Tianna M. Moore v. FCA US, LLC; Cerritos Dodge Chrysler Jeep Ram

the payment. (Chow Decl., P. 3; Exh. B.) Plaintiff argues Defendants' current amount due is $25,701.00.

Upon review of the Agreement attached as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Plaintiff's counsel Ron Chow ("Chow"), the Court notes the following issues: (1) The Stipulation re: Judgment Upon Conditional Settlement attached to Chow's declaration appears to have been signed only by Defendant Gamliel (Chow Decl., Exh. A, p. 3) and Plaintiff (Id., pp. 6, 9). There is no signature by Defendant GI Group. (2) The Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release attached as Exhibit A to the Chow Declaration is only signed by Plaintiff. (Id., p. 10.) (3) There is no Proof of Service of notice of the instant motion.

The Stipulation re: Judgment Upon Conditional Settlement states that "[i]f there is an Uncured Default by Defendnats, the resulting judgment may be entered ex parte by Plaintiff's Counsel's declaration (which includes and accounts for any payments received from Defendants) without any further notice and/or hearings to Defendants, and Defendants hereby waive all rights to further notice and/or further hearings." (Id., p. 2:22-25 (emphasis in original).) But, as is noted above, the Stipulation does not appear to have been signed by all parties. In the absence of a fully executed stipulation to waive notice, notice of the instant motion should have been given.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff may re-file its motion, addressing the Court's concerns noted above. The matter is ordered dismissed without prejudice with the Court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the parties' settlement agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 664.6.

OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT TIANNA M. MOORE. Plaintiff, vs. FCA US, LLC; CERRITOS DODGE CHRYSLER JEEP RAM; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants.

|)))))))))))))))) | CASE NO: 24CMCV01667 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT FCA US, LLC'S MOTION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFF TIANNA M. MOORE'S DISCOVERY RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $608.00 DATE: August 26, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M. DEPT.: E | Moving Party: Defendant FCA US LLC Responding Party: None Notice: Ok SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT Tentative Ruling: (1) FCA's Motion to Compel Plaintiff's Discovery Responses to Request for Production of Documents Set One is GRANTED. (2) FCA's Request for Sanctions is GRANTED IN THE REDUCED AMOUNT OF $368.00. SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT

I. BACKGROUND

This is a Song-Beverly action. Plaintiff Tianna M. Moore alleges that, on October 14, 2017, she entered into a warranty contract with Defendant FCA US, LLC ("FCA") regarding a 2017 Dodge Challenger (the "Subject Vehicle"). Plaintiff alleges that defects and nonconformities to the warranty which substantially impaired the use, value and or safety of the Subject Vehicle manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period. Plaintiff further alleges that FCA was unable to repair the Subject Vehicle after a reasonable number of repair attempts and failed to either promptly replace the Subject Vehicle or make restitution.

On October 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed this action against FCA, Cerritos Dodge Chrysler Jeep Ram, and Does 1 through 10, inclusive (collectively, the "Defendants"), alleging causes of action for: (1) Violation of Subdivision (d) of Civil Code Section 1793.2; (2) Violation of Subdivision (b) of Civil Code Section 1793.2; (3) Violation of Subdivision (a)(3) of Civil Code Section 1793.2; (4) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability; (5) Negligent Repair; and (6) Fraudulent Inducement - Concealment.

On May 18, 2026, FCA filed this Motion to Compel Plaintiff's Discovery Responses to FCA's Request for Production of Documents, Set One and Request for Sanctions in the Amount of $608.00. As of August 24, 2026, Plaintiff has not filed an Opposition and FCA has not filed a Reply.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 1005(b), all papers opposing a noticed motion must be filed with the court and served on all other parties "at least nine court days ... before the hearing"¿and all reply papers must be filed with the court and served on all other parties "at least five court days before the hearing."¿ (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1005(b).) ¿Accordingly, any opposition or reply papers now filed are untimely, and the Court exercises its discretion to refuse to consider untimely papers. (Cal. R. Ct., Rule 3.1300(d); Mackey v. Bd. of Trustees of California State Univ.¿ (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 640, 657.)

