Torres vs Honda

TENTATIVE RULING(S) FOR August 21, 2026 Department S37 – Judge Winston Keh This court follows California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(b) for tentative rulings. (See San Bernardino Superior Court Local Emergency Rule 8.) Tentative rulings for each law & motion will be posted on the internet (https://www.sb-court.org) by 3:00 p.m. on the court day immediately before the hearing.

You may appear in person at the hearing although remote appearance by CourtCall is preferred. (See www.sb-court.org/general-information/remote-access).

If you do not have Internet access or if you experience difficulty with the posted tentative ruling, you may obtain the tentative ruling by calling the department (S-37) at (909) 708-8707 or the Administrative Assistant (909) 708-8756, who prepared the ruling.

If you (or both parties) wish to submit on the Tentative, notify the other party and call the department by 4:00 pm the day before and your appearance may be excused unless the Court orders you to appear.

You must appear at the hearing if you are so directed by the court in the tentative ruling. Be prepared to address those issues set forth by the court in its ruling.

UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, THE PREVAILING PARTY IS TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE

RULING.

Torres vs Honda

__________________________________________________________________________

TENTATIVE RULING(S):

On September 15, 2025, Plaintiff Torres accepted Defendant Honda’s Code of Civil Procedure

section 998 Offer (998 Offer) for $57,554.77 in exchange for returning the Subject Vehicle.

(Song Decl. at ¶10, Exh. 2.)

Plaintiff Torres now moves to recover his attorney fees. Defendant Honda opposes.

Plaintiff Torres replies.

Neither party disputes Plaintiff’s right to recover attorney fees under the Act, or under the

accepted 998 Offer.

Hourly Rates

In fixing the reasonable fees, the court must determine the reasonableness of the attorney’s

hourly rates. (Cordero-Sacks v. Housing Authority of City of Los Angeles (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th

1267, 1286.) Generally, a reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing rate in the community where

the case is litigated for similar work. (PLCM Group v. Dexter (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095

[PLCM]; MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Gorman (2006) 147 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 13.) Community

is “based on where the services are rendered, i.e., where the court is located.” (Tidrick v. FCA

US LLC (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1145, 1157.)

Here, the reasonable rate is based on the rates charged by consumer attorneys practicing in San

Bernardino County.

In this litigation, 4 attorneys and 6 paralegals at the following rates worked on the matter: (1)

Jordan Cohen: $560, (2) Jasmine Song: $435, (3) Tomas De Jesus: $395, (4) Bobby Walker:

$440, and (5) paralegals (Alexis Valdovinos, Destiny Olvera, Robert Aguilar, Elaine Astroga,

Araceli Alatorre, and Isabel Garcia): $215. (Song Decl. at ¶¶11-15.)

Defendant Honda argues these rates are unreasonable. However, it offers no counter-evidence

to support that the rates are unreasonable. That being said, the reasonable rates in San

Bernardino for consumer litigations (e.g., lemon law cases) range between $300 and $500.

Additionally, as noted by Honda, Plaintiff is seeking to apply hourly rates that currently exist, but

not the rates charged before 2026. In particular, Song attests her rate in 2024 was $425, and it

increased to $435, on January 5, 2026; Cohen’s rates are $510 (for 2023), $525 (2024), $540

(2025), and $560 (2026); and Walker’s rates are $400 (2023), $415 (2024), $430 (2025), and

$440 (2026). (Song Decl. at ¶¶11-12, 14.) This is not justified. Merely because this case

commenced in 2023 and the parties litigated the matter for 2.5 years before settling does not

support applying a 2026 rate to work done in the years prior.

Based on the above, the following are the reasonable rates:

• Jordan Cohen: $500 (2023-2026);

• Jasmine Song: $425 (2025) and $435 (2026);

• Tomas De Jesus: $395 (2023-2024);

• Bobby Walker: $440 (2026); and

• Paralegals: $200 (2023-2026).

Reasonable Time

The starting point for every fee award is calculating an attorney’s services by the time expended

on the case. (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 815.) This is

because a court must not blindly accept an attorney’s reported hours but must carefully review

the attorney’s documented hours. (Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)

The fees associated with a senior attorney reviewing another attorney’s work, preparing internal

memos, and engaging in internal conferences are not fees that should be passed onto the

defense. (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 250; Premier

Medical, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 556; Mountjoy v. Bank of America, N.A. (2016) 245

Cal.App.4th 266, 270, 278-279.)

Although attorney fees may include paralegal (or law clerk) fees [Roe v. Halbig (2018) 29

Cal.App.5th 286, 312], it does not include secretary or receptionist fees. Secretarial tasks are not

compensable. (Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei (1989) 491 U.S. 274, 288, fn. 10; Neil v.

