NewNew Inc. v. Williams

(Stanley Mosk Courthouse: Dept. 516) August 26, 2026 DEPARTMENT 516 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

Department 516 Hearing Date: August 26, 2026 Case Name: 23STCV23426 Case No.: NewNew Inc. v. Williams Matter: Motion to Vacate Renewed Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Default and/or Default Judgment Moving Party: Defendant Jennifer Williams Responding Party: Plaintiff NewNew Inc. Tentative Ruling: Defendant Jennifer Williams's renewed motion is denied.

On September 27, 2023, Plaintiff NewNew Inc. ("Plaintiff"), a Delaware corporation, filed this action against Defendant Jennifer Williams ("Defendant") and Does 1 through 100. The First Amended Complaint ("FAC") alleged 5 causes of action against Defendant for: (1) breach of contract; (2) attempted extortion; (3) conversion; (4) specific performance; and (5) violation of the Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (Penal Code section 502).

On January 5, 2024, the Court entered entry of default against Defendant. On February 1, 2024, the Court entered a default judgment against Defendant for a total amount of $59,487.05 (for costs and attorney's fees), and a permanent injunction. On April 15, 2024, Plaintiff appealed the Court's judgment. On March 23, 2026, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court's default judgment. On June 18, 2026, the Court denied Defendant's motion to Set/Aside Vacate Default and Default Judgment (CCP 473.5). Defendant moves for a renewed motion to vacate the February 1, 2024, default judgment pursuant to the Court's inherent equitable powers. Plaintiff opposes.

Legal Standard

Renewed Motion Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (b) states: A party who originally made an application for an order which was refused in whole or part, or granted conditionally or on terms, may make a subsequent application for the same order upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, in which case it shall be shown by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. For a failure to comply with this subdivision, any order made on a subsequent application may be revoked or set aside on ex parte motion. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1008, subd. (b).)

"In general, a party may move for reconsideration of a motion within 10 days after the motion is denied, based upon 'new or different facts, circumstances, or law.' (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1008, subd. (a).) In addition, after expiration of the 10-day period to move for reconsideration, a party 'may make a subsequent application for the same order upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law.' (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1008, subd. (b).) Such a motion does not seek reconsideration of the earlier motion but, instead, is simply a new motion that is permitted by the existence of new law or facts--in effect, it renews the earlier motion by submission of a new motion raising the same issues." (UAS Management, Inc. v. Mater Misericordiae Hospital (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 357, 367, as modified on denial of reh'g (Jan. 13, 2009).

Hearing on Motion to Set/Aside Vacate Default, and Default Judgment "To set aside a judgment based upon extrinsic mistake one must satisfy three elements. First, the defaulted party must demonstrate that it has a meritorious case. Secondly, the party seeking to set aside the default must articulate a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action. Lastly, the moving party must demonstrate diligence in seeking to set aside the default once it had been discovered." (Stiles v. Wallis (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1143, 1147 (Stiles).)

""Extrinsic mistake is found when a party becomes incompetent but no guardian ad litem is appointed; when one party relies on another to defend; when there is reliance on an attorney who becomes incapacitated to act; when a mistake led a court to do what it never intended; when a mistaken belief of one party prevented proper notice of the action; or when the complaining party was disabled at the time the judgment was entered. Relief has also been extended to cases involving negligence of a party's attorney in not properly filing an answer."" (Ibid. (emphasis added.))

"When a default judgment has been obtained, equitable relief may be given only in exceptional circumstances. "[W]hen relief under section 473 is available, there is a strong public policy in favor of granting relief and allowing the requesting party his or her day in court. Beyond this period there is a strong public policy in favor of the finality of judgments and only in exceptional circumstances should relief be granted."" (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981-982 (Rappleyea)(emphasis added).)

"Relief is denied, however, if a party has been given notice of an action and has not been prevented from participating therein. He has had an opportunity to present his case to the court and to protect himself from mistake or from any fraud attempted by his adversary." (Kulchar v. Kulchar (1969) 1 Cal.3d 467, 472.)

Analysis

Defendant moves for a renewed motion for the Court to use its inherent equitable authority to vacate the default judgment entered against her on January 5, 2024, based on extrinsic mistake. Defendant contends that the Court's June 18, 2026, ruling fails to take into account Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 and California Rules of Court 2.259 in its denial of Defendant's previous motion. (Williams Decl., P. 10.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6 states that: If the clerk of the court does not file a document received by the court under subparagraph (A) because the document does not comply with applicable filing requirements or the required filing fee has not been paid, the court shall promptly send notice of the rejection of the document for filing to the party or person who submitted the document. The notice of rejection shall state the reasons that the document was rejected for filing and include the date the clerk of the court sent the notice. (Code of Civ. Proc., Sec. 1010.6, subd. (e)(4)(C).)

