Chad Norris v. General Motors LLC, et al.

(Van Nuys Courthouse East: Dept. I) August 21, 2026 DEPARTMENT I LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES CHAD NORRIS, an individual, Plaintiff, vs. GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al., Defendants. |))))))))))))))) | CASE NO: 25VECV06299 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO SET ASIDE OFFER OF COMPROMISE Dept. I HEARING DATE: August 21, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M. COMPLAINT FILED: November 3, 2025 TRIAL

DATE: None set. | I. BACKGROUND This is a lemon law action arising out of Plaintiff Chad Norris' ("Plaintiff") purchase of a Certified Pre-Owned 2021 Cadillac Escalade, VIN: 1GYS4DKL7MR249337 (the "Subject Vehicle") manufactured by Defendant General Motors LLC ("GM") and sold by Defendants Cadillac Pasadena LLC d/b/a Cadillac Pasadena and Cadillac of Calabasas Inc. d/b/a Cadillac of Calabasas. On November 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against GM, Cadillac Pasadena, Cadillac of Calabasas, and DOES 1 through 25 (collectively, "Defendants"), asserting causes of action for: (1) Violation of Song-Bevery Act - Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act - Breach of Implied Warranty; (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2(b); (4) Negligent Repair; (5) Violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (California Civil Code Sec. 1770 et seq.); (6) Fraudulent Inducement - Concealment; (7) Intentional Misrepresentation; and (8) Negligent Misrepresentation.

On January 7, 2026, GM filed its Answer to the Complaint. On January 27, 2026, Cadillac Pasadena filed its Answer to the Complaint. On March 11, 2026, GM and Cadillac Pasadena filed separate Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings. The matters were fully briefed and came on for hearing on April 14, 2026; the motions were granted in part as to the fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action with leave to amend. On May 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint ("FAC") against Defendants.

On June 11, 2026, GM filed a Statutory Offer to Compromise (CCP Sec. 998), which was signed by GM and Plaintiff. On June 25, 2026, GM filed the instant Motion to Set Aside Offer to Compromise. On August 11, 2026, Plaintiff filed an Opposition. On August 14, 2026, GM filed a Reply. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A court may "relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 473, subd. (b).) In addition, a court must vacate a default or dismissal when a motion for relief under Section 473, subdivision (b) is filed timely and accompanied by an attorney's sworn affidavit attesting to the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect "unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise or neglect." (Id.) The party or the legal representative must seek such relief "within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or

proceeding was taken." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 473, subd. (b); see Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980 ["because more than six months had elapsed from the entry of default, and hence relief under section 473 was unavailable"]; People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2011) 200 Ca.App.4th 712, 721 [motion for relief under section 473 must be brought "within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months"]). "The six-month limit is mandatory; a court has no authority to grant relief under section 473, subdivision (b), unless an application is made within the six-month period." (Arambula v.

Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 340, citations omitted.) "A mistake of fact is when a person understands the facts to be other than they are; a mistake of law is when a person knows the facts as they really are but has a mistaken belief as to the legal consequences of those facts... [i]nadvertence is defined as lack of heedfulness or attentiveness, inattention, fault from negligence...[and] 'excusable neglect' referred to in the section is that neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances." (Baratti v.

Baratti (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 917, 921 [emphasis added].) "The term 'surprise', as used in section 473, refers to 'some condition or situation in which a party...is unexpectedly placed to his injury, without any default or negligence of his own, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.'" (State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pietak (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 600, 611 [emphasis added].) "Relevant factors in assessing counsel error include: "(1) the nature of the mistake or neglect; and (2) whether counsel was otherwise diligent in investigating and pursuing the claim." (Huh v.

Wang (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1423.) "Conduct falling below the professional standard of care, such as failure to timely object or to properly advance an argument, is not therefore excusable. To hold otherwise would be to eliminate the express statutory requirement of excusability and effectively eviscerate the concept of attorney malpractice." (Toho-Towa Co., Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1112.) III. DISCUSSION GM moves for an order setting aside the Code of Civil Procedure Section 998 Offer of Compromise entered on May 26, 2026 ("Section 998 Offer").

