City of El Monte v. 4610 Peck, LLC et al.

otherwise transmitted to the trial court before the cases were dismissed"]; Sayta v. Chu (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 960, 967 [court did not retain jurisdiction where no request was made and settlement providing for retained jurisdiction was not provided to the court before dismissal].) (Mesa was cited by moving Defendants but not addressed in opposition.) [1]

If anything, the opposition seems to tacitly concede the settlement was not provided to the court by arguing that the settlement agreement was signed on March 9, 2020, and the request for dismissal was filed on March 17, 2020, days after the settlement agreement was signed. But the statute does not read, for example, That the court retains jurisdiction so long as the request is written in a settlement agreement that can be filed after dismissal. No.

The statute states that " If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If the parties to the settlement agreement or their counsel stipulate in writing or orally before the court, the court may dismiss the case as to the settling parties without prejudice and retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement." (emphasis added.)

The statute does not read that The parties to a dismissed case may stipulate that the court retain jurisdiction. To the extent that Plaintiff argues " There is never a single requirement that the request must only be made before the court," this court cannot and will not rewrite a clear statute.

In sum, as correctly argued by moving Defendants, the Settlement Agreement allowing the court to retain jurisdiction is not enough for this court to actually retain jurisdiction because the request was never made to the court itself before dismissal. Accordingly, since the the court did retain jurisdiction over the parties pursuant to the settlement agreement, the judgment is void because the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and that is shown on the face of the record without the need to consider extrinsic evidence. (See e.g., Hagan Engineering Inc. v. Mills (2003) 115 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1008 ["The settlement language purporting to vest the trial court with retained jurisdiction after the dismissal was a nullity: Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, waiver or estoppel."].) With that, the court need not address the other arguments.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the motion is GRANTED. [1] Since Mesa, the Legislature amended section 664.6. (Stats. 2020, ch. 290, Sec. 1.) That amendment was designed to overturn Levy's holding that the litigants themselves must sign (or orally stipulate to) a section 664.6 settlement for it to be effective.

Plaintiff's Application for Entry of Default Judgment is CONTINUED to Thursday, October 1, 2026 at 9 AM for supplemental briefing; the brief is due by Monday, 9/21/26.

Background

This is a complaint for abatement, injunction, equitable relief, and civil penalties arising from the alleged illegal marijuana cultivation. On March 4, 2022, Plaintiff the City of El Monte filed suit against Defendants 4610 Peck, LLC, Shu Qing Lao, and Xuefent Zhao. On August 25, 2023, Defendant 4610 Peck, LLC (the owner of the property) filed an answer. On February 6, 2024, default was entered against Zhao. On March 31, 2024, default was entered against Liao. On May 14, 2024, a CMC was held wherein the parties stated they were in settlement discussions and they believed the matter would resolve. On May 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed a notice of dismissal of the complaint as to 4610 Peck, LLC. On October 13, 2025, the instant request for entry of default judgment was filed.

Discussion

The City of El Monte seeks entry of default in the following amount: $4,419,844.70, consisting of $4,373,600 in civil penalties and $46,244.75 in attorney's fees and costs [Defendant Liao, individually, is hereby assessed a total civil penalty of $2,186,800 and Defendant Zhao, individually, is hereby assessed a total civil penalty of $2,186,800]. (Proposed Judgment.)

After a review of the papers, the court seeks supplemental briefing as to why the court should hold Defendant individually liable for the civil penalties rather than jointly and severally. For example, as to the 1 st COA, Plaintiff seek that Defendants, each of them individually, are assessed a civil penalty to pay to the City in the amount of $25,000 pursuant to Health and Safety Code sections 11581(b)(2); as to the 3 rd COA that Defendants, and each of them individually, are hereby assessed a civil penalty to pay to the City in the amount of $180,000 pursuant to El Monte Municipal Code sections 5.18.010, 5.18.040, 5.18.360, 5.18.370, 5.18.380, 1.24.010(A); and as to the 5 th COA Defendants, and each of them individually, are hereby assessed a civil penalty to pay to the City in the amount of $1,981,800, pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 26038(a)(1).

After all, the same offense is being committed which is but the very premise of joint and several liability. Additionally, Plaintiff has not provided (via a request for judicial notice or in the complaint) the exact and entirety of the various EMCC sections they seek to impose individual liability.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court is not inclined to enter judgment against Defendants each individually but instead jointly and severally. With that, the court asks for supplemental briefing on why judgment should be entered otherwise. The matter is continued to 10/1 at 9 AM; the supplemental brief must be filed by Monday, September 21, 2026.

Case Number: 24PSCV02496 Hearing Date: August 27, 2026 Dept: O Tentative Ruling (1) PLAINTIFFS' NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF COURT'S JANUARY 26, 2026 ORDER PURSUANT TO CCP Sec.1008; OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, REQUEST FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO CCP Sec. 473(b) is DENIED; the motion is grossly untimely and/or Plaintiffs' alternative request for relief is denied. (2) MOTION AND MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS AGAINST PLAINTIFFS is GRANTED. (A proposed order has been filed.)

Background

This is a habitability case. Plaintiffs SAJJAD SAYYAR ROUDSARI; ARMAGHAN SHALBAFTABAR allege the following against Defendants SIENNA RESIDENCES; CSCDA COMMUNITY IMPROVEMENT AUTHORITY; GREYSTAR WORLDWIDE, LLC; GREYSTAR REAL ESTATE PARTNERS, LLC; MONICA MARTINEZ: On August 10, 2022, Plaintiffs moved into their unit but noticed that the unit was infested with insects. Plaintiffs stayed at a hotel that night and moved into another unit the next day; on August 2, 2022, Plaintiffs had numerous bed bug bites across their bodies. On August 20, 2022, Plaintiffs moved out of the apartment.

On August 2, 2024, Plaintiffs filed suit asserting the following causes of action (COAs): 1. Battery 2. Negligence 3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 4. Statutory Breach of Warranty of Habitability (Civil Code Sec.Sec.1941 and 1941.1) 5. Tortious Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability 6. Violation of Business & Professions Code Sec.17200 et seq.

7. Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment 8. Violation of Civil Code Sec.1942.3 9. Violation of Civil Code Sec.1942.4 10. Negligent Violation of Statutory Duty to Maintain Habitable Conditions 11. Breach of Contract 12. Private Nuisance 13. Public Nuisance