Trammell v. LA County Dept. of Health Services

CASE NUMBER: 23STCV25673 SAC FILED: 05-29-25 NOTICE: OK PROCEEDINGS: AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION MOVING PARTY: Defendant County of Los Angeles RESP. PARTY: None MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION (CCP Sec. 437c) TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant County of Los Angeles' unopposed Amended Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Moving party is ordered to give notice. SERVICE: [X] Proof of Service Timely Filed (CRC, rule 3.1300) OK [X] Correct Address (CCP Sec.Sec. 1013, 1013a) OK [X] 16/21 Court Days Lapsed (CCP Sec.Sec. 12c, 1005(b)) OK OPPOSITION: None

filed as of August 24, 2026 [] Late [X] None REPLY: None filed as of August 24, 2026 [] Late [X] None ANALYSIS: I.

Background

On October 20, 2023, Plaintiff Cherelka Trammell ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro per, filed the instant action against Defendant Los Angeles County Department of Health Services ("Defendant").

On March 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") against Defendant.

On May 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") against Defendant, alleging 10 causes of action arising out Plaintiff's employment for Defendant.

On July 3, 2025, Defendant filed an Answer.

On April 21, 2026, Defendant filed the Motion for Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Adjudication of Issues (the "Motion").

On June 5, 2026, Defendant filed and served the instant Amended Motion.

On August 14, 2026, Defendant filed a Notice of Non-Opposition regarding the Amended Motion.

To date, no Opposition has been filed.

II. Procedural Issues

California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350, subdivision (d) requires that a Separate Statement "separately identify: (A) Each cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion; and (B) Each supporting material fact claimed to be without dispute with respect to the cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350, subd. (d)(1).)

Further, "[t]he separate statement should include only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of the motion." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350, subd. (d)(2).)

The Separate Statement here violates the California Rules of Court as it fails to note which element of each specific cause of action each recitation in the Separate Statement refers. (See e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(h) [illustrating formats for separate statements for motion for summary judgment and summary adjudication].)

Further, the Separate Statement includes both nonmaterial facts and material facts.

The Court admonishes Defendant that a separate statement is meant to be "a concise list of the material facts and the evidence that supports them." (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 875, superseded by statute on other grounds.)

It should "provide[] a convenient and expeditious vehicle" to resolve matters in a summary fashion. (Collins v. Hertz Corp. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 64, 74, italics added.)

Furthermore, the Court finds the Amended Motion oscillates between arguments relating to a motion for summary judgment or adjudication and a motion for judgment on the pleadings/demurrer.

However, given the defects on the face of the SAC, the Court proceeds to address the Amended Motion on the merits.

III.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper "if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 437c, subd. (c).)

The moving party "bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).)

To secure summary judgment, a moving defendant may prove an affirmative defense, disprove at least one essential element of the Plaintiff's cause of action . . . or show that an element of the cause of action cannot be established." (Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg Co. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1465; Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

"The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff's cause of action. The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence--as through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing. But . . . the defendant must indeed present evidence." (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)

"In other words, all that the defendant need do is to show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action--for example, that the plaintiff cannot prove element X." (Id., at 853.)

Summary judgment in California "may be reduced to, and justified by, a single proposition: If a party moving for summary judgment in any action . . . would prevail at trial without submission of any issue of material fact to a trier of fact for determination, then he should prevail on summary judgment. In such a case . . . the 'court should grant' the motion 'and "avoid a . . . trial' rendered 'useless' by nonsuit or directed verdict or similar device. (Id., at p. 855.)

Until the moving defendant has discharged its burden of proof, the opposing plaintiff has no burden to come forward with any evidence.

Once the moving defendant has discharged its burden as to a particular cause of action, however, the plaintiff may defeat the motion by producing evidence showing that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (p)(2).)

On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party's supporting documents are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against granting the motion. (D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21.)

Code of Civil Procedure Section 437c, subdivision (f) provides that a party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action or one or more claims for damages if it is contended that the cause or claim has no merit.

Motions for summary adjudication are procedurally identical to motions for summary judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (f)(2); see Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 859.)

IV.

Discussion

Timeliness

The Amended Motion was filed and served by personal service on June 5, 2026 (Amended Motion, Proof of Service), and the time appointed for hearing on the Amended Motion was August 26, 2026.

Code of Civil Procedure section 437c provides in pertinent part: A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.

The motion may be made at any time after 60 days have elapsed since the general appearance in the action or proceeding of each party against whom the motion is directed or at any earlier time after the general appearance that the court, with or without notice and upon good cause shown, may direct.

