Kenneth W. Mignosa v. FC US, LLC

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 12 Honorable Nahal Iravani-Sani, Presiding Courtroom Clerk, Ryan Nguyen 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 Telephone: (408) 882-2230

DATE: 08/21/2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. and 9:01 A.M.

LINE 3 24CV443748 Helgah V. Yeff Defendant/Cross-Complainant moves to compel Plaintiff/Cross- v. LINE 4 James M. Barrett et al. Defendant to respond to discovery. Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant LINE 5 opposes, contending that the motion was stayed while Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion was pending and is only now ripe for determination.

The Court finds that the statutory discovery stay under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (g), applied to the pending motions to compel and that Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant did not waive the stay by failing to oppose the motions. The motions were therefore stayed while the anti-SLAPP motion was pending. (Britts v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1124– 1127.)

The anti-SLAPP motion was denied and notice of entry of the order was served on August 19, 2026. Accordingly, the statutory discovery stay has terminated.

The parties shall meet and confer in good faith regarding each motion to compel and attempt to resolve and narrow the issues in dispute. The parties shall file a joint statement by October 2, 2026, identifying the discovery requests that remain disputed and the relief sought.

The three motions to compel are CONTINUED to October 21, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant shall file and serve any opposition to the remaining disputed issues by October 7, 2026, and Defendant/Cross-Complainant shall file and serve any reply by October 14, 2026.

LINE 6 25CV458972 Kenneth W. Mignosa DEMURRER v. FC US, LLC Please Ctrl Click (or scroll down to) Line 6 Putnam Automotive

Calendar Line 6 Case Name: Kenneth Mignosa v. FCA US, LLC et al. Case No.: 25CV458972

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Kenneth Mignosa (“Plaintiff”) initiated this action against defendants FCA, US, LLC (“FCA”) and Putnam Chrysler Jeep Dodge (“Putnam”) (collectively, “Defendants”) on February 14, 2025. On December 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”). According to the allegations of the FAC, Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with FCA regarding a 2017 Chrysler Pacifica (“Subject Vehicle”) that was manufactured and distributed by FCA. (FAC, ¶ 7; Ex. A.) The contract contained various warranties and FCA also provided Plaintiff with a California Emission Warranty that has not been produced for Plaintiff. (FAC, ¶ 8.)

Plaintiff leased the Subject Vehicle from FCA’s authorized dealer, Stevens Creek Chrysler Jeep Dodge (“the Dealership”), that conveys information to purchasers as directed by FCA. (FAC, ¶¶ 9-10.) Prior to purchase, Plaintiff reviewed FCA’s marketing and advertising materials, viewed the vehicle’s window sticker, and took the Subject Vehicle on a test drive. (FAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff was never told that the engine in the vehicle was defective. (Ibid.) In 2018, 2020, 2022, 2023, and 2025 Plaintiff presented the Subject Vehicle to the authorized repair facility and each time was told it was repaired and working as designed. (FAC, ¶¶ 13-20.)

Plaintiff had no way of uncovering the deception, he was diligent in performing regular maintenance and presenting the vehicle for repairs. (FAC, ¶¶ 21-23.) Plaintiff believes FCA knew of engine defects, including before Plaintiff acquired the Subject Vehicle, but failed to disclose the information. (FAC, ¶¶ 31-35.) The FAC assets the following causes of action: 1) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (d) [against FCA]; 2) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (b) [against FCA]; 3) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3) [against FCA]; 4) Breach of the implied warranty of merchantability [against FCA]; 5) Negligent repair [against Putnam]; and 6) Fraudulent inducement/concealment [against FCA].

On February 18, 2026, FCA filed a demurrer to the FAC. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

LEGAL STANDARD In ruling on a demurrer, the Court treats it “as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Piccinini v. Cal. Emergency Management Agency (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 685, 688, citing Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank).) “A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading. It admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint; the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214.)

DISCUSSION

Statute of Limitations “‘The defense of a statute of limitations may be asserted by general demurrer if the complaint shows on its face that the statute bars the action.’” (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) “There is an important qualification, however: ‘In order for the bar of the statute of limitations to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows merely that the action may be barred.’” (Id. at pp. 1315-1316.) “In assessing whether plaintiff’s claims against defendant are time-barred, two basic questions drive [the] analysis: (a) What statutes of limitations govern the plaintiff’s claims? (b) When did the plaintiff’s causes of action accrue?” (Id. at p. 1316.)

