COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al.

24CV000748: COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 03/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 25

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 25 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept25 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 1342 1868. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

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A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver

24CV000748: COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 03/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 25

and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

The motion of Defendant Jessica Carbajal (“Defendant Carbajal” or “Defendant”) for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication is ruled upon as follows.

Background/Factual Allegations

Plaintiff Beverly Cobb (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action by filing her Complaint on January 17, 2024. The Complaint named Defendants C&H Trust Deed Service (“Defendant C&H”), Defendant Carbajal, and Does 1-50. Plaintiff alleges three causes of action against all Defendants for (1) violation of California Homeowner Bill of Rights; (2) slander of title; and (3) wrongful foreclosure.

As alleged, this action regards the real property located at 3971 Ramsey Drive, North Highlands, CA 95660 (the “Subject Property”). (Compl., ¶ 1.) Plaintiff alleges that she is the owner of fee simple title to the Subject Property and resides therein. (Compl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Carbajal is the holder of a Deed of Trust secured by the Subject Property, and Defendant C&H is the Trustee of the Deed of Trust. (Compl., ¶¶ 3-4.) According to the Complaint, around 2007, Plaintiff underwent a “buy back” (after foreclosure) and refinancing as to the first position mortgage on the Subject Property; this refinancing only involved Plaintiff and her mortgage lender. (Compl., ¶ 10.)

Plaintiff alleges that she never signed the subject Deed of Trust, never signed a promissory note secured by the Deed of Trust, never received the proceeds of the loan the Deed of Trust purports to secure, never applied for any loan from a third-party, never made payments on the Deed of Trust, and until nearly 20 years later, never received any communications from the purported holder of the Deed of Trust. (Compl., ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that in December 2023, she was served with a Notice of Trustee’s Sale, and she never received service of a Notice of Default or Notice of Substitution of Trustee on the Deed of Trust. (Compl., ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that the signature on the Deed of Trust is not hers, and was forged by an unknown party/parties. (Compl., ¶ 13.)

On April 2, 2024, Defendant Carbajal filed her answer (general denial) to the Complaint,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV000748: COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 03/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 25

wherein she also raised various affirmative defenses.

On December 4, 2024, the Court granted Defendant Carbajal’s unopposed motion to compel and deem matters admitted as to Defendant Carbajal’s propounded requests for admission, set one. (12/4/24 Order.) In granting the motion, the Court ordered the matters at issue “are deemed admitted, unless Plaintiff Beverly Cobb serves, “before the hearing on the motion,” proposed responses to the subject request for admissions served on May 28, 2024, that are in substantial compliance with CCP § 2033.220. (CCP § 2033.280(c).)” (Ibid., emphasis in original.)

There is no indication from the Court’s Register of Action, or from either party, that substantial compliance regarding Defendant Carbajal’s requests for admission, set one, was made at or before the hearing. (See Anderson Decl., ¶ 4 [“Plaintiff did not serve any responses to Defendant’s Request for Admission served on May 28, 2024 by the date and time set for the hearing on the motion, December 4, 2024.”].)

On February 23, 2026, pursuant to the Parties’ stipulation, the Court granted Plaintiff’s ex parte application to continue trial, and continued the trial date from March 3, 2026, to August 24, 2026, with all trial and related discovery deadlines to be based upon the new trial date. (2/23/26 Order.)

Legal Standard

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the Court engages in a threestep process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary judgment/adjudication (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382) and the evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden of production. A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, quoting Code Civ. Proc., §

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV000748: COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 03/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 25

437c(p)(2).) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. (Saelzer v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780-781.) Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is required to show only that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 853-855.) Further, the initial burden requires a showing that the plaintiff “could not prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 939-940.)

A party opposing summary judgment/adjudication has no evidentiary burden unless the moving party has first met his/her initial burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151-1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.) Only where the moving party makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment/adjudication. (Salazar v.

Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Ibid.) In ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1376; Brown v.

FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, the court must “consider all of the evidence” and all of the “inferences” reasonably drawn therefrom (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(c)) and must view the evidence and inferences “in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843; see Ragland v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 199.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these differences is found in CRC, rule 3.1350(b), which mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) provides in its entirety:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV000748: COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 03/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 25

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for [punitive] damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for [punitive] damages, or an issue of duty.

