AGUILAR v. PALMER

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR AUGUST 28, 2026

5. AGUILAR v. PALMER, 25CV2775

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Admissions

On July 14, 2026, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.290, plaintiff

Maria Aguilar (“plaintiff”) filed a motion to compel defendant Matt Palmer’s

(“defendant”) further responses to Request for Admissions (Set One) (“RFA”),

Numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9, on the grounds that (1) defendant’s objections to RFA

Numbers 2 through 5 are improper boilerplate objections; and (2) defendant’s claim of

“insufficient information to admit or deny” in response to each of the disputed RFAs is evasive. Plaintiff seeks a monetary sanction against defendant and his attorney of

record, jointly and severally, in the amount of $2,310.00.

Plaintiff’s counsel declares he attempted to meet and confer with defendant

pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.040, but defense counsel failed to

respond to plaintiff’s meet and confer letters or provide any availability for a meet and

confer conference. (O’Connor Decl., filed Jul. 14, 2026, ¶¶ 4–7.) Defense counsel

declares he did respond to plaintiff’s meet and confer efforts. (Rolfe Decl., ¶¶ 4, 5 & Ex.

C.) Either way, the court finds that plaintiff has satisfied the meet and confer

requirement.

On August 17, 2026, defendant filed a timely opposition. On August 19, 2026,

plaintiff filed a timely reply.

1.

Background

This is a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident. At the time of

the incident, plaintiff was allegedly driving eastbound on Highway 50. (Compl., ¶ 6.)

Defendant was driving northbound on Transit Drive, failed to notice plaintiff’s vehicle,

and then crashed into plaintiff. (Compl., ¶ 6.)

Defendant has already served verified written discovery responses and provided

deposition testimony in this case. As pertinent here, defendant served an amended response to Form Interrogatory (Set One) Number 15.1 that indicates certain affirmative

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR AUGUST 28, 2026

defenses asserted in the cases herein are based upon the fact that the traffic collision

report notes plaintiff violated Vehicle Code section 21460.5, subdivision (c). (O’Connor

Decl., filed Jul. 14, 2026, ¶ 8 & Ex. 6.) During deposition, defendant testified the

collision happened so quickly that he had no time to avoid it. (O’Connor Decl., filed Aug.

19, 2026, Ex. 7 at 26:16–27:3.)

2. Legal Principles

“ ‘Requests for admissions ... are primarily aimed at setting at rest a triable issue so

that it will not have to be tried.... For this reason, the fact that the request is for the admission of a controversial matter, or one involving complex facts, or calls for an

opinion, is of no moment. If the litigant is able to make the admission, the time for

making it is during discovery procedures, and not at the trial.’ [Citation.]” (Bloxham v.

Saldinger (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 729, 752; see Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.010.) While a

defendant cannot be forced to admit any fact before trial despite its obvious truth, “the

failure to do so comes with consequences, exposure to a costs of proof award.” (Grace

v. Mansourian (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 523, 534.)

When the propounding party believes that the responses to requests for admission

are deficient or that any objections to the requests are not well taken, that party may

make a motion to compel further responses under Code of Civil Procedure

section 2033.290. (St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 776.) The

grounds for a motion to compel a further response include: (1) that the answer to a particular request for admission is evasive or incomplete; or (2) that an objection to a

request for admission is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290,

subd. (a).)

3. Discussion

3.1. RFA No. 2

RFA No. 2 states: “DEFENDANT had a duty to yield the right-of-way to vehicles traveling in the mutual turn lane before entering said lane.”

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR AUGUST 28, 2026

Defendant objected that the request calls for a legal conclusion and is otherwise

vague, ambiguous, compound, and assumes facts. Without waiving these objections,

defendant stated he “has made a reasonable inquiry concerning this request and, based

on the information known or readily obtainable, information is insufficient to enable

defendant to admit or deny the matter.”

A responding party may not refuse to answer a request on the basis that it asks the

party for a legal conclusion (e.g., were you negligent and was this negligence a legal

cause of the plaintiff’s damages). (Grace v. Mansourian (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 523, 529.) Therefore, the court overrules the objection based on legal conclusion.

“Assumes facts not in evidence” is also not a valid objection to a request for

admission. (See, West Pico Furniture Co. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 421

(West Pico).) West Pico addressed the objection as it pertains to an interrogatory, but

the same analysis applies to a request for admission: “objections such as here raised to

the form of the question are for the protection of a witness on oral examination. When,

as here, the answer is to be made in writing, after due time for deliberation and

consultation with counsel, an answer may be framed which avoids the pitfalls, if any,

inherent in the form of the question.” (Ibid.) Therefore, the court overrules the

objection, “assumes facts not in evidence.”

Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.060, subdivision (f) prohibits a compound

request for admission, unless it has been approved under Chapter 17 (commencing with Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.710). Chapter 17 does not apply here. However,

the court finds that the request is not compound. Therefore, the court overrules the

objection.