Commissioner of Social Sec. (9th Cir. 2012) 495 Fed.Appx. 845, 847; Mountjoy v. Bank of

America, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 270.)

Plaintiff seeks to recover $29,910.50 in fees. Exhibit 10 to Song’s Declaration is the Counsel

billing summary.

Defendant raises 6 challenges to incurred time that is detailed in paragraphs 7-13 to Bell‘s

Declaration.

1. Attorney Fee & Tax Cost Motion

Initially, contrary to any contention by Honda, the fees associated with an attorney fee motion are

recoverable. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 1002 [“[W]hen

attorney fees are recoverable by statute, the reasonable attorney fees incurred in preparing the

motion are also recoverable”].)

Concerning the attorney fee motion, the billing summary indicates attorney Walker incurred 2.2

hours in preparing and finalizing the attorney fee motion on February 16, 2026. Attorney Song

attests that she incurred 1.5 hours to analyze the Opposition, 0.5 hours to analyze the billing

records and claims, and 3 hours to draft the Reply and her supplemental declaration. (Song

Suppl. Decl. at ¶7.) She anticipates 1 hour for the hearing. (Song Suppl. Decl. at ¶6.) This totals

6 hours. Previously, with the motion, Song attested to an anticipation of 0.5 hours to review the

Opposition, 4 hours to prepare the Reply, and 0.5 hours to attend the hearing. (Song Decl. at

¶24.) That totaled 5 hours.

Considering the details in the Opposition, which would require a specific response, but

considering the actual time to prepare the Reply was less than anticipated, 5 hours to review the

Opposition (1.5), prepare the Reply (3), and attend the hearing (0.5) is reasonable. Also, 2.2

hours to draft the motion is reasonable. Thus, the 2.2 hours by Walker should be recoverable,

and added to Song’s (2026) totaled billable time is 5 hours for the post-billing entry work

associated with the attorney fee motion.

Concerning the tax cost motion, the billing summary between October 8, 2025, and February 12,

2026, shows paralegal Olivera spent 0.9 hours on the matter and attorney Song spent 1 hour on

the matter. Except for two entries by Olivera for 0.1 hours to file the Cost Memorandum

(1/29/26), which is administrative/secretarial in nature, and 0.2 hours to review the Motion, which

Song also seeks, the other entries by Olivera and Song are reasonable. Thus, the Court cuts

0.3 hours from the paralegal time.

Additionally, attorney Song attests that she anticipates 0.5 hours to review the motion, 3.5 hours

to prepare the opposition, 0.5 hour to review the reply, and 0.5 hours to attend the hearing.

(Song Decl. at ¶25.) As the Opposition to the Tax Cost Motion consisted of a 7-page points and

authorities and a 20-page declaration, 3.5 hours was not necessary to prepare. Thus, the Court

adds 4 hours to Song’s (2026) hours for this post-billing work.

2. Calendaring and Administrative Tasks

Defendant Honda argues that several entries consist of merely calendaring events and

engaging in administrative tasks. It further notes some of the entries are blocked bill.

Honda is correct that even if paralegal and law clerk time is recoverable, the time for

secretarial and/or administrative tasks is not. However, several of the entries identified by

Defendant are properly paralegal tasks of preparing, conforming, and finalizing legal pleadings,

and reviewing legal pleadings. Yet the following entries for merely calendaring events, filing

pleadings with the Court, updating information, and/or sending reminders are not proper

recoverable fees, and therefore should be cut:

12/8/23 – Aguilar (filing) [0.1]

12/13/23 – Aguilar (calendaring) [0.1, partial]

12/13/23 – Aguilar (filing) [0.1]

12/14/23 – Astorga (calendaring) [0.2]

12/26/23 - Astorga (filing) [0.2]

1/25/24 – Astorga (filing) [0.1]

2/2/24 – Astorga (filing) [0.1]

2/2/24 - Astorga (confirming) [0.1]

2/2/24 – Astorga (calendaring) [0.1]

2/12/24 – Astorga (filing) [0.1]

2/12/24 – Astorga (calendaring) [0.1]

10/8/24 – Valdovinos (filing) [0.2]

10/30/24 – Valdovinos (calendaring) [0.1, partial]

7/8/25 – Song (verifying call) [0.1]

9/4/25 – Alatorre (confirming call) [0.1]

9/8/25 – Alatorre (confirming call) [0.1]

11/10/25 – Alatorre (reminder call) [0.1]

11/14/25 – Olvera (filing) [0.1]

11/26/25 – Olvera (review of docket) [0.1]

12/2/25 – Olvera (review of docket) [0.1]

The above amounts to cutting 2.2 hours from the paralegal’s time, and 0.1 hours from attorney

Song’s (2025) time.

