Kelley Roberts vs. Rehana Harborth

34-2022-00319058-CU-MC-GDS: Kelley Roberts vs. Rehana Harborth 12/16/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two in Department 54

Tentative Ruling

Defendant Tyler Q. Dahl’s (“Defendant”) motion to compel Plaintiff Kelley Roberts’ (“Plaintiff”) further responses to request for production (“RFP”) is GRANTED in part on the condition that prior to or at the hearing, Defendant files amended proofs of service showing that he served the motion, memorandum of points and authorities, declaration of Jason J. Sommer, and request for judicial notice on co-defendants Rehana Harborth and Keri Harborth. The proofs of service of Defendant’s motion, memorandum of points and authorities, declaration of Jason J.

Sommer, and request for judicial notice indicate that Defendant only served Plaintiff, but did not serve Rehana Harborth and Keri Harborth. If no amended proofs of service are filed prior to or at the hearing, the Court will drop the motion for defective service. If amended proofs of service are filed prior to or at the hearing, the Court will issue the following ruling.

Overview This is an action for slander of title arising out of Defendant’s representation of his client and codefendant Rehana Harborth regarding the property of decedent Jerry B. DaValle (“Decedent”), who died on December 2, 2020. On November 9, 2020, prior to his death, Decedent settled the revocable Jerry B. DaValle 2020 Trust (“DaValle Trust”), assigning all of his real and personal property to himself as Trustee and naming Plaintiff, his daughter, as Successor Trustee. Also on November 9, 2020, Decedent executed a pour-over will, which left any remainder of his estate to the Trustee of the DaValle Trust and revoked all prior wills.

Decedent made a deed transferring title to his real property at 1509 Greenhills Road in Sacramento to himself as Trustee of the DaValle Trust. Prior to the creation of the DaValle Trust, Decedent allegedly settled a separate trust entitled the Jerry B. DaValle Revocable Trust, naming Decedent as Trustee and Ms. Harborth as Successor Trustee. Following Decedent’s death, Ms. Harborth filed an Affidavit – Death of Trustee (“Affidavit”) with the Sacramento County Clerk/Recorder, identifying herself as sole Successor Trustee of the Jerry B.

DaValle Revocable Trust and naming herself titleholder of the real property at 1509 Greenhills Road as Successor Trustee of the Jerry B. DaValle Revocable Trust. The Affidavit names Defendant as the person seeking the recording of the Affidavit. Plaintiff filed a petition under Probate Code section 850 (the “850 petition”) to confirm ownership of the real property at 1509 Greenhills Road (Case No. 34-2021-00299094). A trial was held in that matter on August 7, 2023, and on August 10, 2023, the Court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, declaring as valid the DaValle Trust, declaring Plaintiff as the owner of the Greenhills Road property as Successor Trustee of the DaValle Trust, and declaring as void the Affidavit and any prior trust or will of Decedent.

Plaintiff subsequently brought this action against Defendant for slander of title—in addition to

34-2022-00319058-CU-MC-GDS: Kelley Roberts vs. Rehana Harborth 12/16/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two in Department 54

actions for financial abuse of an elder, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and imposition of constructive trust against Ms. Harborth and other defendants—and seeks recovery of attorney’s fees and costs to clear title to the Greenhills Road property. Defendant moves to compel Plaintiff’s further response to RFP No. 8, which requests “Please produce any and all DOCUMENTS that evidence or reflect the attorney’s fees YOU are claiming as damages in the lawsuit filed against [Defendant] for slander of title, Case No.

Case No. 34- 2022-00319058, filed in the Sacramento County Superior Court, entitled Roberts v. Harborth, et al. filed on or about April 28, 2022.” Plaintiff responded: “OBJECTION. This question and the applicable ‘instructions’ demand both documents and work product and opinion of Plaintiff’s counsel in violation of the attorney-client and attorney work product privileges, contrary to law. Without waiving any objection, this party responds: Counsel will provide a list of payments Plaintiff has made to counsel for attorneys fee’s [sic] from the date that Plaintiff first sought advise of counsel in this matter through the completion of the proceeds required to clear title to the real property of the Decedent.” Defendant moves for further responses, arguing that the objection lacks merit because the attorney-client privilege does not cover attorney fee invoices.

Defendant also argues that the invoices for the 850 petition are not privileged because that legal matter has concluded. Defendant insists that the invoices are necessary to determine whether the legal services were reasonable and necessary to clear the title of the Greenhills Road property. Plaintiff opposes the motion, arguing that Defendant has not met his burden to show his entitlement to the invoices, nor has Defendant shown that the invoiced attorney’s fees can be apportioned between the 850 petition and the present actions.

Plaintiff also argues that the 850 petition and the present actions have significant overlapping issues, such that producing the invoices related to the 850 petition would necessarily involve producing invoices related to the present actions, which are ongoing and protected by the attorney-client privilege. Analysis “[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 2017.010.) In the discovery context, information is relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. [citations omitted.] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612.) Generally, “a civil litigant's right to discovery is broad.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00319058-CU-MC-GDS: Kelley Roberts vs. Rehana Harborth 12/16/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two in Department 54

541.) As part of discovery, a party may demand inspection of documents or property. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.010.) The party presented with the demand may respond with an objection. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.210, subd. (a)(3).) If the propounding party deems “[a]n objection in the response is without merit or too general,” it may move for an order compelling further response to the demand. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).) “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 2031.310 subd. (b)(1).) If an objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked shall be stated. (Code. Civ. Proc., § 2031.240, subd. (b)(2).) If an objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work product, that claim shall be expressly asserted. (Ibid.) If an objection is based on a claim of privilege or a claim that the information sought is protected work product, the response shall provide sufficient factual information for other parties to evaluate the merits of that claim, including, if necessary, a privilege log. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 2031.240, subd. (c)(1).) The moving party claiming the attorney-client privilege (here, Plaintiff) “has the burden of establishing the preliminary facts necessary to support its exercise, i.e., a communication made in the course of an attorney-client relationship.” (Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733.) “[W]hile billing invoices are generally not ‘made for the purpose of legal representation,’ the information contained within certain invoices may be within the scope of privilege.” (Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors v.

Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 282, 297 (hereafter Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors).) However, while the privilege encompasses everything in an invoice—including the amount of aggregate fees—for active and pending legal matters, the same may not be true for fee totals in legal matters that concluded long ago. (Id., at p. 298.) “In contrast to information involving a pending case, a cumulative fee total for a long-completed matter does not always reveal the substance of legal consultation.” (Ibid.)

A writing that reflects an attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories is not discoverable under any circumstances. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2018.030, subd. (a).) In the instant matter, Defendant seeks further responses to RFP No. 8 based on his position that Plaintiff’s objection lacks merit, that Plaintiff’s claim of attorney-client privilege does not justify her failure to provide her attorney fee invoices, and that the invoices are responsive to this request. Because the invoices represent payments made by Plaintiff to her counsel, the Court finds the invoices are relevant because they may assist Defendant in evaluating his case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement regarding Plaintiff’s claimed damages, such that the invoices are generally discoverable unless privileged. (See Lipton v.

Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1611-1612.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00319058-CU-MC-GDS: Kelley Roberts vs. Rehana Harborth 12/16/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two in Department 54

In opposition, Plaintiff first argues that Defendant has not met his “burden to show basic entitlement to the requested invoices” because “he has failed to establish a right to apportion the subject billings,” and that even if Defendant were to obtain the invoices, “the proposed effort would be fruitless.” (Plaintiff’s Opposition, pp. 2-3.) Citing Brown Bark III, L.P. v. Haver (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 809 (hereafter Brown Bark III), Plaintiff appears to argue that Defendant must first show that the attorney fees incurred in the 850 petition and the present actions are able to be respectively allocated before they are discoverable.

However, Plaintiff’s reliance on Brown Bark III is misplaced, as that case involved the post-judgment allocation of attorney’s fees (e.g., when the same attorney represents one party that is entitled to recover its attorney fees and another party that is not, and when attorney’s fees must be allocated among separate causes of action). At this stage in the current matter, information may be relevant for discovery purposes if it might reasonably lead to discoverable information. It is reasonable to assume that Plaintiff’s attorney’s fees she allegedly sustained as damages in the 850 petition could be exposed through discovery.

Plaintiff cannot refuse to produce responsive documents simply because she believes it would be “fruitless” for Defendant to receive them, nor because she believes it is sufficient that she provided a list of her attorney’s fees in her response to Plaintiff’s original RFP. Accordingly, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument. Plaintiff next argues that the attorney invoices are protected by both the attorney-client and the work product privileges, but provides little, if any, factual information supporting her objection.

Plaintiff’s claim of attorney-client privilege appears to arise from her allegation, as discussed above, that her attorney’s work completed in the 850 petition and in the present actions are so interrelated that the invoices for attorney’s fees do not distinguish between the work done on either matter. And, because the current matters are still active and pending, Petitioner argues that the invoices for attorney’s fees are privileged, as held in Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors. The Court disagrees.

In Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors, the California Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege encompasses the amount of aggregate fees in an attorney’s invoice for active and pending matters, reasoning that even though the amount of money paid for legal services is generally not privileged, an invoice that shows “a sudden uptick in spending” or “midlitigation swings in spending” could reveal trial strategy or impending filings. (Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 2 Cal.5th 282 at p. 297.)

That is, the privilege applies to “realtime disclosure of ongoing spending amounts.” (Id., at p. 298.) Here, Defendant’s RFP No. 8 requests all documents that reflect the attorney’s fees Plaintiff claims as damages for slander of title in the present matter, and, according to Plaintiff, “Plaintiff is not claiming attorney’s fees and costs incurred after the trial of the [850 petition].” (Plaintiff’s Opposition, p. 3.) Because judgment was entered in the 850 petition on August 10, 2023, the invoices for fees incurred during that matter do not represent “real-time disclosure of ongoing spending amounts” that would otherwise be privileged.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection based on attorney-client privilege is OVERRULED.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00319058-CU-MC-GDS: Kelley Roberts vs. Rehana Harborth 12/16/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two in Department 54

As for Plaintiff’s objection based on work product privilege, Plaintiff provides virtually no factual information in support thereof. It may, however, be possible that the attorney invoices include Plaintiff’s attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s objection based on attorney work product privilege is therefore SUSTAINED. Nonetheless, to the extent the invoices contain entries which reflect Plaintiff’s attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories, those portions may be redacted.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to compel is GRANTED in part as to RFP No. 8, pursuant to the limitations set forth above. Plaintiff shall serve further responses by no later than December 30, 2025, unless the parties agree in writing to a later date. To the extent Defendant seeks to compel Plaintiff to produce responsive documents, the motion is premature as Plaintiff has not yet provided a statement that responsive documents exist and will be produced. Such motion is only proper where a party has agreed to produce documents but has failed to do so in compliance with its statement. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 2031.320, subd. (a).) Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s unopposed requests for judicial notice are also GRANTED for the limited purposes permitted for judicial notice. (See Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein].) This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00319058-CU-MC-GDS: Kelley Roberts vs. Rehana Harborth 12/16/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Discovery Responses to Requests for Production of Documents, Set Two in Department 54

telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 54 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept53.54 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 4650 6749. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

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A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.