Olivas vs TA Operating

TENTATIVE RULING(S) FOR August 26, 2026 Department S37 – Judge Winston Keh This court follows California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(b) for tentative rulings. (See San Bernardino Superior Court Local Emergency Rule 8.) Tentative rulings for each law & motion will be posted on the internet (https://www.sb-court.org) by 3:00 p.m. on the court day immediately before the hearing.

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UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, THE PREVAILING PARTY IS TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE

RULING.

Olivas vs TA Operating

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TENTATIVE RULING(S):

On December 22, 2025, Defendant TA Operating LLC’s (Defendant or TA) filed the instant

Motion to Compel Arbitration (Motion), supported by a Request for Judicial Notice and

declarations from Eric J. Gitig (Gitig) and Pam Major (Major). Plaintiff Gregory Olivas (Plaintiff)

filed his Opposition to the Motion (Opposition) on May 1, 2026, along with a declaration from the

Plaintiff and Evidentiary Objections. Defendant filed its Reply on May 7, 2026, along with a

Notice of Errata, Evidentiary Objections, a Response to Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections and a

supplemental declaration from Gitig. On May 8, 2026, Plaintiff filed Plaintiff’s Evidentiary

Objections to Defendant’s Reply.

A. Request for Judicial Notice

TA requests the court take judicial notice of four trial court orders in other cases filed against the

Defendant in the San Bernardino Superior Court, attached as Exhibits 1-4, pursuant to Evidence

Code section 452, subdivision (d).

Evidence Code section 452 states, in pertinent part, as follows:

Judicial notice may be taken of the following matters to the extent that they are not embraced

within Section 451:

(d) Records of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any

state of the United States.

A court may judicially notice a variety of matters, only relevant material is subject to such

excused burden of evidentiary proof, and the court should decline judicial notice of material “that

has no bearing on the limited legal question at hand.” (Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

(1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063 (citing, People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1144, fn. 5.)

In the case of court records, not all matters contained therein (e.g., pleadings, affidavits, etc.) are

indisputably true. While the existence of any document in a court file may be judicially noticed,

the truth of matters asserted in such documents – including the factual findings of the judge who

was sitting as the trier of fact – is not necessarily subject to judicial notice unless the document is

an order, statement of decision, or judgment. (Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548,

1564-1569; Garcia v. Sterling (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 17, 22.)

The four orders concern other cases filed against Defendant and have no precedential value.

Defendant has not established that the orders have a bearing on the limited legal questions

presented by the instant Motion. The existence of those orders is not necessary to resolution of

whether Plaintiff entered into an arbitration agreement with Defendant or whether the parties’

Agreement contains an enforceable delegation provision.

Accordingly, Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is DENIED.

B. Evidentiary Objections

i. Plaintiff’s Objections

Plaintiff files seventeen objections to the declaration of Major filed in support of Defendant’s

Motion. Specifically, Plaintiff objects to paragraphs 6-15, 18, 18(a), 18(b). 18(e), 18(e)(i), 18(e)(ii)

and 19 on the grounds that the statements made in these paragraphs are irrelevant, lack

foundation or personal knowledge, are speculative or constitute improper legal opinions,

constitute hearsay or lack proper authentication.

Defendant argues in its response that foundation requirements may be inferred from the

circumstances and argues Major sufficiently provides support for the declaration indicating she is

employed as Lead HRIS Solutions Analyst for TA and is its custodian of records, responsible for

maintaining custody of the original employment files for Defendant’s employees. Defendant

argues the lack of the phrase “true and correct copy” is not fatal as the declaration sufficiently

identifies the document, explains its origin, and ties it to Defendant’s business practices.

Major identifies her position as Lead HRIS Solutions Analyst for TA and explains her

responsibility for maintaining custody of Defendant’s employment files. Her declaration further

describes the Cornerstone onboarding system, the manner in which applicants access the

system, the use of unique usernames and passwords, the transmission of onboarding

documents, and the circumstances under which Plaintiff accessed and electronically signed the

documents at issue.