(Underline added for emphasis.)

Finally, the Court reminds the parties of the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment/adjudication: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (italics in original).) Moreover, according to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, supra, at p. 252, citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1.)

Discussion

Defendant Carbajal moves for summary judgment, or alternatively, summary adjudication on the following grounds:

1. Defendant Is Entitled To Judgment On The First Cause Of Action Alleging Violation Of California Homeowner's Bill Of Rights Because The Issues Proving Defendant's Compliance Are Admitted And Other Evidence Alternatively Establishes Compliance;

2. Defendant Is Entitled To Judgment On The Second Cause Of Action Alleging Slander Of Title Because The Issues Disproving The Elements Of Falsity And Lack Of Justification Are Admitted, Other Evidence Alternatively Establishes The Elements Cannot Be Met, And Carbajal Also Establishes The Qualified Privilege Of Good Faith; and

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24CV000748: COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 03/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 25

3. Defendant Is Entitled To Judgment On The Third Cause Of Action Alleging Wrongful Foreclosure Because The Issues Disproving The Claim Are Admitted And The Claim Is Alternatively Disproved With Other Evidence.

(Ntc. Mot.)

In support of this motion, Defendant Carbajal proffers 26 Undisputed Material Facts (“UMFs”). Notably, in support of her UMFs, Defendant Carbajal primarily relies upon matters set forth in her propounded requests for admission, set one, which were deemed admitted on December 4, 2024. (12/4/24 Order.)

Plaintiff is deemed to have admitted the following:

1. In December, 2006, Beverly Cobb borrowed $41,000.00 from Jessica Carbajal.

2. On December 14, 2006, Beverly Cobb signed a deed of trust that secured a loan from Jessica Carbajal with property located at 3971 Ramsey Drive, North Highland, California.

3. Beverly Cobb defaulted on a loan from Jessica Carbajal.

4. On August 25, 2023, a notice of default on a loan from Jessica Carbajal to Beverly Cobb was properly recorded.

5. On December 7, 2023, a substitution of trustee under a deed of trust that secured a loan from Jessica Carbajal to Beverly Cobb was properly recorded.

6. On January 26, 2004, a trustee's deed upon sale was properly recorded in which the property located at 3971 Ramsey Drive, North Highland, California was granted to Jessica Carbajal.

(See Anderson Decl., Exh. 1; 12/4/24 Order.)

With this, Defendant Carbajal contends that Plaintiff’s admissions contradict all the charging allegations in her Complaint, establish the validity of the loan, deed of trust, Plaintiff’s default on the loan, and establish the propriety of the notice of default, substitution of trustee, and trustee’s deed upon sale, and thus, Defendant Carbajal is entitled to judgment as each of Plaintiff’s three causes of action must fail. (Mov. MPA, pp. 5:18-22, 8:26-9:2, 10:1-6.)

In opposition, Plaintiff submits as evidence only her own declaration[1] and contends that Defendant Carbajal’s motion for summary judgment must be denied as there are numerous genuine disputes of material fact regarding the validity of the underlying loan,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV000748: COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 03/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 25

the authenticity of the Deed of Trust, the propriety of the foreclosure, and Defendant’s compliance with statutory requirements.

In reply, Defendant Carbajal argues, among other things, that the matters deemed admitted in response to her requests for admissions may not be disregarded, and further, any contrary evidence is inadmissible.

A. Issue No. 1: Violation of California Homeowner Bill of Rights

In support of Issue No. 1—seeking summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s cause of action for violation of the California Homeowner Bill of Rights, Defendant submits Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 1-8. UMF Nos. 1-2, 4-7 expressly track the language of the facts deemed admitted by the Court’s December 4, 2024, Order. Defendant contends that the undisputed facts regard the gravamen of Plaintiff’s cause of action—that Plaintiff never applied for nor received the loan, never signed a deed of trust, never received Notice of Default or Substitution of Trustee, that false documents were filed in the foreclosure process, that required information was not provided, that the foreclosing party had no authority to act, and that information regarding foreclosure alternatives were not provided.

