Magdy Tawadrous v. United States Fire Insurance Company, Blue Star Claims, LLC, and Gemma Monica

Moreover, the nature of the asserted harm differs. In Roe, the trial court relied in part on the plaintiffs' concern that future employers might discover the lawsuit through an Internet search. Here, Plaintiffs assert a risk of harassment, threats, and violence from third parties and social-media followers if their identities as litigants are publicly disclosed. Plaintiffs have also submitted declarations and supporting evidence describing harassment and threats they have already experienced, which they contend demonstrates the risk of further harm if their identities as Plaintiffs in this action are publicly disclosed. (Opposition, pp. 4, 11.)

The Court recognizes that the judicially noticed materials are relevant to the strength of Plaintiffs' claimed privacy interests. Although the extent to which certain Plaintiffs have publicly discussed the underlying events and matters associated with this litigation weighs to some degree in favor of disclosure, that circumstance must be considered together with the other interests and evidence before the Court. In particular, the judicially noticed materials do not, standing alone, resolve Plaintiffs' separate concerns regarding the risk of harassment, threats, and retaliation if they are publicly identified by their legal names as Plaintiffs in these actions.

The Court therefore finds that Plaintiffs' asserted privacy and safety interests remain sufficient to support their continued use of pseudonyms. The evidence reflects more than a generalized concern of embarrassment or reputational harm and supports Plaintiffs' contention that publicly identifying them as litigants in this action presents a risk of further harassment, threats, and retaliation. Moreover, Trevi already knows Plaintiffs' identities and is able to defend against their claims. On balance, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' privacy and safety interests continue to outweigh the public interest in disclosure.

Therefore, Trevi has not demonstrated a sufficient basis to disturb the Court's prior orders permitting Plaintiffs to proceed under pseudonyms. The motions are DENIED. Motions to seal These related actions arise from allegations of childhood sexual abuse, sexual battery, assault, and exploitation. Plaintiffs Jane Doe K.C. 1, Jane Doe A.H. 2, Jane Doe 3, and Jane Doe 4 (collectively, "Plaintiffs") allege that Defendants Gloria De Los Angeles Trevino Ruiz aka Gloria Trevi ("Trevi"), Sergio Gustavo Andrade Sanchez aka Sergio Andrade ("Andrade"), and Maria Raquenel Portillo Jimenez aka Mary Boquitas and Mary Raquenel ("Portillo") sexually abused and exploited Plaintiffs while they were minors.

On July 20, 2026, Defendant Trevi filed the instant motions for an order disclosing Plaintiffs' identities. Plaintiffs filed oppositions on August 3, 2026, and Trevi filed replies on August 7, 2026. The parties also filed related motions to seal portions of the briefing and supporting documents containing Plaintiffs' identifying information. For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs' privacy and safety interests constitute an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the identifying information.

That overriding interest supports sealing because disclosure of the information would defeat the Court's determination that Plaintiffs may continue to proceed under pseudonyms. There is a substantial probability that Plaintiffs' interests would be prejudiced absent sealing because disclosure would reveal, or permit the public to determine, their identities as litigants in these actions. The requested sealing is narrowly tailored because it is limited to Plaintiffs' true identities and information from which those identities may be determined, rather than the entirety of the parties' filings.

No less restrictive means would adequately protect Plaintiffs' anonymity. Thus, the Court GRANTS the parties' motions to seal in both related actions. The portions of the parties' filings containing Plaintiffs' true names or other information which their identities as Plaintiffs may be determined shall remain under seal. IV. ORDER The Court DENIES Trevi's motion to disclose Plaintiffs identities. The Court GRANTS motions to seal. Defendant Trevi to give notice. Dated: August 25, 2026 JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT Case Number: 25NNCV07791 Hearing Date: August 26, 2026 Dept: P [TENTATIVE] ORDER SUSTAINING DEFENDANT GEMMA MONICA'S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT I.

INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Magdy Tawadrous ("Plaintiff") filed this action against Defendants United

States Fire Insurance Company ("U.S. Fire"), Blue Star Claims, LLC ("Blue Star"), and Gemma Monica ("Monica") arising from the handling and denial of benefits under an occupational accident insurance policy. Plaintiff alleges causes of action for (1) breach of insurance contract, (2) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (3) violation of Insurance Code section 790.03, (4) violation of Business and Professions Code sections 17200/17500, (5) unjust enrichment, and (6) fraud.

