STEPHANIE ESTRADA GUZMAN, et al. v. LYFT, INC., et al.

CASE NO: 25CMCV00039 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF STEPHANIE GUZMAN'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR RELIEF PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Sec. 473 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT LYFT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER Dept. A DATE: August 26, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M. COMPLAINT FILED: 01/09/2025 TRIAL: 01/25/2027 | This is a motor vehicle collision action.

Plaintiffs Stephanie Estrada Guzman, Juan Diego Estrada Godinez, Maximino Filiberto Estrada Aroche, Edla Coralia Estrada Aroche, German Estrada Estuardo Aroche, Gilberto Benjamin Estrada Aroche, and Gilberto Benjamin Estrada Godinez (collectively, "Plaintiffs") allege that defendants Lyft, Inc., Sam Hans Kazerouni, and Victor Gonzalez (collectively, "Defendants") negligently hired, trained, entrusted, supervised, and/or retained the driver of their respective motor vehicles so as to cause injuries to and the wrongful death of Decedent Gilberto Estrada Montufar.

On June 9, 2026, the court heard Plaintiff Guzman's motion to compel a second session of Defendant Kazerouni's deposition. The court denied Guzman's motion at that time.

A. Motion for Reconsideration

Plaintiff Guzman moves for reconsideration of the court's June 9, 2026 order. In the alternative, Guzman requests relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 473. Guzman contends that the court denied her motion based on failure to file a transcript of the first deposition of Defendant Kazerouni, but that the transcript was lodged with the court and erroneously was not filed.

In opposition, Kazerouni contends that the minute order does not state that the transcript was the sole issue for which the motion was denied and that Guzman has not shown new or different facts, circumstances, or law as is required on a motion for reconsideration.

The court finds that Guzman has not demonstrated new or different facts, circumstances or law warranting reconsideration, and on that basis denies the motion. However, the court sua sponte vacates its prior order denying the motion to compel a second session of Kazerouni's deposition.

Despite Guzman's prior assertion that counsel relied on advice purportedly received from the clerk's office rather than the governing statute, the court finds that Guzman complied with Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 2025.480, subd. (h) when counsel timely lodged the relevant deposition transcript prior to the hearing on the motion. The court therefore concludes that the order denying the motion on that ground was entered in error.

The court enters a new order on Guzman's motion to compel further responses to deposition questions by Kazerouni as follows: Under Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 2025.480, if a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document, electronically stored information, or tangible thing under the deponent's control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production.

Guzman moves for an order compelling a second session of Kazerouni's deposition as to specified topics. Guzman contends that Kazerouni's counsel improperly objected to and prevented Kazerouni from answering questions involving efforts to obtain his cell phone records from the date of the incident; whether anyone performed a download of his vehicle's data; whether he had been involved in other motor vehicle collisions; and the positions of other parties in the litigation.

The motion to compel is granted as to topics 1, 2, 3, and 4. These categories of discovery are relevant to the litigation and discoverable. Kazerouni's phone records as limited are relevant and do not fall under the attorney-client privilege, as they do not constitute communications between Kazerouni and his counsel, and therefore are discoverable.

Similarly, Kazerouni's knowledge as to whether any person has done a download of the computer in his vehicle at any time does not constitute communications between Kazerouni and his counsel and is discoverable. Even if Kazerouni learned of the information from counsel, transmission by counsel to the client of a non-privileged fact does not result in the recharacterization of the fact as privileged. The court overrules the objection based on attorney-client privilege.

Whether Kazerouni has been involved in another motor vehicle collision is discoverable information and is not overbroad.

The motion to compel is denied as to topics 5 and 6. These questions are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence and are therefore irrelevant and not discoverable.

To the extent Guzman seeks leave to question Kazerouni on additional topics, the court finds that because Kazerouni's counsel unilaterally suspended the deposition, and did so without adequate efforts to meet and confer in good faith, Guzman has not waived the remainder of the applicable eight hour time limit. Guzman is therefore entitled to continue the deposition until the time limit has been reached.

Guzman requests monetary sanctions against Kazerouni and his counsel of record, attorney Emily T Zinn-McBride. The court shall impose a monetary sanction against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel an answer or production, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2025.480, subd. (j).)

The court finds that circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust. Based on the court's review of the deposition transcript, both parties' counsel were highly argumentative and uncivil, resulting in the instant motion and Kazerouni's motion for protective order. At one point, Guzman's counsel began lecturing Kazerouni on the law, which is not the purpose of a deposition and which triggered the premature conclusion of the deposition.

