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26SMCV01748·la·Civil·Civil Dispute
Hearing todayDENIED

Not specified

Application to strike/vacate default

Hearing date
Aug 21, 2026
Department
I
Judge
Prevailing
Defendant
Appearance
Not required

Motion type

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Parties

DefendantSilverstein
DefendantNejadpour
PlaintiffPlaintiff

Ruling

(Santa Monica Courthouse: Dept. I) August 21, 2026 DEPARTMENT I LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

If the parties wish to submit on the tentative ruling and avoid a court appearance on the matter, the moving party must contact the opposing party and all other parties who have appeared in the action and confirm that each will submit on the tentative ruling. Please call the court no later than 4:30 p.m. on the court day before the hearing, leave a message with the court clerk at (310) 260-3629 advising her that all parties will submit on the tentative ruling and waive hearing, and finally, serve notice of the Court's ruling on all parties entitled to receive service. If any party declines to submit on the tentative ruling, then no telephone call is necessary, and all parties should appear at the hearing.

This is so for a number of reasons. First, the declaration for an extension was timely filed. Plaintiff does not dispute that; plaintiff claims it was perjurious, but concedes it was filed. The clerk nonetheless entered a default at plaintiff's request some weeks later. The clerk then sent the court a request that the default be vacated. The clerk stated that the default was in error due to the declaration, meaning that the clerk had not examined the docket closely enough to see that the declaration had been filed when plaintiff's request for entry of default was processed.

The court reviewed that request and determined that the clerk was correct insofar as the docket was concerned and entered the requested order that same day: August 17, 2026. (The court assumes that the default was sought by plaintiff because plaintiff did not get the declaration--for if plaintiff did get the declaration, then it was improper to seek a default through the bare form. Rather, plaintiff would have had to bring a motion to strike the declaration.)

A few things. Technically, it might be true that even an erroneous default precludes the filing of a dispositive motion. That would apply to Silverstein--who filed the motion on August 11--but not for Nejadpour--who filed his motion on August 18. But the court moves beyond that. If the default was improperly filed, then the court sees no harm in allowing the SMS to remain on the docket rather than having it stricken, only to be refiled, or (more likely) to have it deemed filed on August 18. If plaintiff needs additional time to respond, that is a different question and if the mistaken default is the reason, the court would look with favor on such a request.

Second, even if the default were proper, relief from default would be all but certain. Even putting to one side the mandatory rule where an attorney assumes fault (which, as plaintiff points out, would not apply to Silverstein), relief from default if requested early in the case is liberally granted in furtherance of the strong public policy of resolving cases on their merits. That means that the court would almost certainly grant such a motion. But the end result given that assumption is that Silverstein would move to vacate the default, it would be granted, and he would file the SMS. We wind up in the same place.

Third, the better way to deal with an allegedly false declaration is through a motion relating to that declaration directly. If Silverstein lied about trying to contact plaintiff's counsel, then that is a significant issue. The response might be to disqualify Silverstein from representing anyone but himself and referring him to the Bar. On the other hand, if Silverstein did not lie about trying to contact plaintiff's counsel, then there is nothing wrong with the declaration and there are issues that would need to be addressed with plaintiff's counsel.

The court could be persuaded to delve deeper into that question, but the court is not prepared to resolve this by way of a swearing contest. The declaration states that Silverstein emailed plaintiff's counsel. That suggests that there is metadata out there that would prove the case on both ends. Silverstein ought to have metadata showing the outgoing email, and plaintiff's counsel ought to have metadata showing no incoming email from Silverstein on the day and time in question. If the parties want to go that route, either of them can request it, but the court warns that if it finds that Silverstein lied or plaintiff's counsel was dishonest or mistaken, consequences follow. (It is also possible that there was an honest mistake, like a typographic error in the email address.)

For now, though, the application is DENIED. The court does not anticipate hearing argument on this matter today. | Home -->)" -->

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