The motion is made on the grounds that the Section 998 Offer is unenforceable because Plaintiff failed to add co-buyer Dara Lynn Norris, who is a necessary and indispensable party, to this instant action. Specifically, GM argues that it entered into the Section 998 Offer on the mistaken belief that Plaintiff had sole possession of the Subject Vehicle. (Kay Decl., P.5, Ex. 2.) "[T]he discretionary relief provision of section 473 only permits relief from attorney error 'fairly imputable to the client, i.e., mistakes anyone could have made.' " (Zamora v.

Clayborn Contracting Group, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 249, 258 (Zamora).) Here, GM contends that it discovered Plaintiff's wife, Dara Lynn Norris (hereinafter, "Mrs. Norris"), was a co-buyer of the Subject Vehicle on June 3, 2026. (Kay Decl., P.6, Ex. 3.) In opposition, Plaintiff contends that GM cannot claim

mistaken belief because GM was served with Plaintiff's initial disclosures on March 10, 2026, which was approximately six weeks prior to execution of the Section 998 Offer. (Ahoubim Decl., P.2.) GM admits that the Retail Installment Sales Contract ("RISC") received with Plaintiff's initial disclosures revealed Mrs. Norris' co-buyer and/or co-owner status. (Kay Decl., P.5 ["(See purchase contract for the Subject Vehicle, received as part of Plaintiff's initial disclosures, attached hereto as Exhibit 2.)"].)

However, GM's counsel's failure to carefully review the documents submitted during initial disclosures, which contained production of over 100 pages of documents, constitutes a mistake that could be made by a reasonable person under similar circumstances. (See Zamora, supra, 28 Cal.4th 259 ["While counsel's failure to review the document before sending it out was imprudent, we cannot say that his imprudence rendered the mistake inexcusable under the circumstances."].) This is further evidenced by the fact that GM never raised the issue during the attack on the pleadings via motion for judgment on the pleadings nor when drafting the Section 998 Offer, which expressly requires Plaintiff alone to surrender the Subject Vehicle to GM with clear title. (GM Mot. for Judgment on the Pleadings, 3/11/26; Kay Decl., P.5, Ex. 2 at p. 1, P.1.)

Accordingly, GM has demonstrated that the Section 998 Offer was entered into upon the mistaken belief that Plaintiff was the sole owner of the Subject Vehicle. A. CONCLUSION Defendant General Motors LLC's Motion to Set Aside Offer to Compromise is GRANTED. Defendant General Motors LLC to give notice. Dated: August 21, 2026 __________________________________ Hon. Karen Moskowitz Judge of the Superior Court ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES CHAD NORRIS, an individual, Plaintiff, vs.

GENERAL MOTORS LLC, et al., Defendants. |))

))))))))))))) | CASE NO: 25VECV06299 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS ACTION Dept. I HEARING DATE: August 21, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M. COMPLAINT FILED: November 3, 2025 TRIAL DATE: None set. | I. BACKGROUND This is a lemon law action arising out of Plaintiff Chad Norris' ("Plaintiff") purchase of a Certified Pre-Owned 2021 Cadillac Escalade, VIN: 1GYS4DKL7MR249337 (the "Subject Vehicle") manufactured by Defendant General Motors LLC ("GM") and sold by Defendants Cadillac Pasadena LLC d/b/a Cadillac Pasadena and Cadillac of Calabasas Inc. d/b/a Cadillac of Calabasas.

On November 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against GM, Cadillac Pasadena, Cadillac of Calabasas, and DOES 1 through 25 (collectively, "Defendants"), asserting causes of action for: (1) Violation of Song-Bevery Act - Breach of Express Warranty; (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act - Breach of Implied Warranty; (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2(b); (4) Negligent Repair; (5) Violation of the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (California Civil Code Sec. 1770 et seq.); (6) Fraudulent Inducement - Concealment; (7) Intentional Misrepresentation; and (8) Negligent Misrepresentation.