HAYSE-GREGSON, et al. vs FCA US LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al.

25CV009054: HAYSE-GREGSON, et al. vs FCA US LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure: To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16D Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-3056 by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message (a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; (b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and (c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below.

If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court. Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16D Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16146506749 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED. Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-services-transcripts.

Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000. A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. *** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA

25CV009054: HAYSE-GREGSON, et al. vs FCA US LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiffs’ notice of motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel and advise him/her of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing in person, by Zoom or by telephone.

Plaintiffs’ motion for “attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses” is ruled upon as follows.

Both moving and opposing counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1110(b)(3)-(4).

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties must at the time oral argument is requested notify the clerk and opposing counsel of the specific attorney fees discussed below that will be addressed at the hearing. Counsel are also reminded that pursuant to local rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion matters. ***

Overview

This is a “lemon law” action arising from plaintiffs’ purchase of a 2023 Jeep Grand Wagoneer. Plaintiffs, represented by California Consumer Attorneys (“CCA”) in Los Angeles, filed suit in April 2025 and ultimately agreed at a mediation in October 2025 to settle this action against defendant FCA US.

According to the moving papers, plaintiffs now seek an award of attorney fees of $37,035 (consisting of roughly $20,000 for past attorney fees representing over 36 hours of attorney time; nearly $4,700 for anticipated attorney fees to be incurred with reviewing the opposition to this motion, preparing a reply and attending the hearing; and a multiplier of 1.5 which would amount to an additional $12,345 in fees) plus “costs and expenses” of $1,892.41, for a total award of $38,927.41.

Defendant opposes, generally arguing that the amount of attorney fees sought by plaintiffs exceeds what should have been reasonably incurred in this routine “lemon law” case, especially when moving counsel claim to be “experts” in this field of law. Among other things, the opposition takes issue with the hourly rates claimed by plaintiffs’

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV009054: HAYSE-GREGSON, et al. vs FCA US LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

attorneys and the excessive time billed for certain tasks, some of which appear to be clerical in nature. At Pages 5-9 of the opposition, defendant addresses specific billing entries which are characterized as unreasonable and/or excessive, while further contending no multiplier is justified here. In the end, defendant does not object to the $1,892.41 in claimed “costs and expenses” but maintains that the attorney fee award should be limited to no more than $8,800, meaning that the total award should not exceed $10,692.41.

In reply, plaintiffs assert that the opposition “is unsupported by evidence” and consists of nothing more than “unsupported legal argument” and “bellyaching.” Filed with the reply is a “supplemental declaration” by one of plaintiffs’ attorneys but it was not considered by the Court because the general rule in California is that new arguments and/or evidence presented for the first time on reply are not permitted as the opposing party had no opportunity to address such new matters in the opposition papers. (See, e.g., Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 241; Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537; Tyler v. Children’s Home Society (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 511, 526, n.8.)

Legal Standard

“[The Song-Beverly Act] includes a fee-shifting provision allowing for prevailing buyers to recover attorney fees under [Civil Code] section 1794.” (Reynolds v. Ford Motor Co. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1111.) California courts have concluded the “lodestar” adjustment method of calculating attorney fees is appropriate” in awarding attorney fees under the Song-Beverly Act. (Id., at 1112.) A trial court assessing attorney fees using the lodestar adjustment method begins with a touchstone or lodestar figure, based on the “careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney involved in the presentation of the case.” (Id., at 1111.)

Under §1794, the trial court is tasked with calculating attorney fees based on actual hours expended that were reasonably incurred for the particular litigation. (Id., at 1113; see also, Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 [“Under the lodestar adjustment methodology, the trial court must initially determine the actual time expended and then ‘ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable.’ [Citation.]”].) “If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Morris v.

Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 34.) The party moving for statutory attorney fees has the burden of proof. (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV009054: HAYSE-GREGSON, et al. vs FCA US LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

Time records are generally the starting point for the “lodestar” determination. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of CSU (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 397.) The “lodestar” is the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate. (See, e.g., Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1393- 1394; Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) However, a trial court is vested with discretion to decide which of the hours expended by the attorneys were ‘reasonably spent’ on the litigation.” (Meister v.

