Shabana Pirani v. Sweet Jane Kathleen Hammon

SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 12 Honorable Nahal Iravani-Sani, Presiding Courtroom Clerk, Ryan Nguyen 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 Telephone: (408) 882-2230

DATE: 08/21/2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. and 9:01 A.M.

LINE 7 25CV464704 Dennis Perry MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION v. LINE 8 City of Morgan Hill et LINE 9 al. Please Ctrl Click (or scroll down to) Line 7-9 LINE 10 25CV480258 Shabana Pirani MOTION TO STRIKE v. Sweet Jane Kathleen Hammon Please Ctrl Click (or scroll down to) Line 10

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Calendar line 10 Case Name: Shabana Pirani v. S.J.K. Hammon Case No.: 25-CV-480258

Special Motion to Strike the Complaint by Defendant Sweet Jane Kathleen Hammon (erroneously sued and served herein as S.J. Hammon)

Factual and Procedural Background

On December 9, 2025, plaintiff Shabana Pirani (“Plaintiff”) (self-represented) filed a judicial council form complaint against defendant Sweet Jane Kathleen Hammon (erroneously sued and served herein as S.J. Hammon) (“Defendant”) alleging causes of action for general negligence, professional negligence, and intentional tort.

On June 9, 2026, Defendant filed a motion seeking discretionary relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) for the late-filing of her special motion to strike the complaint. On July 21, 2026, this court posted a tentative ruling granting such relief and denying Plaintiff’s request for entry of default. On July 22, 2026, the motion came on for hearing with an appearance by defense counsel. There was no appearance by the Plaintiff and no contest to the tentative ruling. Therefore, the tentative ruling became the final order of the court.

Currently before the court is Defendant’s special motion to strike the complaint. Plaintiff filed written opposition on July 27, 2026.

A case status review is scheduled for December 4, 2026.

Self-Represented Litigants

Self-represented litigants “are held to the same standards as attorneys.” (Kobayashi v. Super. Ct. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543; see also Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1270 [“self-represented litigants are generally entitled to no special treatment”].) “[M]ere self-representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984.) Otherwise, “exceptional treatment of parties who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation.” (Id. at p. 985.)

Special Motion to Strike the Complaint

Defendant moves to strike each cause of action in the complaint on the ground that the pleading arises from protected activity and Plaintiff will be unable to demonstrate a probability of success on the merits.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 provides for a “special motion to strike” when a plaintiff’s claims arise from certain acts constituting the exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances, “unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subds. (a) & (b)(1).)

“Consistent with the statutory scheme, ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step procedure. First, the moving defendant must identify ‘all allegations of protected activity’ and show that the challenged claim arises from that activity. [Citations.] Second, if the defendant makes such a showing, the ‘burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.’ [Citation.] Without resolving evidentiary conflicts, the court determines ‘whether the plaintiff’s showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.’ [Citation.]” (Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 934 (Bel Air Internet).)

First Prong: Protected Activity

Law

“A defendant meets his or her burden on the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis by demonstrating the acts underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action fall within one of the four categories spelled out in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (Collier v. Harris (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 41, 50-51 (Collier).) That section provides that an “act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).) “These categories define the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute by listing acts which constitute an ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue.’ ” (Collier, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 51, citing Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. (e).)

“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity underlies or forms the basis for the claim. [Citations.] Critically, ‘the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action must itself have been an act in furtherance of the right of petition or free speech.’ [Citations.] ‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute.’ [Citations.] Instead, the focus is on determining what ‘the defendant’s activity [is] that gives rise to his or her asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning.’ [Citation.]” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1062-1063 (Park).)

“[A] claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability is asserted.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.) To determine whether the speech constitutes the wrong itself or is merely evidence of a wrong, “in ruling on an anti- SLAPP motion, courts should consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Id. at p. 1063.)

“In deciding whether the ‘arising from’ requirement is met, a court considers ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.’ ” (Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 670.)

