Martin vs. FCA US, LLC.

Defendants Beach Hill Solutions Group, LLC, Scott Fowler, Josh Liem, Vivian Hung, Patrick Yajko, Heather White, Janet Acevedo, Abraham Klatt, Sheena Neal, and Shahed Modiri move to strike portions of the First Amended Complaint (FAC) of Plaintiff Robert Half, Inc. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.

Standard on Motions to Strike

California Civil Procedure Code section 436 permits a court to strike “any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or “all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” “Irrelevant matter” means an immaterial allegation in a pleading (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10(c)), and includes an allegation that is not essential to the statement of a claim or defense, an allegation that is neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense, and a demand for judgment requesting relief that is not supported by the allegations of the complaint or cross- complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 431.10(b).) A motion to strike is not “a procedural ‘line item veto’ for the civil defendant.” (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1683.)

Irrelevant and Immaterial Allegations

Defendants move to strike various allegations in paragraphs 5, 44(a)-(h), 45 of the FAC are irrelevant and immaterial. In doing so, Defendants improperly attempt to exercise a procedural line-item veto. For this reason, the court will DENY the motion to strike portions of the FAC.

No later than 10 days after service of the notice of ruling, Defendants shall file and serve an answer to the Complaint.

Case Management Conference is continued to December 03, 2026, at 09:00 am in Department C10.

Plaintiff to give notice.

4 Martin vs. FCA US, Defendant FCA US, LLC moves for judgment on the pleadings as to the LLC. first, second, third, fourth, and sixth causes of action in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed by Plaintiff Virginia Martin. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Should Plaintiff wish to file a Second Amended Complaint consistent with this ruling, she shall do so by September 10, 2026.

Defendant’s request for judicial notice of 5 Complaints filed in other lawsuits is denied. The Court need not take judicial notice of irrelevant documents and pleadings, including those that are ultimately irrelevant to the resolution of a particular dispute (Licudine v. Cedars-Sinai Medical

Center (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 881, 902; Barratt American, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 809, 812, fn. 2.)

The four-year statute of limitations articulated in Commercial Code section 2725 applies to claims brought pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act. (Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 205, 214- 215.) Section 2725 provides, in pertinent part:

(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.

(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. [¶] ... [¶]

(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this code becomes effective.

(Com. Code, § 2725, subds. (1), (2), (4), emphasis added.) Similarly, “[t]he statute of limitations for breaches of the implied warranty of merchantability is four years.” (Montoya v. Ford Motor Co. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 493, 494.)

Plaintiff entered into the relevant warranty contract on July 28, 2018. (FAC, ¶ 7.) Although not explicitly stated, the reasonable implication is that the vehicle was delivered to Plaintiff, on that same date. On demurrer or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court “assume[s] the truth of all properly pleaded facts, as well as all facts that may be implied or reasonably inferred from those expressly alleged....” (Sonoma Luxury Resort LLC v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 935, 940; Mendoza v. Continental Sales Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1402.)

As the instant action was not commenced until March 27, 2025, almost seven years after delivery of the vehicle, the First through Fourth Causes of Action appear time barred, on their face.

The applicable statute of limitation permits delayed discovery and limited tolling. The FAC attempts to invoke various tolling doctrines, including the discovery rule and equitable tolling. (FAC, ¶¶46-64.)

As stated briefly above, Commercial Code section 2725, allows delayed discovery, where “a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods....” (Com. Code, § 2725, subd. (2).) 10

“California law recognizes a general, rebuttable presumption, that plaintiffs have ‘knowledge of the wrongful cause of an injury.’ ” (Grisham v. Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 623, 638 (Grisham).) The delayed discovery rule rebuts that presumption and tolls the statute of limitations. (Ibid.; See also Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 803.)

“In order to rely on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of action, ‘[a] plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.’” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 808.)

Likewise, "[w]hen a plaintiff relies on a theory of fraudulent concealment, delayed accrual, equitable tolling, or estoppel to save a cause of action that otherwise appears on its face to be time-barred, he or she must specifically plead facts which, if proved, would support the theory." (Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 641.) "A plaintiff who fails to sufficiently plead such facts normally should be permitted to amend his or her complaint to do so." (Ibid.)

Here, the FAC alleges that “[d]efects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period” and that Defendant knew of the existence of such defects, prior to Plaintiff purchasing the vehicle. (FAC, ¶¶ 12, 21-25.) The implication from the above allegations, is that defects existed at the time of delivery. Because Plaintiff is presumed to have knowledge of the wrongful cause of their injury (Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 638), the applicable statute of limitations began to accrue when they received the vehicle with a defect that could not be conformed to warranty.

Thereafter, the FAC alleges that delayed discovery and/or tolling apply, in a conclusory manner. (FAC, ¶ 46 [“To the extent there are any statutes of limitation applicable to Plaintiff’s claims...the running of the limitation periods have been tolled by, inter alia, the following doctrines or rules: equitable tolling, the discovery rule, the fraudulent concealment rules, equitable estoppel, the repair rule, and/or class action tolling (e.g., the American Pipe rule).”])