First and Second Causes of Action Plaintiff’s first two causes of action are brought pursuant to Civil Code section 1793.2, known as the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly”). “Song-Beverly, California’s lemon law, ‘protects consumers who purchase defective vehicles or other goods.’” (Lathrop v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 808, 816; Cal. Civ. Code, § 1790 et seq.) FCA argues that Plaintiff’s first two Song-Beverly claims are time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure sections 871.20 and 871.21 which requires that “claims sounding in breach of express warranty under Section 1793.2(b) or (d) of the Song-Beverly Act must be brought within one year after the expiration of the applicable express warranty and, under no circumstances, later than six years after the date of original delivery[.]” (Demurrer, p. 4:21-23.)

FCA contends that Plaintiff’s complaint was filed on February 14, 2025 but he admits that he purchased the Subject Vehicle in 2017 and so the statute of limitations expired in May 2022. (Demurrer, p. 5:16-23.) Code of Civil Procedure section 871.21 is a statute of repose that was enacted in 2024 through Assembly Bill No. 1755 and went into effect in 2025. Code of Civil Procedure, Section 871.21 states: (a) An action covered by Section 871.20 shall be commenced within one year after the expiration of the applicable express warranty. (b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), an action covered by Section 871.20 shall not be brought later than six years after the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 871.21(a)-(b).) The operation of section 871.21 is tied to section 871.30, subdivision (a), which was also added to the Song-Beverly Act. Section 871.30, subdivision (a) authorizes automobile manufacturers to elect to be governed by the statutes of repose for all actions that fall within section 871.20 “with respect to all of its motor vehicles sold in the year 2025 and all prior years[.]” (Code Civ. Proc., § 871.30(a).) In this case, there are no allegations that FCA opted into the procedures above before Plaintiff filed his complaint.

Thus, the FAC is not clearly and affirmatively barred by section 871.21. As such, the demurrer to the first and second causes of action is OVERRULED.

Fourth Cause of Action

FCA additionally argues that the fourth cause of action for breach of implied warranty is time-barred under the four-year statute of limitations. (Demurrer, p. 6:19-20.) To properly assert a breach of implied warranty claim, a plaintiff must allege a breach of warranty, occurring while the warranty is valid, and bring suit within the limitations period. (See Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306.) An action for damages under the Song-Beverly Act is generally governed by the four-year limitations period for breach of warranty in sales contracts set forth in Commercial Code section 2725. (See Jensen v.

BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 132; Krieger v. Nick Alexander Imports, Inc. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 205, 213-215 [noting that the statute of limitation in section 2725, specifically governing actions for breach of warranty in a sales contract, controls over the general provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 338(a) for liabilities created by statute].) Commercial Code section 2725, subdivision (1) states that, “[a]n action for breach of contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued.”

Commercial Code section 2725, subdivision (2) further provides that “[a] cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach.” (Com. Code, § 2725, subd. (1) & (2).) “A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the times of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.” (Com.

Code, § 2725, subd. (2) [emphasis added].) Here, the FAC contains allegations that the Subject Vehicle was leased/purchased1 on or around May 5, 2017, more than seven years before the initial complaint was filed. (FAC, ¶¶ 7, 31.) Thus, on its face, the fourth cause of action is time-barred. In opposition, Plaintiff argues the FAC contains allegations that the Subject Vehicle was presented to FCA’s authorized repair facility on at least eight occasions between 2018 and 2025 and each time Plaintiff was told the vehicle had been repaired and was working as designed but the defects persisted. (Opposition, p. 3:8-15; FAC, ¶¶ 13-20, 53, 57-58.)

The Court finds that these allegations are sufficient to show that FCA’s authorized repair facilities informed Plaintiff that the various defects had been fixed and that the vehicle was operating as designed, which is why Plaintiff did not discover the defects earlier. (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1101; Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1301, 1304-1305.) Whether these allegations are credible and whether a reasonable person would nonetheless have discovered the defects earlier are questions of fact not properly resolved on demurrer. (See Alcorn v.

Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496 [court reviewing propriety of ruling on demurrer is not concerned with the “plaintiff’s ability to prove . . . allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof”].) The demurrer to the fourth cause of action is OVERRULED.

