William Wortz v. Lea Schlemmer

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 10 Honorable Jeffrey B. El-Hajj Blanca Than, Courtroom Clerk 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113

DATE: August 27, 2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. / 9:01 A.M. To contest the ruling, call (408) 808-6856 before 4:00 P.M. Make sure to let the other side know before 4:00 P.M. that you plan to contest the ruling. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1); Local Rule 8.D.)

**Please specify the issue to be contested when calling the Court and counsel**

9:00 A.M. LINE # CASE # CASE TITLE RULING Line 1 24CV445456 North Mill Equipment Plaintiff’s motion to strike the answer of Ryan Peacock, Inc. Finance, LLC et al. v. Notice is proper and the motion is unopposed. The basis for the RYAN PEACOCK et al. motion is that a corporation cannot be self-represented. The corporation had counsel when it filed the answer. The court subsequently granted a motion by that counsel to withdraw. The corporate defendant’s failure to appear through counsel at future hearings (including the order to show cause hearing at 10:00 a.m. on August 27, 2026) may lead to the striking of the answer.

But plaintiff provides no authority to strike an answer filed by corporate counsel. The motion is DENIED. The court will prepare the order. Line 2 24CV447855 William Wortz v. Lea Click LINE 2 or scroll down for ruling. Schlemmer Line 3 24CV453911 Carlos Velasquez v. Ford Click LINE 3 or scroll down for ruling. Motor Company et al.

Calendar Line 2 Case Name: William Wortz v. Lea Schlemmer et al. Case No.: 24CV447855

This is an action for breach of contract brought by plaintiff William Wortz (Plaintiff) against defendant Lea Schlemmer, trustee of the Katherin E. Mazzola Revocable Living Trust dated June 30, 1995 (Defendant).

The operative first amended complaint (FAC), filed in October 2024, alleges a single cause of action for breach of contract. The FAC alleges that Plaintiff entered into an oral contract with Kathryn Mazzola and Frank Mazzola. (FAC, ¶ 13.) Plaintiff would receive a one-quarter interest in the Mazzolas’ estate. (Ibid.) That included a one-quarter interest in the Mazzolas’ primary residence that would remain in the Mazzolas’ estate until their passing. (Ibid.) Plaintiff was to receive the property interest in return for his past and ongoing relationship with the Mazzolas, and for the services he had provided. (Ibid.)

The terms of the agreement were memorialized in a trust amendment Kathryn Mazzola executed in November 2019. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Through a December 2020 trust amendment, Kathryn Mazzola revoked the agreement with Plaintiff and instead bequeathed the property interest to Defendant. Defendant was the Mazzolas’ attorney-in-fact. (Id. at ¶¶ 10, 15.) The FAC alleges the December 2020 trust amendment breached the oral contract plaintiff entered with the Mazzolas to receive the property interest. (Id. ¶¶ 15-18.)

The Mazzolas have since passed away. (Id. at ¶ 5.) The November 2019 trust amendment and December 2020 trust amendment are attached to the FAC as Exhibits A and B, respectively.

At issue is Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the FAC, opposed by Defendant. Plaintiff seeks to add a second cause of action for interference with expected inheritance.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

A trial court has discretion to “allow a party to amend any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1); Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163.) Leave to amend can be denied if the party seeking amendment unnecessarily delayed the motion, or if the delay prejudiced the opposing party. (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 490.)

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend to add a tort cause of action for interference with expected inheritance. Defendant opposes the motion, contending that (1) Defendant would be prejudiced by the proposed second amended complaint (SAC); (2) Plaintiff unreasonably delayed seeking leave to amend; and (3) the proposed SAC fails to allege sufficient facts for an interference with expected inheritance cause of action.

No Prejudice

Defendant argues that she would be prejudiced by the amendment because additional discovery on the new cause of action would need to be conducted. (Opposition, at p. 4:13-17.)

Prejudice exists where the amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting in loss of critical evidence, or would add costs of preparation and an increased burden of discovery. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488.) “Prejudice will not be presumed but must be affirmatively demonstrated through production of evidence.” (L&S Framing, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 995, 1012.)

No trial date has been set. Plaintiff’s counsel declares discovery is ongoing, and no depositions have been taken. (Roberts Decl., filed 2/5/2026, ¶ 6.) Leave to amend will not substantially prejudice Defendant. Even though Defendant may need to conduct additional discovery on the new cause of action, there is adequate time to do so.

Timeliness

Defendant argues that Plaintiff unduly delayed bringing this motion because Plaintiff already knew and alleged the facts supporting the proposed interference with expected inheritance claim in his FAC. (Opposition, p. 3:20-22.)

In evaluating delay, a court must consider whether the party failed to diligently move to amend after discovering facts supporting the amendment. (Solit v. Tokai Bank (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1448.) Leave to amend is liberally granted where discovery and investigation lead to facts justifying a timely amendment. (Mabie v. Hyatt (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 581, 596.)

Plaintiff’s motion argues Defendant’s November 19, 2025 document production revealed the facts supporting amendment. (Motion, p. 3:9-13.) Plaintiff moved to amend in February 2026 after Defendant refused to stipulate to the amendment. (Roberts Decl., ¶ 7.) The FAC alleges minimal facts concerning Defendant’s role in taking over the Mazzolas’ financial affairs. (FAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff may refine and expand his legal theories based on information uncovered through discovery. (See Honig v. Financial Corp. of America (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 960, 965 [“If the original pleading has not framed the issues in an articulate and precise manner, a plaintiff should not be precluded from having a trial on the merits.”])

Sufficiency of the Allegations

Defendant argues that because the interference with expected inheritance cause of action is inadequately pleaded, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend must be denied. (Opposition, p. 4:20.) That argument can be addressed through a demurrer or other pleading challenge. (Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048 [“even if the proposed legal theory is a novel one, ‘the preferable practice would be to permit the amendment and allow the parties to test its legal sufficiency by demurrer, motion for judgment on the pleadings or other appropriate proceedings.’ ”].)

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is GRANTED.

Plaintiff must separately file the proposed second amended complaint no later than September 1, 2026.

The court will prepare the order.

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