Christina Arreseigor; Juan Garcia Velazquez v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, et al.

meaningfully participate in discovery without waiving her privilege. Defendant has no absolute right not to be forced to choose between testifying in a civil matter and asserting her Fifth Amendment privilege. ¿ (See id., 79 Cal.App.4 th at 885.) ¿ Further, Courts have devised procedures designed to accommodate the specific circumstances of each case, including allowing civil defendants to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, conferring an immunity on the party invoking the privilege, or precluding a litigant from waiving the privilege and testifying at trial to matters upon which the privilege has been asserted. (See Fuller, 87 Cal.App.4th at 308.)

Should Defendant wish to litigate whether certain, specific discovery requests improperly implicate her right against self-incrimination, the Court stands ready to address the issue as needed. Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for a Stay, or Alternatively, for a Stay of Discovery. VI. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for a Stay, or Alternatively, for a Stay of Discovery. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: August 21, 2026 Hon. Michael R. Amerian Judge, Superior Court | [1] All statutory references are to California codes unless stated otherwise. [2] Under the UVTA, a transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor either: (1) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or (2) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that the debtor would incur debts beyond the debtor's ability to pay as they became due. (See Civ.

Code Sec. 3439.04(a)(2).)

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHWEST DISTRICT CHRISTINA ARRESEIGOR; JUAN GARCIA VELAZQUEZ, Plaintiff, vs.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; GLORIA JEFFERSON; CITY OF LOS ANGELES; COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; DOES 1 TO 25, Defendants. |))))))))))))))))))) | CASE NO.: 24VECV03990 ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR DISABLED PERSON'S COMPROMISE | I. BACKGROUND Plaintiffs Christina Arreseigor ("Arreseigor") and Juan Garcia Velazquez ("Velazquez") (jointly, "Plaintiffs") filed this personal injury action against Defendants Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority ("LACMTA"), Gloria Jefferson ("Jefferson"), City of Los Angeles ("City"), County of Los Angeles ("County"), and State of California ("State").

Plaintiffs allege Jefferson was the bus driver of the Orange Bus Line that collided with Arreseigor, a pedestrian crossing the street. Plaintiffs allege Defendants LACMTA, City, County, and State own or control the Orange Line Busway. Velazquez, as guardian ad litem for Arreseigor, filed the instant Petition for Disabled Person's Compromise.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On August 21, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint alleging (1) Motor Vehicle tort, (2) Negligence, (3) Premises Liability, and (4) Loss of Consortium. On January 8, 2025, LACMTA filed an Answer. On March 6, 2025, the Court ordered Velazquez appointed guardian ad litem of Arreseigor. On March 11, 2025, Plaintiffs dismissed Velazquez from the Complaint. On December 4, 2025, Arreseigor dismissed City, County, and State. On January 5, 2026, Arreseigor filed a Notice of Settlement.

On July 30, 2026, Velazquez filed the instant Petition on behalf of Arreseigor. As of August 18, 2026, no opposition has been filed. III. LEGAL STANDARD An enforceable settlement of a minor's or disabled person's claim requires court approval. (See Prob. Code Sec.Sec. 2504, 3500, 3600 et seq.; Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 372.) [1] Probate Code Sec. 3600, et seq., governs how the settlement proceeds are to be paid. Pursuant to Probate Code Sec. 3601, the order shall approve payment of reasonable expenses from the settlement as follows: ¿ The court making the order or giving the judgment referred to in Section 3600, as a part thereof, shall make a further order authorizing and directing that such reasonable expenses (medical or otherwise and including reimbursement to a parent, guardian, or conservator), costs, and attorney's fees, as the court shall approve and allow therein, shall be paid from the money or other property to be paid or delivered for the benefit of the minor or person with a disability. (See Prob.

