Tracie Lackey, et al. v. CTM Apartment Services Corporation

includes time spent preparing the motion, as well as anticipated time to review an opposition, prepare a reply, and prepare for and attend the hearing. The Court finds the hourly rate reasonable. However, because the four motions are routine compel discovery motions, substantially similar, and unopposed, the requested time is excessive. No reply work was required. The Court awards 1.0 hour for preparation of all four motions at $600.00 per hour, plus four $60.00 filing fees, for a total sanction award of $840.00. Accordingly, Plaintiff's request for sanctions against Defendant Derrell Spann is GRANTED in the aggregate reduced amount of $840.00. Sanctions are payable within 30 days.

CONCLUSION Plaintiff's Motion to Deem Requests for Admission, Set One, Admitted is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Responses to Form Interrogatories - General, Set One, is GRANTED. Defendant Derrell Spann is ordered to serve verified responses, without objections, within 20 days. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, is GRANTED. Defendant Derrell Spann is ordered to serve verified responses, without objections, within 20 days. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Responses to Requests for Production, Set One, is GRANTED. Defendant Derrell Spann is ordered to serve verified responses, without objections, and produce responsive documents in accordance with those responses, within 20 days. Plaintiff's request for monetary sanctions is GRANTED in the reduced aggregate amount of $840.00 against Defendant Derrell Spann. Sanctions are payable within 30 days.

Hearing Date: August 26, 2026 Case Number: 25CHCV04417 DEFENDANT CTM APARTMENT SERVICES CORPORATION'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT Motion filed on June 17, 2026. MOVING PARTY: Defendant CTM Apartment Services Corporation (CTM) RESPONDING PARTIES: Plaintiffs Tracie Lackey and Sean Lackey (Plaintiffs) NOTICE: OK. RELIEF REQUESTED: CTM generally demurs to Tracie Lackey's (Lackey) second cause of action for negligence for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and specially demurs on the ground of uncertainty. RULING: Overruled. CTM shall file and serve its Answer within 10 days.

BACKGROUND On December 11, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the operative Complaint asserting causes of action for assault and battery, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress by Lackey, and negligent infliction of emotional distress by Sean Lackey. On June 17, 2026, CTM filed the present demurrer to Lackey's second cause of action, supported by the declaration of David P. Reid and Exhibits A through C. Plaintiffs filed an opposition on August 11, 2026, supported by the declaration of Stephen M. Johnson. CTM filed a reply on August 19, 2026.

LEGAL STANDARD "[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint." (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the Court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

DISCUSSION Workers' Compensation Exclusivity Workers' compensation exclusivity is an affirmative defense that an employer must plead and prove unless the conditions of compensation appear on the face of the complaint. (Doney v. Tambouratgis (1979) 23 Cal.3d 91, 96.) Workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy against an employer "[w]here the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 concur." (Lab. Code, Sec. 3602, subd. (a).) Those conditions include that, at the time of injury, the employee is "performing service growing out of and incidental to his or her employment and is acting within the course of his or her employment," and that the injury is proximately caused by the employment. (Lab.

Code, Sec. 3600, subd. (a)(2)-(3).) Where the conditions of compensation do not concur, "the liability of the employer shall be the same as if this division had not been enacted." (Lab. Code, Sec. 3602, subd. (c).)

Here, the Complaint alleges Lackey was CTM's property manager at Plummer Park Apartments, worked on the premises, and interacted with tenants, including Anita Young. (Complaint P.P. 14, 53.) It further alleges CTM "sent" Lackey to interact with Young despite the alleged danger and required Lackey to work around Young despite knowledge of her violent behavior. (Complaint P.P. 57, 76(b).) These allegations support an employment-related connection to the risk that allegedly resulted in Lackey's injury.

They do not, however, establish that Lackey was performing the CTM-directed interaction or otherwise acting in the course of her employment when she was shot. The Complaint does not state when the interaction described in paragraph 57 occurred relative to the shooting. Its specific allegation concerning the shooting states that Lackey was sitting in her vehicle in the parking lot when Young fired at her. (Complaint P. 31.)

CTM asserts Lackey was working toward Young's eviction on the day of the shooting and "had just finished a discussion with her which led to the Incident." (Demurrer at p. 13.) The reply similarly asserts Lackey "had just interacted" with Young in the course of her employment before remaining in the parking lot. (Reply at p. 3.) Those facts are not alleged in the Complaint. The Court cannot rely on them to establish the conditions of compensation on demurrer.

The premises-line rule generally provides that employment commences upon an employee's entry onto the employer's premises and continues until the employee leaves those premises. (Jones v. Regents of University of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 502, 508-509.) In Jones, the employee had completed her workday, exited her workstation, and was injured approximately 10 seconds after beginning her trip home while still on the employer's campus. (Id. at pp. 505-506, 509-510.) Here, the Complaint does not allege a comparable factual sequence connecting Lackey's presence in the parking lot to her arrival at, departure from, or performance of work.

As Weinstein v. St. Mary's Medical Center (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1231, explains, "[t]he fact Weinstein was an employee of the Hospital at the time of the accident is not controlling." The pertinent inquiry is whether the employee was acting within the course of employment when injured. (Ibid.) The allegations here do not conclusively establish that fact.

CTM also argues paragraphs 76 through 78 constitute judicial admissions that the Workers' Compensation Act applies. They do not. Those paragraphs state Lackey's legal grounds for contending exclusivity does not apply and do not allege that she was acting in the course of her employment when she was shot. Accordingly, it is not apparent from the face of the Complaint that the conditions of compensation under Labor Code section 3600 concurred at the time of Lackey's injury. CTM therefore has not established workers' compensation exclusivity as a bar to the second cause of action on demurrer.

