RUSSO vs THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SAN LEANDRO, et al.

25CV113140: RUSSO vs THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SAN LEANDRO, et al. 08/21/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate Merits (CEQA) in Department 25

Tentative Ruling - 08/20/2026 Jenna Whitman

PARTIES TO APPEAR. Having carefully considered the parties’ briefs and administrative record, the Court is inclined to rule as follows. At the hearing, counsel may address the following tentative ruling and any other issues relevant to the merits.

FAILURE TO PROCEED IN THE MANNER REQUIRED BY LAW. First, the Court finds that Respondent “proceeded in the manner required by law” in considering whether to approve the Conditional Unit Permit for the construction of the telecommunications monopine facility. San Leandro Zoning Code section 4.04.376(K) required the City to consider specific factors in evaluating the application. The Ordinance also imposes various guidelines and requirements. The 11/7/2024 approval resolution and the findings of the staff report, incorporated by reference, demonstrate that the City considered the relevant factors in evaluating the application.

Petitioner only argues noncompliance with section 4.04.376(J) and (L). subdivision (J) imposes requirements upon applicants (not upon the City). In any event, the AR demonstrates that each of the items enumerated in subdivision (J) were submitted to the City in conjunction with the Application. Subdivision (L) requires a demonstration that no existing tower, structure, or building can accommodate the proposed antennas. The Alternative Site Analysis (Attachment 7) addresses this directly.

Petitioners cannot rely upon the City’s Completeness Letters (1-3) to demonstrate, by negative inference, some failure to satisfy the items in subdivisions (J) and (L), or to cure specific demands by the City, where materials were continually provided after Completeness Letter No. 3 (8/26/2024). Initially, the Court observes that the City’s completeness letters maintained the same numbering system for initially identified deficiencies in subsequent completeness letters: in letters 2 and 3, items that were still not cured were marked as “repeat comment,” sometimes with further explanation; other items were marked as “placeholder.” Placeholders appeared to be included to preserve the numbering and avoid confusion.

There is nothing to indicate that the City regarded “placeholder” items as requiring further action. Further, by Completeness Letter No. 3, there were only two items outstanding: the RFE/EME report, and apparent missing information; and the 5-year master plan. As to the former, after Completeness Letter No. 3, the City was provided with the RFSSPR (AR 107), which appears to address substantially all of the concerns raised in the third completeness letter. As to the 5-year master plan, the applicant provided a letter attesting to no plans for further development on the parcel, beyond the Project, during the 5 year period.

This would appear to constitute substantial compliance. Even if there is some authority that the City was barred from concluding that it had sufficient information, after undertaking extensive review and soliciting additional information from the applicant, to evaluate the application, Petitioner has not cited it. Similarly, to the extent Petitioner challenges the content of the items submitted, this would appear to concern the substantive merits of the application (and the other issues raised in this Petition, e.g. the substantial evidence question) – not a failure to proceed in the manner required by law. 25CV113140: RUSSO vs THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SAN LEANDRO, et al. 08/21/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate Merits (CEQA) in Department 25

Petitioner also argues that the City’s approval findings failed to bridge the analytical gap between the recurring deficiencies in the Completeness Letters and the ultimate decision. However, that is not the gap the City must bridge. (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Cmty. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 516-517.)

GENERAL PLAN AND HOUSING IMPACTS. Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the findings and the substantial evidence supporting that analysis as it pertains to consistency with the General Plan and Housing Element impacts. This argument turns on the City’s conclusion that the Project can be built without losing the ability to build a residential development with 117 units (as previously designated in the Housing Element). Petitioner asserts this is not possible because there is no showing that the proposed Project and a transit oriented housing Project with 117 units are “compatible.” The City’s conclusion that they are compatible (AR0058) specifically relies upon the emissions analyses provided in support of the application. (AR0106.)

This report shows that the Project would far exceed FCC compliance thresholds. Its illustrations and calculations appear to address emissions exposure at ground level and at higher elevations. Thus, it is apparent that the City considered the relevant policies and determined that the Project was compatible with the plan's objectives and policies. (Sequoyah Hills Homeowners Assn. v. City of Oakland (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 704, 717–719 [a decision need not comply with every policy stated in a general plan in order to be in harmony with the plan]; Gov.

Code, § 65860.)

For the same reasons, Petitioner’s challenge on the grounds that the City failed to consider any impact the decision might have on infill housing policy, or that the AR lacks substantial evidence to support the findings in the Resolution and incorporated staff report also fails.

CLASS 3 CATEGORICAL EXEMPTION AND “UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES” EXCEPTION. Petitioner also challenges the City’s finding that the Project is categorically exempt from CEQA review as a Small Structure. This determination is entitled to some deference. “An agency interpretation of the meaning and legal effect of a statute is entitled to consideration and respect by the courts....” (Don't Cell Our Parks v. City of San Diego (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 338, 356.) The question of whether there are unusual circumstances is a factual inquiry, within the agency’s experience, entitled to some deference. (Berkeley Hillside Pres. v.

City of Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086, 1115.) Prior to the City’s approval, a wireless telecommunications tower has previously been found to fall within Class 3. (Don’t Cell Our Parks, supra.) Further, it would appear that an agency is merely required to file a notice of exemption, which may be construed to include implied, necessary findings. (See, e.g., Berkeley Hillside Pres., supra, 60 Cal.4th at 1114. See also World Bus. Acad. v. California State Lands Comm'n (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 476, 496.)