The declaration therefore provides an adequate foundation for the evidence offered concerning

the electronic onboarding process and Plaintiff’s electronic signature. Plaintiff’s objections

principally challenge the weight and sufficiency of the evidence rather than establish a basis for

excluding it altogether.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objections are OVERRULED.

ii. Defendant’s Objections

Along with its Reply, Defendant files six objections to the declaration of the Plaintiff. Specifically,

Defendant objects to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 on the grounds that the subject statements

are vague and ambiguous, irrelevant, conclusory, constitute an inadmissible opinion testimony or

are otherwise, prejudicial and speculative.

The challenged statements concern Plaintiff’s recollection of the onboarding process, his

understanding of the documents presented to him, and whether he recalls signing the

Agreement. These matters are relevant to the factual dispute concerning formation and

authentication of the arbitration agreement. Defendant’s objections principally concern the

weight to be afforded Plaintiff’s testimony rather than its admissibility.

Accordingly, Defendant’s objections are OVERRULED.

C. Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendant’s Reply Evidence

Plaintiff filed objections to statements made in the declaration of Gitig filed with Defendant’s

Reply as well as to Defendant’s Notice of Errata. Plaintiff argues the subject documents

constitutes new evidence filed in reply and cites to cases such as Jack v. Ring LLC (2023)186

forApp.5th 1186 for authority that the general rule is that new evidence is not permitted with reply

papers. Plaintiff argues styling the instant evidence as an “errata” does not change its character

or cure the prejudice to Plaintiff.

The Court finds Plaintiff’s argument unpersuasive because it conflates rebuttal evidence with

truly new evidence.

“The general rule of motion practice...is that new evidence is not permitted with reply papers.”

(Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537; Espejo v. SCPMG (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th

1047 [Espejo]; Ruiz v. Moss (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836 [Ruiz].) However, a trial court is “vested

with a sound discretion as to the permissible scope of evidence offered in rebuttal.” (Tesoro del

Valle Master Homeowners Assn. v. Griffin (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 619, 641.) Under Evidence

Code section 210, relevant evidence is evidence that tends to prove or disprove any disputed

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.

The Court finds the Court of Appeals holding in Ruiz to be instructive here. In Ruiz, the plaintiff

also requested the court decline to consider defendant’s reply evidence, a supplemental

declaration. In Ruiz, however, the defendant sought to compel arbitration based on the existence

of a 2011 arbitration agreement. (Id. at 839.) Because plaintiff presented a factual dispute as to

the authenticity of her signature in opposition, in reply, defendant adduced the 2010 arbitration to

argue its petition should be granted based on the 2010 arbitration agreement. (Id. at 842.) The

Court of Appeal rejected this argument because grounds for relief first raised in reply papers in

the trial court are not proper. (Ibid.)

The circumstances here are materially different. Defendant is not attempting to enforce a

different arbitration agreement. Rather, Gitig’s supplemental declaration, presenting Exhibits E-

G, is rebuttal to Plaintiff’s evidence that he does not recall signing the Agreement and the

argument that there is no contractual relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant.

The supplemental evidence therefore responds directly to factual issues raised by Plaintiff in

Opposition. It does not assert a new ground for relief or seek to enforce a different arbitration

agreement.

The Court therefore OVERRULES Plaintiff’s objections to Defendant’s Notice of Errata and

supplemental declaration of Gitig in their entirety and will consider the evidence filed

concurrently with Defendant’s Reply.

D. Motion to Compel Arbitration

i. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)

Here, the Agreement states, in pertinent part, as follows:

“Federal Arbitration Act. The Parties acknowledge and agree that the Company is involved in

transactions involving interstate commerce and that the Federal Arbitration Act shall govern any

arbitration pursuant to this Agreement, including but not limited to the Agreement’s scope,

interpretation and application.”

