Malki vs. Karanouh

Failure to appear will result in court dismissal of entire action.

Plaintiffs’ counsel of record SHALL file and serve a status report no later than 10 court days before the hearing. Failure to do so will result in the imposition of up to $1,500.00 against Plaintiffs’ counsel of record, unless good cause is shown otherwise. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 177.5.)

Further, the court exercises its discretion and ORDERS Attorney HARRY SADEGHI to pay $500.00, payable to the Clerk of the Court, within 30 days.

Section 473(c)(1)(A) of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the court “[w]henever the court grants relief from a ... dismissal based on any of the provisions of this section, the court may ... “[i]mpose a penalty of no greater than one thousand dollars ($1,000) upon an offending attorney or party” or “[g]rant other relief as appropriate.”

Plaintiffs to give notice.

6 Malki vs. Karanouh Motion for Stay of Enforcement of Attorney-Fee Award Pending Appeal

The court DENIES Plaintiff WAJIH MALKI’S Motion for Stay of Enforcement of Attorney-Fee Order.

Background: On 3/20/26, this court GRANTED Defendant ABDULMAJID KARANOUGH’s Anti-SLAPP motion directed at Plaintiff’s entire Complaint. On 4/6/26, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. And on 6/26/26, this court awarded Defendant a total of $12,112.50 after prevailing on his anti- SLAPP motion.

Plaintiff now argues that enforcement of this court’s order granting attorneys’ fees and costs following Defendant’s Anti-SLAPP ruling should be stayed pending the appeal of the Anti-SLAPP ruling.

Both parties cite to Dowling v. Zimmerman (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1400. In Dowling, the court held: “The issue

we must decide is whether a prevailing SLAPP defendant’s enforcement of a judgment awarding reasonable attorney fees and costs under subdivision (c) of section 425.16 is automatically stayed by the SLAPP plaintiff’s perfecting of an appeal from that judgment. We conclude that enforcement of such judgment is not stayed absent the filing of an appropriate appeal bond or other undertaking.” (Id. at 1427.)

Dowling relied on Section 917.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides: “(a) Unless an undertaking is given, the perfecting of an appeal shall not stay enforcement of the judgment or order in the trial court if the judgment or order is for any of the following: (1) Money or the payment of money, whether consisting of a special fund or not, and whether payable by the appellant or another party to the action. ...” (Code Civ. Proc., § 917.1(a)(1)).

In Dowling, the court analyzed whether the portion of the judgment awarding attorney fees and costs pursuant to Section 425.16(c) is a judgment for “money or the payment of money” within the meaning of the money judgment exception codified in Section 917.1(a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Dowling, 85 Cal.App.4th at 1429.) The court held, “In our view, such a judgment entered after the granting of a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute should be treated as a judgment for ‘money or the payment of money’ within the meaning of the money judgment exception codified in section 917.1(a)(1) such that a bond or undertaking is required to stay enforcement of the judgment pending the disposition of a SLAPP plaintiff's appeal.” (Id. at 1432).

Here, Plaintiff has not posted a bond or undertaking and therefore the conditions for a stay have not been met.

The court does not find that any of Plaintiff’s other arguments are persuasive. There is no equitable basis under which the court finds good cause to stay the enforcement of the award under the court’s inherent powers. Plaintiff has other mechanisms of preserving the status quo by posting a bond or undertaking on appeal but has not done so.

Cross-border considerations or federal compliance are not relevant to the court’s decision on this matter. As such, Plaintiff’s request for a sixty-day stay to permit completion of an independent United States sanctions and regulatory compliance review is denied.

In sum, the motion is DENIED in its entirety.

Defendant to give notice.

7 Oxygen Funding, Motion for Leave to Amend Inc. vs. Colombia Hemp No tentative. International, LLC

8 Tekyz, Inc. vs. Gigo Motion for Leave to Amend Clean Technology Inc. The court DENIES Defendant/Cross-Complainant GIGO CLEAN TECHNOLOGY INC. and DEFENDANT/PROPOSED CROSS-COMPLAINANT BITA SAFARI’s (collectively, “Moving Parties”) motion for leave to file a First Amended Cross- Complaint.

Moving Parties now seek to add seven new causes of action and add a new cross-complainant (Bita Safari), because current counsel determined at some point that a new pleading was needed after conducting a thorough review of the file.

Denial of leave to amend is appropriate where inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party is shown. This may happen where a proposed amendment opens up an entirely new field of inquiry without any satisfactory explanation as to why the major change in point of attack had not been made long before trial. (Estate of Murphy v. Gulf Ins. Co. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 304, 311.)

Such appears to be the case here. The amendments would likely require substantially new discovery to defend against the proposed new additional causes of action and party,

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