Production Services Inc., et al. v. Rivian Automotive LLC

Decl., P. 5, Exh. D; SROG Geraghty Decl., P. 5, Exh. D.) However, Plaintiff failed to respond to this correspondence or to provide any supplemental responses. (FROG Geraghty Decl., P.P. 6-7; SROG Geraghty Decl., P.P. 6-7.)

The Court finds that Defendant did not adequately meet and confer in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 2016.040. Defendant's counsel failed to make an effort to meet in person, by telephone, or via video conference to discuss the issues at hand. Instead, Defendant's counsel sent a singular meet-and-confer letter, which the Court observes fails to address the individual interrogatories or to provide a rationale as to why Plaintiff's objections are meritless. (FROG Geraghty Decl., P. 5, Exh. D; SROG Geraghty Decl., P. 5, Exh. D.) Consequently, the Court does not consider this a sufficient attempt to meet and confer prior to bringing these motions.

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant's motions to compel further responses and the accompanying requests for sanctions.

ORDERS

1) Defendant FCA US, LLC's Motion to Compel Plaintiff Jimmy Lee Jackson Jr. to Provide Further Responses, without Objections, to Defendant's Form Interrogatories is DENIED.

2) Defendant FCA US, LLC's Motion to Compel Plaintiff Jimmy Lee Jackson Jr. to Provide Further Responses to Defendant's Special Interrogatories is DENIED.

3) Defendant FCA US, LLC's Requests for Monetary Sanctions are DENIED.

4) Defendant is ordered to give notice of this Court's ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 26, 2026 _____________________________ Tamara Hall Judge of the Superior Court

Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles - SOUTHWEST District Department 5 PRODUCTION SERVICES INC., et al.; Plaintiffs, vs. RIVIAN AUTOMOTIVE LLC

; Defendant. | Case No.: |

| | | Hearing Date: | August 26, 2026 | | | Time: | 8:30 a.m. | | | [tentative] Order RE: (1) PLAINTIFFS PRODUCTIONS SERVICES INC. AND DANOVAN ROWLEY'S MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS UNDER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT | MOVING PARTY: Plaintiffs, Production Services Inc. and Danovan Rowley RESPONDING PARTY: Defendant, Rivian Automotive, LLC

(1) Plaintiffs Production Services Inc. and Danovan Rowley's Motion for Determination of Attorney Fees and Costs under Settlement Agreement is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $16,142.29 pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d). The Court considers the moving papers filed on July 14, 2026, the opposition filed on August 13, 2026, and the reply brief filed on August 19, 2026.

BACKGROUND

Factual Background

On August 11, 2025, plaintiffs Production Services Inc. and Danovan Rowley (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed the Complaint against defendants Rivian Automotive, LLC ("Defendant") and DOES 1 through 10. The Complaint includes the following causes of action: (1) Violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act and (2) Violation of the Federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

On April 7, 2026, the parties reached a settlement amounting to $119,504.79. (Declaration of Timothy Whelan ("Whelan Decl."), P. 5.) The settlement agreement designates Plaintiffs as the prevailing parties for the purposes of this motion. (Whelan Decl., P. 5.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Attorneys' fees are allowed as costs when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc, Sec. 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)(B).) In a lemon law action, costs and expenses, including attorney's fees, may be recovered by a prevailing buyer under the Song-Beverly Act and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. (See Civ. Code, Sec. 1794, subd. (d); see also 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2310(d)(2).)

Civil Code section 1794 provides: "If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action." (Civ. Code, Sec. 1794, subd. (d).)

United States Code section 2310 states: "If a consumer finally prevails in any action brought under paragraph (1) of this subsection, he may be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of cost and expenses (including attorneys' fees based on actual time expended) determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the plaintiff for or in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action, unless the court in its discretion shall determine that such an award of attorneys' fees would be inappropriate." (15 U.S.C. Sec. 2310(d)(2).)

Thus, the statutes include a "reasonable attorney's fees" standard. The attorney bears the burden of proof as to the "reasonableness" of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1033.5, subd. (c)(5).) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.) "Testimony of an attorney as to the number of hours worked on a particular case is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records." (Ibid.)