II. ANALYSIS

A.

Legal Standard

A party must respond to requests for production of documents within 30 days after service of the requests. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 2031.260(a).) If the responding party fails to timely respond, the requesting party may move for an order compelling response to the discovery. (Id., Sec. 2031.300(c).) Where no response is made, the responding party also waives the right to make any objections, including ones based on privilege or work-product protection. (Id. at Sec.¿2031.300(a).)

No meet and confer efforts are required before filing a motion to compel responses to the discovery. (Id. at Sec. 2031.300; Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pac. Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 411.)

Although unverified responses to discovery are tantamount to no response at all, a party is not required to verify a response containing only objections. (See Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636 (" Appleton ")(Unverified response are tantamount to no response); see also Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 2031.250(a) (A response containing only objections need not be verified).) Because a response containing only objections need not be verified, a party's failure to verify such a response does not result in a waiver of the objections made or render them untimely. (Food 4 Less Supermarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 651, 658.)

B.

Discussion

FCA moves the Court for an order compelling Plaintiff to provide initial responses, without objections, to its Requests for Production of Documents, Set One ("RPDs").

1. RPDs 1-7 and 9

FCA's motion misconstrues the parties' procedural position as RPDs 1-7 and 9. Upon review of Plaintiff's responses to RPDs 1-7 and 9, the Court determines that Plaintiff has indeed provided initial responses; to each Plaintiff asserts only objections. (See Hughes Decl., Exh. B.) Because Plaintiff's initial responses consist of nothing but objections, those responses need not be verified but need only be signed by counsel. (See Appleton, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 696; Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 2031.250(a).) Accordingly, the Court understand FCA's motion as it pertains to RPDs 1-7 and 9 to be a motion to compel further responses.

Each of FCA's RPDs 1-7 and 9 seek basic information as to the Subject Vehicle and/or Plaintiff's Complaint: (1) the lease agreement or sales contract (RPD 1); (2) the Subject Vehicle's current registration (RPD 2); (3) document evidencing Plaintiff's damages (RPD 3); (4) a copy of the Subject Vehicle's title (RPD 4); (5) a current payoff statement for the Subject Vehicle (RPD 5); (6) a current payoff statement for the Subject Vehicle with a 30 day per diem (RPD 6); (7) payment history for the Subject Vehicle (RPD 7); and (8) documents evidencing any repairs, maintenance, or other service work performed on the Subject Vehicle (RPD 9).

Although FCA's RPDs 1-7 and 9 seek the most basic information about the Subject Vehicle, Plaintiff responds to each with essentially the same language: Plaintiff objects that the request is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, harassing, and lacks reasonable particularity. Plaintiff objects that 'YOUR' is uncertain, ambiguous, and confusing and Plaintiff responds on their own behalf. Plaintiff objects that, as written, the request seeks information neither relevant to the subject matter of this action nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Plaintiff objects further to the extent that request imposes on Plaintiff any requirement or discovery obligation greater than or different from those under the Code of Civil Procedure and other applicable law. Plaintiff objects that the request invades the right of privacy. Plaintiff objects that the request seeks information that Defendant has in its possession, custody, and/or control or which may be obtained through other means that are more convenient, less costly, and less burdensome. Plaintiff objects to the extent this request seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine and seeks the premature disclosure of expert witness information in contravention of Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 2031.410 set seq.

Plaintiff objects to the extent the request calls for a legal conclusion. (See Hughes Decl., Exh. B, p. 8:5-17 (Plaintiff's response to RPD 9); Compare, generally, Hughes Decl., Exh. B (Plaintiff's responses to RPDs 1-7.)