Notice of the motion and supporting papers shall be served on all other parties to the action at least 81 days before the time appointed for hearing.

If the notice is served by mail, the required 81-day period of notice shall be increased by 5 days if the place of address is within the State of California, 10 days if the place of address is outside the State of California but within the United States, and 20 days if the place of address is outside the United States.

If the notice is served by facsimile transmission, express mail, or another method of delivery providing for overnight delivery, the required 81-day period of notice shall be increased by two court days.

The motion shall be heard no later than 30 days before the date of trial, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise.

The filing of the motion shall not extend the time within which a party must otherwise file a responsive pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 437c, subd. (a)(1)-(3).)

Here, the Amended Motion was filed and served 82 days before the time appointed for hearing.

The Jury Trial in this matter is scheduled for September 28, 2026, and the Amended Motion is scheduled for hearing on August 26, 2026.

Thus, the Amended Motion is being heard 30 days before trial.

Accordingly, the Amended Motion is timely.

Initial Matters

As an initial matter, the Court finds there are defects apparent on the face of the SAC.

"[W]here a defect appears on the face of the complaint, a trial court may elect to treat the hearing of the summary judgment motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings and grant the opposing party an opportunity to file an amended complaint to correct the defect." (Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 614, 625, overruled on other grounds; see also Oroville Dam Cases (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 173, 180; Taylor v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 472, 479-480.)

Indeed, in evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the trial court's first step is to identify the issues framed by the pleadings. (See Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1662.)

" 'Where a complaint does not state a cognizable claim, it is not necessary to proceed to the second step, since a defendant has no obligation to present evidence to negate a legally inadequate claim. "[A] defendant 's motion for summary judgment 'necessarily includes a test of the sufficiency of the complaint....' Motions for summary judgment in such situations [sic] have otherwise been allowed as being in legal effect motions for judgment on the pleadings. [Citations.]" ' [Citation.] ' " 'Thus, if the reviewing court finds the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action as a matter of law, it need not reach the question whether plaintiff's opposition to the summary judgment motion raises a triable issue of fact.' " ' " (Id., at pp. 1662-1663.)

As such, the Court elects to treat the instant hearing on the Amended Motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Causes of Action Nos. 1, 3, 6, 9

Here, the Court finds the SAC fails to plead sufficient facts to state Plaintiff's alleged disability.

Indeed, the SAC is completely devoid of any facts describing Plaintiff's alleged disability.

The SAC merely contains broad references to a "disability" and statutory language regarding the general definitions of disability.

This is insufficient to state cognizable causes of action based upon a disability. (See e.g., Faust v. Cal. Portland Cement Co. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 864, 886 ["A prima facie case for discrimination 'on grounds of physical disability under the FEHA requires plaintiff to show: (1) he suffers from a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to do his job; and, (3) he was subjected to adverse employment action because of his disability' "];

In re M.S. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1252 [" 'To state a claim of disability discrimination under Title II, the plaintiff must allege four elements: (1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity's services, programs, or activities; (3) the plaintiff was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability' "]; Civ. Code Sec. 51.)

Given the SAC's lack of cognizable first, third, sixth, and ninth causes of action, the Court finds the SAC is insufficiently pled and, as such, treats the instant motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first, third, sixth, and ninth causes of action. (See Hobson, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 625; Bostrom, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1662; see also Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 438, subd. (b) ["The court may upon its own motion grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings"].)

Notably, there is no Opposition or response to the Amended Motion filed demonstrating why the Court should grant leave to amend the SAC.

As such, the Court GRANTS the Amended Motion as the first, third, sixth, and ninth causes of action.

Causes of Action Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6, 8

Government Code section 12965, subdivision (C)(1)(D) states that "person claiming to be aggrieved may bring a civil action under this part against the person, employer, labor organization, or employment agency named in the verified complaint within one year from the date of that notice."

Here, the SAC states the Department of Fair Employment and Housing issued a right-to-sue notice on July 26, 2022; however, this action was not brought until October 20, 2023. (See SAC, p. 3.)

The face of the SAC thus demonstrates that the instant action was not brought within the time allowed pursuant to the Government Code section 12965. (See SAC; Amended Motion, p. 5.)

As such, the Court finds the SAC fails to plead sufficient facts to state the FEHA causes of action - namely, the first, second, fifth, sixth, and eighth causes of action.

The Court finds the SAC is insufficiently pled and, as such, treats the instant motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first, second, fifth, sixth, and eighth causes of action. (See Hobson, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 625; Bostrom, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1662; see also Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 438, subd. (b) ["The court may upon its own motion grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings"].)

Notably, there is no Opposition or response to the Amended Motion filed demonstrating why the Court should grant leave to amend the SAC.