A plaintiff's verified billing invoices are prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses, and services listed were necessarily incurred. (See Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682.) "In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice." (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488, quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass'n (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

The Court has discretion to reduce fees that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time. (Horsford v. Bd. of Trustees of California State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal. App. 4th 359, 395.) In determining a reasonable attorney fee, the trial court begins with the lodestar, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 36.) The lodestar may then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case in order to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided. (Ibid.)

The factors that courts look at to determine if a multiplier is reasonable are: "(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; (3) the contingent nature of the fee award" and (4) the success achieved. (Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 (Serrano).)

No specific findings reflecting the court's calculations are required. The record only needs to show that the attorney's fees were awarded according to the "lodestar" or "touchstone" approach. The court's focus in evaluating the facts should be to provide a fee award reasonably designed to completely compensate attorneys for the services provided.¿ The starting point for this determination is the attorney's time records. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of Calif. State Univ. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 395-397 [verified time records entitled to credence absent clear indication they are erroneous].)

However, California case law permits fee awards in the absence of detailed time sheets. (Sommers v. Erb (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1644, 1651; Dunk v. Ford Motor Co. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1794, 1810; Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 103.) An experienced trial judge is in a position to assess the value of the professional services rendered in his or her court. (Serrano, supra, 20 Cal.3d 25 at p. 49.)

DISCUSSION

It is undisputed that Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties in this action and are therefore entitled to attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to Civil Code section 1794, subdivision (d), and United States Code section 2310, subdivision (b)(2) . (Motion, pp. 2:16-3:5.)

Plaintiffs move for a total award of $19,236.29, which encompasses (1) $15,470.00 in attorneys' fees, (2) a 20% multiplier amounting to $3,094.00, and (3) $672.29 in costs and expenses. (Motion, pp. 1:7-10, 7:16-18.) Upon reviewing the reasonableness of the requested fees, the Court has determined that a more appropriate award is $16,142.29.

However, before beginning its analysis, the Court notes that Defendant has submitted Exhibit A as a list of proposed reductions. (Declaration of Donna Hooper ("Hopper Decl."), P. 2, Exh. A.) As Plaintiffs aptly point out, "[D]efendant improperly attempted to bypass the page limitation for its opposition by tacking on three and a half more pages of single-spaced, small-font complaints in its Exhibit A. Not only does the exhibit represent an improper expansion of the opposition, but it also is devoid of any evidence or authority." (Reply, p. 10:1-4.) For these reasons, the Court will not consider the reductions proposed solely in Exhibit A but will take into account the reductions suggested in Defendant's opposition brief.

Reasonableness of the Hourly Rates

Plaintiffs request the hourly rates detailed in the following table. (Whelan Decl., P.P. 1, 8-9, 15, Exh. 1; Declaration of Mark Romano ("Romano Decl."), P.P. 1-2.)

Name | Position | Years of Experience | 2025 Hourly Rate | 2026 Hourly Rate | Timothy Whelan | Partner | 17 | $600.00 | $600.00 | Mark Romano | Attorney | 34 | $700.00 | $700.00 |

"Under our precedents, the unadorned lodestar reflects the general local hourly rate for a fee-bearing case; it does not include any compensation for contingent risk, extraordinary skill, or any other factors a trial court may consider under Serrano III." (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1139, internal citation and quotations omitted (Ketchum).)

"It has long been recognized, however, that the contingent and deferred nature of the fee award in a civil rights or other case with statutory attorney fees requires that the fee be adjusted in some manner to reflect the fact that the fair market value of legal services provided on that basis is greater than the equivalent noncontingent hourly rate. (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1132-1133, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 17 P.3d 735.) ' "A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second of these functions.

If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee award cases." ' (Id. at p. 1133, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 17 P.3d 735, quoting with approval from Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards (1981) 90 Yale L.J. 473, 480.) The contingency adjustment may be made at the lodestar phase of the court's calculation or by applying a multiplier to the noncontingency lodestar calculation (but not both). (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1133-1134, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 17 P.3d 735.)" (Horsford v.

Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.359, 394-395, emphasis added (Horsford).)

"In determining hourly rates, the court must look to the 'prevailing market rates in the relevant community.' [Citation.] The rates of comparable attorneys in the forum district are usually used. [Citation.] In making its calculation, the court should also consider the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees. [Citation.] The court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate. [Citation.] Affidavits of the plaintiffs' attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs' attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate. [Citation.]" (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009, internal citations and quotations omitted.)