Plaintiff's responses to RPDs 1-7 and 9 reveals that the objections asserted are meritless. There is nothing ambiguous, vague, confusing or implicating privacy or any other privilege (or expert opinion) in a request for the lease or purchase contract at issue, service and repair documents, vehicle title documents, or any of the other documents sought via FCA's RPDs 1-7 and 9. Similarly, seeking basic information regarding the Subject Vehicle and Plaintiff's claimed damages could not be more relevant to this matter and could not be more reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Plaintiff's objections to RPDs 1-7 and 9 appear spurious and intended to delay. In accordance with the above, each of Plaintiff's objections to FCA's RPDs 1-7 and 9 are OVERRULED. Plaintiff will be ordered to provide further code-compliant responses, without any further objection.

2. RPDs 8 and 10

FCA's RPD No. 8 seeks "[a]ll DOCUMENTS relating to the sale, trade-in, or other exchange or dispossession of YOUR VEHICLE, including but not limited to any lease agreement or sales contract for another vehicle for which YOUR VEHICLE was used as a partial down-payment, trade-in credit, otherwise." (Hughes Decl., Exh. A, p. 3:10-12 (emphasis in original).) FCA's RPD No. 10 seeks "[a]ll DOCUMENTS relating to any repairs, maintenance or other service work performed on YOUR VEHICLE." (Id., p. 3:14-15.)

After asserting the same objections addressed above in the Court's discussion of RPDs 1-7 and 9, Plaintiff responds to both RPD No. 8 and RPD No. 10 that no responsive documents have ever existed (see Hughes Decl., Exh. B., p. 7:10-27, p. 8:11-9:11.) For the same reasons as discussed above, the Court finds each of Plaintiff's objections to RPDs 8 and 10 meritless and OVERRULES each asserted objection. Plaintiff's failure to verify her discovery response renders her substantive response tantamount to no response at all. (See Appleton, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 696.) Accordingly, the Court will order Plaintiff to provide responses to RPDs 8 and 10, without further objection.

C. Monetary Sanctions

FCA requests the Court impose monetary sanctions of $608.00 against Plaintiff and her attorney of record for violating obligations under the Discovery Act. T he Court is required to impose monetary sanctions against a party who unsuccessfully opposes a motion to compel initial responses to RPDs, unless the court finds that the responding party's delay was substantially justified or caused by other circumstances that make the imposition of monetary sanctions unjust. (See Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 2031.300(c).)

Further, pursuant to Rule of Court 3.1348, the Court has discretion to award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a successful moving party, even if no opposition to the motion was filed. (See Cal. R. Ct., Rule 3.1348(a).)

Hughes attests he spent 0.4 hours preparing for this Motion to Compel and anticipates spending 0.6 hours reviewing Plaintiff's opposition and drafting a reply, at a rate of $400.00 per hour. (Hughes Decl., P. 9.) Hughes further attests that Kayla Marie Sideco, his Post-Bar Law Clerk ("Sideco"), spent 0.8 hours drafting this motion at a rate of $185.00 per hour, and that the filing fee for the motion was $60.00. (Id.) The Court finds both Hughes and Sideco's hourly rates reasonable for an attorney and a Post-Bar Law Clerk in the Greater Los Angeles Area. However, the Court finds Hughes' anticipated 0.6 hours unnecessary here as Plaintiff has not filed an opposition and FCA has not filed a reply. Accordingly, the Court awards sanctions in the reduced amount of $368.00.

III. CONCLUSION

FCA's Motion to Compel Request for Production of Documents, Set One is GRANTED. Plaintiff is ordered to serve code-compliant responses, without objection, to FCA no later than September 10, 2026. The Court GRANTS FCA's Request for Monetary Sanctions in the reduced amount of $368.00, imposed jointly and severally against Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel of record. Sanctions are ordered to be paid to FCA's counsel no later than September 10, 2026.

Case Number: 26CMCV00410 Hearing Date: August 26, 2026 Dept: E SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - SOUTH CENTRAL DISTRICT INDRA SARATH, a minor, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, ANJALI SARATH; ZARA SARATH, a minor, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, ANJALI SARATH; and ANJALI SARATH, individually, Plaintiffs, vs. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, d.b.a., HARBOR-UCLA MEDICAL CENTER; and DOES 1 through 250, inclusive, Defendant(s). |))))))))))