Tinoco v. Lyft

TENTATIVE RULING(S) FOR August 14, 2026 Department S37 – Judge Winston Keh This court follows California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(b) for tentative rulings. (See San Bernardino Superior Court Local Emergency Rule 8.) Tentative rulings for each law & motion will be posted on the internet (https://www.sb-court.org) by 3:00 p.m. on the court day immediately before the hearing.

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UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, THE PREVAILING PARTY IS TO GIVE NOTICE OF THE

RULING.

Tinoco v. Lyft

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TENTATIVE RULING(S):

Before the Court is Defendant Lyft’s motion to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate her claims and stay

the proceedings as to Lyft. Plaintiff opposes. Lyft replies.

Legal Standard

California law favors enforcement of valid arbitration agreements, and doubts are resolved

against the party opposing arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act likewise authorizes

enforcement of arbitration clauses, absent legal or equitable grounds for revocation of the

contract. When a petition to compel arbitration is filed with prima facie evidence of a written

arbitration agreement, the Court must first determine whether an agreement exists. The moving

party bears the burden of proving the existence of the arbitration agreement by a preponderance

of the evidence. If the opposing party raises a defense to enforcement, that party bears the

burden of producing evidence establishing the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. A

stay may be entered pending arbitration.

Analysis

1. Does the FAA Apply?

Yes. The parties’ arbitration agreement expressly provides it is governed by the Federal

Arbitration Act, and Plaintiff does not argue otherwise. Accordingly, the FAA applies.

2. Was a Contract to Arbitrate Formed?

Yes. Under California contract principles, the Court first determines whether the parties entered

into a binding agreement to arbitrate, and the party seeking arbitration bears the burden of

proving the arbitration agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. Lyft has submitted a

copy of the Lyft Terms of Service containing the arbitration provision in effect at the time of the

accident. Lyft also submits evidence that Plaintiff electronically agreed to the Terms of Service.

Once Lyft produced the agreement, Plaintiff was required to come forward with evidence

creating a factual dispute as to the agreement’s existence or authenticity (for example, by

disputing authenticity or offer/acceptance in a meaningful evidentiary way).

Plaintiff does not provide evidence disputing that she agreed to the Terms. Instead, Plaintiff

argues Lyft failed to prove Plaintiff received reasonably conspicuous notice of the arbitration

clause. On this record, Plaintiff has not met her evidentiary burden to create a factual dispute

material to contract formation or the existence of the arbitration agreement. Lyft has therefore

shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a contract was formed.

3. Who Decides Arbitrability and Enforceability?

Generally, courts decide enforceability and arbitrability issues, but the statutes and controlling

authority recognize that the parties may agree who decides arbitrability. Where there is a clear

and unmistakable delegation, challenges directed to the arbitration agreement as a whole are for

the arbitrator; however, a party may challenge the delegation clause itself using generally

applicable contract defenses, but the challenge must be specific to the delegation provision.

Here, the arbitration agreement includes a delegation clause providing that disputes concerning

arbitrability—including scope, applicability, enforceability, revocability, or validity of the arbitration

agreement—shall be decided by the arbitrator. That is a clear delegation of

arbitrability/enforceability questions to the arbitrator.

Plaintiff’s opposition does not establish a specific contract defense to the delegation clause.

Plaintiff’s general assertion that delegation clauses are inherently unconscionable because

arbitrators may decide their own authority is unpersuasive and does not address the delegation

clause as required by the governing standard. Plaintiff has not shown that the delegation

provision in this agreement is specifically unconscionable or otherwise invalid under a defense

targeted at the delegation clause.

Accordingly, the Court will enforce the delegation clause, and the arbitrator will decide the

remaining issues raised by Plaintiff—including any unconscionability challenges to the arbitration

provision, public policy arguments, and Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2 issues.

Conclusion/Order

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant Lyft’s motion to compel arbitration in

its entirety. The Court further STAYS the proceedings against Lyft pending completion of

arbitration. This ruling does not apply to Defendants Melvin Espinoza Torrez and Richard Paul

Guinan, Jr. as they do not appear to be parties to the arbitration agreement.