Regents of Univ. of Cal. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 449.) “A trial court may not rubberstamp a request for attorney fees, but must determine the number of hours reasonably expended.” (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271.) “In evaluating whether the attorney fee request is reasonable, the trial court should consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended.” (Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at 38.)

In other words, “[r]easonable compensation does not include compensation for ‘padding’ in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts.” (Id.)

“Reasonable hourly compensation is based on ‘prevailing hourly rates’ in the community, thereby ‘anchoring the calculation’ to an objective standard. [Citation.]” (Reynolds, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at 1112.) However, “[i]n making its calculation of a reasonable hourly rate, the court may rely on its own knowledge and familiarity with the legal market, as well as the experience, skill, and reputation of the attorney requesting fees, the difficulty or complexity of the litigation to which that skill was applied, and affidavits from other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community and rate determinations in other cases.” (Morris, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at 41.)

Affidavits of the moving attorney(s) and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the moving attorney(s), are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate. (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009.)

The amount of a fee award is within the trial court’s discretion, as “the trial judge is the best judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.” (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 1132 [citing Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49]; see also, PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1096.) The court may reduce the hours it determines were excessive or not supported. (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816 [party seeking attorney's fees has “burden of showing that the fees incurred were ‘allowable,’ were ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,’ and were ‘reasonable in amount’”]; Christian Research Institute v. Ahor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1326-1329.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV009054: HAYSE-GREGSON, et al. vs FCA US LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

Once the court has fixed the “lodestar,” it may increase or decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative “multiplier” after taking into account a variety of other factors, including the quality of the representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained, and the contingent risk presented.” (Lealao v. Beneficial Calif., Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26; see also, Bernardi v. County of Monterey, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at 1399.) An attorney’s incivility and/or personal embroilment in the litigation may also be considered. (Snoeck v. Exak Time Innovations, Inc. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 908, 925 [discussing factors used for applying ‘negative’ multiplier].)

Existing California precedent confirms a fee enhancement or multiplier is not awarded as a matter of right but may, in the court’s discretion, be granted where exceptional skill, novelty of the questions involved, or other factors warrant such relief. (See, e.g., Rey v. Madera Unified School District (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1242.) According to the California Supreme Court, “[A] trial court should award a multiplier for exceptional representation only when the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation that would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience.” (Ketchum v.

Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138-1139 [underline added for emphasis].) In the end, the award of a fee multiplier or enhancement is a discretionary matter largely left to the trial court. (See, e.g., Hogar v. Community Development Comm. of City of Escondido (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1371.)

Discussion

As noted above, the moving papers seek a total award of $38,927.41 for attorney fees, costs and expenses, while the opposition advances an array of arguments about why the amount awarded should be substantially reduced. Under these circumstances, the Court will primarily focus its discussion on the specific items defendant has placed in dispute and unless noted otherwise, generally construes the remainder of the attorney fees which were not explicitly addressed in the opposition as being reasonable and recoverable here. However, it is worth adding here that generic arguments which are not tethered to specific billing entries claimed by defendant to be unreasonable and/or excessive do little to aid the Court in its task of calculating those fees which defendant believes should not be allowed and ultimately, the total amount to be awarded to plaintiffs as the prevailing parties.

Hourly Rates. According to Exhibit A to the moving declaration by attorney Daghighian, the bulk of the work billed on this matter was performed by attorney Daghighian, a partner, and attorney Brim, an associate, with hourly rates of $625 and $550 respectively. The other two associates who billed limited time on this case have hourly rates of $400 and $525, while the other partner performing work on this matter has an hourly rate of $700. The Court declines to reduce or otherwise limit the hourly

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV009054: HAYSE-GREGSON, et al. vs FCA US LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

rates claimed by plaintiffs’ attorneys in this case (ranging from $400 to $700) because it has frequently made awards based on substantially similar hourly rates in other similar lemon law cases litigated in Sacramento Superior Court and because these hourly rates are not in this Court’s view necessarily unreasonable under the circumstances.

Overstaffing. While the opposition vaguely suggests in various places that this routine lemon law action was overstaffed with a “substantial number of attorneys” and likely resulted in inefficiencies and duplication of work for which defendant should not be responsible, defendant failed to identify any particular reduction in billing entries other than an across-the-board hourly rate reduction which the Court has already rejected in the prior paragraph. (See, e.g., Opp., p.5:4-11.)

