In the Matter of THE ESTATE OF LASCELLE DE BASILY

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 13 Honorable Daniel T. Nishigaya R. Belligan, Courtroom Clerk 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 Telephone: 408-882-2240

DATE: August 26, 2026 TIME: 10:00 & 10:30 A.M. TO CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING, YOU MUST CALL (408) 808-6856 BEFORE 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY PRIOR TO THE HEARING. You must also inform all other sides to the issue before 4:00 P.M. the day prior to the hearing that you plan to contest the ruling. The Court will not hear argument, and the tentative ruling will be adopted if these notifications are not made. (Cal. Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1); Civil Local Rule 8.D.)

LINE # CASE # CASE TITLE RULING LINE 7 25PR199694 In the Matter of THE ESTATE OF Hearing: Demurrer LASCELLE DE BASILY Ctrl Click (or scroll down) on Line 7 for tentative ruling. LINE 8 25PR199694 In the Matter of THE ESTATE OF Hearing: Petition LASCELLE DE BASILY Parties to appear (virtual or in-person)

10:30 a.m. CALENDAR LINE 1 23CV420007 In the Matter of NHU TRAN Motion to Vacate Name Change Order

Ctrl Click (or scroll down) on 10:30 Calendar Line 1 for tentative ruling.

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Case Name: In the Matter of THE ESTATE OF LASCELLE DE BASILY Case No.: 25PR199694

INTRODUCTION

On April 7, 2025, Regina Neira (“Petitioner”) initiated this action via the filing of a petition for probate of the will of Lascelle Meserve de Basily (“Decedent”), who passed away on February 2, 1989. Petitioner purports to be the holder of a power of attorney from Irma Bard (“Bard”), the sole beneficiary under Decedent’s will. Petitioner was appointed as administrator and letters of administration issued on August 22, 2025.

On April 18, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for recovery of estate property under Probate Code section 850 (“Petition”). The Petition alleges that Decedent deposited certain works of art with Stanford University prior to 1974, when correspondence allegedly confirmed that the items were not intended to be outright gifts. The art works at issue include two “Spanish polychrome wooden sculptures originating from Andalusia, Spain, dating from the 17th century” and “[e]ighteen paintings and related works of art expressly identified in contemporaneous correspondence as having been retained by Decedent and not included in any completed gift.” (Petition, p. 2:11-15.) The Petition is not separated into causes of action but it seeks recovery of the art described above pursuant to Probate Code section 850.

Currently before the court is a demurrer by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University (“Respondent”) to each cause of action in the Petition. Petitioner has opposed the demurrer and Respondent has filed a reply.

DISCUSSION

Respondent demurs to each cause of action in the Petition on the ground of failure to state a claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)

I. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A demurrer may be utilized by “[t]he party against whom a complaint [] has been filed” to object to the legal sufficiency of the pleading as a whole, or to any “cause of action” stated therein, on one or more of the grounds enumerated by statute. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.10, 430.50, subd. (a).)11 The court in ruling on a demurrer treats it “as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Piccinini v. Cal. Emergency Management Agency (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 685, 688, citing Blank v.

Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) “A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading. It admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint; the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214.) In ruling on a demurrer, courts may consider matters

11 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

subject to judicial notice. (Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 751.) Evidentiary facts found in exhibits attached to a complaint can be considered on demurrer. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.)

II. MERITS OF THE DEMURRER

Respondent asserts that the request for recovery of the artwork is barred by the statute of limitations, which it identifies as three years under Code of Civil Procedure section 338. Respondent contends that the statute of limitations accrued, at the latest, when Decedent passed away in 1989, more than 35 years ago. It argues, in the alternative, that the Petition is barred by the doctrine of laches. Respondent relies primarily on Strasberg v. Odyssey Group (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 906 (Strasberg), in which Anna Strasberg, the only remaining beneficiary of Marilyn Monroe’s personal effects under Monroe’s will and administrator of her estate, brought suit for, inter alia, conversion against the successor in interest of Inez Melson, Monroe’s business manager, whom Strasberg alleged had taken certain of Monroe’s personal items, and others. (Id. at p. 910.)

A jury found that Melson had converted the personal items in issue after Monroe’s death. (Ibid.) On appeal, defendants argued that the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 338 had run on the conversion claim. (Id. at pp. 915- 916.) The Court of Appeal held that Melson, “while acting in her capacity as a fiduciary, wrongfully concealed the items she chose to retain from the Marilyn Monroe estate. Accordingly, the statute of limitations was tolled until the beneficiary discovered or ought to have discovered the existence of the cause of action [for conversion].” (Id. at p. 917.)

