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22GDCV00044·la·Civil·Automobile Subrogation
Hearing in 1 dayGRANTED

Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club v. Marine Saakian

Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Settlement

Hearing date
Aug 28, 2026
Department
P
Prevailing
Plaintiff

Motion type

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Monetary amounts referenced

$33,338.86$8.30$10,000$50$30,300.39$1,100$13,556.31$582.16

Parties

PlaintiffInterinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club
DefendantMarine Saakian

Ruling

(Pasadena Courthouse: Dept. P) August 28, 2026 DEPARTMENT P LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club ("Plaintiff") filed this automobile subrogation action against Defendant Marine Saakian ("Defendant") on January 25, 2022.

Plaintiff alleges that on December 22, 2020, Defendant negligently operated a vehicle and collided with a vehicle insured by Plaintiff at the Colorado Street Freeway extension and San Fernando Road in Los Angeles. Plaintiff alleges it became subrogated to its insured's rights after paying for damages arising from the collision and seeks to recover those amounts from Defendant.

On July 24, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to enforce the parties' settlement agreement and enter judgment against Defendant. The motion is unopposed.

II. LEGAL STANDARD Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 provides a summary procedure that enables courts to enforce a settlement agreement by entering a judgment pursuant to the terms of the parties' settlement. In relevant part, it provides as follows:¿ "If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If requested by the parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 664.6, subd. (a).)

A writing is considered signed if signed by the party or an attorney who represents the party. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 664.6, subd. (b).)

III. ANALYSIS Plaintiff moves to enforce the settlement agreement entered into with Defendant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 187 and 664.6. Plaintiff contends Defendant defaulted on the installment payments required under the parties' Settlement Agreement and Release of All Property Damage Claims and Stipulation for Entry of Judgment and Installment Payments ("Stipulation"). Plaintiff seeks entry of judgment in the amount of $33,338.86, with interest continuing to accrue at $8.30 per day. (Motion, pp. 3-4.) The motion is unopposed.

Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 authorizes the Court to enter judgment on a settlement agreement where the agreement is in writing, signed by the parties, and the Court retains jurisdiction. (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 305.)

Here, the parties entered into a written Stipulation signed by both Plaintiff and Defendant. Defendant agreed to pay $10,000 by January 30, 2024, followed by monthly payments of $50 from March 1, 2024, through August 1, 2036. The Stipulation provides that, upon Defendant's default and failure to cure, Plaintiff may seek judgment for $30,300.39, plus interest and costs, less credit for payments made before default. (Id. at p.4.)

The Stipulation further provides that a default occurs when a payment is not received within five days of its due date and gives Defendant 30 days after notice to cure the default. Paragraph 9 provides that the Court retains jurisdiction pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

On February 28, 2026, the Court granted the parties' Stipulation and retained jurisdiction to enforce its terms. Plaintiff presents evidence that Defendant's insurance carrier paid the initial $10,000 and Defendant thereafter paid $1,100 in installments, for total payments of $11,100. No further payments have been received. (Tapper Decl., P. 4.)

Plaintiff's counsel further declares that Defendant was provided written notice of the default and 30 days to cure, but failed to do so. (Tapper Decl., P. 5.) Defendant has filed no opposition disputing the default or the amount sought.

Thus, Plaintiff has established that Defendant defaulted under the Stipulation and failed to timely cure the default. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to entry of judgment pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation.

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's unopposed motion to enforce the settlement. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Plaintiff Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club and against Defendant Marine Saakian in the amount of $33,338.86, consisting of $30,300.39 in principal, $13,556.31 in interest through July 16, 2026, less $11,100 in payments received, plus $582.16 in court costs, with interest continuing to accrue thereafter at the rate of $8.30 per day.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Plaintiff Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club and against Defendant Marine Saakian in the amount of $33,338.86, consisting of $30,300.39 in principal, $13,556.31 in interest through July 16, 2026, less $11,100 in payments received, plus $582.16 in court costs, with interest continuing to accrue thereafter at the rate of $8.30 per day. Plaintiff to give notice.

Dated: August 28, 2026 JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT Case Number: 25NNCV03267 Hearing Date: August 28, 2026 Dept: P [TENTATIVE] ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION

I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiffs Diana Pitinyan and Khachatur Sagryan ("Plaintiffs") filed this action against Defendant Mid-Century Insurance Company ("Mid-Century" or "Defendant") arising from Mid-Century's handling of Plaintiffs' insurance claim following a July 20, 2024, water loss at their residence.

Plaintiffs allege causes of action for: (1) breach of contract; (2) bad faith denial of insurance claim; (3) unfair business practices; and (4) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiffs subsequently dismissed the second cause of action as duplicative of the fourth cause of action.

On May 12, 2026, Mid-Century filed the instant motion for summary adjudication, seeking adjudication of Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, third cause of action for unfair business practices, and claim for punitive damages.

On July 24, 2026, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On August 17, 2026, Mid-Century filed a reply.

II. LEGAL STANDARD The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)

CCP Section 437c(c) "requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and 'all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence' and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)

"The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings." (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (CCP Sec. 437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.)

Courts "liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party." (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

III. ANALYSIS Covenant of Good Faith and Fear Dealing and UCL Claim "A 'breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing involves something beyond breach of the contractual duty itself' and it has been held that '[b]ad faith implies unfair dealing rather than mistaken judgment.

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