Initial Disclosures and Production of Documents. Defendant contends that the 2.5 hours billed by attorney Brim on 7/28/2025 to “[d]raft [sic] revise initial dislcosures [sic] and production of documents,” after billing 1.3 hours to review the underlying documents, “is patently unreasonable” because “[i]nitial disclosures in Song-Beverly cases are largely standardized and routinely prepared using templates and existing case materials” and thus, these “billing entries reflect excessive time spent on a noncomplex, repetitive litigation task that did not require significant legal analysis or novel drafting.” (Opp., p.6:1-6.)

Although the opposition included a declaration by attorney Santana, this declaration did not include a copy of either plaintiffs’ initial disclosures or production of documents and thus, this Court has no valid, objective basis for sustaining defendant’s objection to this billing entry. Likewise, the Santana Declaration provides the Court with no evidence sufficient basis to bear out defendant’s characterization that the amount of time billed was “patently unreasonable” or that “[i]nitial disclosures in Song-Beverly cases are largely standardized and routinely prepared using templates and existing case materials.” Based on this record, the Court declines to reduce the aforementioned fees billed on 7/28/2025.

Review/Analyze Repair Orders. The opposition next challenges the 2.8 hours billed on 7/28/25 by attorney Brim to “Review/analyze numerous (9) repair orders from AutoNation re reasons for presentment, defects, diagnostics evaluation, repairs attempted, days out of service and other pertinent information to draft a comprehensive repair order summary,” and an additional 2.9 hours to draft a summary of those repair orders. According to defendant, “nearly all of the repair orders pertained to routine service and multi-point inspections, with only one involving a warranty related repair” and “[t]he repair orders were short, straightforward, and largely unrelated to substantive warranty issues at the time the work was performed,” such that there can be no reasonable justification for billing “nearly six hours of attorney time to review and summarize them.” (Opp., p.6:6-17.)

However, defendant has again failed to provide copies of the repair orders at issue and the Santana Declaration in opposition includes

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV009054: HAYSE-GREGSON, et al. vs FCA US LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

no evidence to substantiate the claim that the repair orders were “short, straightforward, and largely unrelated to substantive warranty issues at the time the work was performed” or that the time spent reviewing and summarizing them” was not reasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, these fees will not be reduced.

Amended Notice of Deposition and Preparation for Same. The opposition insists the 1.5 hours billed by attorney Brim on 8/18/25 to “Draft/revise Notice of Amended Confirmed Deposition of Defendant’s Person Most Knowledgeable; Draft outline in preparation of deposition” is “patently unreasonable” because (1) another attorney had already drafted an initial deposition notice on 6/17/2025; (2) the deposition was not scheduled to take place until nearly a month later; and (3) yet another attorney later billed over 4 hours on 9/22/2025 “to draft the same outline” in preparation for the deposition. (Opp., p.6:18-21.) The Court agrees and plaintiffs’ attorney fees will be reduced by $825.

Defendant separately challenges the 4.1 hours billed on 9/22/2025 by attorney Martinez for “preparing for PMK deposition; review[ing] Defendant [sic] document production, case history, etc.; Drafting IPMK [sic] deposition outline” on the grounds “[t]his entry is duplicative of work previously performed by [three other attorneys and t]he number of hours billed to review materials and prepare for a deposition that was estimated to last only two hours is patently unreasonable,” especially when “the deposition did not ultimately go forward.” (Opp., p.6:26-p.7:3.) The Court agrees and therefore reduces plaintiffs’ attorney fees by $1,640.

9/19/2025 Letter re: Disclosure Obligations. According to defendant, the 1.9 hours billed by attorney Ortiz “to draft boilerplate language regarding Plaintiff’s [sic] counsel’s belief that Defendant failed to provide initial disclosures pursuant to AB 1755” is “patently unreasonable” because “[t]he issue involved a routine and standardized procedural allegation that required little legal analysis or original drafting” and “[b]illing nearly two hours for such a basic task reflects excessive and unnecessary time expenditure in a straightforward lemon law matter.” (Opp., p.6:22-26.)

