Sabroso vs. Express Services, Inc.

attorney to pay reasonable compensatory legal fees and costs to opposing counsel or parties.”].)

Defendant does not contest that Plaintiff is entitled to fees under this section, and the court finds Plaintiff’s requested amount of $4,700 to be excessive under the circumstances. (See Hammoud Decl., ¶ 15.)

The court ORDERS Defendant’s counsel EUGENE MATTHEWS to pay $1,000 in reasonable compensatory legal fees and costs to Plaintiff ANGELICA JALOUDI.

Defendant Medi-Syn, Inc. shall also separately file the proposed Answer (attached to the declaration of counsel) within 5 days. The court notes that the scanned copy of the proposed answer is of poor quality and difficult to decipher.

Defendant SHALL file a clear and legible proposed Answer.

Plaintiff to give notice.

2. Motion for Judgment

In light of the above ruling, Plaintiff ANGELICA JALOUDI’s motion for default judgment is DENIED as MOOT.

Plaintiff to give notice.

Trial remains set for 4/26/27.

9 Sabroso vs. Express Motion to Compel Arbitration Services, Inc. As explained below, the court CONTINUES Defendant EXPRESS SERVICES, INC’s Motion to Compel Arbitration to October 30, 2026, at 9:30 am in Dept. W8.

Before arbitration can be compelled, the moving party bears the burden of proving the existence of an applicable

agreement and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense. (Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.) “The arbitration proponent must first recite verbatim, or provide a copy of, the alleged agreement. [Citation]. A movant can bear this initial burden ‘by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing the opposing party’s signatures.’ [Citation.] At this step, a movant need not ‘follow the normal procedures of document authentication’ and need only ‘allege the existence of an agreement and support the allegation as provided in rule [3.1330].” (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755.)

Here, to support the existence of an arbitration agreement, Defendant proffers the Declaration of Harvey H.H. Homsey, the “Senior Vice President of Franchise Systems and Government Affairs” for Defendant. (Homsey Decl., ¶ 1 [ROA 39].) The document attaches an arbitration agreement – Exhibit B. However, the Homsey Declaration was not executed under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California. Consequently, the declaration is not admissible pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5. (See Kulshreshta v. First Union Commercial Corp. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 601, 612, 618.)

Notably, an admissible declaration is not necessary for Defendant to carry its initial burden, under the unique rules applicable to arbitration. See Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755:

“The arbitration proponent must first recite verbatim, or provide a copy of, the alleged agreement. [Citation]. A movant can bear this initial burden ‘by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing the opposing party’s signatures.’ [Citation.] At this step, a movant need not ‘follow the normal procedures of document authentication’ and need only ‘allege the existence of an agreement and support the allegation as provided in rule [3.1330].”

(Emphasis supplied.) As such, the court finds that Defendant met its initial burden.

“If the movant bears its initial burden, the burden shifts to the party opposing arbitration to identify a factual dispute as to the agreement’s existence....” (Iyere, 87 Cal.App.5th at 755.) “To bear this burden, the arbitration opponent must offer admissible evidence creating a factual dispute as to the authenticity of their signatures.” (Id.)

Here, Plaintiff proffers his translated declaration, which complies with California Rules of Court rule 3.1110(g). (See Erazo Decl. ¶¶ 2-7. See also Detrick v. Shimada (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 170, 180 [re requirements for interpreters and translators].)

According to Plaintiff’s Declaration: On 1/16/24, Plaintiff went to the Express Employment Professionals office in Irvine, where Ms. Jazmin Fernandez, an Express employee “updated my information herself using my iPhone.” (Sabroso Decl., ¶¶5-6.) “I recall Ms. Fernandez telling me to check all the boxes and click ‘accept.’ At one point, the system failed to respond. Ms. Fernandez asked for my phone, resolved the issue herself, and then handed the phone back to me, confirming that my information was now up to date.” (Sabroso Decl., ¶ 7.)

The above is sufficient to create a factual issue and shift the burden back to Defendant, as it indicates the identified agreement may have been executed by another individual.

Notably, “[t]he opponent need not prove that his or her purported signature is not authentic, but must submit sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute and shift the burden back to the arbitration proponent, who retains the ultimate burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the authenticity of the signature.” (Iyere, 87 Cal.App.5th at 755.)

While it is true that “an electronic signature has the same legal effect as a handwritten signature,” the signature must still be authenticated. (Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836, 843.) “An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.9(a).) “The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing

of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Ibid.)

Within his initial declaration, Mr. Homsey states that “[o]nly an individual using Plaintiff’s unique link could have accessed the Mutual Arbitration Agreement electronically and signed it.” (Homsey Decl., ¶7 [ROA No. 39].) However, as noted above, the declaration is inadmissible and as such, Defendant cannot rely on it to meet its ultimate burden.

While a Supplemental Homsey Declaration was submitted with the Reply Brief, which was properly executed under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California (See ROA No. 57), this declaration does not attempt to authenticate Plaintiff’s signature on the 1/16/24 Agreement. Instead, the Supplemental Homsey Declaration states, “On or around January 16, 2024, Mr. Sabroso re-applied to the Express franchise office located in Irvine, California. As with all of his previous onboarding, his completed 2024 onboarding documents, which are, again, all in English, show that he electronically signed each document and inserted certain private and sensitive information in some documents that only he would know.” (Supp.

Homsey Decl., ¶ 5 [ROA No. 57].) This statement does not dispute the Declaration offered by Mr. Sabroso or, specifically, the statements which indicate the document was executed by another individual, using his phone.

Based on the documents submitted, the court finds that Defendant failed to authenticate the 1/16/24 agreement.

The arbitrability issue continues however, because the Supplemental Homsey Declaration attaches two new Arbitration Agreements, which were not previously identified (dated 11/9/20, and 6/1/22). (Supp. Homsey Decl., ¶ 3 (ROA No. 57).) These agreements suggest that Plaintiff consented to arbitration, prior to 1/1/24.

It is unclear whether Plaintiff disputes the authenticity of the signatures on these two agreements.

As these Agreements were not identified by Defendant in its original moving papers, Plaintiff has not had a fair opportunity to respond to them.

As such, this motion is CONTINUED to permit both supplemental opposing papers and supplemental reply papers. Plaintiff SHALL have until 10/16/26 to file and serve supplemental opposition. Defendant SHALL have until 10/23/26 to file and serve supplemental reply papers.

Defendant to give notice.

11 Harmon vs. State Motion to Strike (re First Amended Complaint) of California (CALTRANS) The court DENIES in part, and GRANTS in part, the motion to strike filed by Defendant STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ACTING by and through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’s (esa “STATE OF CALIFORNIA (CALTRANS)” (the “State”) to portions of the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed by Plaintiffs ERIC HARMON and GAL COHEN.

Defendant State moves to strike the following from the FAC: Paragraphs 6, 7, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 88, and Prayer for Relief paragraphs C and D.

The court GRANTS the motion as to the following:

Vicarious Liability

Paragraph 88 alleges Defendant State is vicariously liable for the wrongful act of Defendant’s officials and Does 1-30 pursuant to section 815.2 of the California Government Code.

California authority is clear that “public entity liability for property defects is not governed by the general rule of vicarious liability provided in section 815.2, but instead by the specific provisions set forth in sections 830-835.4. Also, public employees’ liability for dangerous public property conditions resulting from the employees’ acts or omissions is provided by the special rules and limitations contained in

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