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25CV020632·sacramento·Civil·Breach of Fiduciary Duty/Fraud
Hearing todayDemurrer OVERRULED in its entirety; Motion to Strike DENIED

NAACP GREATER SACRAMENTO BRANCH vs WILLIAMS, et al.

Demurrer to Complaint; Motion to Strike

Hearing date
Aug 27, 2026
Department
16C
Judge
Prevailing
Plaintiff

Motion type

Browse all Demurrer rulings statewide →

Causes of action

Monetary amounts referenced

$700,000$100,000$3,840$948,037$1,728,769

Parties

PlaintiffNAACP Greater Sacramento Branch
DefendantBetty Williams
DefendantSalena Pryor
Defendant1 Solution LLC
DefendantPryor Consulting LLC
DefendantBlack Small Business Association of California
DefendantLorraine Moore
DefendantElite Professional Inc.

Ruling

25CV020632: NAACP GREATER SACRAMENTO BRANCH vs WILLIAMS, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint in Department 16C

Tentative Ruling

Defendants Lorraine Moore (“Moore”) and Elite Professional Inc.’s (“Elite Professional”) (collectively, “Moving Defendants”) demurrer to Plaintiff NAACP Greater Sacramento Branch’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint is ruled upon as follows.

Overview

On August 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed its operative Complaint against Defendants and codefendants Betty Williams (“Williams”), Salena Pryor (“Pryor”), 1 Solution LLC (“1 Solution”), Pryor Consulting LLC (“Pryor Consulting”), and Black Small Business Association of California (“BSBA”). The Complaint asserts causes of action for (1) Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Constructive Fraud against Moore and Williams, (2) Accounting against all defendants, (3) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, against BSBA, (4) Fraud by Misrepresentation against all defendants, and, finally, (5) Breach of Contract against BSBA.

Plaintiff is a local branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”). (Complaint at ¶ 1.) Williams served as President of Plaintiff from approximately 2005 to 2012 and from 2017 to 2023. (Id., at ¶ 2.) Williams was also the Chief Executive Officer of 1 Solution in or about 2022-2023. (Id., at ¶ 3.) Pryor served as the Education Chair of Plaintiff from about 2021 to 2023. (Id., at ¶ 4.) Pryor also serves as the CEO of Pryor Consulting, which was organized and incorporated on or about November 10, 2020. (Id., at ¶ 5.) Pryor further served as the CEO of BSBA in or about 2022 to 2023. (Id., at ¶ 6.) Moore served as the Treasurer for Plaintiff in or about 2021 and 2023. (Id., at ¶ 7.) Moore also served as Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, and Secretary for Elite Professional from about 2021 to 2023. (Id., at ¶ 8.)

Plaintiff alleges that during the COVID-19 pandemic, Williams, Pryor and Moore (the “Individual Defendants”) obtained grants from the County of Sacramento (the “County”) for the goal of administering a program (the Dine-In 2 program [the “Program”]) that delivered meals to people who were impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiff alleges that the Individual Defendants proceeded to direct hundreds of thousands of dollars to themselves by using their corporate entities as cover and serving as “independent contractors” that were supposed to fulfill administrative tasks associated with the program. (Complaint, ¶ 14.)

Plaintiff alleges that the use of the affiliated subcontractors was a violation of the conflict-of-interest provision in the contracts signed with the County, and that Williams and the others failed to disclose that a number of the subcontractors were affiliated with them. (Complaint, ¶¶ 78-79.)

25CV020632: NAACP GREATER SACRAMENTO BRANCH vs WILLIAMS, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint in Department 16C

Plaintiff contends that the Individual Defendants “acted in their own self-interest from the very start” and hired themselves and their own companies as “independent contractors” for the Program. (Id., at ¶¶ 47-57.) Regarding Moore and Elite Professional, Plaintiff contends that Williams retained “Elite Professional to perform administrative services such as program coordination, developing [a] project charter, and communicating with vendors” and that at the time of Elite Professional’s engagement, Moore served as its CEO, CFO, and Secretary. (Id., at ¶¶ 56, 57.)

Plaintiff alleges that it later discovered the alleged misconduct and investigated. Plaintiff also alleges that “persons and entities affiliated with the Individual Defendants received more than $700,000 through the Program (accounting for nearly one-third of the Program’s budget) and that Moore specifically received more than $100,000 through her entity, Elite Professional. (Id., at ¶¶ 74-76.) Plaintiff further contends that Moore and Elite Professional submitted fraudulent invoices, and that the defendants “may have conspired to falsify or fabricate invoices through entities affiliated with them using similar templates for work that they did not perform.” (Complaint, ¶ 82.) For example, Plaintiff alleges that:

84. Defendant 1 Solution (affiliated with [defendant] Williams) submitted invoices that contained parallel typography, same header and footer layout, and other similar patterns as invoices submitted by Defendant Elite Professional (affiliated with Moore).

