West Coast Add It Up Ad Agency dba, Lex Miller v. Alvin Kusumoto, et al.

(Stanley Mosk Courthouse: Dept. 617) August 21, 2026 DEPARTMENT 617 LAW AND MOTION RULINGS

Date: 8-21-26 Case #: 24STCV17909 Trial Date: 7-26-27 RELIEVED AS COUNSEL MOVING ATTORNEY: Douglas H. Hoang RESPONDING PARTY: Unopposed/Plaintiff, Christopher Hughes RELIEF REQUESTED Motion to be Relieved as Counsel of Record for Plaintiff SUMMARY OF ACTION On July 18, 2024, Plaintiff Christopher Hughes filed a 14 cause of action employment and wage and hour complaint against Defendant Jack Davenport Family Kitchen Inc.

RULING: Granted. Counsel for Plaintiff moves to be relieved as counsel of record due to a breakdown of the attorney-client relationship. Counsel represents that Plaintiff has not responded to his and his office's attempts to contact him. The motion complies with the form requirements and moving counsel's motion is granted. Counsel to submit a revised proposed order reflecting the correct hearing date, department, judicial officer, trial date, and next scheduled hearing. The order is effective upon moving counsel's filing of proof of service of the signed order on Plaintiff. Moving counsel to give notice.

Case Number: 25STCV07096 Hearing Date: August 21, 2026 Dept: 617 Dept. 617 Date: 8-21-26 Case #: 25STCV07096 / Related Case #: 22STCV06315 Trial Date: None Set DEMURRER MOVING PARTY: Defendants, Alvin Kusumoto, Cris B. Liban, Evan Rosenberg, Stephanie Wiggins, and Sayuj Panicker RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, West Coast Add It Up Ad Agency dba, Lex Miller RELIEF REQUESTED Demurrer to Complaint SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiff West Coast Add It Up Ad Agency dba, Lex Miller filed the instant breach of contract action against Defendants Alvin Kusumoto, Cris B.

Liban, Evan Rosenberg, Stephanie Wiggins, and Sayuj Panicker for alleged unauthorized use of the "Tap App" for the benefit of Los Angeles County. Plaintiff alleges Defendants are employees of the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (Metro). Plaintiff asserts claims for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Misappropriation of Ideas - Implied-in-Fact Contract; (3) Claim and Delivery; (4) Conversion; (5) Unfair Business Practices; (6) Violation of Civil Code section 1708; (7) Fraud; (8) Intentional Misrepresentation; (9) Promissory Estoppel; (10) Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (11) Negligent Misrepresentation; and (12) Common Count.

RULING: Sustained. Request for Judicial Notice: Granted in part. The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of the complaints filed in the related case. (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882.) Judicial notice is also taken of the existence of the Court's Judgment and Order of Dismissal in the related case and the truth of the results reached therein. (Id. at pp. 885-86.)

Plaintiff's request for judicial notice is denied because he seeks to impose a duty on Defendants rather than seeking judicial notice of law or indisputable fact. (See Evid. Code, Sec. 452.) Defendants demur to Plaintiff's complaint, arguing that Plaintiff's claims are barred by res judicata, the statute of limitations, and the Government Claims Act. They further contend that the complaint is uncertain and that Plaintiff does not state a cognizable claim under Civil Code section 1708. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer, denying his claims are barred and maintaining the sufficiency of the allegations in support of his claims.

Defendants' demurrer is sustained with leave to amend, except as to the demurrer to the Civil Code section 1708 claim which is sustained without leave to amend. A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading "by raising questions of law." (Postley v.

Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) "In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 452.) The court "treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . . ." (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) "If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer." (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)

Plaintiff's first through fifth and seventh through twelfth causes of action are time-barred. The longest statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiff's claims are those for breach of written contract and unfair business practices. (Civ. Code, Sec. 337, subd. (a); Bus. & Prof. Code, Sec. 17208.) Plaintiff's claims do not fall within the limitations period because he alleges breach of contract and lack of payment in 2014 but did not file the instant action until March 12, 2025. [Compl. P. 14.]

Plaintiff's reliance on the discovery rule is unavailing. Plaintiff claims that "[i]t was not until May 25, 2022, that Plaintiff became aware that Defendants had intentionally misrepresented the intentions to compensate the Plaintiff as independent contract on the vendor portal on the METRO website." [Id. P. 48.] But at the same time, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants represented to him that the "Metro Vendor Portal was suitable to secure payment prior to the June 1, 2014, on the launch of the app." [Id.