Defendant argues the FAA applies as the subject agreement expressly states this. Plaintiff does

not specifically address this issue in their Opposition. As the subject agreement provides for the

FAA to govern, then it governs. (Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35

Cal.4th 376, 394; Aviation Data, Inc. v. American Express Travel Related Services Co., Inc.

(2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1534-35.)

The Court therefore finds that the FAA applies.

ii. Contractual Relationship Between Plaintiff and Defendant

The threshold issue is whether Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an enforceable agreement to

arbitrate.

Defendant contends Plaintiff electronically signed the Mutual Agreement to Resolve Disputes

and Arbitrate Claims (the Agreement) as part of TA’s standard onboarding process after being

notified on multiple occasions that acceptance of the Agreement was a condition of his

employment. As set forth in the declaration of Major, to access the onboarding documents on the

Cornerstone system, Plaintiff created his own unique password that was only known to and

could only be accessed/changed by the Plaintiff. On January 4, 2024, Plaintiff digitally signed the

Agreement through TA’s secure onboarding portal.

Plaintiff argues Defendant fails to establish that there is a valid arbitration agreement between

the parties. Specifically, Plaintiff contends the “Acknowledgment” mechanism described by Major

in her declaration does not “save its threshold failure to authenticate Plaintiff’s purported

electronic signature.” Plaintiff contends the Agreement does not bear Plaintiff’s signature and

Defendant’s Exhibit B is merely an acknowledgment relating to the NAM Rules, not the

Agreement.

Plaintiff argues under the factors set forth under Espejo, Defendant fails to meet its burden to

show the privacy of a unique username, the requirement of a password reset before access, the

signature line containing the signatory’s typed full name, the identification of the time of

execution and the IP address identifying the location of execution. Plaintiff contends Major’s

declaration speaks only in generalities about the Cornerstone system and what an applicant

“would have” done in the abstract.

TA replies, acknowledging the signature page was inadvertently omitted when filing the Motion

as a result of an unintentional clerical error and argues this omission does not change the fact

that Plaintiff signed the Agreement while completing TA’s standard onboarding process or the

Agreement’s operative terms. TA argues when the complete Agreement is considered, which

Plaintiff has long had, there is no genuine dispute that Plaintiff entered into a binding arbitration

agreement. TA argues the omitted signature page is not new substantive matter; it is part of the

Agreement already placed at issue by TA’s motion and directly responds to Plaintiff’s assertion

that TA did not produce a signed arbitration agreement.

Defendant argues TA authenticated the Agreement and Plaintiff’s electronic signature in its

moving papers through the declaration of Major, TA’s Lead HRIS Solutions Analyst. Further,

Major provides a thorough step-by-step analysis of the transmittal of the onboarding documents,

including the Agreement, to the Plaintiff through Cornerstone’s Applicant Portal, which requires a

unique username and password that is only known to and retrievable by the Plaintiff. Defendant

argues under Ruiz, a dated electronic signature affixed through secure and unique login

sufficient to authenticate an arbitration agreement.

The Court finds Defendant met its initial burden to show an agreement to arbitrate between TA

and Plaintiff by attaching a copy of the purported arbitration agreement to the declaration of

Major. (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218.)

In the declaration filed in support of his Opposition, Plaintiff declares that he does not remember

being presented with the subject documents and denies signing them. Under Ruiz, Plaintiff

sufficiently shifts the burden on TA to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

electronic signature was authentic. (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 846.)

The Court finds Defendant has met this burden.

As set forth in the declaration of Major, TA required applicants to first register on Cornerstone by

creating a unique username and password. Major declares an applicant’s unique username and

password would have been required anytime the applicant would have logged into the Applicant

Portal for any reason, including to complete TA’s hiring process and any of TA’s onboarding

documents.

