SchoolsFirst Wage and Hour Cases

The arbitration agreement states: “NO CLASS ACTIONS COLLECTIVE ACTION AND/OR REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS. THE PARTIES AGREE THAT EACH MAY FILE CLAIMS AGAINST THE OTHER ONLY IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES, AND MAY NOT FILE CLAIMS AS A PLAINTIFF IN, AND/OR PARTICIPATE AS A CLASS MEMBER IN, ANY CLASS ACTION, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND/OR REPRESENTATIVE ACTION AGAINST THE OTHER (EXCEPT FOR ANY CLASS ACTIONS, COLLECTIVE ACTIONS AND/OR REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS THAT WERE FILED PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 3, 2018). THE PARTIES AGREE THAT ANY CLASS ACTION, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND/OR REPRESENTATIVE CLAIMS THAT ARE FOUND NOT SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS ARBITRATION PROGRAM SHALL BE RESOLVED IN COURT, AND ARE STAYED PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE ARBITRATION.

THE PARTIES AGREE THAT A COURT, NOT AN ARBITRATOR, SHALL DETERMINE WHETHER ANY CLAIMS MUST PROCEED ON A CLASS ACTION, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND/OR REPRESENTATIVE ACTION BASIS.” (Snow Dec., Ex. B at p. 3 § 9.)

The arbitration agreement reserves the question of whether any claim must proceed on a class action, collective action, and/or representative action basis to be decided by the court. As the arbitration agreement and the class action waiver are enforceable, the court dismisses Plaintiff’s class claims pursuant to the class action waiver.

E. Stay

Both the Federal Arbitration Act and California law provide for a stay of proceedings pending arbitration. (9 U.S.C. §3; CCP §1281.4.) Accordingly, this action is stayed pending completion of arbitration.

Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

12 JCCP 5426 Defendant SchoolsFirst Federal Credit Union’s (“Defendant”) SchoolsFirst Wage Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED. IT IS ORDERED and Hour Cases THAT Plaintiff Mireya Briseno’s (“Plaintiff” of “Briseno”) individual PAGA claim is compelled to arbitration, and the

remaining representative PAGA claim is stayed pending completion of arbitration.

The court concludes that there exists a valid agreement to arbitrate the individual portion of the employment-related PAGA claim asserted by Plaintiff. (CCP § 1281.2.) Plaintiff does not dispute the existence or enforceability of the arbitration agreement, only whether it requires that Plaintiff arbitrate her individual PAGA claim.

Defendant’s Terms of Employment state that “Any and all disputes between you and SchoolsFirst FCU or its affiliates, successors, officers, directors, or agents, which arise out of or relate to your recruitment, employment or separation from employment shall be resolved through final and binding arbitration on an individual basis before a single neutral arbitrator under the auspices of Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services (JAMS).” (Cano Dec., Ex. D.) “This shall include, without limitation, claims by you and claims by SchoolsFirst FCU, including disputes relating to . . . your employment by SchoolsFirst FCU or the termination thereof, . . . . the California Labor Code, including claims for wages or penalties, . . . or claims under any other federal, state or local law or regulation now in existence or hereinafter enacted and as amended from time to time arising out of or concerning in any way the subject of your employment with SchoolsFirst FCU or its termination.” (Id.)

Plaintiff argues that there is a carveout in the arbitration agreement that excludes arbitration of her entire PAGA claim (including both the individual and representative components). The Terms of Employment states: “The only claims not covered by this Agreement are . . . claims that have been expressly excluded from arbitration for example claims under the California Private Attorney General Act . . .” (Cano Dec., Ex. D.) However, that language qualifies that the “claims under the California Private Attorney General Act” are an example of “claims that have been expressly excluded from arbitration.” The only type of PAGA claim expressly excluded from arbitration is a representative PAGA claim; individual PAGA claims may be compelled to arbitration. (Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 662.)