Defendant’s briefing does not articulate why he contends the request is vague and

ambiguous. Ambiguous is generally a valid objection, but only if ambiguity precludes an

intelligent reply. (See, Cembrook v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 423, 430.) Here, the court overrules the objection.

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR AUGUST 28, 2026

Having overruled defendant’s objections, the court turns to the issue of whether

defendant’s answer that he has insufficient information to admit or deny the request is

evasive or incomplete. An answer in response to a request for admission must “[s]pecify

so much of the matter involved in the request as to the truth of which the responding

party lacks sufficient information or knowledge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subd.

(b)(3).)

Here, defendant claims insufficient information or knowledge but does not specify

which part(s) of the request he lacks sufficient information or knowledge. Therefore, the court finds that the answer to the request is incomplete under Code of Civil Procedure

section 2033.220, subdivision (b)(3).

Plaintiff further argues that defendant’s claim of insufficient information is not

genuine because the request plainly asks whether defendant had a legal duty to yield

the right-of-way in a specific factual situation. Plaintiff’s argument is well taken.

Therefore, the court grants plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response.

3.2. RFA No. 3

RFA No. 3 states: “For the SUBJECT INCIDENT, when DEFENDANT began to cross the

eastbound lanes of Hwy 50, PLAINTIFF’s vehicle was close enough to constitute an

immediate hazard.”

Defendant objected that the term, “immediate hazard” is vague and ambiguous, and

the request calls for speculation. Without waiving these objections, defendant stated he “has made a reasonable inquiry concerning this request and, based on the information

known or readily obtainable, information is insufficient to enable defendant to admit or

deny the matter.”

The court overrules the objection that the request calls for speculation.

Plaintiff argues that the term, “immediate hazard,” is an established statutory

standard explicitly embedded in the California Vehicle Code, such as in Section 21801,

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR AUGUST 28, 2026

subdivision (a).1 The court notes, however, that plaintiff did not specially define the

term in her request for admissions. While the term, “immediate hazard,” does appear in

multiple provisions of the Vehicle Code, there is no standalone statutory definition of

the term. Instead, California courts have supplied a working definition through case law,

and jury instructions have further clarified its meaning. CACI No. 703 provides: “The

statute just read to you uses the words ‘immediate hazard.’ An immediate hazard exists

if the approaching vehicle is so near or is approaching so fast that a reasonably careful

person would realize that there is a danger of collision [or accident].” Instead of sustaining the objection in toto, the court deems RFA No. 3 to be

rephrased as specially-defining the term, “immediate hazard,” using the definition in

CACI No. 703. (See, Cembrook, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 430.)

The court also finds that the portion of defendant’s answer claiming insufficient

information is incomplete because it does not specify which part(s) of the request

defendant lacks insufficient information or knowledge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220,

subd. (b)(3).)

The court grants the motion to compel and orders defendant to provide a further

response to RFA No. 3 as rephrased herein.

3.3. RFA No. 4

RFA No. 4 states: “For the SUBJECT INCIDENT, when DEFENDANT began to enter the

two-way left-turn lane, PLAINTIFF’s vehicle was close enough to constitute an immediate hazard.”

1 Vehicle Code section 21801, subdivision (a) provides: “The driver of a vehicle intending

to turn to the left or to complete a U-turn upon a highway, or to turn left into public or private property, or an alley, shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching from the opposite direction which are close enough to constitute a hazard at any time during the turning movement, and shall continue to yield the right-of-way to the approaching vehicles until the left turn or U-turn can be made with reasonable safety.”

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR AUGUST 28, 2026

Defendant objected that the term, “immediate hazard” is vague and ambiguous, and

the request calls for speculation. Without waiving these objections, defendant stated he

“has made a reasonable inquiry concerning this request and, based on the information

known or readily obtainable, information is insufficient to enable defendant to admit or

deny the matter.”

The court overrules the objection that the request calls for speculation. For the same

reasons as discussed under RFA No. 3, the court deems RFA No. 4 to be rephrased as

specially-defining the term, “immediate hazard,” using the definition in CACI No. 703. (See, Cembrook, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 430.)

The court also finds that the portion of defendant’s answer claiming insufficient

information is incomplete because it does not specify which part(s) of the request

defendant lacks insufficient information or knowledge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220,

subd. (b)(3).)

The court grants the motion to compel and orders defendant to provide a further

response to RFA No. 4 as rephrased herein.

3.4. RFA No. 5

RFA No. 5 states: “DEFENDANT failed to yield the right-of-way to PLAINTIFF.”

Defendant objected that the request calls for a legal conclusion and is otherwise

vague, ambiguous, compound, and assumes facts. Without waiving these objections,

defendant stated he “has made a reasonable inquiry concerning this request and, based on the information known or readily obtainable, information is insufficient to enable

defendant to admit or deny the matter.”

The court overrules the objections based on legal conclusion, compound, and

assumes facts not in evidence.

Defendant’s briefing does not articulate why he contends the request is vague and

ambiguous. The court overrules the objection.

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR AUGUST 28, 2026

Having overruled defendant’s objections, the court finds that the answer to the

request is incomplete because it does not specify which part(s) of the request defendant

lacks insufficient information or knowledge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.220, subd. (b)(3).)