Major further declares that on January 3, 2024, Plaintiff submitted an application to TA for a

Porter – Part Time position and on January 4, 2024, a TA managerial employee changed

Plaintiff’s status from “applied” to “offer letter.” Major states Plaintiff was then sent an email by

Cornerstone, to the email address he registered with Cornerstone’s Applicant Portal,

opivagreg@gmail.com, which contained a secure weblink allowing him to access and complete

his onboarding forms using Cornerstone’s Applicant Portal.

Finally, Major states on January 4, 2024, at 1:58:30 p.m., Plaintiff logged into his Cornerstone

Applicant Portal by using his unique username and password and electronically signed his offer

letter.

Plaintiff argues Major’s declaration is insufficient to authenticate Plaintiff’s signature under the

factors set forth under Espejo. The Court disagrees.

In Espejo, the Court of Appeals cites to Civil Code section 1633.9 to address how a proponent of

an electronic signature may authenticate the signature. The statute states: “(a) An electronic

record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of

the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security

procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature

was attributable.” (Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p.1061, citing Civ.Code, § 1633.9, subd.

(a), italics added.)

While the factors set forth by Plaintiff are one way in which a movant may show an electronic

signature was “an act” of the signatory, as clearly set forth under section 1633.9 of the Civil

Code, there is no single manner to do so.

Here, Major sets forth in detail how Plaintiff signed up for a password protected account on

Cornerstone, a third-party vendor, to apply for the position and sign various onboarding

documents. Major further identifies the date and time Plaintiff accessed the Applicant Portal and

electronically executed the relevant onboarding materials.

In contrast to Ruiz where the Court of Appeals held the moving party failed to explain how the

plaintiff’s printed electronic signature, or the date and time printed next to the signature, came to

be placed on the subject agreement, Major’s declaration sets forth how the printed electronic

signature is indeed “the act” of the Plaintiff as required by Civil Code section 1633.9. (Ruiz,

supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 843-44.)

The Court therefore finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Plaintiff electronically

executed the Agreement on January 4, 2024.

Accordingly, a contractual relationship exists between Plaintiff and TA, and the parties entered

into an agreement to arbitrate.

iii. Delegation Clause

Generally, the court determines the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. (Ajamian v.

CantrorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 781) (Ajamian.) Nonetheless, who decides an

issue is a matter of party agreement. (Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 233,

243, overruled on other grounds per Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Valera (2019) 139 S.Ct. 1407, 1413,

1418-19 (Sandquist); Ajamian, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 781.) As the U.S. Supreme Court

states, “Just as the arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon whether the parties

agreed to arbitrate that dispute, ..., so the question ‘who has the primary power to decide

arbitrability’ turns upon what the parties agreed about that matter.” (First Options of Chicago, Inc.

v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 943 (First Options); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson (2010)

561 U.S. 63, 68-69 (Rent-A-Center).) Thus, the starting point on determining who decides is the

parties’ agreement. (Sandquist, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 243.)

“There are two prerequisites for a delegation clause to be effective. First, the language of the

clause must be clear and unmistakable. (Rent-A-Center, supra, 561 U.S. at p. 69, fn. 1.) Second,

the delegation must not be revocable under state contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or

unconscionability. (Id. at p. 68; Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 242,

citing Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63)

“Parties to an arbitration agreement may agree to delegate to the arbitrator, instead of a court,

questions regarding the enforceability of the agreement. [Citation.] They “can agree to arbitrate

almost any dispute—even a dispute over whether the underlying dispute is subject to

arbitration.” [Citation.]” (Tiri v. Lucky Chances, Inc., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at 241.)

Defendant argues in its Motion that the Agreement contains a delegation clause that clearly and

unmistakably delegated to the arbitrator the resolution of all arbitrability questions. Citing First

Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 940, Defendant argues the arbitrator has

exclusive jurisdiction here to decide any gateway issues regarding the Agreement.

In his Opposition, Plaintiff does not make any direct arguments as to the delegation clause

except to argue that the Agreement cannot delegate anything until the court finds that there is a

contract between the parties.