85. ... Defendants Elite Professional and 1 Solution issued invoices that were nearly identical (except for dates, names of the contractors, and invoice numbers), charging $3,840 for four items of “Admin/Training” work, each containing identical descriptions and numbers of hours worked.

86. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that this pattern of irregularities appeared repeatedly in invoices submitted by each vendor associated with the Individual Defendants.

(Complaint, ¶¶ 84-86.)

Plaintiff further alleges that the investigation identified missing invoices for hundreds of thousands of dollars in payments to vendors. (Complaint, ¶ 93.)

The County has demanded that Plaintiff repay $948,037 in “disallowed costs,” and $1,728,769 in costs that do not have supporting documentation. (Complaint, ¶ 113.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV020632: NAACP GREATER SACRAMENTO BRANCH vs WILLIAMS, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint in Department 16C

As stated in their Notice of Demurrer, Moore and Elite Professional “demur to Plaintiff’s Complaint and move to strike specific allegations contained therein.” (Notice of Demurrer at 1:23-25.)

Plaintiff opposes. Trial is not yet set.

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.)

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. §452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318; William S.

Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1616, fn. 2.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . . we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV020632: NAACP GREATER SACRAMENTO BRANCH vs WILLIAMS, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint in Department 16C

action – not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

Discussion

At the outset, the Court notes that Moving Defendants’ demurrer fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 430.60 and California Rules of Court rule 31320 subdivision (a).

In this regard, Code of Civil Procedure section 430.60 states that “[a] demurrer shall distinctly specify the grounds upon which any of the objections to the complaint, cross-complaint, or answer are taken. Unless it does so, it may be disregarded.” Further California Rules of Court, rule 3.1320 requires that “[e]ach ground of demurrer must be in a separate paragraph and must state whether it applies to the entire complaint, cross-complaint, or answer, or to specified causes of action or defenses.”

Here, Moving Defendants’ notice of demurrer indicates that they are demurring to the entire Complaint, but fails to identify the grounds upon which any objection to the Complaint is taken. While the Court could disregard the demurrer entirely (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.60), the Court will rule on the merits of the demurrer since Defendants’ memorandum of points and authorities specifies the grounds on which they demurrer and because Plaintiff responds substantively to each of the asserted grounds in Moving Defendants’ memorandum of points and authorities.

The Court now turns to the substance of the demurrer.

Failure to State a Cause of Action

First Cause of Action (Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Constructive Fraud)

As stated above, the Complaint alleges a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud against Moore.

“The elements of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty are: (1) existence of a fiduciary duty; (2) breach of the fiduciary duty; and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach.” (Stanley v. Richmond (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1086.) Civil Code section 1573 provides, in

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV020632: NAACP GREATER SACRAMENTO BRANCH vs WILLIAMS, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint in Department 16C

relevant part, that constructive fraud consists of “ any breach of duty which, without an actually fraudulent intent, gains an advantage to the person in fault, or any one claiming under him, by misleading another to his prejudice, or to the prejudice of any one claiming under him.” (Civ. Code § 1573 subd. (1).) Indeed, “a breach of fiduciary duty is considered fraud.” (Van de Kamp v. Bank of America (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 819, 854.)

In their moving points of authorities, Moving Defendants argue that “[P]laintiff’s first cause of action against Moore and Elite Professional fails because it lacks specific facts showing a fiduciary breach or constructive fraud.” (Moving MPA at 4:2-3 [underline added for emphasis].) Defendants further contend that:

Here, the Plaintiff does not claim that [Plaintiff] relied on any misrepresentation or omission by Moore or Elite Professional, nor does it present facts showing that [Plaintiff] suffered actual damages caused by Moore’s alleged misconduct. The use of vague terms like “embezzlement” or “conversion” does not replace the need for sufficiently detailed facts.

(Moving MPA at 5:21-26.)

In opposition, Plaintiff rejoins that the Complaint adequately pleads the first cause of action against Moore. In regards to the breach of fiduciary duty claim, Plaintiff argues that it adequately alleges that Moore owed Plaintiff a fiduciary duty as treasurer, that the Complaint alleges multiple, independent breaches of this duty in the form of omission and/or misrepresentation, and that the Complaint alleges damages proximately caused by Moore’s breach (i.e., that Sacramento County demanded that Plaintiff repay $948,037 for disallowed costs and identified $1,728,769 in costs lacking supporting documentation). (Opposition at 7:12-25.) Plaintiff further argues that the same allegations support Plaintiff’s claim for constructive fraud. (Id., at 9:1-6.)