Therefore, the court grants plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response.

3.5. RFA No. 7

RFA No. 7 states: “The SUBJECT INCIDENT was caused solely by DEFENDANT’s failure

to yield the right[-]of-way.”

Defendant raised no objection to RFA No. 7 but stated he “has made a reasonable inquiry concerning this request and, based on the information known or readily

obtainable, information is insufficient to enable defendant to admit or deny the

matter.”

The answer to the request is incomplete because it does not specify which part(s) of

the request defendant lacks insufficient information or knowledge. (Code Civ. Proc., §

2033.220, subd. (b)(3).)

Therefore, the court grants plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response.

3.6. RFA No. 8

RFA No. 8 states: “PLAINTIFF did not violate any California Vehicle Code section at

the time of the SUBJECT INCIDENT.”

Defendant raised no objection to RFA No. 8 but stated he “has made a reasonable

inquiry concerning this request and, based on the information known or readily obtainable, information is insufficient to enable defendant to admit or deny the

matter.”

The answer to the request is incomplete because it does not specify which part(s) of

the request defendant lacks insufficient information or knowledge. (Code Civ. Proc., §

2033.220, subd. (b)(3).) It also appears that claiming insufficient information would be

evasive where, as plaintiff points out, defendant already provided a verified amended response to Form Interrogatory (Set One) Number 15.1 asserting (subject to and

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR AUGUST 28, 2026

without waiving his objections) that the traffic collision report notes plaintiff violated

Vehicle Code section 21460.5, subdivision (c), and that is a fact upon which defendant

bases certain affirmative defenses upon.

The court grants plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response.

3.7. RFA No. 9

RFA No. 9 states: “DEFENDANT’s entry into the mutual turn lane was a substantial

factor in causing the SUBJECT INCIDENT.”

Defendant raised no objection to RFA No. 7 but stated he “has made a reasonable inquiry concerning this request and, based on the information known or readily

obtainable, information is insufficient to enable defendant to admit or deny the

matter.”

The answer to the request is incomplete because it does not specify which part(s) of

the request defendant lacks insufficient information or knowledge. (Code Civ. Proc., §

2033.220, subd. (b)(3).)

Therefore, the court grants the motion to compel.

3.8. Monetary Sanction

“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with

Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or

opposes a motion to compel further response, unless it finds that the one subject to the

sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.290, subd. (d).)

Plaintiff seeks a monetary sanction against both defendant and his attorney in the

total amount of $2,310.00, representing three hours of legal work at Mr. O’Connor’s

hourly rate of $750.00, plus the $60.00 filing fee.

The court finds that a monetary sanction is appropriate in this case but as to

defendant’s attorney only, as plaintiff’s challenges to the responses were directed to the legal objections and claim of insufficient information.

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR AUGUST 28, 2026

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing for private attorneys in the community

conducting non-contingent litigation of the same type. [Citations.] The prevailing hourly

rates apply ‘ “ ‘regardless of whether the attorneys claiming fees charge[d] nothing for

their services, charge[d] at below-market or discounted rates, represent[ed] the client

on a straight contingent fee basis, or are in-house counsel. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” ’

[Citations.]” (Glaviano v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 744,

751.)

The court finds that $750.00 exceeds the reasonable hourly rate in this case. $400.00 per hour is within market range for private attorneys doing similar work in the

Lake Tahoe area. Therefore, the court will impose a monetary sanction of $1,260.00,

representing three hours of legal work plus the $60.00 filing fee.

TENTATIVE RULING # 5: THE MOTION TO COMPEL IS GRANTED. WITHIN 30 DAYS OF

THE NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER, DEFENDANT SHALL SERVE A VERIFIED FURTHER

RESPONSE TO THE REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION ADDRESSED HEREIN, WITH RFA NOS. 3

AND 4 REPHRASED TO SPECIALLY-DEFINE THE TERM, “IMMEDIATE HAZARD,” USING

CACI NO. 703. ALSO WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER,

DEFENDANT’S ATTORNEY, TIZA SERRANO THOMPSON & ASSOCIATES, SHALL PAY

PLAINTIFF A TOTAL MONETARY SANCTION OF $1,260.00.

NO HEARING ON THIS MATTER WILL BE HELD (LEWIS v. SUPERIOR COURT (1999) 19 CAL.4TH 1232, 1247), UNLESS A NOTICE OF INTENT TO APPEAR AND REQUEST FOR

ORAL ARGUMENT IS TRANSMITTED ELECTRONICALLY THROUGH THE COURT’S

WEBSITE OR BY TELEPHONE TO THE COURT AT (530) 573-3042 BY 4:00 P.M. ON THE

DAY THE TENTATIVE RULING IS ISSUED. NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES OF AN INTENT TO

APPEAR MUST BE MADE BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON. PROOF OF SERVICE OF SAID

NOTICE MUST BE FILED PRIOR TO OR AT THE HEARING.