Sixth Cause of Action

FCA next argues that the sixth cause of action for fraudulent inducement is time-barred by a three-year statute of limitations. FCA’s entire argument is that Plaintiff purchased the vehicle in May 2017, the attached warranty booklet provides a three-year limited warranty and

1 Paragraph 7 indicates the vehicle was leased. Paragraph 31 indicates the vehicle was purchased.

five-year powertrain warranty, and the defects manifested during the applicable express warranty period. (Demurrer, p. 7:15-20.) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d), there is a three-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake.” “The cause of action in that case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” (Ibid.) Here, the FAC alleges that: 1) FCA knew of the defects even prior to Plaintiff’s purchase of the Subject Vehicle but failed to disclose this to Plaintiff (FAC, ¶¶ 31, 33, 35, 37, 38, 99, 100); 2) Plaintiff did not know of the defects when he purchased the vehicle and could not reasonably discover the defects before it was purchased (FAC, ¶ 37); and 3) Plaintiff discovered the defects shortly before filing the complaint because the Subject Vehicle continued to exhibit issues of defects following FCA’s attempts at repairing them (FAC, ¶¶ 53, 60-61).

As noted above, fraud claims do not accrue until the aggrieved party discovered, or should have discovered, the defect. Plaintiff alleges he discovered the defect “shortly before” the complaint was filed and could not have discovered it sooner (FAC, ¶ 53), although no specific date is alleged. Based on the FAC’s allegations, the sixth cause of action is not timebarred on its face. (See Daley v. Regents of University of California (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 595, 603 [“As an exception to the general rule of accrual, however, the discovery rule ‘postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.’”].)

Based on the above rulings, the Court finds it unnecessary to address the remaining statute of limitations arguments. FCA additionally argues that the sixth cause of action fails to state sufficient facts because fraud claims must be alleged with specificity. (Demurrer, p. 12:4-11.) FCA asserts that Plaintiff offers no allegations of fact regarding the nature of the defect experienced or how FCA had exclusive knowledge of the unknown defect. (Id. at p. 13:20-22.) Each element in a fraud cause of action must generally be pleaded with specificity. (Cadlo v.

Owens-Illinois, Inc. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 513, 519.) In the case of fraud by concealment or omission, however, courts require less particularity because “[h]ow does one show ‘how’ and ‘by what means’ something didn’t happen, or ‘when’ it never happened, or ‘where’ it never happened?” (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Ass’n., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.) Less specificity is required when it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant necessarily possesses full information concerning the facts of the controversy. (See Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v.

General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 217 [superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 227].) Here, the FAC alleges that FCA manufactures, distributes, markets, and sells motor vehicles in Santa Clara County, California. (FAC, ¶ 4.) It alleges that Plaintiff entered into a contract with FCA on May 5, 2017. (Id. at ¶ 7.) The FAC also alleges that FCA knew of the alleged engine defect and did not disclose it to consumers such as Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 31, 33, 35, 37-38, 100-101.)

At least one appellate court has found similar allegations sufficient to support a cause of action for fraudulent concealment. (Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843-844 (Dhital).) Dhital is persuasive here, and thus, the sixth cause of action is pleaded with adequate specificity. Accordingly, the demurrer to the sixth cause of action on the ground it is time-barred and fails to state sufficient facts is OVERRULED.

Third Cause of Action

Plaintiff’s third cause of action is for violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3), which states: “Every manufacturer of consumer goods sold in this state and for which the manufacturer has made an express warranty shall: . . . Make available to authorized service and repair facilities sufficient service literature and replacement parts to effect repairs during the express warranty period.” FCA argues that the third cause of action is insufficiently pled because it is “utterly silent with respect to factual allegations regarding the vehicle’s service and repair history[.]” (Demurrer, p. 6:5-11.)

In opposition, Plaintiff asserts the FAC contains nine paragraphs addressing defects and nonconformities in Paragraphs 12-20. (Opposition, p. 4:8-14.) Thus, as to FCA’s first argument, the Court is not persuaded. FCA next argues that there are insufficient allegations that FCA’s repair facilities were unable to complete repairs because FCA failed to provide sufficient service literature and replacement parts to effect repairs. (Demurrer, p. 6:12-16.) Here, the FAC merely restates the language of the statute without factual support and is therefore insufficient pled. (See Carter v.

Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 410 [where statutory remedies are invoked, “[f]acts, not conclusions, must be pleaded.”].) Accordingly, the demurrer to the third cause of action is SUSTAINED with 15 days leave to amend.

Punitive Damages

Finally, FCA seeks to strike the request for punitive damages in the FAC. This is an improper use of a demurrer, which is limited to addressing the sufficiency of causes of action. (Grieves v. Superior Ct. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 163.) Consequently, a demurrer is not the proper procedural vehicle for challenging the sufficiency of punitive damages allegations. (Ibid.; see also Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047.) The request to strike punitive damages is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

The demurrer to the first, second, fourth, and sixth causes of action is OVERRULED. The demurrer to the third cause of action is SUSTAINED with 15 days leave to amend. The request to strike punitive damages is DENIED. The Court will prepare the final order.

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