In the Matter of: The Five A Family Trust

25PR002929: IN THE MATTER OF: THE FIVE A FAMILY TRUST 08/20/2026 General Probate Rehearing on the Demurrer in Department 129

Tentative Ruling

RESPONDENT RONALD H. MELCHIN’S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO PETITION; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF JOHN T. LUPTON

Filed: 2/4/2026

Moving Party: Respondent Ronald Melchin Attorney: John Lupton, (213) 493-6400

RESPONDING PARTY: Petitioners George Bauslaugh and Lacy Burdick Attorney: Dorian Jackson, (310) 359-9201

NOTICE: Pursuant to Local Rule 1.06 (A), the court will make a tentative ruling on the merits of this matter by 2:00 p.m., the court day before the hearing. The complete text of the tentative ruling may be downloaded off the court’s website. If the party does not have online access, they may call the dedicated phone number for the Probate Department at (916) 875-2529 between the hours of 2:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing and receive the tentative ruling. If you do not call the court and the opposing party by 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing, no hearing will be held.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure § 367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings. The Department 129 Zoom Link is https://saccourt-cagov.zoomgov.com/my/sscdept129 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 161 3352 9231. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government Code § 68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.pdf.

25PR002929: IN THE MATTER OF: THE FIVE A FAMILY TRUST 08/20/2026 General Probate Rehearing on the Demurrer in Department 129

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING Respondent Ronald Melchin’s demurrer to Petitioners George Bauslaugh and Lacy Burdick’s (“Petitioners”) petition is sustained in part with leave to amend as follows.

Respondent is the former counsel of Decedent Elizabeth Anderson (“Decedent”). Decedent maintained a trust, The Elizabeth E. Anderson Family Trust, and with her deceased spouse Keith Anderson, created the Five A Family Trust on February 26, 1976 and the Anderson Family Trust on August 29, 1994.

Keith Anderson died on February 28, 2003. (Petition, ¶ 21.) Upon her spouse’s passing, Decedent allegedly executed various documents changing the ownership and interests in her spouse’s limited partnership and real property. (See, e.g., Petition, ¶¶ 30-33, 42-44.) Petitioners also assert improper conduct by Richard Anderson, Keith Anderson’s brother. (See, e.g., Petition, ¶¶ 39-40, 44, 46-47.)

Petitioners allege to be beneficiaries of the Five A Family Trust. (Petition, ¶ 1.) The petition alleges Decedent’s failure to report various assets and sales to the Internal Revenue Service and other improper conduct. (See, e.g., Petition, ¶¶ 73, 97.) Respondent is listed in the complaint for his alleged role in drafting certain documents executed by Decedent. (See, e.g., Petition, ¶¶ 65, 68, 73.) Petitioners assert the first three causes of action against Respondent.

Respondent demurs to the petition in its entirety on the grounds that it is barred by Civil Code, section 1714.10 and thus fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 430.10(e). Respondent also demurs to the first, second, and third causes of action individually on grounds that each fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 430.10(e).

Petitioners oppose on the ground that the demurrer is untimely. Petitioners erroneously reference a July 22, 2025 hearing date, while this matter was not initiated until a petition for breach of trust and recovery of trust property was filed on August 27, 2025. Nonetheless, Probate Code section 1043 requires that an “interested person may appear and make a response or objection in writing at or before the hearing.” Goebner v. Superior Court, (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1105, interprets

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25PR002929: IN THE MATTER OF: THE FIVE A FAMILY TRUST 08/20/2026 General Probate Rehearing on the Demurrer in Department 129

the term “objection” in Probate Code section 1043 to include demurrers. (Goebner v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1111.) Petitioners correctly point out the demurrer must be filed at or before the hearing. The matter was originally set for hearing on October 14, 2025, and was continued twice to February 4, 2026. At the October 14, 2025, hearing, the matter could not be heard because of the non-stipulation to Commissioner Langle. On December 2, 2025, the matter was continued pending mediation – again, no hearing on the substance of the Petition. This demurrer was served on February 3, 2026, and filed on February 4, 2026, the date of the next hearing. Thus, the demurrer is timely.

A demurrer may be sustained if “the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10(e).) The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.) A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.)

The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. §452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v.

Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . . we are not concerned with plaintiff’s possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 732-733.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action – not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

Respondent first demurs to the petition in its entirety on the ground that Civil Code section 1714.10 bars the petition absent the required prefiling court order. “Civil Code section 1714.10, subdivision (a), establishes a prefiling requirement for a ‘cause of action against an attorney for a civil conspiracy with his or her client arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute, and which is based upon the attorney’s representation of the client.’” (Wong v. Dong (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 109, 117, citing Cortese v. Sherwood, (2018) 26 Cal. App. 5th 445, 453 [emphasis added].) Petitioners oppose on the ground that the purported civil conspiracy actions

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25PR002929: IN THE MATTER OF: THE FIVE A FAMILY TRUST 08/20/2026 General Probate Rehearing on the Demurrer in Department 129

were conducted as transactional activities, which is distinct from contesting or compromising a claim or dispute. (Opposition, 6:15-23.)