When an arbitration agreement “simply says that ‘claims under PAGA ... are not arbitrable under this Agreement,’” and no other qualifying language, the courts find no ambiguity and hold that

all PAGA claims are excepted from arbitration. (Duran v. EmployBridge Holding Co. (2023) 92 Cal. App. 5th 59, 66.) “Civil Code section 1638 provides that the ‘language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit.’” (Id.) “[C]ourts enforce an unambiguous agreement as written rather than rewriting it to contain limitations the parties did not express.” (Id.) However, in Duran, that court stated that the defendant could have drafted the agreement to state that “only nonarbitrable PAGA claims would not be arbitrable under the agreement.” (Id. at 67.) The court finds that is essentially what Defendant has done in this case by qualifying the language to limit the PAGA carveout to non-arbitrable representative PAGA claims, i.e. “claims that have been expressly excluded from arbitration.”

“When an action includes arbitrable and nonarbitrable components, the resulting bifurcated proceedings are not severed from one another; rather, the court may ‘stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.’” (Adolph v. Uber Techs., Inc. (2023) 14 Cal. 5th 1104, 1125-1126 [when an arbitration agreement “requires the trial court to bifurcate and order individual PAGA claims to arbitration when an appropriate arbitration agreement exists, the individual PAGA claims in arbitration remain part of the same lawsuit as the representative claims remaining in court”].) Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is granted, Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim is compelled to arbitration, and the remaining representative PAGA claim is stayed.

The court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of Judge McCormick’s August 21, 2025 Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration of the Villapudua v. SchoolsFirst Federal Credit Union PAGA Action (Orange County Case No. 30-2024-01400940-CU-OE-CXC) (“Villapudua PAGA Action”) from Orange County Superior Court Judge Melissa R. McCormick. (Cal. Evid. Code § 452(d).)

Judge McCormick evaluated the identical language in Defendant’s arbitration agreement in the Villapudua PAGA Action and denied Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration, but the facts here are distinguishable from the facts that were in front of Judge McCormick. In the Villapudua PAGA Action, “[t]he parties agree that (1) the operative complaint only asserts a representative, non individual claim under the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”),” and “(2) Villapudua never pleaded an

‘individual PAGA claim.’” (Villapudua PAGA Action [ROA 79 at p. 2].) Thus, the carveout language foreclosed arbitration of the sole representative PAGA claim that was at issue. Here, the parties do not argue that Plaintiff Briseno’s PAGA Complaint consists of only a representative PAGA claim. In other words, unlike in the Villapudua PAGA Action, there is an individual PAGA claim in this action that can be compelled to arbitration.

Further, in the Villapudua PAGA Action, “[d]espite plaintiff’s identification of this [carveout] issue in her opposition, defendant offered no response to this point in its reply.” (Plaintiff’s RJN, Ex. 1 at pp. 1-2 [emphasis added].) Here, Defendant has provided a substantive response to Plaintiff’s argument.

Defendant is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

13 30-2026-01538632 Motion 1: Defendant’s Requests for Admission, Set One Nunez vs. California Automobile Defendant California Automobile Insurance Company’s Insurance Company (“Defendant”) Motion to Deem Matters Admitted is GRANTED. IT IS ORDERED THAT the truth of any matters specified in Defendant’s Requests for Admission, Set One be deemed admitted.

On March 11, 2026, Defendant served written discovery on Plaintiff’s attorney of record. (Sarni Dec. ¶ 2.) On May 6, 2026, Jorge Vera with Plaintiff’s counsel’s office requested a three- week extension of time to respond. (Sarni Dec. ¶ 4.) By email dated May 6, 2026, Defendant agreed to provide a two-week extension of time, up to and including May 20, 2026 for Plaintiff to respond to all pending discovery. (Sarni Dec. ¶ 4.) On May 20, 2026, Plaintiff did not provide any responses and also did not seek a further extension of time. (Sarni Dec. ¶ 5.) Despite remainders from Defendant, to date, Plaintiff has not provided any discovery responses. (Sarni Dec. ¶ 7.) This Motion is unopposed.

“If a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to serve a timely response . . . [t]he party to whom the requests for admission are directed waives any objection to the requests, including one based on privilege or on the protection for work product[.]” (CCP § 2033.280(a).) “The requesting party may move for an order that the genuineness of any documents and the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted, as well as for a monetary sanction[.]” (CCP § 2033.280(b).) “The

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