ALLISON FAUST vs. TEOBALDO SCHUJMAN, ET AL

The Court extends its appreciation for the thorough and helpful report submitted by the Discovery Facilitator, Patricia J. Medina, Esq.

Defendant Teobaldo Schujman’s (“Defendant”) motion for discovery sanctions is DENIED.

Background

This action arises out of the end of a long-term romantic relationship. Plaintiff Allison Faust (“Plaintiff”) alleges that she and Defendant were a couple for many years. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ¶ 23.) During that period, they lived together and held each other out to the world as husband and wife, although they did not legally marry. (Id. at ¶¶ 26, 35-36.) Plaintiff asserts that in December 2008, she and Defendant “agreed to and did form a partnership to collect assets, including interests in real property, and operate the said partnership property for the benefit of the partnership.” (Id. at ¶ 10.) They allegedly agreed to pool their resources and efforts and use the partnership assets for their joint livelihood. (Id. at ¶ 11.) Using partnership assets, they acquired certain real properties in which Plaintiff asserts an interest. (Id. at ¶ 66.)

In 2023 or 2024, Defendant allegedly fathered a child with another woman. (FAC, ¶¶ 29, 50.) The complaint asserts that Defendant subsequently told Plaintiff that all of their shared property actually belonged exclusively to him. (Id. at ¶ 50.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant transferred partnership property to his mother, Defendant Carmen Schujman, and that both defendants are wrongfully keeping this property from Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 40.) Her FAC alleges various claims designed to vindicate her purported rights under the parties’ partnership agreement.

Plaintiff’s original complaint in this action contained a claim for sexual battery, the Twelfth Cause of Action. (Defendant’s RJN, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 216-233.) The claim described an incident in December 2021 or January 2022 in which Defendant allegedly anally raped Plaintiff. (Ibid.) In April 2025, the Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to the sexual battery claim with leave to amend on the basis that it was barred by collateral estoppel. (Defendant’s RJN, Ex. 2.) Plaintiff’s next pleading, the FAC (filed June 2, 2025 and the operative pleading in this case), retained the Twelfth Cause of Action for sexual battery, this time with additional allegations designed to circumvent the collateral estoppel issue. (Id. at Ex. 3, ¶¶ 216-233.)

Defendant demurred to the FAC’s sexual battery claim and moved to strike references to the anal rape incident from the pleading. (See Defendant’s Notice of Demurrer and Notice of Motion to Strike [both filed July 3, 2025].)

On September 25, 2025, the Court sustained Defendant’s demurrer to the FAC’s sexual battery claim without leave to amend, finding that the new allegations were not enough to render the claim viable given that a different judge in a separate proceeding found that the anal rape incident did not occur. (Id. at Ex. 4, p. 6.) It also granted the motion to strike in relevant part without leave to amend. (Ibid.)

On August 27, 2025, Plaintiff noticed the deposition of Dr. Carolyn Million, a colorectal surgeon who treated Plaintiff. (Brekhus Dec., Exs. A, B [7:1; 8:6-9].) Plaintiff deposed Dr. Million on January 27, 2026, months after the Court’s ruling on Defendant’s demurrer to the FAC and motion to strike portions of the same. (Brekhus Dec., ¶ 6.) Plaintiff’s entire examination of Dr. Million was devoted to eliciting evidence that Plaintiff was injured in an incident of anal rape by Defendant. (Id. at Ex. B.)

Defendant now moves for an award of $10,227.50 in monetary sanctions for discovery abuse. The sole form of discovery abuse at issue in this motion is Plaintiff’s deposing Dr. Million.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure, section 2023.030 permits a court, “after notice to any affected party, person, or attorney, and after opportunity for hearing, [to] impose [specified] sanctions against anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process[.]” (See also Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.010 [defining “misuse of the discovery process”].) Specifically, “[t]he court may impose a monetary sanction ordering that one engaging in the misuse of the discovery process, or any attorney advising that conduct, or both pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result of that conduct. . . .

If a monetary sanction is authorized by any provision of this title, the court shall impose that sanction unless it funds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a).) The monetary sanctions contemplated by the Discovery Act are the “reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred by anyone as a result” of the discovery abuse. (Ibid.)

Discussion

Defendant argues that Plaintiff “misuse[d] . . . the discovery process” (Code. Civ. Proc., § 2023.030) by deposing a witness exclusively in relation to allegations that were no longer at

issue by the time of the deposition. Plaintiff responds that there is a use for Dr. Million’s evidence notwithstanding the Court’s prior rulings that Plaintiff is barred by collateral estoppel from relitigating whether the anal rape incident occurred. There is nothing before the Court suggesting that prior to Dr. Million’s deposition, Defendant ever moved for a protective order or otherwise objected to Plaintiff’s deposing this witness. Nor did Defendant object during the deposition on the ground that Plaintiff was asking questions designed to elicit irrelevant evidence.

