Zamarron vs. General Motors LLC

9. Burtin vs. Tanner

25-01504831

Motion to Deem Facts Admitted

VACATED 10. Zamarron vs. General Motors LLC

25-01510394

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Defendant General Motors LLC’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings against the entire complaint or as to any of the causes of action stated therein if the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438(b), (c)(1)(B)(ii).) “A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.)

First Cause of Action – Violation of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

“Magnuson-Moss governs warranties for consumer products distributed in interstate commerce. It requires disclosures in connection with written warranties, regulates the substantive content of warranties, and establishes a federal cause of action for breach of a written or an implied warranty (15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)), among other provisions.” (Orichian v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 226 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1330, as modified (July 1, 2014).)

As such, to state a claim under Magnuson-Moss, a plaintiff must adequately plead a cause of action for breach of written or implied warranty under state law. (See Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 [“The district court held—and Clemens does not dispute—that the claims under the Magnuson–Moss Act stand or fall with his express and implied warranty claims under state law.”].) (See also Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 833 [“failure to state a warranty claim under state law necessarily constituted a failure to state a claim under Magnuson–Moss.”]).

Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act is based on breaches of express and implied warranties “by virtue of the abovedescribed acts.” (Complaint, ¶ 14.) The Complaint, however, is devoid of any allegations regarding what alleged defects rendered the Subject Vehicle unsafe for use.

Plaintiffs contend the statement “by virtue of the above-described acts” is an error in drafting and the Magnuson-Moss cause of action should have been placed after the cause of action for violation of the California UCC. This error, however, is not the only deficiency with the pleading. As stated below, Plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action for breach of express or implied warranty under state law. Therefore, they cannot state a claim for violation of the Magnuson- Moss Act.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED as to the 1st cause of action.

Second Cause of Action – Violation of the California UCC

“The essential elements of a cause of action under the California Uniform Commercial Code for breach of an express warranty to repair defects are (1) an express warranty [citation] to repair defects given in connection with the sale of goods; (2) the existence of a defect covered by the warranty; (3) the buyer’s notice to the seller of such a defect within a reasonable time after its discovery [citation]; (4) the seller’s failure to repair the defect in compliance with the warranty; and (5) resulting damages [citations].” (Orichian v. BMW of North America, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1333–1334; see Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 205, 217 [a promise to repair defects that occur during a future period is the very definition of express warranty of future performance under the California Uniform Commercial Code section 2313].)

When ruling on a demurrer, the court does “not assume the truth of contentions or conclusions of fact or law, such as those contained in plaintiffs’ pleadings. Facts, not conclusions, must be pleaded. Further, where, as here, statutory remedies are invoked, the facts must be pleaded with particularity.” (Carter v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 410 [cleaned-up].)

Defendant argues the Complaint fails to plead the most basic facts about the alleged defects the Vehicle manifested or whether any particular nonconformity recurred or remains unresolved. Plaintiffs describe the alleged defects in such vague terms that it is impossible to discern what the alleged defects are, where they arose, or under what circumstances.

In opposition, Plaintiffs assert they have adequately alleged defects with the Subject Vehicle. The Complaint states Plaintiffs purchased a

“virtually useless vehicle due to the frequency of breakdowns, the safety hazards associated with using the Subject Vehicle, and the amount of time the Subject Vehicle was out of service due to repair attempts made by Defendants.” (Complaint, ¶ 26.) Paragraph 25 further alleges that the Vehicle “suffered and continues to suffer from significant defects and non-conformities during the implied and express warranty periods,” and that Defendant violated its obligations to repair the Vehicle to conform to factory specifications and breached its agreement with Plaintiffs.

Such allegations are insufficient to plead a claim for breach of express warranty. Other than conclusory statements that the Subject Vehicle suffered from defects and was “useless” there are no facts regarding the exact nature of the alleged defect. There are insufficient allegations regarding the name(s) of the repair facility/facilities to which Plaintiff delivered the Vehicle, and when/how many repair attempts were made.

Additionally, stating a complete cause of action for a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability requires that Plaintiff plead, among other elements, that at the time of purchase, the automobile was not fit for ordinary purposes for which the goods are used. (Com. Code § 2314.) Because there are no specific facts alleged regarding the defect, the Court cannot determine if the Subject Vehicle was merchantable.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED as to the 2nd cause of action.

Attorney’s Fees and Double Damages

Defendant also argues Plaintiffs cannot seek attorney’s fees and double damages under the provisions of the Song-Beverly Act because it does not allege a claim under the Act.

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed.” (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) A demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained. (Thompson v. Spitzer (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 436, 451-452.)

If Defendant wishes to challenge Plaintiffs’ claim for attorneys’ fees and double damages, the proper motion would be a motion to strike, not a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.)

Therefore, the motion is DENIED with respect to attorney’s fees and double damages.

Plaintiffs are granted 30 days leave to amend the Complaint. (Code Civ. Proc. § 438(h)(2).) Leave is only permitted with respect to amending the first and second causes of action. Any other amendments to the complaint will require leave of court.

Moving Defendant to give notice of this ruling.

11. Flanders vs. City of Huntington Beach

23-01328127

Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication

Continued via ex parte application to December 11, 2026.

12. Franco vs. County of Orange

25-01452421

Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication

VACATED