P. 55.] Absent facts showing why Plaintiff could not have discovered the breach earlier with reasonable diligence (e.g., by checking the vendor portal), his allegations are insufficient to invoke application of the discovery rule. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 808.) Given this is Plaintiff's original complaint and the liberal policy permitting amendment, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend to cure this defect.

Plaintiff also fails to state his Civil Code section 1708 claim. Plaintiff seeks money damages for this claim, but this provision does not authorize a cause of action for damages. (Ley v. State of Cal. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306.) Defendants' demurrer to this claim is therefore sustained without leave to amend.

Because the Court sustains the demurrer on these grounds, it does not address Defendants' res judicata and government claim arguments. Indeed, Defendants do not analyze how the claims in each case are the same or how the defendants who were not parties in the related case are nonetheless in privity with those that were. Both sides also do not sufficiently address whether Plaintiff alleges a taking of intangible property, thus making the government claim requirement inapplicable. (Gov. Code, Sec. 905.1; see Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v.

Helliker (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1167 ["The takings clauses of the United States and California Constitutions protect not only tangible property, but also intangible trade secret property rights protected by state law"].) The Court declines to make the arguments for the parties. (Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-85 ["When [a party] fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived"].)

Plaintiff is granted 30 days' leave to amend. Plaintiff may only add facts in support of the successfully challenged claims. (Harris v. Wachovia Mortgage, FSB (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023.) If Plaintiff declines or fails to file an amended complaint, Defendants may move for dismissal. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 581, subd. (f)(2).) Any new causes of action outside the scope of the order may be addressed via a motion to strike. Defendants to give notic

Case Number: 25STCV25429 Hearing Date: August 21, 2026 Dept: 617 DEMURRER MOVING PARTY: Defendant, Chubb National Insurance Company RESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff, Mahin Hakak RELIEF REQUESTED Demurrer to Complaint SUMMARY OF ACTION Plaintiff Mahin Hakak alleges that Defendant Chubb National Insurance Company (Chubb) failed to fully compensate her under her insurance policy for damages suffered after her home was flooded. She further alleges that Chubb hired Defendant D&A Endeavors, Inc. dba ServPro to make repairs but ServPro abandoned the project and caused further damage.

On October 17, 2025, Plaintiff substituted in Federal Insurance Company for Doe 1. Plaintiff asserts claims for: (1) Breach of Insurance Contract; (2) Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Negligence; (4) Negligent Undertaking; (5) Breach of Contract; (6) Conversion; (7) Financial Elder Abuse; and (8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

RULING: Sustained. Request for Judicial Notice: Granted. The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of the complaint filed in the instant action. (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 875, 882.) Defendant Chubb demurs to Plaintiff's complaint, arguing that Plaintiff fails to state a claim against it because the insurance policy attached to the complaint identifies Federal Insurance Company as the insurer. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer, contending that Chubb is properly named as a party under the doctrine of ostensible agency. Although the opposition was filed 2-court days late, the Court finds no prejudice to Chubb and therefore considers the opposition in ruling on the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1005, subd. (b).) Chubb's demurrer is nonetheless sustained with leave to amend.

A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The purpose of a demurrer is to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading "by raising questions of law." (Postley v. Harvey (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 280, 286.) "In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 452.) The court "treat[s] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law . . . ." (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 525.) In applying these standards, the court liberally construes the complaint to determine whether a cause of action has been stated. (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726, 733.) "If the complaint states a cause of action under any theory, regardless of the title under which the factual basis for relief is stated, that aspect of the complaint is good against a demurrer." (Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 38.)

Plaintiff attached her insurance policy to the complaint, which reveals on the first page that it was issued by Federal Insurance Company. [Compl. P. 9, Ex. 1.] This is given precedence over Plaintiff's contrary allegations that Chubb issued the policy. (Dodd v. Citizens Bank of Costa Mesa (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1624, 1627 ["[F]acts appearing in exhibits attached to the complaint will also be accepted as true and, if contrary to the allegations in the pleading, will be given precedence"].) The complaint therefore establishes that Federal Insurance Company, not Chubb, was Plaintiff's insurer and thus Chubb owed no duties to her.

Plaintiff cannot rely on an ostensible agent or alter ego theory to seek recovery against Chubb. The ostensible agent theory is misplaced because an agent's ostensible authority is used to recover against the principal, not a purported agent like Chubb. (Kaplan v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 741, 747.) Plaintiff's alter ego theory is unavailing because she does not allege the requisite facts to establish alter ego liability. (Tran v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1219.) She only alleges that "each Defendant, including DOES, was and is the . . . alter ego . . . of each other Defendants." [Compl. P. 8.] Still,