Defendant contends that the requested hourly rates are excessive on the grounds that they are contingent hourly rates rather than reflective of noncontingent market rates. (Opp., pp. 8:14-9:11.) Furthermore, Defendant alleges that Plaintiffs have not provided evidence of the noncontingent market rates typically associated with lemon law cases, as mandated by Ketchum. (Opp., pp. 9:12-10:13.)

The Court, however, finds this argument unpersuasive. As previously indicated, the lodestar calculation phase permits a contingency adjustment to account for the reality that the fair market value of legal services provided on a contingent basis generally exceeds the equivalent noncontingent hourly rate. (Horsford, supra, 132 Cal.App.359 at pp. 394-395.) Consequently, the Court may award Plaintiffs the prevailing hourly rate for private attorneys in the community who engage in similar contingent litigation. There is no requisite to consider noncontingent market rates, including those charged by Defendant's legal counsel, in determining the appropriate hourly rates for this case.

In the present case, Whelan and Romano's declarations present a detailed account of their qualifications and experience. (Whelan Decl., P.P. 1, 8-11, 15-16, Exhs. 1-10; Romano Decl., P.P. 1-5.) With reference to these declarations and the Court's own familiarity with the billing rates of Los Angeles-area counsel in similar lemon law cases, the Court finds that the attorneys' rates are reasonable due to their experience and qualifications.

Reasonableness of the Hours Incurred

Template Complaint

Defendant contends that the Court should decline to award $840.00 in attorney's fees associated with drafting the Complaint. (Opp., p. 14:7-12.) Defendant contends that, since Plaintiffs' counsel utilizes templated complaints, the necessary changes should "not take more than.4 hours to accomplish including the supporting documents[.]" (Opp., p. 14:10-11.)

The Court disagrees. The Court finds that the 1.4 hours allocated for drafting the Complaint is appropriate, as the unique circumstances surrounding each case necessitate a thorough evaluation of the pertinent facts and the applicable causes of action against Defendant. Consequently, the Court finds that the hours claimed are reasonable and declines to reduce the requested attorney's fees on this ground.

Discovery

Defendant contends that the Court should decline to award $1,140.00 in attorneys' fees associated with discovery. (Opp., p. 14:13-26.) Defendant argues that discovery was unnecessary because it offered to repurchase the vehicle, and that Plaintiffs' counsel obstructed settlement discussions by failing to provide certain financial documents. (Opp., p. 14:14-23.) Furthermore, Defendant argues that the billing rates for discovery are excessive, claiming that Plaintiffs employed templated discovery requests that a paralegal could have easily modified. (Opp., p. 14:23-25.)

The Court disagrees with both arguments. First, the Court observes that while Defendant extended an offer to repurchase the vehicle, a specific monetary amount was not provided. (Hopper Decl., P. 5.) Additionally, as emphasized by Plaintiffs, "a buyback is not the sole relief available under the Song-Beverly Act. Instead, a consumer may recover a civil penalty for a defendant's willful failure to comply with the Act. Cal. Civ. Code Sec. 1794(c). As a result, discovery was needed to evaluate any offer from defendant and determine whether defendant was liable for a civil penalty, in addition to obtaining evidence and information for evaluating and refuting defendant's 46 affirmative defenses and proving Plaintiffs' claims at trial. (Id.)." (Reply, p. 8:18-23.)

Thus, pursuing discovery was indispensable for a comprehensive evaluation of the case, irrespective of Defendant's potential objections to the discovery requests.

Regarding the assertion that the billing rates are excessive because a paralegal could have conducted edits to the templated discovery requests, the Court similarly disagrees. Defendant has provided a set of discovery requests filed in this case for comparative analysis. (Hopper Decl., P. 8, Exhs. D1-D2.) The Court notes that the discovery requests vary due to the distinct factual circumstances of each case. Therefore, it is reasonable for attorneys with greater experience and legal expertise than a paralegal to allocate time to make the necessary modifications to the templated discovery. Consequently, the Court finds that the hours claimed are reasonable and declines to reduce the requested attorneys' fees on this ground.

Fee Motion

Defendant contends that the Court should decline to award $2,110.00 in attorney's fees associated with this fee motion. (Opp., pp. 14:27-15:5.) Specifically, Defendant argues that "6.5 hours to review this opposition and prepare a reply and appear at the hearing is excessive and should be reduced to 3.0 hours." (Opp., p. 14:4-5.)