Similarly, Plaintiff alleges the wrongful conduct was discovered “shortly before the filing of the complaint, as the Vehicle continued to exhibit symptoms of defects following FCA’s unsuccessful attempts to repair them.” (FAC, ¶ 47.) This is insufficient to allege delayed discovery or tolling. Notably, the FAC does not allege the time and manner of discovery nor the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence, as required. Plaintiff alleges she took the car in for a repair around January 26, 2019 and one more time on March 6, 2021. (FAC, ¶¶ 13-14.) Plaintiff did not file this lawsuit until March 27, 2025. 11

Thus, the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the First through Fourth Causes of Action is granted.

Sixth Cause of Action: Fraudulent Inducement:

The limitations period for Plaintiff’s fraud cause of action is three years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subdivision (d).) “The cause of action in that case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” (Ibid.)

As noted above, the FAC alleges Plaintiff entered into the warranty contract on July 27, 2018. (FAC, ¶ 7.) This allegation implies Plaintiff purchased the vehicle and took possession on that date. Additionally, the FAC alleges “FCA committed fraud by allowing the Subject Vehicle to be sold to Plaintiff without disclosing that the Subject Vehicle equipped with the 2.4L engine was defective, and which may result in loss of power, stalling, engine running rough, engine misfires, failure or replacement of the engine.” (FAC, ¶ 90.)

Based on the above, the alleged fraud occurred on July 27, 2018, and as noted above, Plaintiff is presumed to have knowledge of the wrongful cause of their injury. (Grisham, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 638.) As the instant action was not filed until March 27, 2025, more than six years thereafter, the claim appears barred on its face.

As noted above, while the FAC includes general allegations that delayed discovery applies, the same are insufficient. (FAC, ¶¶ 46-47; 50- 55.) Similarly, the specific allegations included within the fraudulent inducement claim fail to plead delayed discovery. Plaintiff alleges she “could not reasonably have been expected to learn of or discover the Vehicle's Engine Defect and its potential consequences until well after Plaintiff purchased the Vehicle.” (FAC, ¶ 92.) The above, however, does not allege facts which demonstrate “(1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.’” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 808.)

Plaintiffs did not file an opposition to the motion and failed to address any of the arguments that Defendant makes. The failure to oppose such a motion may be construed as having abandoned the claims. (See Herzberg v. County of Plumas (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1, 20 (“Plaintiffs did not oppose the County’s demurrer to this portion of their seventh cause of action and have submitted no argument on the issue in their briefs on appeal. Accordingly, we deem plaintiffs to have abandoned the issue”).) In addition, it is axiomatic that the failure to challenge a contention in a brief result in the concession of that argument. (DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Sup. Ct. (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 562, 566 (“By failing to argue the contrary, plaintiffs concede this issue”); Westside Center Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal. App. 4th 507, 529 (“failure to 12

address the threshold question . . . effectively concedes that issue and renders its remaining arguments moot”); Glendale Redevelopment Agency v. Parks (1993) 18 Cal. App. 4th 1409, 1424 (issue is impliedly conceded by failing to address it).)

Case Management Conference is set on December 03, 2026, at 09:00 am in Department C10.

Defendant shall give notice of this ruling.

5 Tissera vs. Mann Defendants Jeff A. Mann and Brian K. Trinidad’s motion to transfer venue to Los Angeles County is GRANTED.

Defective Service of Opposition

As a preliminary matter, the proof of service for Plaintiffs’ Opposition, dated 8/14/26, shows electronic service to Defendant Jeff Mann, in pro per, at Defendant Mann’s address, and to Defendant Brian Trinidad, in pro per, at Defendant Trinidad’s address. (See ROA 52). However, on 7/28/26, Defendant Trinidad filed a substitution of attorney, and is now represented by Michael McCarthy of Nemecek & Cole. (See ROA 45). A copy of this substitution was served to Plaintiff’s counsel on 7/28/26. (See ROA 45). Accordingly, Plaintiffs were required to serve Mr. McCarthy with the Opposition. (See Cal. R. Ct., rule 1.21 [Whenever a document is required to be served on a party, the service must be made on the party's attorney if the party is represented.]).

The court notes that Defendant Mann filed a Reply to the Opposition on 8/17/26, and that Defendant Trinidad (represented by counsel Mr. McCarthy) filed a Notice of Joinder to Defendant Mann’s Reply on 8/20/26. Defendant Trinidad did not raise the issue of improper service in his Notice.

Accordingly, the court will consider Plaintiffs’ Opposition, Defendant Mann’s Reply, and Defendant Trinidad’s Joinder.

Governing Authority

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 396b, subdivision (a), “if an action or proceeding is commenced in a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof, other than the court designated as the proper court for the trial thereof...the action may, notwithstanding, be tried in the court where commenced, unless the defendant...within the time otherwise allowed to respond to the complaint, files with the clerk, a notice of motion for an order transferring the action or proceeding to the proper court...”

“Upon hearing of the motion the court shall, if it appears that the action or proceeding was not commenced in the proper court, order the action or

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