Jaeil Lee v. Acuprogroup Inc., et al.

shows an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances. While Plaintiff did sue her former employer for multiple causes of action including harassment and discrimination, Plaintiff would not reasonably expect that, as a result, the contents of every electronic device used to communicate with former co-workers in a year and a half time span would be subject to forensic inspection. And while Defendant contends that such inspection would not be invasive because a neutral third-party vendor would complete the examination, this narrowing is not reflected in the deposition notice itself or any stipulation between the parties.

Thus, as written, the request for inspection is in direct tension with Plaintiff's objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of her electronic devices. Third, Plaintiff shows that the threatened intrusion is serious. Even with Defendant's proposed use of a third-party vendor, Plaintiff would still be forced to turn over the contents of all electronic devices containing broad communications within a year and a half period for the vendor's potentially limitless review. This is a serious intrusion of Plaintiff's privacy rights.

Plaintiff's privacy rights outweigh Defendant's need for disclosure here. Here, Defendant seeks this inspection because Plaintiff has admitted to deleting text messages during her employment and therefore, Defendant "cannot be certain [Plaintiff's] production is exhaustive." (Motion, at p. 5.) Defendant states it desires these documents to "verify that all relevant, nonprivileged information has been produced." (Reply, at p.1.) Meanwhile, Plaintiff's counsel attests that Plaintiff already produced copies of the desired deleted messages, including communications she received from Defendant Ledezma. (Gardner Decl.

P.P. 11-12.) Defendant does not provide evidence showing that responsive documents exist that Plaintiff has not already produced; Defendant's speculation that there are more responsive communications based on its disbelief of Plaintiff does not justify the phone inspection. In other words, Plaintiff's privacy interest in the content of her electronic devices for a 1.5-year period outweighs Defendant's desire to confirm that it has received all responsive communications.

Disposition

Defendant Biolife Plasma Services LP's motion to compel further discovery responses to requests for production in first amended notice of deposition is denied. [1] The Court notes that these requests are identical to request nos. 61 and 62 contained in Defendant's requests for production set three, for which Defendant moved to compel further responses. The Court denied the motion as untimely. However, the untimeliness of the motion to compel further responses under CCP Sec. 2031.310 does not preclude Defendant from bringing this motion to compel further responses under CCP Sec. 2025.450 as a separately authorized discovery procedure. (See Carter v. Superior Court (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 994, 997.) Case Number: 24STCV18825 Hearing Date: August 28, 2026 Dept: 510 No. 10 - Jaeil Lee v. Acuprogroup Inc., et al. Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees Plaintiff Jaeil Lee ("Plaintiff") moves

for a total of $11,200 in attorney fees [1] and $512.17 in costs against Defense counsel, Henry M. Lee ("Defense counsel"). As an initial matter, the Court notes that Defense counsel's opposition brief was filed with the Court two days late. The opposition brief was due on August 17, 2026, and was not filed with the Court until August 19, 2026. There is no explanation for this delay in the papers. However, the Court exercises its discretion to consider the untimely filing when ruling on the motion. (See Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(d)). Attorney Fees A. Entitlement to Fees On August 19, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff's ten motions to compel discovery responses and imposed $7,600 in monetary sanctions, jointly and severally, against Defendants and their counsel of record for misuse of the discovery process. On October 15, 2025, Defense counsel filed an appeal from the sanctions order. However, Defense counsel failed to file his opening brief. On March 17, 2026, the appeal was dismissed due to Defense counsel's default.

The Court of Appeal issued remittitur on June 12, 2026. Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees incurred on appeal of a discovery sanctions order. Under Baer v. Tedder (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1139, 1151, "Sections 2023.030(a) and 2031.320(b) authorize recovery of attorney's fees and do not specifically preclude recovery of attorney's fees on appeal. [Citation.] Sections 2023.030(a) and 2031.320(b) therefore authorized [plaintiff's] recovery of attorney's fees expended in connection with the appeal of the sanctions order."

Defense counsel argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to fees under the reasoning in Baer because Plaintiff does not identify the specific discovery statute that authorizes the appellate fees. The Court disagrees. In his notice of motion, Plaintiff identifies "Sec.Sec. 2023.010, 2023.030, et seq." as providing a statutory basis for attorney fees. Defense counsel further argues that Baer limits recovery of fees to those incurred defending the sanctions order in substance; here, an opening brief was never filed, so Plaintiff did not incur any fees defending the sanctions order.

While the Court understands Defense counsel's argument, Baer does not compel such a narrowed reading of "defending" a sanctions order. It is plausible that time incurred on pre-merits brief tasks was thought to be reasonable and necessary to defend the sanctions order on appeal at the time they were completed. These tasks would not have been necessary but for Defense counsel's appeal. Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to fees. B. Reasonableness of Fees Plaintiff presents billing records showing $11,200 for 16 hours of work; this includes 7 hours of work on the appeal and 9 hours

of work on this fee motion. (Park Reply Decl., Ex. J.) In determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, the court ordinarily begins with the lodestar, that is, "the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate." (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) In calculating the lodestar, the court must determine whether the tasks performed by an attorney were necessary and whether the amount of time billed for each task was reasonable. (Baxter v. Bock (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 775, 793.)