Defendant contends that the deemed admissions directly refute this theory and that Plaintiff presents no triable issues of fact regarding violation of the California Homeowner Bill of Rights.

Plaintiff asserts that all UMFs are disputed, citing to Plaintiff’s declaration and exhibits thereto. Specifically, despite the deemed admission on this fact, Plaintiff contends that the Deed of Trust is a forgery, rendering it void ab initio. As such, Plaintiff contends that Defendant proceeded to foreclosure on a non-existent lien. Plaintiff also asserts that “regardless of HBOR’s technical applicability,” Defendant’s conduct constituted a “wrongful foreclosure.” (Opp’n, p. 6:23-27.)

1. Effect of Facts Deemed Admitted.

As set forth above, on December 4, 2024, the Court deemed certain facts to be admitted by Plaintiff as to Defendant.

Notably, any matter admitted in response to a request for admission is preclusively established against the party making the admission, unless the court has permitted withdrawal or amendment of the admission. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.410(a); Murillo v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 730, 736.) Specifically, Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.410(a) provides in its entirety:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV000748: COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 03/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 25

Any matter admitted in response to a request for admission is conclusively established against the party making the admission in the pending action, unless the court has permitted withdrawal or amendment of that admission under Section 2033.300.

Admissions in response to requests for admissions are treated in effect as stipulations to the truthfulness of the matters admitted, and thus, no other evidence is necessary to establish the point at trial and no contrary evidence is admissible unless leave of court is obtained to withdraw or amend the response. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2033.300- 2033.410; see Murillo, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 736.) “A party may withdraw or amend an admission made in response to a request for admission only on leave of court granted after notice to all parties.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.300(a) (emphasis added).)

“[W]hen discovery has produced an admission or concession on the part of the party opposing summary judgment which demonstrates that there is no factual issue to be tried,” controverting affidavits submitted by that party may be disregarded. (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21-22; Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1522 [noting that “answers to requests for admissions, which are specifically designed to pare down disputed issues in a lawsuit” “constitute incontrovertible judicial admissions”].).)

In this case, no relief from the order deeming the requests for admission admitted has been requested by Plaintiff or permitted by the Court. As such, to those UMF Nos. (1-2 and 4-7) that directly incorporate the language from the requests for admission, Defendant has met her initial burden.

Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact as to those facts through her own declaration. (See D’Amico, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 21-22; Castillo v. Barrera (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1324 [defendants moving for summary judgment are entitled to rely on allegations in the complaint, which are judicial admissions and conclusive concessions and which frame the disputed issues].) The Court notes that while Plaintiff asserts her declaration regarding borrowing money from Defendant and agreeing to a mortgage or executing a Deed of Trust somehow create triable issues in light of her own deemed admissions, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s own declaration on these matters is equivocal.

Specifically, Plaintiff declares, “I do not recall ever borrowing money from Defendant Jessica Carbajal” and that “I have no knowledge of ever agreeing to a mortgage or executing a Deed of Trust.” (Cobb Decl. ¶¶ 4-5 [emphasis added]; see also

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV000748: COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 03/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 25

¶ 11 [“I do not recall ever appearing before any notary public to execute the Deed of Trust or any loan documents in favor of Defendant.” [emphasis added].) To the extent the Court must determine “the scope and the effect of the admission,” the Court finds that the requests for admission are straightforward and unequivocal and that Plaintiff’s evidence (solely her own declaration) do not show that the RFAs distort the actual events. (See Fredericks v. Filbert Co. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 272, 278; see also Monroy v.

City of Los Angeles (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 248, 260 [“[W]hile courts may utilize evidence to elucidate and explain an admission, they cannot use such evidence to contradict the plain meaning of a response to a request for admissions. . . . If a response to a request for admission is unambiguous, and is not subject to different meanings, the matter admitted is conclusively established.”].)

In addition to UMFs based on Plaintiff’s deemed admissions, Defendant also asserts UMF No. 3, which provides:

Jessica Carbajal’s deed of trust was in second position against the Property behind a deed of trust in favor of Argent Mortgage Company, LLC.

Based on the evidence submitted by Defendant in support of the UMF, the Court finds that Defendant has met her initial burden in establishing the Defendant’s Deed of trust was in second position against the Property.

