Harmon vs. State of California (CALTRANS)

As these Agreements were not identified by Defendant in its original moving papers, Plaintiff has not had a fair opportunity to respond to them.

As such, this motion is CONTINUED to permit both supplemental opposing papers and supplemental reply papers. Plaintiff SHALL have until 10/16/26 to file and serve supplemental opposition. Defendant SHALL have until 10/23/26 to file and serve supplemental reply papers.

Defendant to give notice.

11 Harmon vs. State Motion to Strike (re First Amended Complaint) of California (CALTRANS) The court DENIES in part, and GRANTS in part, the motion to strike filed by Defendant STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ACTING by and through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’s (esa “STATE OF CALIFORNIA (CALTRANS)” (the “State”) to portions of the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed by Plaintiffs ERIC HARMON and GAL COHEN.

Defendant State moves to strike the following from the FAC: Paragraphs 6, 7, 18, 19, 21, 22, and 88, and Prayer for Relief paragraphs C and D.

The court GRANTS the motion as to the following:

Vicarious Liability

Paragraph 88 alleges Defendant State is vicariously liable for the wrongful act of Defendant’s officials and Does 1-30 pursuant to section 815.2 of the California Government Code.

California authority is clear that “public entity liability for property defects is not governed by the general rule of vicarious liability provided in section 815.2, but instead by the specific provisions set forth in sections 830-835.4. Also, public employees’ liability for dangerous public property conditions resulting from the employees’ acts or omissions is provided by the special rules and limitations contained in

sections 840-840.6. [Citation.]” (Van Kempen v. Hayward Area Park etc. Dist. (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 822, 825.) Specifically, Government Code section 815.2(c) provides that “a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability.” Section 840, in turn, provides that “a public employee is [immune from liability] for injury caused by a condition of public property where such condition exists because of any act or omission of such employee within the scope of his employment.” These statutes preclude any assertion of liability against Defendant State based on an act or omission by any state official or employee.

Statutory Damages

The FAC prays for an award of statutory damages. (FAC, Prayer for Relief at ¶ C.)

Plaintiffs argue that the FAC alleges facts supporting “statutory damages” pursuant to Civil Code sections 3281 and 3333. These statutes merely codify common law recovery of compensatory damages, rather than providing for any statutorily created damages. (See Civ. Code, §§ 3281, 3333.)

Attorney’s Fees

The FAC prays for an award of attorney’s fees. (FAC, Prayer for Relief at ¶ D.)

Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees under the Private Attorney General doctrine. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5.) Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5 provides the court may award attorney’s fees “in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit . . . has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden . . . are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any.” In other words, fees are not recoverable where the primary effect of the litigation is to advance or vindicate a plaintiff’s

personal economic interest. (See, e.g., Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1170.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ claims seek to recover only compensatory damages for injuries suffered by the individual plaintiffs. The FAC seeks no relief that would confer a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons.

The court DENIES the motion as to the following:

Remaining Challenged Allegations

To the extent Defendant State moves to strike the challenged allegations in paragraphs 6, 7, 18, 19, 21, and 22, Defendant State improperly attempts to invoke a procedural line-item veto.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 436 the court may, upon a motion made or at any time in its discretion, strike out “any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” A motion to strike, however, is not “a procedural ‘line item veto’ for the civil defendant.” (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1683.)

In sum: The court STRIKES the following from the FAC: Paragraph 88 and Prayer for Relief at Paragraphs C and D. The motion is otherwise DENIED.

No later than 10 days from the date of hearing, Defendant State SHALL file and serve a responsive pleading to the remaining portions of the FAC.

Moving Defendant to give notice.

13 Vierra vs. Zaratzian Demurrer Motion to Strike

OFF CALENDAR as MOOT. Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint on 7/2/26, well before their opposing papers

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