On November 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed the Complaint. On June 3, 2026, Monica filed the instant demurrer to all six causes of action. Plaintiff filed an opposition on August 14, 2026, and Monica filed a reply on August 20, 2026. Meet and confer Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a), the demurring party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading at least five days before the responsive pleading is due. This must occur in person, telephone or by video conference with the aim of resolving any objections raised in the demurrer.

Additionally, the demurring party must file and serve a declaration detailing the meet and confer efforts. It should be noted, however, that the failure to meet and confer is not itself grounds for sustaining or overruling a demurrer or granting or denying a motion to strike. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec.Sec. 430.41, subd. (a)(4), 435.5, subd. (a)(4).) Defense counsel declares that beginning on May 15, 2026, she attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff's counsel by telephone and sent an email summarizing the grounds for the demurrer.

Counsel further declares that Plaintiff's counsel responded by email, but the parties were unable to resolve the issues. (Ingulsrud Decl., P.P. 2-3.) The declaration does not establish that the parties actually met and conferred in person, by telephone, or by video conference as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a). Thus, the requirement is not satisfied, however, the Court elects to consider the demurrer on the merits. II. LEGAL STANDARD "[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint." (Lewis v.

Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v.

Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) CCP section 430.10(f) provides that a pleading is uncertain if it is ambiguous and unintelligible. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 430.10(f).) "A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures." (Khoury v. Maly's of

California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) "A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond --i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her." (Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group) Sec. 7:85 (emphasis in original).) "The objection of uncertainty does not go to the failure to allege sufficient facts." (Brea v.

McGlashan (1934) 3 Cal.App.2d 454, 459.) "It goes to the doubt as to what the pleader means by the facts alleged." (Id.) "Such a demurrer should not be sustained where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet." (People v. Lim (1941) 18 Cal.2d 872, 882.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [court shall not "sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment"]; Kong v.

City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 ["A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment."]; Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 ["When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend."].) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v.

Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) III. ANALYSIS Defendant Monica demurs to all six causes of action alleged against her. Monica argues she is not a proper party because she was not a party to the insurance contract and is alleged only to have acted within the course and scope of her employment as a claims adjuster. (Demurrer, p. 4.) Plaintiff alleges Monica was an "agent, claims adjuster, employee, and/or authorized representative" of Blue Star Claims, LLC and United States Fire Insurance Company, acting within the course and scope of that agency or employment. (Complaint, P. 4.)

The Complaint otherwise refers generally to "Defendants" and does not separately identify conduct undertaken by Monica. First and second causes of action: breach of insurance contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "The standard elements of a claim for breach of contract are: '(1) the contract, (2) plaintiff's performance excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendant's breach, and (4) damage to plaintiff therefrom.'" (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1178.)

The elements for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are: (1) existence of a contract between plaintiff and defendant; (2) plaintiff performed his contractual obligations or was excused from performing them; (3) the conditions requiring defendant's performance had occurred; (4) the defendant unfairly interfered with the plaintiff's right to receive the benefits of the contract; and (5) the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant's conduct. (Merced Irr.

Dist. V. County of Mariposa (E.D. Cal. 2013) 941 F.Supp.2d 1237, 1280 [discussing California law].) Here, Monica argues that both causes of action fail because she is not a party to the insurance policy. Monica contends that Plaintiff alleges only that she acted as an agent and claims adjuster for Blue Star and U.S. Fire, which is insufficient to establish contractual privity. (Demurrer, pp. 6-7.) Plaintiff opposes arguing she may be held for tortious conduct she participated, notwithstanding her status as an agent or employee. (Opposition, pp. 6-7.)

The Court agrees with Monica. The Complaint does not allege that Monica was a party to the insurance policy. Rather, Monica is alleged only to have acted as an agent and claims adjuster for Blue Star and U.S. Fire. (Complaint, P. 4.) Thus, there is no contractual relationship between Plaintiff and Monica that could support either a breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant claim. Plaintiff's argument that an agent may be liable for her own tortious conduct does not change this result because these claims arise from duties imposed by the insurance contract.