3. Discovery

Defendant Honda argues that the time to prepare discovery was excessive, especially

when it was never served. It asks that the Court cut all 5.3 hours listed. Also, the time to review

and respond to propounded discovery is excessive when it propounds the same type of

discovery in lemon law cases. It asks that of the 7.7 hours to prepare responses, the Court cuts

4 hours.

Defendant Honda also indicates duplicate entries by De Jesus and Song. However,

attorney Song adequately explains that De Jesus started the discovery responses, but after he

left, she completed them. Thus, it cannot be said that there is duplication of work.

In reviewing the time entries identified by Honda, 5.3 hours to prepare 4 sets of discovery that

require case-specific inquiries is not overstated. However, preparing discovery that is never

served should not be passed onto Defendant. Yet not all of the 5.3 hours related to just

preparing discovery. De Jesus’ time on 11/8/23 (1.4 hours) and Song’s time on 7/18/25 (0.6

hours) included reviewing documents associated with the Subject Vehicle. Of these two entries,

De Jesus’ 1.4 hours should be cut in half, and Song’s time should be allowed. Therefore, of the

5.3 hours, the Court only cuts 4 hours, i.e., 0.7 hours from De Jesus and 3.3 hours from Song

(2025).

Concerning the time to review and respond to Honda’s propounded discovery, nothing in

the identified entries is problematic. Although Honda may serve similar discovery in its defense

in lemon law cases, a plaintiff’s response must be particular to that plaintiff. In other words,

Plaintiff Torres could not provide a rote response because he needs to provide specifics on his

experience and damages. Therefore, the Court denies cutting any of the 7.7 hours by Counsel

associated with responding to discovery.

4. Opposing Arbitration Motion

Plaintiff billed between January 17, 2024, and January 25, 2024, 8 hours to prepare the

Opposition to Defendant Honda’s Motion to Compel Arbitration. Defendant argues that 8 hours is

overstated when Plaintiff’s Counsel is well-versed in the Act and the applicable case law.

In general, the time entries are not problematic. However, attorney Cohen includes 2.6

hours to analyze the authorities criticizing Felisida v. FCA, FAA preemption, and equitable

estoppel doctrine, and 4.3 hours to draft the Opposition. These entries seem overstated in light

of Honda was preparing almost identical Motions to Compel Arbitration under an arbitration

provision with the Retail Installment Sales Contract. The Court therefore cuts 1.5 hours from

Cohen’s time associated with opposing the Arbitration Motion.

5. Block Billing

Defendant takes issue with 5 hours that are part of block billing. Yet it does not explain

what entries are improper. That being said, Song’s entries on 6/12/25 (x2), 7/29/25, and 7/31/25

include descriptions of secretarial tasks (calendaring), internal office matters (updating repair

order summary, communicating with supervising attorney). Of the 1.6 hours associated with

these entries, the Court cuts 0.7 hours from Song (2025).

6. Vehicle Surrender

Finally, Honda argues that the entries between 9/16/25 and 11/24/25 for 5 hours to

schedule the vehicle surrender are overstated. It asks that only 2.5 hours be recoverable. A

review of the record shows paralegals coordinating the matter with Torres. Nothing in the entries

supports that the time was not properly incurred. Therefore, the Court denies striking any of the

vehicle surrender entries.

Recap. In reviewing the post-billing request, Plaintiff’s Counsel is entitled to 9 additional

hours for post-billing work on the tax cost motion and attorney fee motion at attorney Song’s

2026 rate. However, time sought for secretarial/administrative work, duplicative work, and

excessive discovery and arbitration matters is reduced: attorney Cohen (1.5 hours), attorney De

Jesus (0.7 hours), attorney Song (2025) (4.1 hours), and paralegals (2.5 hours).

After the above hourly rate reductions and reduction of unreasonable hours, the lodestar fee

award is $24,911.50:

Reasonable Hours Hours Hours Total

Rates Sought Cut Compensable

Jordan Cohen $500.00 12.1 1.5 10.6 $5,300.00

Tomas De Jesus $395.00 1.5 0.7 0.8 $316.00

Jasmine Song (2025) $425.00 29.6 4.1 25.5 $10.837.50

Jasmine Song (2026) $435.00 10.0 0.0 10.0 $4,350.00

Bobby Walker $440.00 2.2 0.0 2.2 $968.00

Paralegals $200.00 18.2 2.5 15.7 $3,140.00

TOTAL $24,911.50

RULING

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court AWARDS Plaintiff Torres $24,911.50 in

reasonable attorney fees.