Plaintiff disputes this fact, as follows:

Disputed. Plaintiff denies the validity of any deed of trust in favor of Defendant, as she never executed such a document. Plaintiff’s financial institution confirmed during a 2009 loan modification that there were no other loans or home equity lines of credit on her home.

(Pl.’s Response to UMF No. 3.) However, Plaintiff’s contention, supported only by her own declaration, directly contradicts her admission that she signed the deed of trust. Plaintiff’s declaration to the contrary does not raise a triable issue of fact, as set forth above. To the extent that Plaintiff also asserts that her financial institution confirmed no other loans or lines of credit in 2009, such information is not contained in the cited portion of her declaration (Cobb Decl., ¶¶ 8-11) and does not appear to be supported by Exhibit A, which is a Deed of Trust recorded in 2006, three years prior to the purported statement. Further, even if the evidence were supported by any evidence submitted, such evidence regarding the truth of statement by a financial institution is inadmissible

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24CV000748: COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 03/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 25

hearsay.[2] Accordingly, Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact with respect to UMF No.

3.

Finally, UMF No. 8 asserts that Defendant “did not violate any provisions of the California Homeowner’s Bill of Rights.” In support of this UMF, Defendant cites to Plaintiff’s response to Form Interrogatory No. 14.1, which points only to alleged violations of the Business & Professions Code and the Penal Code as statutes Plaintiff contends Defendant violated. As such, the Court finds that Defendant has met her initial burden with respect to this UMF.

Plaintiff disputes this UMF, asserting that Defendant “violated the California Homeowner’s Bill of Rights by recording and acting upon forged and fraudulent documents, failing to provide proper notice, and not offering alternatives to foreclosure as required by law.” (Pl.’s Response to UMF No. 8.) As set forth above, to the extent Plaintiff contends that the Deed of Trust was fraudulent because Plaintiff did not sign the Deed of Trust, Plaintiff’s own declaration that directly contradicts the admissions do not create a triable issue of fact.

In this case, the Complaint alleges that Defendant violated section 2923.55 and the notice provision of section 2924(a)(1). With respect to these alleged violations, the Court addresses those herein.

2. Violation of Civil Code section 2923.55

Civil Code section 2923.55 requires certain mortgage servicers to contact a borrower to assess the borrower’s financial situation and explore options for a borrower to avoid foreclosure. to With respect to duties imposed by the California Homeowner’s Bill of Rights (“HBOR”), the California Supreme Court has explained:

By its plain terms, HBOR's provisions apply only to first lien mortgages. (See Civ. Code, § 2924.15, subd. (a) [“Unless otherwise provided, paragraph (5) of subdivision (a) of Section 2924, and Sections 2923.5, 2923.55, 2923.6, 2923.7, 2924.9, 2924.10, 2924.11, and 2924.18 shall apply only to a first lien mortgage or deed of trust that meets either of the following criteria”]; see also, e.g., Civ. Code, § 2924.10, subd. (a) [specifying requirements applicable “[w]hen a borrower submits a complete first lien modification application or any document in connection with a first lien modification application”].) Because the loans at issue in this case were junior loans — the second and third loans that plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV000748: COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 03/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 25

secured using the Property as collateral — HBOR does not apply.

(Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 921.)

Given Plaintiff’s admissions and the lack of a triable issue of fact regarding UMF No.3, it is undisputed for purposes of this motion that Defendant was in second position against the Property. As set forth above, section 2923.55 do not apply to Defendant as a second lien holder. As such, Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact regarding an alleged violation of section 2923.55.

3. Violation of section 2924(a)(1)

With respect to notice, Civil Code section 2924(a)(1) provides:

(1) The trustee, mortgagee, or beneficiary, or any of their authorized agents shall first file for record, in the office of the recorder of each county wherein the mortgaged or trust property or some part or parcel thereof is situated, a notice of default. That notice of default shall include all of the following:

(A) A statement identifying the mortgage or deed of trust by stating the name or names of the trustor or trustors and giving the book and page, or instrument number, if applicable, where the mortgage or deed of trust is recorded or a description of the mortgaged or trust property.

(B) A statement that a breach of the obligation for which the mortgage or transfer in trust is security has occurred.