Defendant replies, arguing Plaintiff does not even attempt to argue the Agreement’s delegation

clause is not clear and unmistakable and as such, concedes the point. Defendant contends

Plaintiff’s argument that the delegation clause fails because no agreement exists is meritless as

set forth above. Further, citing cases such as Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561

U.S. 63, 70–72, Defendant argues challenges to enforceability must be decided by the arbitrator

unless the plaintiff specifically challenges the delegation clause itself. Here, Defendant argues

no such challenge is made and as such, any remaining arguments, including Plaintiff’s claims of

unconscionability, must be resolved in arbitration.

The Court finds the Agreement contains an enforceable delegation clause.

Evidence that the parties intended such a delegation must be “clear and unmistakable” before a

court will enforce a delegation provision. (Mondragon v. Sunrun (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 592,

603.) The “clear and unmistakable” test reflects a heightened standard of proof that reverses the

typical presumption in favor of the arbitration of disputes. (Ibid. Internal citations omitted).

Here, the Agreement states, in pertinent part:

“All challenges to the interpretation or enforceability of any provision of this Agreement shall be

brought before the arbitrator, and the arbitrator shall rule on all questions regarding the

interpretation and enforceability of this Agreement.”

The language expressly assigns to the arbitrator questions concerning the interpretation and

enforceability of the Agreement. It therefore constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the

parties agreed to delegate arbitrability and enforceability questions to the arbitrator.

Plaintiff does not specifically challenge the delegation clause itself on the grounds of fraud,

duress, unconscionability, or any other defense to its revocability. Plaintiff instead argues that

the delegation clause cannot become operative until the Court determines that an agreement

exists.

The Court has now determined that a contractual relationship exists between Plaintiff and TA

and that Plaintiff executed the Agreement. Accordingly, the threshold issue concerning contract

formation has been resolved. Since the Court finds that the parties entered into an Agreement

containing a clear and unmistakable delegation clause, and because Plaintiff has not specifically

challenged the delegation clause itself, the Court will not decide Plaintiff’s remaining challenges

to the enforceability of the Agreement. Those challenges are delegated to the arbitrator pursuant

to the parties’ Agreement.

Accordingly, the Court declines to reach the merits of Plaintiff’s remaining arguments regarding

the enforceability of the Agreement and grants Defendant’s request to compel Plaintiff’s claims

to arbitration.

III. Ruling

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court rules as follows:

1. Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice is DENIED.

2. Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections to the declaration of Major are OVERRULED in their

entirety.

3. Defendant’s evidentiary objections to the declaration of Plaintiff are OVERRULED in their

entirety.

4. Plaintiff’s objections to Defendant’s Notice of Errata and supplemental declaration of Gitig

are OVERRULED in their entirety.

5. The Court finds that Defendant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that

Plaintiff electronically executed the Mutual Agreement to Resolve Disputes and Arbitrate

Claims on January 4, 2024.

6. The Court finds that a contractual relationship exists between Plaintiff and Defendant and

that the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate.

7. The Court finds that the Federal Arbitration Act applies to the parties’ Agreement.

8. The Court finds that the Agreement contains a clear and unmistakable delegation clause

assigning to the arbitrator questions concerning the interpretation and enforceability of

the Agreement.

9. The Court declines to reach Plaintiff’s remaining challenges to the enforceability of the

Agreement because those challenges have been delegated to the arbitrator and Plaintiff

has not specifically challenged the delegation clause itself.

10. Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED.

11. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant are ORDERED to arbitration pursuant to the parties’

Agreement.

12. The action is STAYED pending completion of arbitration pursuant to Code Civ. Proc.,

§1281.4; see also 9 U.S.C. §3. The Court’s Stay Order applies only to moving defendant

TA, not Defendant Richard Rodriguez (DOE 1). It does not appear that Mr. Rodriguez

has been served.