Plaintiff's counsel billed at a $700 attorney fee rate for some tasks that were clerical or could have been done by a paralegal or secretary. For example, counsel billed for tasks such as "issue check for Clerk's Transcript Fees," "calendar deadline," "check court docket on dates," "calendar new deadline," and "calendar date of finality." Billing time at attorney rates for such tasks was not reasonable. Plaintiff's counsel also billed at least 3 hours for reviewing various notices and orders issued by the Court of Appeal, such as a notice of appeal, notice of default, and remittitur, and the clerk's transcript.

Billing that much time at attorney rates for reviewing simple documents is not reasonable. For these reasons, while Plaintiff's counsel's hourly rate is reasonable based on the Court's familiarity with attorney billing rates in Los Angeles County, the Court is unable to award the full amount of fees requested. Following review of Plaintiff's billing summary (Park Decl., Ex. F), the Court exercises its discretion to reduce Plaintiff's counsel's hours incurred on the appeal (time entries from October 3, 2025, to March 17, 2026, when the appeal was dismissed) to 1.9 hours.

That time was spent for legal work performed on October 16 and November 13, 2025 and January 9, 2026. This totals $1,330. In addition, Plaintiff's counsel bills 9 hours for drafting the motion and reply. It also includes Plaintiff's counsel's anticipated time spent attending the hearing on the motion. Plaintiff's counsel did not reasonably incur $6,300 in fees on this motion. The motion itself is only 7.5 pages long and did not require significant research to complete. The Court will reduce the total hours requested for time spent drafting the motions, reply briefs, and attending the hearing by 50% (time entries from June 17, 2026 to August 28, 2026).

Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to $1,330 for fees incurred on appeal and $3,150 ($700 * (9 hours * 0.5)) for fees incurred drafting this motion. This totals $4,480. Costs Plaintiff also requests $512.17 in costs incurred on appeal. The Court finds that all costs were reasonably incurred and will award the requested amount of costs in full. Defense counsel raises a concern that the Court's award of these costs will lead to double recovery of costs already recorded on Form APP-013. The Court disagrees.

This court order confirms his entitlement to certain costs. The Court does not find this will lead to double recovery. To the extent that Defendant has already paid the $512.17 in costs reflected on Form APP-013,

no further payment is required as a result of this order.

Disposition

Plaintiff Jaeil Lee's motion for attorney fees is granted in part. Plaintiff shall recover $4,480 in attorney fees and $512.17 in costs from Defense counsel Henry M. Lee. [1] Plaintiff amended his initial fee request from $9,800 to $11,200 to account for time incurred drafting the reply brief. The Court will analyze the $11,200 amount when ruling on this motion. Case Number: 25STCV08308 Hearing Date: August 28, 2026 Dept: 510 No. 9 - Quan Ding, et al. v. FCA US, LLC, et al. Defendants FCA US, LLC, and JRDTSP LLC deb Scott Robinson Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram's Motion to Dismiss Defendants FCA US, LLC, and JRDTSP LLC dba Scott Robinson Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram move to dismiss Plaintiffs' entire first amended complaint ("FAC") under Code of Civil Procedure section 581(f)(2).

On February 3, 2026, the Court sustained Defendant FCA US, LLC's demurrer to Plaintiffs' first and second causes of action as alleged in their FAC with 21 days' leave to amend. The Court overruled FCA's demurrer as to the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 581(f)(2): "The court may dismiss the complaint . . . after a demurrer to the complaint is sustained with leave to amend, the plaintiff fails to amend it within the time allowed by the court and either party moves for dismissal." (CCP Sec. 581(f)(2) [emphasis added].)

Here, the Court did not sustain the demurrer as to the entire complaint. There is no statutory basis to dismiss claims on which the demurrer was overruled. The Court will not dismiss Plaintiffs' entire action for failure to amend two of its claims. In opposition, Plaintiffs request the Court deny dismissal of the first and second causes of action on the grounds that the rationale guiding the Court's ruling on demurrer is currently under appellate review in a separate case. This argument misunderstands the Court's ruling and its consequences.

The Court sustained the demurrer as to these claims with 21 days' leave to amend. Plaintiffs did not file an amended complaint within the time allotted. Therefore, these claims are no longer operative in this action. This is due to Plaintiff's inaction, not any action by the Court.

Disposition

Defendants FCA US, LLC, and JRDTSP LLC dba Scott Robinson Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram's motion to dismiss is denied. | Home -->)" -->