While the claim or cause of action for civil conspiracy need not be explicitly labeled “conspiracy,” the plain wording of Civil Code section 1714.10(a) “requires court permission to file an attorney-client conspiracy claim ‘arising from any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute.’” (Cortese v. Sherwood (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 445, 450; Stueve v. Berger Kahn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 327, 331.) The alleged conspiratorial conduct in Stueve v. Berger Kahn, “the siphoning off of assets through fraudulent estate planning, including the misappropriation of the Stueves’ assets through the diversion of those assets to entities created and controlled by the defendants,” is analogous to the allegations in this present matter. (Id.)

In 2018, Cortese explained that the statute applies to “situations in which the alleged conspiracy arose from the attorney’s representation of his or her client in a previous or current legal dispute or litigation with the plaintiff.” (Cortese, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 457.) The petition alleges Respondent’s role in drafting and preparing various written instruments, which were not related to any attempt to contest or compromise a claim or dispute. Further, under Cortese, there was no “previous or current legal dispute or litigation with the plaintiff.” Accepting the allegations in the petition as true, the petition states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and the pre-filing requirements of section 1714.10(a) do not apply. (Serrano v.

Priest, supra, 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) The demurrer to the entire petition on this basis is OVERRULED.

The first cause of action for tortious trustee is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. Petitioners, relying on King v. Johnston (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1488, argue that Keith and Elizabeth Anderson were ‘tortious trustees’ by executing transfers and engaging in other conduct while Richard Anderson was trustee, thus making the transfers “pursuant to [Richard’s] authority.” (MPA, 10:24-11:10.) King v. Johnston defines a ‘trustee de son tort,’ or tortious trustee, as a “[p]erson who is treated as a trustee because of his wrongdoing with respect to property entrusted to him or over which he exercised authority which he lacked.” (King v.

Johnston (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1505.) Petitioners’ cause of action states facts regarding the “ANDERSONS’” conduct, and only distinguishes which Andersons are being referenced when alleging Keith Anderson appointed Richard Anderson as successor trustee of the Five A Family Trust. (Petition, ¶ 71.) It is unclear whether the tortious trustee allegations are directed to Keith Anderson, Elizabeth Anderson, Richard Anderson, or another Anderson mentioned in the preceding paragraphs incorporated into the cause of action.

Thus, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend to clarify which individuals, and which tortious conduct, is alleged under this cause of action.

The demurrer to the second cause of action, breach of fiduciary duty, is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. Petitionershave “the burden of proving (1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) breach of that relationship, and (3) damage proximately caused by the breach.” (Starr v. Ashbrook (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 999, 1019, fn. 7.) Petitioners allege Respondent breached various duties by aiding a trustee in the breach of their fiduciary duty. (Petition, ¶ 81.) Petitioners

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25PR002929: IN THE MATTER OF: THE FIVE A FAMILY TRUST 08/20/2026 General Probate Rehearing on the Demurrer in Department 129

also allege damages of at least $4 million. (Petition, ¶ 82.) However, Respondent maintains that he was counsel for Keith and Elizabeth Anderson only, and did not aid Richard Anderson in any unauthorized conduct. (MPA, 12:8-22.) Petitioners do not articulate which trustee Respondent allegedly aided in their breach of duty, referencing only the “ANDERSONS.” Because Richard Anderson, Keith Anderson, and Decedent Elizabeth Anderson could all be the parties referenced as “ANDERSONS,” the petition is unclear as to whether the conduct at issue pertains to Richard’s conduct as trustee, Elizabeth’s conduct as trustee, or both.

Petitioners have demonstrated a fiduciary relationship between Respondent and Keith and Elizabeth Anderson, but not Richard Anderson. It is unclear whether Petitioners are asserting a fiduciary relationship between Richard Anderson and Respondent, or simply Keith and Elizabeth Anderson. The demurrer to the second cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.

The third cause of action seeking an accounting is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. Petitioners reference only Probate Code sections 16062 and 16063. (Petition, ¶ 87.) These sections relate to a trustee’s duty to account, not a trustee’s counsel’s duty to account. In opposition, Petitioners appear to concede this point by raising an equitable tracing claim and pointing to a beneficiary’s authority to trace assets pursuant to Probate Code section 16420(a)(9). Neither of these points is raised in the petition. Thus, Petitioners did not allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action to compel a trustee’s counsel to account to the beneficiaries. The demurrer to the third cause of action is sustained.

In sum, the demurrer is sustained in part, as to the first, second, and third causes of action, with leave to amend. Petitioners may file and serve an amended petition no later than September 16, 2026. Respondent shall file and serve a response within 30 days thereafter, 35 days if the petition is served by mail.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)