SANCHEZ vs CITY OF FREMONT, A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY, et al.

24CV082581: SANCHEZ vs CITY OF FREMONT, A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY, et al. 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by City of Fremont, a governmental entity (Defendant) CRS# 734398115335 in Department 19

Tentative Ruling - 08/25/2026 Joscelyn Jones

The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by City of Fremont, a governmental entity on 05/15/2026 is Denied.

The Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant City of Fremont (“the City”) is DENIED.

Preliminarily, the Court observes that Plaintiff’s opposition Separate Statement purports to dispute several of the City’s Facts, but Plaintiff cites no evidence creating any dispute, as required by California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1350(f) and (h). (See, e.g., Plaintiff’s response to the City’s Separate Statement Facts (“SSF”) Nos. 2, 10, and 17, among many others.) The vast majority of Plaintiff’s responses consist solely of legal argument, which is not appropriately included in a Separate Statement. This made Plaintiff’s opposition Separate Statement extremely unhelpful in ruling on this motion.

Factual Background

Plaintiff alleges he was injured on June 28, 2023 when he tripped and fell on a raised portion of a sidewalk (which the parties refer to as “the uplift”) adjacent to 45463 Sodaville Drive in Fremont. The owner of the adjacent property, since 1985, is Defendant Chao Yun Wu. The City has a public right of way adjacent to Wu’s property that includes the sidewalk. (SSF Nos. 6-7.)

In 1984, the City planted an American Sweetgum tree near the site of Plaintiff’s accident. (SSF No. 4.) Prior to 2010, the City maintained street trees and sidewalks on behalf of adjacent property owners. (See the Declaration of Chris Curry, paragraph 4.) In 2010, the City’s municipal code was amended to require property owners of a lot adjacent to a public street to maintain street trees and landscaping adjacent to their property. (Id.; see also Fremont Municipal Code § 12.30.200.) The Court observes, however, that the City cites no statutory or case law providing that this type of municipal code provision relieves a public entity from any liability for a dangerous condition on property owned or controlled by the public entity. (See, e.g., the discussion in Jordan v. City of Sacramento (2007) 148 Cal.app.4th 1487, 1490-1492.)

Shortly after Wu moved into the subject property in 1985, his gardener planted shrubs adjacent to the site of Plaintiff’s 2023 accident. (SSF No. 9.)

In 1998, the sweetgum tree blew over in a storm. (SSF No. 11.) Wu testified that he did not contact the City to remove the tree or its debris, stump, and roots. (See Wu’s deposition at page 32.) However, the tree and its debris was removed by someone, without any involvement by Wu. (See Wu’s deposition at page 29 and 31-32.) Wu assumed that the tree and its debris was removed by the City because it is the City’s job to clean streets and obstructions to traffic. (Id.) The City has no records reflecting removal of the sweetgum tree or its debris, roots, or stump. 24CV082581: SANCHEZ vs CITY OF FREMONT, A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY, et al. 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by City of Fremont, a governmental entity (Defendant) CRS# 734398115335 in Department 19 (See SSF No. 26; see also Plaintiff’s Additional Facts (“PAF”) No. 2.)

In 2018, Wu directed his gardener to remove the shrubs adjacent to the 2023 accident site. (SSF No. 15.) Wu’s deposition testimony is not entirely clear on whether, or to what extent, the uplift was visible before removal of the shrubs in 2018. (See SSF Nos. 16-17, Wu’s response, and the evidence cited in support.) However, after removal of the shrubs, the uplift was plainly visible. (SSF No. 18.) Wu did not fix the uplift because he did not believe it would pose a danger to pedestrians unless they chose to enter his lawn. (SSF Nos. 19-20 and Wu’s response.)

The City uses a complaint driven inspection system to respond to issues about, inter alia, sidewalk uplifts. (SSF Nos. 30-35.) The City’s database does not reflect any complaints about the uplift at the site of Plaintiff’s accident between 2018 – 2023. (SSF Nos. 36-37.)

