Anahit Yesayan v. BMW of North America, LLC and McKenna Motors Torrance, Inc.

to be adjudicated and that defendant is submitting new evidence. Defendant also reiterates its argument that there is good cause. The Court rules as follows: Defendant has shown that its proposed second motion for summary judgment involves different legal theories and distinct material facts rather than the exact issues previously litigated. "A comparison of the arguments and material facts shows that the [defendant's] second motion for summary judgment is not simply a 'reformatted, condensed, or cosmetically repackaged' version of its first motion." Patterson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2007) 155 Cal. App. 4 th 821, 827 (citation omitted). Moreover, defendant has shown good cause based on judicial economy. ORDER The motion is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to give notice of ruling.

Parties: Plaintiff Anahit Yesayan Responding Party: Defendant BMW of North America, LLC Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Costs, and Expenses The Court considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers.

The motion is GRANTED. See Order below. BACKGROUND On June 12, 2025, plaintiff Anahit Yesayan filed a complaint against BMW of North America, LLC and McKenna Motors Torrance, Inc. for (1) fraud and deceit, (2) breach of written warranty under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, (3) breach of implied warranty under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, (4) breach of written warranty under Song-Beverly Act, (5) breach of implied warranty under Song-Beverly Act, (6) violation of Bus. and Prof. Code Sec.17200, (7) violation of Bus. and Prof.

Code Sec.17500, (8) negligence, and (9) strict liability as to a leased 2024 BMW X5 sDrive40i. On May 27, 2026, plaintiff filed notice of settlement. On July 27, 2026, plaintiff filed a memorandum of costs. LEGAL AUTHORITY CCP Sec.1021 states: "Except as attorney's fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties; . . ." CCP Sec.1032(b) states: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a

prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding." CCP Sec.1033.5(a)(10)(B) states that attorney fees when authorized by statute are allowable as costs and may be awarded upon a noticed motion pursuant to CCP Sec.1033.5(c)(5). Civil Code Sec.1794 states, in part: "(a) Any buyer of consumer goods who is damaged by a failure to comply with any obligation under this chapter or under an implied or express warranty or service contract may bring an action for the recovery of damages and other legal and equitable relief. . . . (d) If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action." "The trial court has 'broad authority' to determine the amount of a reasonable attorneys' fees.

PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095. "[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the 'lodestar,' i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate." (Id. ["California courts have consistently held that a computation of time spent on a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys' fee award."].) "Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records."

Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal. App. 3d 553, 559. "General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice." Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass'n (2008) 163 Cal. App. 4 th 550, 564. DISCUSSION Pursuant to Civil Code Sec.1794(d), plaintiff requests an order awarding $68,478 in attorney's fees, $1020 in assistant fees, a multiplier in an amount the Court deems appropriate, and $5532.15 in costs and expenses. Entitlement Plaintiff asserts that the parties executed a Confidential General Release and Settlement Agreement resolving plaintiff's claims.

Plaintiff contends that pursuant to the settlement agreement, plaintiff is entitled to recover her attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses under Civil Code Sec.1794(d). Defendant does not dispute that plaintiff is the prevailing party. The Court finds that plaintiff is the prevailing party. Reasonableness

Plaintiff requests $68,478 in attorney's fees and $1020 in legal assistant fees. The request breakdown is as follows: Hovanes Margarian - $11,760 (16 hrs. x $650/hr. and $750/hr.), Shushanik Margarian - $40,128 (62.40 hrs. x $550/hr. and $670/hr.), Akop Jack Ter-Saakyan - $16,590 (23.70 hrs. x $700/hr.), and $1020 ($150/hr. x 6.8 hrs.) in assistant fees based on 102.10 hours. Counsel states that their hourly rates are higher as this case is on contingency. Counsel also requests an enhancement multiplier because the case was taken on contingency and based on counsel's experience and skill.

In opposition, defendant argues that the hourly rates and hours incurred are excessive and that the Court should reduce to $350/hr. and to no more than 44.7 hours. Defendant also asserts that the Court should apply a 33% reduction for plaintiff's failure to apportion time spent on non-fee claims, and award no more than $10,482.15 in reasonable attorney's fees and to deny a multiplier. Defendant contends that attorney's fees are not recoverable under the first, eighth, and ninth causes of action and that the claims are distinct from Song-Beverly and cannot be deemed to derive from a common core of facts, based on related legal theories, or be so inextricably intertwined that it would be impractical or impossible to separate the attorney time.

Defendant further argues that plaintiff should not recover research and inspection fees that were not reasonably incurred in commencement or prosecution of the action (2.3 hrs.); or fees for excessive overbilling on routine tasks, such as to draft and serve template written discovery (reduce 14.7 hrs. to 3 hrs.) and review discovery responses and document production (reduce 16.4 hrs. to 5 hrs.); drafting complaint (reduce 3.5 hrs. to 1 hr.); routine notices, administrative tasks, intrafirm communications (reduce 6.4 hrs. to.5 hrs.); "avoidable motion practice" (reduce 3.5 hrs. to.5); telephonic mediation participation (reduce 4.4 hrs. to.5 hrs.); post-settlement OSC/dismissal work 1.5 hrs.); motion for attorney fees (reduce 18.2 hrs. to 3 hrs.).

In reply, plaintiff argues that counsel's hourly rates are reasonable and justified. Plaintiff also argues that she is entitled to recover fees related to the fraud, negligence, and strict liability claims because the claims involve a common core of facts or are based on related legal theories and that counsel's work was "inextricably intertwined and could not reasonably be separated by cause of action." Plaintiff further contends that counsel's fees were incurred in good faith and are fully recoverable and addresses the categories raised by defendant.

The Court rules as follows: In consideration of the Court's review of the billing entries and defendant's objections, the Court finds that a reduction in hourly rates and hours is warranted. The Court does not award fees incurred by a legal assistant for proofreading. The Court reduces the attorney hourly rates to a range from $350 to $550. The Court reduces the amount of hours incurred by 47.1 hours, based on time incurred for clerical tasks, duplicative tasks, an attorney inspecting the vehicle (separate and apart from the attorney

attending the expert vehicle inspection), and unreasonable/excessive amount of time drafting complaint/motions and preparing/reviewing discovery. Thus, the Court finds that $24,060 ($350/hr. x 28.8 hrs., $525/hr. x 17.2 hrs., $550/hr. x 9 hrs.) is a reasonable amount for attorney fees. A multiplier is not warranted. Defendant did not raise any arguments in opposition to the request for costs. ORDER The motion is GRANTED. The Court awards $24,060 in attorney fees and $5,532.15 in costs in favor of plaintiff and against defendant BMW of North America, LLC. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of ruling. | Home -->)" -->