While California Rules of Court, rule 2.259(b) states that "[i]f the clerk does not file a document because it does not comply with applicable filing requirements or because the required filing fee has not been paid, the court must promptly send notice of the rejection of the document for filing to the electronic filer." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.259(b).) Defendant contends that the Court's failure to send a notice of rejection in her previous motion to "seek relief from the default entered against her," constitutes extrinsic mistake. (Williams Decl., P.P. 4, 7.) Defendant relies on Baske v. Burke (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 38 to support her argument.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Defendant's reliance on Baske is inapposite. The Court agrees with Plaintiff's argument. In Baske, the Court vacated a default judgment because the clerk "mistakenly refused to file papers and documents sent by [the party] as an answer." (Baske v. Burke (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 38, 41 (Baske).) Here, there is no record in the file that Defendant attempted to or filed a responsive pleading to Plaintiff's FAC. Nor does Plaintiff declare under penalty of perjury that she attempted to file a responsive pleading prior to the default judgment entered against her.

Assuming arguendo that the alleged failure of notice constitutes an extrinsic mistake, Baske also instructs that in order for the Court to exercise its inherent equitable authority for relief, the moving party requires "[t]he existence of a meritorious defense to the action is generally regarded as a prerequisite to vacating or setting aside of a default judgment. (Baske, supra, 125 Cal.App.3d at p. 46, Stiles, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 1147.) Defendant fails to make such a showing.

Defendant cites to Stiles, but the Court finds the reliance on Stiles inapplicable. In Stiles, the Court determined that the party seeking relief provided a meritorious case because he filed an answer with his motion to set aside the default. (Stiles, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 1148 ["It has long been established that merely attaching a verification to a proposed answer is sufficient to demonstrate meritoriousness"].) Defendant has not filed a proposed answer to Plaintiff's FAC.

In opposition, Plaintiff cites to Shapiro to support its argument that Defendant has not provided a meritorious defense. In actions of equity "brought to set aside a prior judgment, the plaintiff must " plead and prove that the result in the main action would have been different had the mistake not occurred [citations], since equity will not grant relief to a party who claims only the barren right of being permitted to defend against a claim to which he has no defense. [Citations.]" (Shapiro v. Clark (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1144.) While such a requirement is no longer required for statutory relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 437, subdivision (b), it is required in motions like the one before the Court. (Ibid.)

Defendant argues that she has already returned the laptop which default judgment requires her to return. (Mot., p. 8.) However, it is unclear how Defendant contends that this is sufficient, nor does the Court find that this constitutes a meritorious defense. Defendant's return of Plaintiff's chattel is part of Plaintiff's relief.

Moreover, Defendant contends that she was deprived of procedural fairness because she was not allowed to speak at the March 13 and 25, 2024 hearings. (Ibid.) ""A defendant against whom a default has been entered is out of court and is not entitled to take any further steps in the cause affecting plaintiff's right of action; he cannot thereafter, until such default is set aside in a proper proceeding, file pleadings or move for a new trial, or demand notice of subsequent proceedings. (Hammond Lumber Co. v. Gilkey (1932) 120 Cal.App. 252, 255.) The Court entered an entry of default against Defendant on January 5, 2024. Thus, she was legally barred from participating in the hearings. "The rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation." (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1270.)

Defendant also argues that it was Plaintiff's own demand letter that initiated the negotiations that led to the extortion claims, and that Plaintiff's forensic allegations have never been examined or subject to discovery. However, these arguments made only in her motion are not sufficient to present a meritorious defense. She does not deny the allegations made in Plaintiff's FAC.

The FAC alleges that: Following the termination of her Contractor Non-Disclosure and Services Agreement, [Defendant] illegally retained [Plaintiff's] devices and proprietary data and confidential information to use as an unlawful bargaining chip to extract monetary payments from [Plaintiff]. [Defendant] has gone so far as to threaten to disseminate [Plaintiff's] confidential and proprietary information to the media and business community unless [Plaintiff] meets her illegal demands. Following the notice of termination [Defendant] additionally deleted and altered [Plaintiff's] passwords and hundreds of thousands of emails and files without [Plaintiff's] knowledge or permission. [Plaintiff] now brings this action to stop [Defendant's] unlawful and illegal actions and to force her to return the devices and proprietary information she should have returned months ago. (FAC, P. 1.)

The FAC alleges five causes of action against Defendant for: (1) breach of contract; (2) attempted extortion; (3) conversion; (4) specific performance; and (5) violation of the Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (Penal Code section 502). Yet, Defendant does not address all causes of action in the FAC.

In reply, Defendant argues that she is a Canadian contractor who resided in and performed work in Canada, making it unclear whether California law applies to her. Defendant cites to Sullivan v. Oracle Corp. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1191, 1206, but the Court finds that the case does not support her claim. The court in Sullivan addressed whether Labor Code and Unfair Competition Law claims apply to claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act for overwork performed by nonresidents in other states. (Id. at p. 1206-09.) Plaintiff's causes of action are not regarding wage disputes; thus, the case is inapplicable.

The Court finds for a second time that Defendant has not met the requirements for the Court to exercise its inherent equitable authority to vacate the default judgment against Defendant. Thus, the Court denies Defendant's renewed motion.

Plaintiff's Request for Sanctions Plaintiff requests that the Court impose sanctions against Defendant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (d). Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (d) provides that "A violation of this section may be punished as a contempt and with sanctions as allowed by Section 128.7." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1008, subd. (d).) As an initial matter, the request for sanctions is procedurally improper, but the Court also finds that sanctions are not warranted. Thus, the request for sanctions is denied.

Because the Court finds that Defendant does not meet the requirements for relief, the Court will not address the remaining arguments made in the moving papers and opposition.

Conclusion

Defendant