Thus, the demurrer as to the first and second causes of action are SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Third cause of action: California Insurance Code Sec. 790.03 Monica demurs to the third cause of action, arguing that Insurance Code section 790.03 does not provide a private cause of action, citing Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 304. (Demurrer, p. 7.) The Court agrees. In Moradi-Shalal, the California Supreme Court held that Insurance Code section 790.03 does not create a private right of action. (Id. at p. 304.)

Thus, Plaintiff cannot maintain a standalone claim under section 790.03. Thus, the demurrer as to this cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend. Fourth cause of action: UCL violation To set forth a claim for a violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 ("UCL"), Plaintiff must establish Defendant was engaged in an "unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising" and certain specific acts. (Bus. & Prof. Code, Sec. 17200.)

A cause of action for unfair competition "is not an all-purpose substitute for a tort or contract action." (Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 173.) Section 17500 provides that it is unlawful for a person or corporation to disseminate false or misleading advertisements with the intent to dispose of real or personal property or perform services. (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, Sec. 17500.) To establish a false advertising cause of action under section 17500, Plaintiff must demonstrate the advertisement was likely to deceive or mislead consumers. (See Brockey v.

Moore (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 86, 98-99.) Monica demurs to the fourth cause

of action, arguing that the Complaint does not allege any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent conduct by Monica individually and instead relies on the same claims-handling conduct alleged against Defendants collectively. (Demurrer, p. 8.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Monica may be individually liable under the UCL because she personally participated in the alleged unfair and fraudulent conduct. (Opposition, p. 8.) The Court agrees with Monica. The Complaint does not identify any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business practice undertaken by Monica individually.

Rather, the allegations are asserted generally against "Defendants," and Monica is alleged only to have acted as an agent and claims adjuster for the corporate defendants. Further, to the extent the UCL claim is based on the alleged fraudulent conduct, the Complaint does not plead any misrepresentation by Monica with the required specificity. Thus, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer as to this cause of action without leave to amend. Fifth cause of action: Unjust enrichment Monica demurs to the fifth cause of action, arguing that it fails to state sufficient facts and is uncertain. (Notice, p. 2.)

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that Monica does not substantively address the unjust enrichment claim in her demurrer and therefore provides no basis for sustaining the demurrer to this cause of action. (Opposition, p. 9.) The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's argument. Monica expressly challenged the fifth cause of action in her Notice of Demurrer on the ground that it fails to state sufficient facts. (Notice, p. 2.) Moreover, "[u]njust enrichment is not a cause of action"; rather, it is simply "a restitution claim." (Hill v.

Roll International Corp. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1307; see also Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793.) Thus, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer as to this cause of action with 20 days' leave to amend to allege facts sufficient to state a restitutionary claim against Monica. Sixth cause of action: Fraud "The elements of fraud are (a) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) scienter or knowledge of its falsity; (c) intent to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage." (Hinesley v.

Oakshade Town Ctr. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) The facts constituting the alleged fraud must be alleged factually and specifically as to every element of fraud, as the policy of "liberal construction" of the pleadings will not ordinarily be invoked. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) To properly allege fraud against a corporation, the plaintiffs must plead the names of the persons allegedly making the false representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. (Tarmann v.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 153, 157.) Monica demurs to the sixth cause of

action, arguing that Plaintiff fails to allege the specific misrepresentation made by Monica, including how, when, where, to whom, and by what means it was made. (Demurrer, p. 9.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the Complaint adequately alleges Monica personally participated in the fraudulent conduct. The Court disagrees. The Complaint generally attributes the alleged misrepresentations to "Defendants" without identifying any representation made by Monica individually. It does not allege what Monica said or concealed, when or how the alleged misrepresentation occurred, or facts showing Monica's knowledge of falsity and intent to induce Plaintiff's reliance.

Thus, the fraud claim is not pled with the required specificity. The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer as to this cause of action with 20 days leave to amend. IV. ORDER The Court SUSTAINS Monica's demurrer without leave to amend as to the first, second, third, and fourth causes of action. The Court SUSTAINS Monica's demurrer with 20 days' leave to amend as to the fifth and sixth causes of action. Defendants are to give notice. Dated: August 26, 2026 JARED D. MOSES JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT | Home -->)" -->