The deposition transcript, which Defendant has provided in its entirety, reveals that defense counsel was silent as Plaintiff’s counsel elicited evidence regarding the anal rape incident and Plaintiff’s alleged injuries resulting from it. Defense counsel objected only once, on the ground that a question about the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries was vague and ambiguous and called for speculation. (Brekhus Dec., Ex. B, 20:24-21:4.) Not only did defense counsel not object based on relevance, but during cross-examination, she asked questions of Dr.

Million designed to elicit evidence on the merits of the sexual battery claim. (Id. at 33:16-34:12, 35:13-17, 39:17-20 [asking about possible alternative causes of the injuries], 34:13-16, 35:6-9 [seeking admission designed to support argument that Dr. Million’s evidence regarding the cause of the injuries was unreliable].)

The Court sees no reason why Defendant should be permitted to sit back and allow Plaintiff to take an irrelevant deposition without any pushback, cross-examine the witness as though her evidence was relevant, and then recover costs associated with that deposition based on an argument that it was directed exclusively at allegations that had been removed from the case months prior. The gravamen of this motion is that Plaintiff wasted Defendant and his counsel’s time and resources by taking this deposition, but defense counsel permitted her own time and her client’s resources to be wasted by failing to object. These circumstances “make . . . imposition of [a] sanction unjust” and also establish that at least a portion of the attorney’s fees Defendant seeks as a sanction were not reasonably incurred. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a).)

Defendant argues that “[t]he misuse here was not a line of questioning that could have been curtailed with an objection by counsel before or during the deposition as it was not known that the sole purpose of the deposition was to present evidence of anal rape.” (Reply,1 p. 4.) The Court does not follow. Of course this could have been addressed effectively through objections. Throughout the deposition, Plaintiff’s counsel asked Dr. Million numerous individual questions aimed solely at establishing that Defendant anally raped Plaintiff.

Defense counsel could have objected to any of those questions and, if Plaintiff’s counsel persisted in asking them and refused to move to a different line of questioning, could have suspended the deposition and moved for a protective order. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2025.470, 2025.420, subds. (a), (b)(1), (b)(9).) Instead, defense counsel permitted Plaintiff’s counsel to proceed with this line of questioning as long as he wanted.

As to the idea that there was nothing Defendant could have done in advance of the deposition, defense counsel offers evidence that she spent at least an hour preparing for the deposition before it actually began. (Brekhus Dec., ¶ 7 & Ex. B [length of deposition itself was approximately one

1 Defendant filed his reply late due to a miscommunication within his counsel’s office. (Brekhus Reply Dec., ¶ 3.) The Court exercises its “broad discretion” to consider this late-filed document. (Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 262.)

hour and ten minutes].) The Court infers that defense counsel understood how Dr. Million was connected to this case before the deposition, both as a matter of basic legal competence and because there would have been little for her to spend an hour doing in advance of the proceeding if she did not know who Dr. Million was. From the facts that Dr. Million is a colorectal surgeon connected to Plaintiff and that Plaintiff had alleged that she had sought medical treatment for anal injuries after the incident, the conclusion is almost inescapable that Plaintiff planned to depose Dr.

Million regarding the anal rape allegations. The idea that defense counsel walked into the deposition with no idea where it was headed is not credible, particularly given defense counsel’s record of competence before this Court. Still, defense counsel did not, in advance of the deposition, file a motion for a protective order seeking to prohibit Plaintiff from questioning Dr. Million about the anal rape incident.

The motion is DENIED. Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is likewise DENIED. To the extent Plaintiff is requesting sanctions on the basis that Defendant’s motion is without merit (Opposition, p. 3), she presents no legal authority for the idea that the party who prevails on a motion is entitled to sanctions on that basis. To the extent she is seeking them as a “discovery sanction” (id. at p. 4), she cannot request discovery sanctions in an opposition to a motion. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.040 [requests for discovery sanctions must be made by way of a noticed motion].)

All parties must comply with Marin County Superior Court Local Rules, Rule 2.10(B) to contest the tentative decision. Parties who request oral argument are required to appear in person or remotely by ZOOM. Regardless of whether a party requests oral argument in accordance with Rule 2.10(B), the prevailing party shall prepare an order consistent with the announced ruling as required by Marin County Superior Court Local Rules, Rule 2.11.

The Zoom appearance information for May, 2026 is as follows: https://marin-courts-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/1605267272?pwd=908CbP6TV2mhCAyai1nzo6lyz2dKaw.1

Meeting ID: 160 526 7272 Passcode: 026935 If you are unable to join by video, you may join by telephone by calling (669) 254-5252 and using the above-provided passcode. Zoom appearance information may also be found on the Court’s website: https://www.marin.courts.ca.gov