(C) A statement setting forth the nature of each breach actually known to the beneficiary and of the beneficiary’s election to sell or cause to be sold the property to satisfy that obligation and any other obligation secured by the deed of trust or mortgage that is in default.

(D) If the default is curable pursuant to Section 2924c, the statement specified in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 2924c.

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24CV000748: COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 03/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 25

Defendant asserts that the Notice provided to Plaintiff complies with the requirements. (See Req. for Judicial Notice, Exh. 3.)

In opposition, Plaintiff does not specifically identify any defects in the Notice of Default and any Notice of Trustee’s sale that violate HBOR nor does Plaintiff proffer evidence regarding same. Rather, Plaintiff argues that she was prejudiced because foreclosure notices were sent while she was “deployed for work” with FEMA, she had no practical ability to access or respond to documents, and she was denied a fair opportunity to respond or challenge the foreclosure. (Opp’n, p. 6:7-27.) Accordingly, Plaintiff asserts that, “regardless of HBOR’s technical applicability,” Plaintiff can challenge the foreclosure.

However, Issue No. 1 is directed at whether there was a violation of HBOR, not whether Plaintiff has a claim for wrongful foreclosure (which will be addressed herein). While Plaintiff cites to Sciarratta v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 552, in support of her assertion that there are triable issues regarding Issue No. 1, the Sciaretta Court addressed whether the plaintiff could state a claim for the tort of wrongful foreclosure, not for violation of HBOR.

Because Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence and made no argument regarding how Defendant’s notices violated the provisions of HBOR, Plaintiff has not met her burden in demonstrating a triable issue of fact.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant has met her initial burden in demonstrating that Plaintiff has not presented evidence to support her cause of action for violation of the HBOR as alleged in the Complaint, and Plaintiff has not met her burden in demonstrating a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Issue No. 1 is GRANTED.

B. Issue No. 2: Slander of Title

In support of Issue No. 2—seeking summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s cause of action for slander of title, Defendant submits UMF Nos. 9-15. UMF Nos. 9-14 expressly track the language of the facts deemed admitted by the Court’s December 4, 2024 Order. Defendant contends that the admitted facts disprove the element of falsity and that there is evidence that established the qualified privilege of good faith.

Plaintiff again asserts that all UMFs are disputed, again citing to Plaintiff’s declaration

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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and exhibits thereto.[3] Plaintiff contends that the element of falsity is established by Plaintiff’s declaration of forgery, that the qualified privilege is defeated by evidence of actual malice, and that pecuniary loss is established.

“The elements of a cause of action for slander of title are (1) a publication, which is (2) without privilege or justification and thus with express or implied malice, (3) false, either knowingly so or made without regard to its truthfulness and (4) causes pecuniary loss.” (Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Pyle (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 513, 528, citing Howard v. Schaniel (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 256, 263-264.) Further, “[a] privilege, either absolute or qualified, is a defense to a charge of slander of title.” (Smith v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 625, 630.) The relevant privilege is codified in Civil Code section 47, which provided in relevant part:

A privileged publication or broadcast is one made ... (c) In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent . . . .

(Civ. Code, § 47(c).)

As discussed above, Plaintiff’s admissions are conclusive evidence of those facts, which Plaintiff’s bare declaration has not and cannot overcome based on the procedural posture and nature of the assertions in the declaration. As such, the Court concludes that Defendant has met her initial burden that Plaintiff has not provided evidence of falsity and that Plaintiff has not presented evidence to sufficiently set forth a triable issue of fact to those matters that have been deemed admitted. (UMF Nos. 9-14.)

With respect to Defendant’s contention regarding application of the qualified privilege set forth in section 47, UMF No. 15 sets forth the following as an undisputed material fact:

Defendant's deed of trust, a declaration of mortgage servicer, notice of default, substitution of trustee, trustee's deed upon sale, and notice of sale were prepared, served, recorded, and/or published in good faith and without malice for the purpose of Defendant's recovering the collateral for her loan to Plaintiff, which Defendant is informed and believes was her right due to Plaintiff's defaulting on Defendant's loan to Plaintiff.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV000748: COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 03/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 25

Based on the evidence submitted in support of UMF No. 15, the Court finds that Defendant has met their initial burden to establish this fact, which supports application of the qualified privilege when considered with UMF Nos. 9-14.