Respondent contrasts Strasberg with Bono v. Clark (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1409 (Bono), in which the Court of Appeal distinguished Strasberg on the ground that the plaintiff in the case before it knew about the property at issue and knew it was in the hands of the defendant. (Id. at p. 1433.) The Bono court held that the conversion cause of action therefore accrued when the defendant refused to allow the plaintiff to retrieve her property. (Id. at p. 1434.)

Respondent asserts that language in a letter from Decedent to an official of Respondent, as paraphrased in Exhibit I to the Petition, made the sculptures a conditional gift to Respondent unless Decedent retrieved the sculptures before her death or otherwise disposed of them in her will. Relying on Strasberg and Bono, Respondent contends that it has held the property at issue in a highly public manner since before Decedent’s death and that the statute of limitations accrued as to the sculptures upon Decedent’s death because assuming that Decedent’s will left the sculptures to someone else, Respondent has been openly holding them and has not returned them.

As to the paintings, Respondent contends that the paintings were donated to Respondent in 1974 as evidenced by a letter attached to the Petition as Exhibit B. Thus, he contends that the statute of limitations accrued as to the paintings in 1974.

Petitioner counters that the artwork was provided to Respondent “on deposit” creating a bailment and, in such a situation, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the bailee refuses a demand for return of the property. She relies on several cases, in which the court held that where “the original taking is lawful, the statute of limitations for conversion or claim and delivery does not begin to run ‘until the return of the property has been demanded and refused or until a repudiation of the owner’s title is unequivocally brought to [her or] his attention.’ [Citations.]” (Coy v. County of L.A. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1077, 1088; Niiya v. Goto (1960) 22

181 Cal.App.2d 682, 688; Ramirez v. Tulare County Dist. Attorney’s Office (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 911, 938 [“the three-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (c), would not begin to run until either (i) the return of the property has been demanded and refused or (ii) a repudiation of the owner’s title is unequivocally brought to his or her attention”].) Accordingly, she contends that the statute of limitations did not begin to accrue until she was appointed administrator of the estate and made a request for return of the property, which was refused. The problem with Petitioner’s position is that, in none of the cases she relies on was the bailor deceased and, if the cause of action belonged to Decedent, it would be barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 366.1.12

It appears to the Court that none of the authorities cited by either party is directly on point as to the issue of when the statute of limitations began to run. The Court’s own research discovered Civil Code section 1899, et seq., which apply to items on loan to museums and which neither party addresses. In Civil Code section 1899, the Legislature declared, “Many museums have benefited greatly from having property loaned to them for study or display. Problems have arisen, however, in connection with loans for indefinite or long terms, when museums and lenders have failed to maintain contact.

Many of these problems could be avoided by a clarification and regularization of the rights and obligations of the parties to loans for indefinite or long terms.” (Civ. Code, § 1899, subd. (a).) Accordingly, if Respondent qualifies as a museum, it would appear that the statute of limitations for such a claim, which is contained in Civil Code section 1899.10, may be the most directly on point. (See Civ. Code, § 1899.1, subd. (c) [“The terms ‘loan,’ ‘loaned,’ and ‘on loan’ include all deposits of property with a museum which are not accompanied by a transfer of title to the property.”]; see also Petition, pp. 3:11-12 [arguing no transfer of title occurred as to the sculptures], 5:23-26 [arguing no transfer of ownership as to the paintings].)

CONCLUSION

The Court hereby CONTINUES the hearing on the demurrer to allow for supplemental briefing regarding Civil Code section 1899.10. The Court hereby requests supplemental briefing regarding the following issues: (1) is Civil Code section 1899.10 applicable in the instant case and (2) does the petition or evidence from which the Court may take judicial notice establish whether Respondent is a museum within the meaning of Civil Code section 1899.1?13

12 That section provides If a person entitled to bring an action dies before the expiration of the applicable limitations period, and the cause of action survives, an action may be commenced before the expiration of the later of the following times: (a) Six months after the person’s death. (b) The limitations period that would have been applicable if the person had not died. (Code Civ. Proc., § 366.1.) 13 Civil Code section 1899.1, subdivision (a) provides, “A ‘museum’ is an institution located in California and operated by a nonprofit corporation or public agency, primarily educational, 23

The parties or their counsel, as applicable, are ordered to appear at the hearing on this matter, either in person or remotely to select a continued hearing date and to set a briefing schedule.

The Court will prepare the final order.

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scientific, or aesthetic in purpose, which owns, borrows, or cares for, and studies, archives, or exhibits property.”

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