This ruling is limited to the sufficiency of the pleadings and does not preclude CTM from asserting and proving the defense on a developed evidentiary record. Because the threshold applicability of workers' compensation exclusivity is not established at this stage, the Court does not reach Lackey's asserted exceptions to exclusivity.

Premises Liability, Failure to Warn, and Superseding Cause "The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, and damages." (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) "Premises liability is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises." (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158, quotation marks omitted.) Where liability is premised on third-party criminal conduct, the existence and scope of the duty are determined by identifying the protective measures asserted and balancing the foreseeability of the harm against the burden of those measures. (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213-1214.)

CTM argues Lackey fails to allege an unsafe condition of the property under CACI No. 1003. That argument does not address the theory pleaded. "Premises liability may be based upon crimes, depending upon foreseeability, or conditions of the property or activities." (Eric J. v. Betty M. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 715, 722.) Lackey alleges CTM negligently managed and controlled the premises by failing to respond to the danger posed by Young. (Complaint P.P. 29, 31, 33-44.) She alleges CTM had repeated notice of Young's prior assaults, escalating threats, harassment of property-management personnel, and expressed intentions to harm CTM staff, yet failed to warn, take precautions, address Young's conduct, or implement protective measures. (Complaint P.P. 28-29, 34-48.)

She further alleges CTM's negligence was a substantial factor in her harm. (Complaint P.P. 49-50.) These allegations are sufficient for purposes of demurrer.

CTM also argues Lackey already knew of Young's dangerous behavior and therefore required no warning. The Complaint alleges Lackey worked as a property manager on the premises and interacted with Young. (Complaint P.P. 14, 53.) It does not, however, establish the nature or extent of Lackey's knowledge of Young's dangerous propensities. CTM's assertion that Lackey had been employed since approximately January 2020 is not alleged in the Complaint. Lackey's knowledge therefore does not defeat the failure-to-warn theory on demurrer.

Finally, CTM argues Young's intentional shooting was a superseding cause. "[I]f the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes the actor negligent," intentionally tortious or criminal conduct does not necessarily preclude liability. (Landeros v. Flood (1976) 17 Cal.3d 399, 411.) Because the Complaint alleges Young's escalating violence was the danger CTM knew of and failed to address, the Court cannot determine from the face of the Complaint that the shooting was a superseding cause as a matter of law. Accordingly, the premises liability and failure-to-warn allegations are sufficient to withstand demurrer.

Remaining Negligence Theories CTM separately challenges Lackey's negligent undertaking, negligent hiring, retention, supervision and training, and NIED theories. A general demurrer does not lie to only part of a cause of action. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682-1683.) Because the allegations discussed above sufficiently state a negligence claim, a defect in an alternative theory would not support sustaining the general demurrer. The Court nevertheless addresses CTM's principal pleading objections.

Under Restatement Second of Torts section 324A, liability may arise where a defendant undertakes to render services to another that it should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person, fails to exercise reasonable care, causes physical harm, and either increases the risk of harm, undertakes a duty owed by another, or induces reliance. (Artiglio v. Corning Inc. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 604, 612-614.) The Complaint alleges CTM rendered property-management services to tenants, should have recognized those services as necessary for Lackey's protection, failed to exercise reasonable care, and increased the risk of harm by sending Lackey to interact with Young despite the alleged danger. (Complaint P.P. 51-57.)

CTM's argument that the undertaking fails because the alleged services were rendered to tenants rather than Lackey does not, by itself, defeat the theory. Section 324A expressly contemplates services rendered to another for the protection of a third person. (Artiglio, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 612-614.) The Complaint alleges that relationship. (Complaint P.P. 52-53.) CTM's additional contention that the theory is redundant because CTM allegedly owed Lackey a preexisting duty does not provide a basis to sustain the demurrer to the negligence cause of action as a whole.

As to negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and training, the Complaint alleges CTM employed on-site and regional property managers and supervisors who were inadequately qualified or trained to address violent or threatening tenants, that CTM knew or should have known of their unfitness or incompetence, and that these deficiencies were a substantial factor in Lackey's harm. (Complaint P.P. 61-71.) CTM argues Lackey fails to identify a particular unfit employee and that Young, rather than a CTM employee, caused the injury.

The Complaint identifies the employees at issue by position and alleges the particular deficiencies and resulting risk. (Complaint P.P. 61-71.) A plaintiff need not plead each evidentiary fact that may later form part of her proof. (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) The alleged risk was that inadequately qualified or trained CTM personnel would fail to respond appropriately to Young's known dangerous conduct, and the Complaint alleges that risk contributed to Lackey's harm. (Complaint P.P. 63-71; see Doe v.

Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1054-1055.) CTM's argument based on Lackey's status as its employee depends on workers' compensation exclusivity, which, as discussed above, is not established on the face of the Complaint.

Finally, NIED is not an independent tort, but negligence to which the traditional elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages apply. (Spates v. Dameron Hosp. Ass'n (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 208, 213.) Lackey's allegations of physical injury and resulting emotional distress are pleaded within her negligence cause of action. (Complaint P.P. 73-75.) They do not state a separate tort and do not render the second cause of action defective.

Uncertainty A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed because ambiguities can ordinarily be clarified through discovery. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Here, the second cause of action identifies CTM as a defendant and separately labels the premises liability and failure to warn, negligent undertaking, negligent hiring, retention, supervision and training, and NIED theories. CTM separately addresses each theory in its demurrer. The allegations sufficiently apprise CTM of the conduct and theories to which it must respond. The special demurrer for uncertainty is overruled.

CONCLUSION CTM's general and special demurrers to Lackey's second cause of action are overruled. CTM shall file and serve its Answer within 10 days. | Home -->)" -->