Plaintiff asserts that UMF No. 15 is disputed, as follows:

Disputed. Plaintiff asserts that all such documents were based on a forged deed of trust and were not prepared or recorded in good faith. Plaintiff never received any loan from Defendant, never defaulted, and was not given proper notice or opportunity to cure. Plaintiff believes the documents were knowingly false and recorded with malice.

(Pl.’s Response to UMF No. 15.) Further, in Opposition, Plaintiff argues that malice inferred based on “fabrication” of the loan and the Deed of Trust and based on “suspicious timing and silence.” Specifically, with respect to the latter, Plaintiff contends that “Defendant waited over 16 years and then initiated foreclosure only while Plaintiff was deployed for work,” which Plaintiff contends was “intentional and designed to deprive [her] of [her] rights.” (Opp’n, p. 8:16-26.)

With respect to evidence based on purported fabrication, as set forth above, Plaintiff’s admissions foreclose this contention. The admissions conclusively establish that Plaintiff entered into a loan with Defendant and signed the Deed of Trust. Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact with respect to this.

With respect to alleged inferences raised by “silence and timing,” in support of the alleged dispute to UMF No. 15, Plaintiff cites only to Plaintiff’s Declaration at ¶¶ 2-3, which provide:

2. | am the owner of the real property that is the subject of this lawsuit (the Property). have resided at and/or owned the Property at all relevant times.

3. I am a full-time employee of the United States Federal Emergency Management Agency ('FEMA') working in network security and information technology. My job frequently requires me to be deployed to various locations within the United States on a sometimes 1 to 6 months long period.

(Cobb Decl., ¶¶ 2-3.) Plaintiff also cited to Exhibit A, which purports to be a Deed of Trust. (Exh A. to Cobb Decl.) None of this evidence supports the facts set forth in

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV000748: COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 03/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 25

response to UMF No.

15. Nevertheless, Plaintiff presents no evidence to support that Defendant knew Plaintiff was deployed at the time of the foreclosure activity and timed the activity to deprive Plaintiff of her rights. Plaintiff’s speculation that she believes the time was intentional and so motivated, without facts to support such a belief, are insufficient.[4] (Doe v. Salesian Society (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 474, 481 [holding that speculation regarding the defendant’s knowledge without factual support was “impermissible” and “grounds for granting summary judgment]; Yuzon v. Collins (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 149, 163, 166 [landlord not liable for tenant's dog bite incident where evidence that landlord knew the dog was dangerous was based on speculation, imagination, guesswork, or mere possibilities].) As such, Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact regarding UMF No.

15.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant has met her initial burden in demonstrating that Plaintiff has not presented evidence to support her cause of action for slander of title as alleged in the Complaint and to support application of the qualified privilege set forth in Civil Code section 47, and Plaintiff has not met her burden in demonstrating a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Issue No. 2 is GRANTED.

C. Issue No. 3: Wrongful Foreclosure

In support of Issue No. 3—seeking summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s cause of action for wrongful foreclosure, Defendant submits Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 16- 24. UMF Nos. 6-17 and 19-22 expressly track the language of the facts deemed admitted by the Court’s December 4, 2024 Order. UMF No. 18 repeats UMF No. 3, and UMF No. 23 repeats UMF No.

15. Defendant contends that the admitted facts disprove conclusively establish the propriety of the actions and demonstrate that Plaintiff cannot show that the sale was illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive. Defendant also contends that undisputed evidence demonstrates that Cobb cannot show that she has tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness.

Plaintiff again asserts that all UMFs are disputed, again citing to Plaintiff’s declaration and exhibits thereto. Plaintiff contends that the sale was “illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive” because the Deed of Trust is a forgery and the tender rule does not apply to void instruments or where inequitable. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the Deed of Trust is void as a forgery and that tender would be inequitable because she never received a loan. (Opp’n at 10:15-24.) Plaintiff also asserts that she has established harm or prejudice.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV000748: COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 03/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 25

“The basic elements of a tort cause of action for wrongful foreclosure track the elements of an equitable cause of action to set aside a foreclosure sale. They are: “(1) the trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of real property pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the party attacking the sale (usually but not always the trustor or mortgagor) was prejudiced or harmed; and (3) in cases where the trustor or mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor tendered the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering.” (Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 104, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 622.)” (Miles v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 394, 408.)

