; (4) knowingly buying, selling, and/or receiving stolen property under Penal Code section 496; (5) unjust enrichment; (6) money had and received; (7) negligence; and (8) violation of Government Code section 12261. The SAC names both Lightking and Sun as Plaintiffs. On July 31, 2026, specially appearing Defendant Qi filed the instant motion to set aside the default and quash service of the summons and complaint. Plaintiffs filed an opposition on August 19, 2026, and Qi filed a reply on August 25, 2026.

II. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) provides that: The court may, upon motion of the injured party, or its own motion, correct clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and may, on motion of either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or order. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 473(d).)

Courts may set aside a default or default judgment due to lack of actual notice. Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 473.5 states: "(a) When service of a summons has not resulted in actual notice to a party in time to defend the action and a default or default judgment has been entered against him or her in the action, he or she may serve and file a notice of motion to set aside the default or default judgment and for leave to defend the action. The notice of motion shall be served and filed within a reasonable time, but in no event exceeding the earlier of: (i) two years after entry of a default judgment against him or her; or (ii) 180 days after service on him or her of a written notice that the default or default judgment has been entered.

III. ANALYSIS Specially appearing Defendant Qi moves for an order setting aside the default and quashing service of the summons and complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 473(d) and 473.5 on the ground that he was not properly served with the summons and complaint.

Qi first argues that the purported substitute service at 3411 Ashley Court in Chino Hills on July 1, 2024, was invalid because, at the time of service, that address was not his "dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address" within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 415.20(b). Qi declares that he was residing in Mexico City at the time, had not been to the Ashley Court property since 2022, and that his former wife did not receive mail for him there or have authority to accept service on his behalf. (Qi Decl., P.P. 4-5.)

Qi further argues that because he was a foreign national residing outside the United States at the time of the purported service, service was required to comply with the Hague Service Convention. Thus, Qi contends the July 1, 2024, substitute service was ineffective, the Court never acquired personal jurisdiction over him, and the