Analysis

A public entity is liable for a dangerous condition of public property if either (1) a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employe of the public entity within the scope of employment created the dangerous condition, or (2) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition a sufficient time prior to the injury to protect against it. (See Government Code § 835.)

On this record, the Court declines to reach the issue of whether the uplift was created by a negligent or wrongful act of a City employee. It is undisputed that the City planted the sweetgum tree that fell over in 1998. Wu’s expert witness Ray Liggett opines that it is more likely than not that the uplift was caused, in whole or in part, by roots of the sweetgum tree. But the parties have not presented any admissible evidence that the City removed the tree after it fell over, and in doing so failed to remove the stump and roots. Wu’s speculation that the tree and its debris was probably removed by the City is a reasonable assumption, but it is nevertheless speculation.

Instead, this motion is denied because the Court determines there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether the City had constructive notice of the dangerous condition that caused Plaintiff’s accident. A public entity has constructive notice of a dangerous condition if the condition existed for such a period of time and was of such an obvious nature that the public entity, in the exercise of due care, should have discovered the condition and its dangerous character. (Government Code § 835.2(b).) A plaintiff may show that a public entity had constructive notice of a dangerous condition based on evidence suggesting that the dangerous condition would have been discovered by an inspection system that was reasonably adequate to inform the public entity that the public property was safe for its intended use. (Government Code § 835.2(b)(1).)

The evidentiary record creates a triable issue of fact as to whether the condition that caused Plaintiff’s accident (the sidewalk uplift) had been an open and obvious danger since at least 2018. (See SSF Nos. 18 and 22-24; see also PAF No. 3.) The City maintained a “complaint

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

24CV082581: SANCHEZ vs CITY OF FREMONT, A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY, et al. 08/26/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment filed by City of Fremont, a governmental entity (Defendant) CRS# 734398115335 in Department 19 driven” inspection system, in which the City only inspected potentially dangerous sidewalk conditions if the public or City employees reported the issue. (See SSF Nos. 30-35.) The City presents no evidence that it made any effort to inspect for dangerous conditions of sidewalks or other public property unless it received specific complaints from the public or a City employee. (Id.)

Based on this evidentiary record, there is a triable issue of material fact whether the City maintained a reasonably adequate inspection system to inform the City about public property (including sidewalks) that were unsafe for their intended use. This evidence, in turn, creates a triable issue of material fact as to whether the City had constructive notice of the (allegedly) dangerous condition that caused Plaintiff’s injury.

The Court observes that the absence of prior accidents at the site of Plaintiff’s injury is a relevant factor to consider in determining whether the uplift created a dangerous condition of public property to people exercising due care (see, e.g., Thimon v. City of Newark (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 745, 756), but it is not dispositive of the issue. (See Salas v. Department of Transportation (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1071.)

Plaintiff’s Objections to Evidence are all OVERRULED on the grounds asserted. The declarations of Chris Curry and Robert Wheeler satisfy the business records exception to hearsay under Evidence Code § 1271.

The Court rules as follow on the City’s Objections to Defendant Wu’s evidence:

Objections Nos. 1-2, 5, and 9 are OVERRULED on the grounds asserted.

Objections Nos. 3, 6, and 10 are SUSTAINED as inadmissible legal conclusions as to the City’s duty (No. 3) and notice of alleged dangerous condition (Nos. 6 and 10).

Objection No. 4 is SUSTAINED as lacking foundation as to when the uplift developed.

Objections No. 7-8 are SUSTAINED as lacking foundation as to who planted and/or performed work on the trees that Brown observed.

Objections Nos. 11-12 are SUSTAINED as lacking foundation as to who applied the asphalt patching (No. 11) and when the uplift developed (No. 12).

The Court did not read or consider the City’s response to the Separate Statements of Plaintiff and Wu (see Code of Civil Procedure § 437c(b)(4)), or the City’s response to Plaintiff’s Objections to Evidence. None of those documents are authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure or the California Rules of Court.