Petitioner has not cited law requiring an expres analysis of this issue or explained what circumstances here, gave to an obligation to provide such analysis at the time of the finding.

In any event, Petitioner bears the burden to show that there are unusual circumstances or, no unusual circumstances cannot be shown, that the Project “will” have a substantial adverse

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV113140: RUSSO vs THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SAN LEANDRO, et al. 08/21/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate Merits (CEQA) in Department 25 environmental impact. (Berkeley Hillside Pres., supra, 60 Cal.4th at 1105; Don't Cell Our Park, supra, at 360.) Petitioner has not done so. The Project falls within the same class as other structures enumerated in Class 3 (single family homes, small commercial installations, or accessory units). (14 Cal. Code Regs., § 15300.2(c).) It is a small commercial installation.

While it may be taller and larger than the installation in Don’t Cell, Petitioner has not presented any evidence that the Project height or size exceeds those normally associated with wireless communications installations. (Moreover, it falls within the CEQA Guidelines in constituting less than the 10,000 square feet limit for an urban setting.) It is certainly smaller in size than the home at issue in Berkeley Hillside. Petitioner has not shown that size and height distinguish the Project from other wireless installations.

Nor does Petitioner show that the length of the encumbrance is a distinguishing factor from similar installations. Assuming the encumbrance would impact consistency with the housing plan, Petitioner has not shown it to be a “distinguishing feature” from other cell installations; nor is this an environmental, as opposed to a social or other type of impact. (See San Lorenzo Valley Cmty. Advocs. for Responsible Educ. v. San Lorenzo Valley Unified Sch. Dist. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1390 [stating requirements for significant environmental impact].)

Petitioner has not shown that a backup generator that would increase ambient noise levels at nonpeak conditions is a distinguishing factor from other wireless installations. Indeed, the subject ordinance, 4.04.376.F.4. expressly anticipates that these types of facilities may include a backup generator, and automatically exempts from generators from otherwise applicable noise ordinances, indicating that such generators are commonly featured as part of such an installation, and that the City concluded that any environmental impact would not be substantial.

The latter conclusion is affirmed by the Noise Assessment, which concludes that the generator does not cause appreciable additional noise over peak baseline (and thus, is not a “change” required to show a substantial environmental impact under San Lorenzo Valley, supra). Even at low baseline, generator activation would not cause ambient noise to exceed peak baseline or even exceed acceptable levels. Thus, there is no evidence of a substantial environmental impact.

Finally, as to radio emissions, again, Petitioner has not shown how this tower would differ in emission levels from other similar wireless installations, or that it will cause a significant environmental impact.

INADEQUATE ANALYSIS/LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. Finally, the Court finds that the City’s findings are sufficiently analytical to illuminate the City’s path from the evidence to findings to action, and are supported by substantial evidence. Initially, findings in the Approval Resolution and Staff Report, which are expressly incorporated, suffice. Such findings need not be formal, extensive, or highly technical. (See World Business Academy, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at 496-497; Env't Prot. Info. Ctr. v. California Dep't of Forestry & Fire Prot. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 459, 516.) The findings here, particularly insofar as they include the Staff Report findings, illuminate the fundamental reasoning for the City’s decision on each point and, in many cases, cite to specific documents and evidence upon which the findings rely.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV113140: RUSSO vs THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF SAN LEANDRO, et al. 08/21/2026 Hearing on Petition for Writ of Mandate Merits (CEQA) in Department 25 Petitioner’s desire for more explanatory, technical findings is not supported.

As to substantial evidence, there is substantial evidence in the City’s Approval Resolution, Staff Reports, and attachments to support each of the challenged findings. First, contrary to Petitioner’s argument, the applicant provided a report discussing their investigations and data which expressly stated that there was no existing tower that was not already fully occupied, and no existing building within the coverage area that could accommodate an antennae, thereby justifying the need to proceed with a monopole project.

Documentation was included to show current coverage, the improvement the Project would afford, and that existing buildings and towers were considered but not viable options. Coverage objectives were fully explained, and the report observed that many of the alternative sites considered would not meet those or are unavailable for development. This analysis was provided 7/10/2024. (AR 0136.) Petitioners rely upon deficiencies in Completeness Letters 1 and 2, which were issued before this analysis. (See, e.g., AR 1060, Completeness Letter 2.)

Petitioner’s claim that there is no evidence to support the height justification is also rebutted by the Alternative Site Analysis. Petitioner also attacks the sufficiency of the evidence in regards to the RFE/EME analysis. As noted, following the issuance of Completeness Letter 3, the applicant provided the City with the RFSSPR (AR 107), which includes protective modeling, not just at ground level, and appears to address substantially all of the concerns raised in the third completeness letter.

Moreover, Petitioner does not explain what finding is not supported by substantial evidence. The Court presumes this relates to the City’s conclusion that approval of the Project is consistent with the General Plan and Housing Element, which is addressed above. Petitioner asserts that the final approval findings contain no visual impact analysis that engages with specified aspects of the surrounding environment. The findings rely upon Attachment 4, which depict vantage points from precisely the aspect identified by Petitioner.

Attachment 4 constitutes substantial evidence to support the finding of no negative visual impacts.

For the reasons cited above, the Court DENIES the Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

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Meeting ID: 161 8066 1142 Passcode: 5805