Code, Sec. 3601(a).) ¿ In cases pursuant to Probate Code Sec. 3601, "unless the court has approved the fee agreement in advance, the court must use a reasonable fee standard when approving and allowing the amount of attorney's fees payable from money or property paid or to be paid for the benefit of a minor or a person with a disability." (See Rules of Court, rule 7.955(a)(1).) In doing so, "[t]he court must give consideration to the terms of any representation agreement made between the attorney and the representative of the minor or person with a

disability and must evaluate the agreement based on the facts and circumstances existing at the time the agreement was made, except where the attorney and the representative of the minor or person with a disability contemplated that the attorney's fee would be affected by later events." (See id., rule 7.955(a)(2).) There are several nonexclusive factors a court may consider in determining a reasonable attorney's fee. (See id., rule 7.955(b).) Rule 7.955(c) requires a petition requesting court approval and allowance of an attorney's fee under 7.955(a) must include a declaration from the attorney that addresses the factors listed in 7.955(b) that are applicable to the matter before the Court. "In any case in which the court orders that funds to be received by a minor or a person with a disability must be deposited in a financial institution and not disbursed without further order of the court, the order must include a provision that a certified or filed endorsed copy of the order must be delivered to a manager at the financial institution where the funds are to be deposited, and that a receipt from the financial institution must be promptly filed with the court, acknowledging receipt of both the funds deposited and the order for deposit of funds." (See id., rule 7.953(a).) /// /// IV.

ANALYSIS Velazquez ("Petitioner"), as guardian ad litem for Arreseigor ("Claimant"), filed the instant Petition for Disabled Person's Compromise. Claimant is an adult with a disability. Petitioner has agreed to settle Claimant's claims for $200,000. (See Pet., P. 10, Attach. 10c.) Claimant sustained injuries, which she has not fully recovered from. She remains unresponsive in a coma on life support since the date of the subject incident. (See id., P.P. 6, 8(a), Attach. 8c.) If approved, $59,763.83 will be used for medical expenses (see id., P.P. 12b(1), 12b(4), Attach. 12b(4)(c)), $70,000.00 will be used for attorney's fees (see id., P. 13a), and $5,547.36 will be used for costs. (See id., P. 13b.)

This would leave a balance of $64,688.81 for Claimant to be deposited in an insured account at Bank of America Financial Center, 333 S. Hope Street, Suite 100 Los Angeles, CA 90071, subject to withdrawal only on authorization of the Court. (See id., P.P. 16, 18(b)(2), Attach. 18(b)(2)).) Claimant's counsel, Christopher K. Dickson, requests attorney fees of $70,000. This comprises 35% of the settlement amount. (See Attach. 13(a), 17(a).) Counsel estimates his firm spent over 200 hours on this case including conducting discovery and reviewing a high volume of medical records, developing Claimant's optimal theories on liability, and participating in mediation. (See id.)

The Petition appears to set forth information that bears upon the reasonableness of the compromise pursuant to Rules

of Court, rule 7.950. The Court finds the requested attorney's fees are reasonable. This case settled a little over one year after it commenced and involved about 200 hours of attorney time, which the Court finds to be a reasonable amount of time given the totality of the circumstances. The Court finds the 35% fee is thus proportionate to the value of the services performed. (See Rules of Court, rule 7.955(b).) Given the medical status of the Claimant, the Court will only require attendance at the hearing by the Petitioner to grant the petition. (See Rules of Court, rule 7.952(a).)

Additionally, Petitioner filed a proposed order on Form MC-351 and Order to Deposit Money into Blocked Account on Form MC-355 for Claimant, both of which the Court will grant upon granting of the instant Petition. Thus, the Court GRANTS Petitioner's Petition for Disabled Person's Compromise. V. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Petitioner's Petition for Disabled Person's Compromise. The Court will sign the proposed order on Form MC-351 and Form MC-355 filed with this Petition.

The Court sets an Order to Show Cause Re: Proof of deposit/purchase of annuity for September 21, 2026. (See Rules of Court, Rule 7.953(a).) If an acknowledgement of receipt by the financial institution is filed before that date, no appearance will be required. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: August 21, 2026 Hon. Michael R. Amerian Judge, Superior Court | [1] All statutory references are to California codes unless stated otherwise. | Home -->)" -->