However, defendant has again failed to provide a copy of the subject letter and the Santana Declaration in opposition includes no evidence to substantiate the claim that “[t]he issue involved a routine and standardized procedural allegation that required little legal analysis or original drafting” or that “[b]illing nearly two hours for such a basic task reflects excessive and unnecessary time expenditure in a straightforward lemon law matter.” Based on this evidentiary record, the Court is not persuaded that these attorney fees should be reduced.

9/29/2025 Letter re: Disclosure Obligations. The opposition also objects on the same grounds to the 0.8 hours billed by attorney Ortiz to draft a follow-up to the letter

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV009054: HAYSE-GREGSON, et al. vs FCA US LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

discussed in the previous paragraph. (Opp., p.7:4-8.) Because defendant did not provide a copy of this follow-up letter or otherwise address it within the body of the Santana Declaration, the Court has no valid basis on which to reduce these fees.

Motion for Attorney Fees. Defendant’s final contention is that the 4.4 hours which were billed for preparation of the moving papers and the 7.5 hours which plaintiffs ‘anticipate’ being incurred in reviewing the opposition to this motion, preparing a reply and attending the hearing should not be recovered here because (1) the moving papers are substantially similar to prior motions filed by CCA in other lemon law cases; (2) the ‘anticipated’ 7.5 hours “has not occurred and is not accurate for what time will be or has been actually incurred;” and (3) CCA “routinely requests this time regardless of case, which shows the boilerplate nature of the matter, yet plaintiffs’ counsel is billing like it’s a complex matter that is not boilerplate.” (Opp., p.7:9-25.)

The Court holds that the 4.4 hours billed for preparing the moving papers is unreasonably excessive under the circumstances, especially when CCA routinely handles lemon law cases similar to the one at bar and has in the past prepared similar fee motions and when the moving papers required little more than a summary of the billing records. Thus, the $2,750 billed by attorney Daghighian on 12/21/2025 for preparation of the moving shall be reduced by $1,187.50 (representing a reduction of 1.9 hours).

Additionally, while it is not improper for plaintiffs to include the time estimated to be billed in connection with reviewing the opposition, preparing a reply and attending a possible hearing on this motion, this Court finds that the full 7.5 hours estimated by plaintiffs is not recoverable here given the limited nature of the opposition and reply, as well as the uncertainty of a hearing on this motion actually taking place. After reviewing the opposition and reply papers, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ fee award should be reduced by an additional $2,812.5 (representing a reduction of 4.5 hours).

Multiplier. The moving papers request a multiplier of 1.5, which would add another $12,345 to the fee award. This Court does not find that a multiplier is warranted under the circumstances here, as this case appears to be a fairly typical lemon law case which CCA frequently handles, it presented no unusual issues or risks for CCA or its client, and CCA has not demonstrated that it handled this case with “exceptional skill” or that other factors warrant such relief. (See, e.g., Rey v. Madera Unified School District, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at 1242.)

As noted above, the California Supreme Court has clarified that a trial court should award a multiplier only where the quality of representation far exceeds the quality of representation which would have been provided by an attorney of comparable skill and experience.” (See, e.g., Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 1138-1139.) Since the award of a fee multiplier or

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV009054: HAYSE-GREGSON, et al. vs FCA US LLC, A DELAWARE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, et al. 08/25/2026 Hearing on Motion for Attorney Fees in Department 16D

enhancement is purely a discretionary matter (see, e.g., Hogar v. Community Development Comm. of City of Escondido, supra, 157 Cal.App.4th at 1371), this Court declines to award a multiplier in this matter.

Costs and Expenses. As noted above, plaintiffs claim “costs and expenses” of $1,892.41. In light of the opposition’s express statement that defendant “does no [sic] challenge Plaintiff’s [sic] costs, this Court will award the full amount sought by plaintiffs in the moving papers.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorney fees of no more than $18,225 (i.e., $20,002.50 for “past fees” + $4,687.50 for “anticipated” fees – $825 – $1,640 – $1,187.50 – $2,812.50) plus “costs and expenses” of $1,892.41, for a total award of $20,117.41.

The Court declines to sign the proposed order submitted with the moving papers because it improperly indicates the awarded fees, costs and expenses are “payable within 30-days of this Order” and because no formal order is necessary here.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)