The Court disagrees. Defendant filed a lengthy opposition, which necessitated over six hours of work for Plaintiffs' counsel to review the opposition brief and draft the reply brief. (Supplemental Declaration of Timothy Whelan ("Suppl. Whelan Decl."), P. 9.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs' counsel will require at least an additional thirty minutes to prepare for and attend the hearing on this motion. (Suppl. Whelan Decl., P. 9.) Consequently, the Court finds that the hours claimed are reasonable and declines to reduce the requested attorney's fees on this ground.

Intake, Emails, Administrative, and Clerical Work

Defendant contends that the Court should decline to award $1,440.00 in attorneys' fees associated with various tasks that are allegedly clerical and administrative in nature, arguing that such activities are either non-billable, inflated, or should be compensated at a reduced billing rate. (Opp., p. 15:6-19.)

The Court disagrees. Defendant asserts, "Clerical tasks - calendaring, preparing proofs of service, internal filing, preparing binders for a hearing, and scanning, reserving hearing dates are examples of tasks that have been found to be purely clerical and thus non-compensable or compensable at a reduced billing rate. (Save Our Uniquely Rural Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1187.)" (Opp., p. 15:10-15.)

The Court notes that this interpretation of the Court of Appeal's ruling is somewhat inaccurate. The Court of Appeal did not categorically classify these tasks as non-compensable; rather, it indicated that a trial court may determine that the billing rates and hours are excessive in relation to these activities. (Save Our Uniquely Rural Community Environment v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1187.)

Upon thorough review of Defendant's proposed reductions, the Court does not categorize these tasks as clerical or administrative. Furthermore, the Court finds the time allocated to these activities to be reasonable. Consequently, the Court finds that the hours claimed are reasonable and declines to reduce the requested attorneys' fees on these grounds.

Loadstar Multiplier

Plaintiffs contend that their legal counsel should be granted a lodestar multiplier of 20%. (Motion, pp. 6:17-7:18.) They assert that such a multiplier is warranted due to "the excellent result obtained, the skill of counsel, the risk of taking this case on a contingent basis, and the delay in payment of one year since the beginning of this case in August 2025." (Motion, p. 7:16-18.)

The Court disagrees. The factors that courts look at to determine if a multiplier is reasonable are: "(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; (3) the contingent nature of the fee award" and (4) the success achieved. (Serrano, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 49.)

Nonetheless, courts must not consider extraordinary skill and the other Serrano factors to the extent these are already included in the lodestar. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138-1139.) "[A] trial court should award a multiplier for exceptional representation only when the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience billing at the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation. Otherwise, the fee award will result in unfair double counting and be unreasonable." (Id. at p. 1139.)

The Court finds that a lodestar multiplier is not appropriate for this case, given the circumstances. This is a straightforward lemon law case, and there is nothing to suggest that it involves novel issues or that the quality of representation exceeded what would typically be provided by attorneys of comparable skill and experience billing at similar rates. Furthermore, there is no indication that the settlement was "excellent." Additionally, Plaintiffs do not argue that their counsel was unable to take on more cases.

While Plaintiffs assert that their counsel accepted the case solely on a contingency basis and experienced delayed payment, the Court believes that these considerations and the associated risks are already accounted for in the lodestar amount. This is because the substantial hourly rates approved by the Court reflect those typically charged for lemon law cases pursued on a contingency basis. Based on the foregoing, the Court declines to grant a lodestar multiplier.

Costs and Expenses

Plaintiffs seek reimbursement in the amount of $672.29 for incurred costs and expenses. (Motion, pp. 7:19-8:18.) In support of this request, Plaintiffs have included a memorandum of costs. (Whelan Decl., P. 17, Exh. 11.) The costs appear to be reasonable on their face, and Defendant did not submit any objections to the requested sum. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the requested amount is appropriate.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion in the reduced amount of $ 16,142.29 ($ 19,236.29- $3,094.00).

ORDERS

1) Plaintiffs Production Services Inc. and Danovan Rowley's Motion for Determination of Attorney Fees and Costs under Settlement Agreement is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $16,142.29.

2) Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice of this Court's ruling.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 26, 2026 _____________________________ Tamara Hall Judge of the Superior Court | Home -->)" -->