In this case, as set forth above, UMF Nos. 16-23 remain undisputed, as they rely on Plaintiff’s deemed admissions and other evidence for which the Court has found that Defendant has met her initial burden and Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has met her burden to demonstrate the lack of an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale, and Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact. Specifically, Plaintiff has not presented a triable issue of fact that the Deed of Trust was forged or otherwise invalid, and Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact that would show the sale was “willfully oppressive” based on the validity of the Deed of Trust, the existence of the loan, or the timing of the foreclosure activity.

Turning to the one unaddressed UMF set forth in support of Issue No. 3, UMF No. 24 sets forth:

Beverly Cobb has not tendered the amount of the debt that had been secured by the deed of trust to Jessica Carbajal.

Based on the evidence submitted in support of UMF No. 24, the Court finds that Defendant has met their initial burden to establish this fact, which supports that Plaintiff has not met all elements of a cause of action for wrongful foreclosure.

Plaintiff asserts that UMF No. 24 is disputed, as follows:

Disputed. Plaintiff denies the existence of any valid debt to Defendant and therefore had no obligation to tender any amount. Defendant’s own evidence demonstrates that at least one year of payments were made.

(Pl.’s Response to UMF No. 24.)

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s response to UMF No. 24 does not actually dispute the fact

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV000748: COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 03/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 25

submitted. No evidence shows that Plaintiff tendered the full amount of the loan secured by the Deed of Trust. Nevertheless, to the extent that Plaintiff contends that there is no valid debt owed to Defendant, such assertion is contradicted by the deemed admissions that Plaintiff borrowed money from Defendant, a Deed of Trust secured the loan, and that Plaintiff defaulted on the loan. As set forth above, Plaintiff has not raised a triable issue of fact in the face of these admissions.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant has met her initial burden in demonstrating that Plaintiff has not presented evidence to support her cause of action for wrongful termination, and Plaintiff has not met her burden in demonstrating a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication as to Issue No. 3 is GRANTED.

Disposition

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Carbajal’s motion for summary adjudication of Issue Nos. 1-3 is GRANTED. As such, Defendant Carbajal’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

The Court declines to rule on Defendant Carbajal’s evidentiary objections as they concerned evidence immaterial to the Court’s ruling herein. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(q).) The Court has addressed the arguments regarding assertions in Plaintiff’s declaration that contradict deemed admissions herein.

Defendant Carbajal’s requests for judicial notice are GRANTED for the limited purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (See Evid. Code, §451(a); §452(b)-(d); see also Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

Defendant Carbajal shall prepare a formal order complying with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(g) and California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

[1] The Court notes that the first paragraph of Plaintiff’s declaration provides that she is

“one of two joint owners of Plaintiff Almega Partners, LLC and a managing member of plaintiff.” (Cobb Decl., ¶ 1.) Since Plaintiff is suing in her individual capacity, this statement appears to be inaccurate.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV000748: COBB vs C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 03/02/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 25

[2] Defendant raises such an objection in her reply, which the Court would sustain.

[3] The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Separate Statement in Opposition mis-numbers the

facts associated with Defendant’s UMFs. [4] Rather, Plaintiff’s own declaration seems to undermine this belief, given that Plaintiff

asserts that the nature of her work “frequently” requires her to be deployed for extended periods. (Cobb Decl., ¶¶ 3, 22.) This undermines Plaintiff’s unsupported speculation that Defendant particularly targeted a specific time that Plaintiff was deployed for work. The Court also notes that Plaintiff does not present facts regarding exactly when or for how long she was deployed in relation to the challenged foreclosure activity. (See Cobb Decl. ¶ 3, 21, 25.) Indeed, Plaintiff declares that she received “a packet of documents— including a Notice of Default, a Notice of Trustee’s Sale, and references to the alleged Deed of Trust” in November 2023, which was prior to the recordation of the Notice of Trustee’s Sale in December 2023. (Exh. 5 to RJN.)