Suncreek Apartments, LLC v. Cambridge Advantaged Properties II, L.P.

(Santa Monica Courthouse: Dept. I) August 26, 2026 DEPARTMENT I LAW AND MOTION RULINGS If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance on the matter, the moving party must contact the opposing party and all other parties who have appeared in the action and confirm that each will submit on the tentative ruling. Please call the court no later than 4:30 p.m. on the court day before the hearing, leave a message with the court clerk at (310) 260-3629 advising her that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling and waive hearing, and finally, serve notice of the Court's ruling on all parties entitled to receive service. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary, and all parties should appear at the hearing.

contract action by plaintiff, who was a landlord, against the guarantor of a lease. But the record is somewhat complicated. There are two related cases between these parties. The first, filed in 2021, resulted in a default judgment in plaintiff's favor. The default was not vacated, and defendant paid the judgment. A Satisfaction of Judgment has been filed in that action. But shortly before the Satisfaction was filed, plaintiff filed another breach of contract action, which is the instant case.

Plaintiff owns property in West Hollywood. The parties entered into a lease on October 15, 2019. It was for 7 years at a monthly rent starting at $15,000. The lease was amended on December 4, 2019. Plaintiff failed to pay rent starting in April 2020 and extending through April 2021, which led to the first action. Plaintiff believed that defendant had abandoned the premises as of December 2021 and sent a notice to that effect to defendant. Defendant responded that he had not abandoned the premises, and plaintiff ultimately gave defendant a new key. The lease relationship then resumed and defendant made payments beginning in January 2022.

Defendant vacated the premises in May 2025, and defendant sent plaintiff a letter so stating. That letter claimed that the lease had become a month to month lease as a result of the events surrounding the first action, and defendant gave 30 days' notice. Defendant also claims that plaintiff holds a $15,000 security deposit. Plaintiff contends that there remains a very significant balance owing and that the lease was not month to month, but rather was governed by the written agreement and thus could not be terminated by defendant on 30 days' notice. Accordingly, plaintiff also sues for future rent.

It appears that defendant's payments were applied first to the oldest amount owed, which may be how the original judgment was satisfied. According to plaintiff, the instant case asserts a balance owing for rent accruing after the first action (and thus not a part of that judgment). Plaintiff seeks a writ of attachment to secure the past due rent as well as lost profits for the period after defendant purported to terminate the lease. Plaintiff seeks a writ for about $700,000.

The court notes as a preliminary matter that there must be an attestation as to the validity in the statements in the application. Plaintiff did not sign the document; counsel did. The court has no reason to believe that counsel has the requisite knowledge to allow such attestation. That is itself a fatal defect. (Sacramento Suncreek Apartments, LLC v. Cambridge Advantaged Properties II, L.P. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1.) In light of the court's ruling, though, this can be (and should be) corrected.

Turning to the merits, a writ of attachment can be sought where to secure a contract claim with a readily ascertainable amount in controversy of not less than $500. The claim here arises out of the alleged breach of a commercial lease agreement. Plaintiff says that the amount is readily ascertainable because the contract sets forth the base rent and the amounts of annual increases. The ledger that plaintiff attached shows unpaid rent of $333,389.26. Plaintiff also claims interest is due.

Defendant, however, disputes the calculation. Defendant states that the lease was month to month as of January 2022 (the court earlier denied a demurrer relating to this issue, but that is not an adjudication on the merits) and that therefore there has been an overcharge from January 2022 to May 2025 because (according to defendant) plaintiff is wrongly contending that the rent escalation clause in the original written lease had the effect of increasing the rent periodically to an amount over the $15,000 per month that defendant actually paid and an improper application of the amounts defendant did pay.

The court is somewhat concerned. The thrust is that the papers in the earlier case essentially forfeited the lease, so the time frame in it is no longer valid and neither are the terms if in fact the lease was forfeit, as defendant claims. However, that is at least a little bit inconsistent with defendant's stated intent at the time that defendant did not want to abandon the property, and the fact of the matter is that although the landlord seems to have regained possession for a short time, possession was restored. It is muddy.

But defendant goes on. He has payment receipts that show the amount owed and the amounts paid. The receipts show receipt of $15,000, but a large amount owing as of a future date. The amount owing does not increase from month to month even though the $15,000 payment is allegedly insufficient to cover the actual rent. That undercuts somewhat the claim of underpayment and the court is not prepared to issue a writ on that at this time.

Further, there is future rent. There is no showing as to what, if any, efforts plaintiff has made to mitigate the damages even assuming that the original lease was not terminated. Once defendant vacated, plaintiff had a duty to try and re-let the premises to mitigate damages. There is no evidence of any such effort, making this part of the claim hard to calculate. There is some evidence as to what was done--paragraph 22 of the Shokrian declaration--but it is not detailed enough. And the ad that was attached to the declaration was dated January 31, 2026. There is no explanation for the eight month delay in that ad.

But all of that said, the court received the reply only Monday. (That is probably because the opposition was only filed the week before). The reply makes a number of points that are potentially compelling. For example, the reply notes that defendant insisted on the application formula and that is how defendant was able to insist on and obtain the Satisfaction of Judgment. In other words, according to plaintiff, defendant did not pay the $15,000/month and an additional sum to satisfy the default judgment, but rather the $15,000/month and nothing more, and that was used to satisfy the judgment and therefore could not keep the rent current (even putting to one side the escalation clause).

The reply also notes that although the prior action did include an option that the lease be forfeited, that was because possession was being sought. When the parties agreed that defendant could remain in possession, that by definition ended the forfeiture option, and the lease remained. And plaintiff makes a compelling case on the math alone. These are strong points and the court wants to consider them. The matter will be CONTINUED. Defendant will have an opportunity to file a sur-reply to address these issues. The court is concerned because the assertions in the reply are fundamentally inconsistent with the assertions made in the opposition under oath.

Case Number: 23SMCV01463 Hearing Date: August 26, 2026 Dept: I The court needs to discuss the effect that this will have on the trial date, especially given the dismissals. The court's inclination is that it makes sense to try all of the case together, as all deal with what is apparently one road that traverses multiple properties. But if the trial date is jeopardized, the court might take a different view of whether consolidation is the best way to go. If plaintiff is claiming that the trial date will need to be vacated, plaintiff will need to be specific as to why in light of the common question of access to plaintiff's property and plaintiff's earlier position that consolidation is appropriate.

Case Number: 24SMCV04056 Hearing Date: August 26, 2026 Dept: I This case involves property. Back in 2015, there was a fire at the property and the units became uninhabitable. The owner at the time, Leovy, allegedly told the tenants (cross complainants here) that he would rebuild the units and he would allow them to move back in when the construction was completed if they wanted to do so. Cross complainants then moved out of the property (which was necessary because of the fire) and lived elsewhere for a while.

In March 2024, cross defendant Fairfax purchased the property. Fairfax has stated that it would not honor Leovy's promise and seeks an order clarifying that there is no obligation on Fairfax to re-let the premises to the prior tenants. The prior tenants have sued to enforce the deal and claim that Fairfax's refusal to let them back is a violation. Fairfax has demurred to that cross complaint.

The parties agree that at the time of the fire (and now) the property was subject to certain rent control ordinances. The court notes that many of the cross complainants have different or slightly different facts--such as whether the agreement to re-lease the property made by Leovy is in writing or oral. But the gist is largely the same so the court discusses them together. In a prior hearing, the court sustained Fairfax's demurrers with leave to amend. The court asked for certain clarifications and suggested that cross complainants try to avoid the kitchen sink approach. (The court notes