Analysis

In the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Defendant relies on section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and (2) for statements made before or in connection with a judicial proceeding.

“ ‘[A]ny act’ [citation] ‘includes communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action. [Citation.] This includes qualifying acts committed by attorneys in representing clients in litigation. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘Under the plain language of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and (2), as well as the case law interpreting those provisions, all communicative acts performed by attorneys as part of their representation of a client in a judicial proceeding or other petitioning context are per se protected as petitioning activity by the anti-SLAPP statute. ...’ [Citation.]” (Finton Construction, Inc. Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 210.)

“However, protection is not accorded to statements ‘having any connection, however remote, with an official proceeding.’ [Citation.] Rather, ‘[t]he statements or writings in question must occur in connection with “an issue under consideration or review” in the proceeding’ or the anticipated action. [Citation.]” (Bassi v. Bassi (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1096 (Bassi).)

As interpreted by the Courts of Appeal, a statement or writing is ‘made “in connection with” ’ litigation under section 425.16(e)(2) – including anticipated litigation – ‘if it relates to the substantive issues in the litigation and is directed to persons having some interest in the litigation.’ [Citation.]” (Bassi, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 1096.)

Defendant, who is an attorney, argues Plaintiff is suing her for representing an opposing party in Plaintiff’s other case against Costco Wholesale Corporation (“Costco”). Defendant contends her representation of Costco is within the context of active litigation and therefore constitutes protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. In support, Defendant sets forth the following timeline of events:

The matter purportedly stems from Case Management Conference scheduled for December 4, 2025, in Department 13 at 2 p.m. before the Honorable Judge Daniel T. Nishigaya in regard to a case filed before Santa Clara Superior Court, Case No. 25CV473157 (“Pirani v. Costco”). Attorney Hammon appeared on behalf of defendant Costco.

Upon seeing that Attorney Hammon appeared on behalf of defendant Costco, Plaintiff objected to Attorney Hammon’s appearance. Plaintiff asserted that defendant Costco did not file an answer, had a judgment against it, and that Matheny Sears Linkert & Jaime, LLP, did not represent Costco, despite receiving five separate letters from Mathey Sears Linkert & Jaime, LLP, in regard to the case of Pirani v. Costco.

Judge Nishigaya informed Plaintiff that defendant Costco did file an answer in Pirani v. Costco, did not have a judgment against it, and Matheny Sears Linkert & Jaime, LLP, did in fact represent defendant Costco, as displayed on the Santa Clara Docket.

On December 18, 2025, Attorney Hammon was served with the Summons and Complaint in the present case. (See Memo of P’s & A’s at pp. 2:13-3:6; Hammon Decl. at ¶¶ 2, 4-5, 8, 10, Exs. A, C; Jaime Decl. at ¶¶ 3-17, 10, Exs. B-G.)

As a preliminary matter, “[w]here a defendant moves to strike the entire complaint and fails to identify, with reasoned argument, specific claims for relief that are asserted to arise from protected activity, the defendant does not carry his or her first-step burden so long as the complaint presents at least one claim that does not arise from protected activity.” (Park v. Nazari (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1108.)

More recently, in Pechkis v. Trustees of California State University (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 497 (Pechkis), the Third Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s denial of a special motion to strike two retaliation causes of action because the challenged claims were not shown to arise exclusively from protected conduct:

“Through an elemental analysis, the speech must form the basis of liability for the two challenged causes of action. [Citation.] Defendant provides no analysis of the elements necessary to prove each cause of action, how allegations related to the speech supply the necessary elements of each cause of action, and whether there are other allegations supporting the cause of action that are not protected conduct. Defendant incorrectly assumes one drop of protected conduct fatally poisons both challenged causes of action.” (Pechkis, supra, at p. 506, emphasis added.)