Though some of the objections and instructions that Kazerouni did not answer were without merit, the court elects not to reward counsel's incivility and failure to adequately meet and confer in good faith with an award of monetary sanctions. The court orders both parties' counsel to review the civility rules at Appendix 3A of Chapter 3 of the Superior Court of Los Angeles Local Court Rules.

B. Motion for Protective Order

Kazerouni moves for a protective order stating that he need not be produced for a subsequent deposition. Kazerouni contends that Guzman's counsel improperly questioned Kazerouni as to objectionable issues at Kazerouni's April 15, 2025 deposition, to which Kazerouni's counsel objected, and that the deposition was suspended due to Guzman's counsel's improper and argumentative questioning.

In opposition, Guzman contends that her counsel's lines of questioning were legitimate and that Kazerouni's counsel unilaterally suspended the deposition before it could be completed as to critical issues.

"The court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party or other person from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense." (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 2031.060, subd. (a).) Such a motion will include a meet and confer declaration pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 2016.040. (See id.)

Protective orders may be also granted on motion of the deponent or any party, or any third person who could be affected by the disclosure (e.g., a nonparty whose privacy would be impaired). (See Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 2025.420, subd. (a).)

The decision upon whether to enter a protective order lies within the sound discretion of the court. (See Raymond Handling Concepts Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 584, 588, 591; see also Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 237, 242.)

Moving parties have the burden to show good cause for protective order. (See Emerson Elec. Co. v Sup. Ct. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1101, 1110.) In order to establish good cause, the moving party must make a factual showing demonstrating a specific harm that would arise from denial of the protective order. (See Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 317-318 (Nativi).)

Kazerouni's proposed protective order is grossly overbroad. Kazerouni requests a protective order stating that he need not be produced for a subsequent deposition. Although, based on the deposition transcript provided as Exhibit A to the motion, Guzman's counsel's conduct was argumentative and improper, this does not constitute good cause for a sweeping protective order barring any further deposition from being taken. (See People v. Superior Court (Credit One Bank, N.A.) (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 804 [different requested protective orders require different showings of good cause].)

Kazerouni has not established a specific harm that would arise if a subsequent deposition were to be granted that would not be resolved through the use of a less expansive protective order.

Moreover, Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 2025.420 requires that a motion for protective order be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. Although Kazerouni provides the declaration of attorney Emily T. Zinn-McBride, there is no indication of any meet and confer efforts beyond the bickering and argument that occurred during Kazerouni's previous deposition, which the court finds inadequate on the part of either counsel.

Attempting informal resolution means more than the mere attempt by the discovery proponent "to persuade the objector of the error of his ways." (Townsend v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1435). "A reasonable and good faith attempt at informal resolution entails something more than bickering with [opposing] counsel.... Rather, the law requires that counsel attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult, and deliberate." (Id. at p. 1439.)

Kazerouni requests monetary sanctions against Guzman and her counsel, attorney Matthew Taylor, in the amount of $1,270. In light of the court's denial of the instant motion and the inadequate meet and confer efforts, the court will deny monetary sanctions.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES Guzman's motion for reconsideration of or relief from the court's June 9, 2026 order denying Guzman's motion to compel further responses to deposition questions. However, the court vacates its prior order and enters a new order GRANTING IN PART Guzman's motion to compel Kazerouni's responses to deposition questions, only as to topics 1, 2, 3, and 4 set forth in Guzman's separate statement.

The court DENIES Guzman's request for monetary sanctions. The court DENIES Kazerouni's motion for a protective order.

The continued deposition of Defendant Kazerouni shall take place not later than September 25, 2026. The parties are ordered to meet and confer not later than August 28, 2026 as to a deposition schedule. Attorney Matthew M. Taylor and attorney Emily T. Zinn-McBride are ordered to review the Superior Court of Los Angeles County litigation civility rules. Counsel are ordered to meet and confer in good faith prior to filing any future discovery motions, as required by the governing statutes.

Counsel for Plaintiff Guzman is ordered to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: August 26, 2026 Hon. Elizabeth L. Bradley Judge of the Superior Court Case Number: 25CMCV00074 Hearing Date: August 26, 2026 Dept: A SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT 14333 INGLEWOOD LLC, Plaintiff, vs. MOBILE WORLD LOGISTICS LLC, et al., Defendants. |)))))))))))))))) |