First, to the extent that Elite Professional attempts to demur to the first cause of action, such a demurrer is overruled as Elite Professional is not named as a defendant to the first cause of action.[1]

Second, to the extent that Moore demurs to the first cause of action, that demurrer is overruled as the Court, taking the allegations in the Complaint as true, finds that the Plaintiff sufficiently states a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and constructive fraud. Additionally, Plaintiff’s claims are based, in part, on Defendants’ fraudulent concealment. Although in California fraud must be pled specifically, courts have repeatedly recognized that “‘it is harder to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV020632: NAACP GREATER SACRAMENTO BRANCH vs WILLIAMS, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint in Department 16C

apply [the requirement of specificity] to a case of simple nondisclosure. “How does one show ‘how’ and ‘by what means’ something didn’t happen, or ‘when’ it never happened, or ‘where’ it never happened?”‘ [Citation.]” (Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1199.)

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently plead its first cause of action and Moving Defendants’ demurrer as to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

Second Cause of Action (Accounting)

“A cause of action for an accounting requires a showing that a relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant that requires an accounting, and that some balance is due the plaintiff that can only be ascertained by an accounting.” (Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 179.) “An action for accounting is not available where the plaintiff alleges the right to recover a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by calculation.” (Ibid.) A fiduciary relationship is not necessary; rather, “[a]ll that is required is that some relationship exists that requires an accounting.” (Ibid.)

The right to an accounting does not require a fiduciary relationship (although one has been established in this case). Such a right to an accounting “can arise from the possession by the defendant of money or property which, because of the defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff, the defendant is obliged to surrender.” (Id., at 180.)

Moving Defendants argue that the Complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for accounting. Specifically, Moving Defendants argue that the second cause of action fails because “ Plaintiff does not allege that Moore or Elite Professional currently holds funds belonging to [Plaintiff], nor does it allege that the financial records are so complex that ordinary legal remedies would be inadequate.” (Moving MPA at 6:2-8.) Defendants add that the contracts between Plaintiff and Sacramento County gave Sacramento County “broad audit rights” which Sacramento County “has already exercised” and thus “an equitable accounting is unnecessary because the amounts allegedly owed can be determined though the very audit process Plaintiff acknowledges.” (Id., at 6:9-17.)

The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition that it adequately pled its accounting cause of action. Here, as Plaintiff argues and Moving Defendants do not dispute, the Complaint adequately alleges that a relationship exists between plaintiff and defendant that requires an accounting as the Complaint alleges that a fiduciary relationship between Moore and Plaintiff and a contractual and business relationship between Elite Professional and Plaintiff. (Complaint at ¶¶ 56, 71, 116.) The Complaint further alleges that the County has demanded that Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV020632: NAACP GREATER SACRAMENTO BRANCH vs WILLIAMS, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint in Department 16C

repay $948,037 in “disallowed costs” and $1,728,769 in unsupported costs, and that “significant amounts of the [P]rogram’s budget were paid to entities...associated with the Individual Defendants.” (Id., at ¶¶ 70, 113.) The Complaint further alleges that Moore received more than $100,000 through her entity (Elite Professional) and that “a significant number of the submitted invoices associated with Individual Defendants and/or their entities raised serious questions as to what, if any, services the Individual Defendants and/or their entities actually provided in exchange for the hundreds of thousands of dollars they charged and received.” (Id., at ¶¶ 76, 81.)

Finally, Plaintiff contends that the amount of embezzled, misappropriated, or stolen funds can only be ascertained by an accounting. (Id., at ¶ 131.) Accordingly, the Complaint sufficiently pleads both elements of an accounting cause of action, that a relationship exists which requires an accounting and that some balance is due to Plaintiff which only be ascertained by an accounting.

Additionally, the Court is unpersuaded by Moving Defendants argument that the County’s separate audit renders an accounting as between Plaintiff and Moving Defendants unnecessary. As stated by Plaintiffs in opposition, the County’s right to an audit does not displace Plaintiff’s independent equitable right to demand an accounting from the Moving Defendants to specifically determine the amount of allegedly embezzled, misappropriated, or stolen funds of the Program.

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently pled its second cause of action and Moving Defendants’ demurrer as to this cause of action is OVERRULED.

Fourth Cause of Action (Fraud by Misrepresentation)

The Complaint also brings a cause of action for fraud by misrepresentation against all defendants. Moving Defendants argue that this cause of action fails because the Complaint does not allege facts with the requisite specificity and because “[P]laintiff has not alleged, reliance, causation, or specific damages regarding Moore or Elite Professional.” (Moving MPA at 6:19-7:8.) Moving Defendants further argue that plaintiff improperly makes “group allegations” of fraud against multiple defendants. (Id., 6:24-28.)