As such, the Court GRANTS the Amended Motion as the first, second, fifth, sixth, and eighth causes of action.

Cause of Action No. 4

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."

Here, the SAC states that Plaintiff "was denied access to work on May 29, 2020; in favor of Latino/Hispanic employees. Plaintiff was targeted and subjected to harassment by Latino/Hispanic Sheriff Deputies and/or Caucasian Sheriff Deputies." (See SAC, pp. 4, 9-10.)

The Court is unable to ascertain what "denied access to work" means in the context of this SAC, and thus is unable to find that the SAC states sufficient facts to state the fourth cause of action for Violation of Title VII.

The Court finds the SAC is insufficiently pled and, as such, treats the instant motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the fourth cause of action. (See Hobson, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 625; Bostrom, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1662; see also Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 438, subd. (b) ["The court may upon its own motion grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings"].)

Notably, there is no Opposition or response to the Amended Motion filed demonstrating why the Court should grant leave to amend the SAC.

As such, the Court GRANTS the Amended Motion as the fourth cause of action.

Cause of Action No. 7

Labor Code section 1102.5 states, in pertinent part: (b) An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information, or because the employer believes that the employee disclosed or may disclose information, to a government or law enforcement agency, to a person with authority over the employee or another employee who has the authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, or for providing information to, or testifying before, any public body conducting an investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the employee's job duties.

... (d) An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for having exercised their rights under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) in any former employment. (e) A report made by an employee of a government agency to their employer is a disclosure of information to a government or law enforcement agency pursuant to subdivisions (a) and (b). (Lab. Code, Sec. 1102.5, subds. (b), (d)-(e).)

Here, the SAC alleges "Plaintiff raised complaints of workplace harassment and racial discrimination, and the Defendant retaliated against her by discriminating against her and taking adverse employment actions against her, including subjecting the Plaintiff to forcibly resign from her position with the County of Los Angeles Department of Health Services; denying Plaintiff's rights to full and equal use of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services the Defendant offers to employees." (SAC, p. 14.)

The SAC fails to allege to which individuals exactly at Defendant that Plaintiff reported workplace harassment and racial discrimination to, and which individuals at Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff.

Further, there are no facts in the SAC as to the vaguely referenced "forcibl[e] resign[ation]" and how this forced resignation was tied to Plaintiff's report of harassment and discrimination.

The Court is unable to glean enough facts from the SAC to find the seventh cause of action is adequately pled.

The Court finds the SAC is insufficiently pled and, as such, treats the instant motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the seventh cause of action. (See Hobson, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 625; Bostrom, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1662; see also Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 438, subd. (b) ["The court may upon its own motion grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings"].)

Notably, there is no Opposition or response to the Amended Motion filed demonstrating why the Court should grant leave to amend the SAC.

As such, the Court GRANTS the Amended Motion as the seventh cause of action.

Cause of Action No. 10

To state a Civil Rights Violation under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, " 'the defendant in a [section] 1983 action [must] have exercised power "possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.' [Citations.]" ' " (Tichinin v. City of Morgan Hill (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1063.)

Further, the defendant's conduct must have " ' "deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." ' " (Vergos v. McNeal (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1402.)

Here, the Court finds the SAC fails to plead sufficient facts to state a Civil Rights Violation against the Defendant municipality as there are no particularized, specific, and nonconclusory facts demonstrating how Defendant's policy and/or someone in Defendant with authority to make municipal policy deprived Plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity. (See Harman v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1296 [according to the Monell decision addressing 42 USC section 1983: " 'Congress did not intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional tort.' "]; Breneric Assocs. v.

City of Del Mar (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 166, 180 ["A plaintiff seeking recovery under section 1983 must plead more than constitutional 'buzzwords' to survive demurrer.... The plaintiff must allege specific and nonconclusory facts showing the defendant's acts deprived him of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or federal laws."]; Bach v. County of Butte (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 554, 564 ["Some particularized facts demonstrating a constitutional deprivation are needed to sustain a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act"].)

The Court finds the SAC is insufficiently pled and, as such, treats the instant motion as a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the tenth cause of action. (See Hobson, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 625; Bostrom, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1662; see also Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 438, subd. (b) ["The court may upon its own motion grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings"].)

Notably, there is no Opposition or response to the Amended Motion filed demonstrating why the Court should grant leave to amend the SAC.

As such, the Court GRANTS the Amended Motion as the tenth cause of action.

Thus, the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

V. Conclusion & Order

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant County of Los Angeles' unopposed Amended Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

Moving party is ordered to give notice.

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