According to the notice of motion, Defendant moves to strike the entire complaint in connection with the special motion to strike. But, the moving papers fail to address whether Plaintiff’s claims for negligence and the unidentified intentional tort claim arise from protected activity. Instead, the motion considers only Plaintiff’s cause of action for professional negligence. (See Memo of P’s & A’s at p. 6:11-18.) Having failed to consider the other two claims, the motion fails on this basis alone.

Also, the complaint does not set forth any factual allegations in support of the causes of action for professional negligence, negligence, and intentional tort. The only facts alleged are contained in Plaintiff’s “Exemplary Damages Attachment” where Plaintiff says Defendant appeared at a CMC and identified herself as an attorney without possessing a bar license. There are no additional attachments included with the complaint establishing a factual basis for each cause of action. Without such facts, the court cannot properly determine if any cause of action arises from protected activity.

And, “[c]onsistent with the primary role of the complaint in identifying the claims at issue, courts have rejected efforts by moving parties to redefine the factual basis for a plaintiff’s claims as described in the complaint to manufacture a ground to argue that the plaintiff’s claims arise from protected conduct.” (Bel Air Internet, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 936-937.)

For example, in Central Valley Hospitalists v. Dignity Health (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 203 (Central Valley), the First Appellate District affirmed the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion by the operator of a hospital that claimed the plaintiff’s causes of action were based on protected medical peer review activities. The complaint did not allege facts concerning peer review, and expressly disavowed basing any claims on peer review conduct. The appellate court rejected the defendant’s attempt to construct a peer review claim through facts included in its own declarations. Citing a number of decisions that reached similar conclusions, the court explained that “ ‘[t]he question is what is pled—not what is proven.’ ” (Central Valley, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 217, quoting Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 931, 942.)

Similarly, in Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 602 (Medical Marijuana), the Fourth Appellate District, in affirming the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion, stated:

“It would be inappropriate for us to insert into a pleading claims for relief based on allegations of activities that plaintiffs simply have not identified, even if the parties suggest on appeal how plaintiffs might have intended to frame those claims or attempt to identify the specific conduct or assertions of statements alleged to be false on which plaintiffs intended to base such claims for relief. It is not our role to engage in what would amount to a redrafting of the first amended complaint in order to read that document as alleging conduct that supports a claim that has not in fact been specifically alleged, and then assess whether the pleading that we have essentially drafted could survive the anti-SLAPP motion directed at it.” (Medical Marijuana, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 621.)

Here, like the aforementioned cases, Defendant is attempting to redefine the factual basis for the complaint alleged against her. The complaint, as currently pled, simply doesn’t refer to Defendant’s representation of Costco, matters related to the Pirani v. Costco case, or actions taken by Judge Nishigaya in that action. Nor is Plaintiff’s passing reference to the CMC in her “Exemplary Damages Attachment” sufficient to trigger protected activity under the anti- SLAPP statute. (See Hylton v. Frank E.

Rogozienski, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1272 [“If the core-injury producing conduct upon which the plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute.”]; see also Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 394 [“Allegations of protected activity that merely provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.”].)

And, while Defendant may supplement her motion with declarations and affidavits, she is not permitted to repackage the complaint to construct a claim that arises from protected activity.

Based on the foregoing, the court finds Defendant did not meet her first-prong burden in establishing that each cause of action arises from protected activity. Therefore, the court does not need to consider whether Plaintiff can show a probability of success on the merits of her claims. (See Nam v. Regents of University of California (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1176, 1185 [“If defendant fails to meet its burden, we need not assess plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing on the merits.”].)

Consequently, the special motion to strike the complaint is DENIED. (See Shahbazian v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 823, 830 [“If the moving party fails to demonstrate that any of the challenged causes of action arise from protected activity, the court denies the motion.”].)

Request for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

Defendant’s request for attorney’s fees and costs is DENIED as she did not prevail on the merits of the special motion to strike.

Disposition

The special motion to strike the complaint is DENIED.

The request for attorney’s fees and costs is DENIED.

The court will prepare the order.

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