The elements of a claim for fraudulent concealment require the plaintiff to show that: “(1) the defendant ... concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant [was] under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant ... intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff [was] unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV020632: NAACP GREATER SACRAMENTO BRANCH vs WILLIAMS, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint in Department 16C

result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage. [Citation.]” (Prakashpalan v. Engstrom, Lipscomb & Lack (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1105, 1130.) A duty to disclose material facts may arise not only when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff but also when the defendant has exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff or when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff. (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)

Here, the Complaint alleges that the Defendants “prepared and submitted falsified invoices related to the administration of the [Program]”, that these invoices “falsely represented that services had been provided in exchange for payments, when in fact no services were rendered or the amounts charged were grossly inflated”, that each defendant “knew the representations contained therein were false and misleading, or they recklessly submitted falsified invoices” that each defendant “intended that Plaintiff and the County would rely on the falsified invoices to approve payment of public funds”, that Plaintiff reasonably relied on Defendants’ representations, and approved or facilitated the disbursement of substantial sums of public funds, and finally that as a direct result of Defendants’ misrepresentations, Plaintiff has been damaged. (Complaint at ¶¶147-156.) Accordingly, the Court rejects Moving Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff has not alleged reliance, causation, or specific damages regarding Moore or Elite Professional.

The Court further rejects Moving Defendants' argument that Plaintiff has failed to plead its misrepresentation claim with sufficient specificity. As an initial matter, less specificity is required of fraud claims “when ‘it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy,’ [citation]; ‘[e]ven under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party ....’” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 217.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff that this is such a situation since the Defendants possess their own internal records with details of the invoices.

Nonetheless, the Court also agrees with Plaintiff that it pled its misrepresentation claim with sufficient specificity. In addition to the alleged facts already recited by the Court, Plaintiff alleges a number of additional specific facts related to its fraud allegations including (but not limited to), the administration of the Program (Complaint at ¶¶ 46-59), NAACP’s discovery if misconduct (Id., at ¶¶60-73), the amount of Program funds which was distributed to Individual Defendants and their entities (Id., at ¶¶ 74-79), and detailed examples of the allegedly fraudulent invoices submitted by the Individual Defendants’ entities. (Id., at ¶80-92.)

In sum, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court concludes that Plaintiff pleads the cause

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV020632: NAACP GREATER SACRAMENTO BRANCH vs WILLIAMS, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint in Department 16C

of action with the requisite specificity. The demurrer as the fourth cause of action is thus OVERRULED.

Uncertainty

Moving Defendants also contend that the Complaint is uncertain and ambiguous “because it fails to distinguish the conduct attributable to Lorraine Moore and Elite Professional, Inc. from the broad, conclusory allegations made against all defendants collectively” and that such “vague and ambiguous allegations prevent Moore and Elite Professional from determining their alleged role in the supposed wrongdoing.” (Moving MPA at 7:18-20, 8:13-14.) Demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and are only granted where the complaint is so muddled that the defendant cannot reasonably respond.

The favored approach is to clarify theories in the complaint through discovery. (A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695; see also Khoury v. Maly's of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) The Court finds that the allegations are not so uncertain that Moving Defendants cannot frame a response or determine their alleged role in the supposed wrongdoing. Indeed, Moving Defendants may clarify any asserted “ambiguities” in the allegations through discovery.

Thus, Moving Defendants’ demurrer on the ground of uncertainty is OVERRULED

Motion to Strike

To the extent that Moving Defendants request, by way of this motion, that the Court strike specific allegations in the Complaint, the Court DENIES this request for the reasons stated in the Court’s concurrent ruling on Moving Defendants’ motion to strike which challenges the same allegations.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, Moving Defendants’ demurrer to the Complaint is OVERRULED in its entirety. Moving Defendants shall file and serve an answer by no later than September 10, 2026.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV020632: NAACP GREATER SACRAMENTO BRANCH vs WILLIAMS, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint in Department 16C

Civ. Proc. §1019.5; California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] In reply, Moving Defendants contend that the Court should sustain the demurrer to

the first cause of action as to Elite Professional because the “the first cause of action is not pleaded against Elite Professional.” (Reply at 4:9-26.) However, the Court cannot sustain a demurrer directed at a cause of action which was not actually pleaded against the demurring defendant in the first place.

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16C Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-1475 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-cagov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 160 3087 7014. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV020632: NAACP GREATER SACRAMENTO BRANCH vs WILLIAMS, et al. 08/27/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Complaint in Department 16C

Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-servicestranscripts. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

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