Al-Jamal v. Qatar Airways Group, et al.

In ruling on a demurrer, the court "assumes the truth of all well-pleaded facts, as well as those that are judicially noticeable, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law." (Van de Kamps Coalition v. Board of Trustees of Los Angeles Community College Dist. (2012) 206 Cal. App. 4th 1036, 1045.)

Defendant demurs to the Complaint on the ground that he is the plaintiff in another action pending between the same parties here and arising from the same incident. Defendant filed an action against Plaintiff on September 20, 2024, in LASC Case No. 24NNCV04464. (Demurrer, p. 4:19-23.) Defendant asserts that "the issues alleged in the Complaint merely swap those pled in the pending action." (Demurrer, p. 4:19-23.) Defendant argues that this action is thus barred because Plaintiff failed to file a cross-complaint in that earlier action. (Demurrer, p. 5:6-7.)

A demurrer lies where "[t]here is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action." (CCP, Sec. 430.10 subd. (c).) Furthermore, "if a party against whom a complaint has been filed and served fails to allege in a cross-complaint any related cause of action which (at the time of serving his answer to the complaint) he has against the plaintiff, such party may not thereafter in any other action assert against the plaintiff the related cause of action not pleaded." (CCP. Sec. 426.30.) "Thus, a party cannot by negligence or design withhold issues and litigate them in successive actions; he may not split his demands or defenses; he may not submit his case in piecemeal fashion." (Align Technology, Inc. v.

Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 959.) A compulsory cross-claim is one that "arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint." (Id. at p. 960.)

Assuming Plaintiff's motor vehicle cause of action arises from the same facts and transactions as the claims in the prior action, Plaintiff was required to assert these claims in a cross-complaint in the prior action. However, Defendant has not provided the Court with a copy of the complaint in the prior action, submitted a request for judicial notice, or described the allegations in the prior action with any particularity. Accordingly, the Court is unable to definitively determine that Plaintiff's claims here should have been asserted as a compulsory cross-claim in LASC Case No. 24NNCV04464.

Thus, the demurrer is OVERRULED, without prejudice to Defendant refiling the demurrer with a sufficient showing, such as through a request for judicial notice of the complaint in the prior action, that the claims asserted here arise from the same facts and transactions as those alleged in the previously filed action.

RULING: Defendant Zaven Galstyan's Demurrer is OVERRULED, without prejudice

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Case Number: 25NNCV08939 Hearing Date: August 21, 2026 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 1 Date: August 21, 2026 Case No: 25NNCV08939 Trial Date: Not yet set Case Name: Al-Jamal v. Qatar Airways Group, et al. MOTION TO VACATE DEFAULT [CCP Sec. 473 subd. (b)] Moving Party: Defendant, Qatar Airways Group Responding Party: Plaintiffs, Aya Al-Jamal, Abdelrahman Al-Jamal, Emaan Al-Jamal, and Omar Al-Jamal, by and through their guardian ad Litem, Mohammad Al-Jamal RELIEF REQUESTED: Vacate the default entered against Defendant Qatar Airways Group CAUSES OF ACTION: from Complaint 1) Violation of the Montreal Convention 2) Negligent Misrepresentation 3) Fraud by Omission / Fraudulent Concealment 4) Negligence 5) Breach of Written Contract

SUMMARY OF FACTS: The Complaint alleges that on July 3, 2022, Aya Al-Jamal, Abdelrahman Al-Jamal, Emaan Al-Jamal, and Omar Al-Jamal (collectively, "Plaintiffs") boarded a flight from Los Angeles to Amman, Jordan, via Doha, on Qatar Airways flights QR742 and QR404. During flight QR742, due to another passenger's medical emergency, the pilot diverted to Reykjavik, Iceland. The diversion increased the scheduled 15-hour flight to approximately 20 hours and caused Plaintiffs to miss their connecting flight.

Upon arriving in Doha, defendant Qatar Airways Group ("Defendant") told Plaintiffs that they had exceeded the maximum number of hotel vouchers, thus forcing Plaintiffs to sleep on the airport floor overnight while they waited for their rebooked connecting flight. Mohammad Al-Jamal, Plaintiffs' parent, submitted compensation claims on behalf of Plaintiffs, however Defendant has refused to provide compensation.

ANALYSIS: CCP section 473 subdivision (b) provides for both discretionary and mandatory relief from a judgment, dismissal, and/or order or other proceeding taken against a party through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (CCP Sec. 473, subd. (b) [mandatory relief more narrowly targeted to defaults, default judgments, and dismissals]; Pagnini v. Union Bank, N.A. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 298, 302.) "A motion for relief under section 473 is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and an appellate court will not interfere unless there is a clear showing of an abuse. [Citation.] The statute is remedial and should be liberally applied to carry out the policy of permitting trial on the merits, but the moving party has the burden of showing good cause. [Citations.]" (David v. Thayer (1980) 133 Cal.App.3d 892, 904-905.)

The mandatory provision of section 473, subdivision (b), states that "the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney's sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect."

Defendant brings this motion to vacate the default entered against it on March 11, 2026 on the grounds that the default was entered due to the mistake and inadvertence of Defendant's counsel. The motion is supported by counsel's declaration. Counsel states that at the time of service, the handling attorney at the time was in the process of transferring to a different department, disrupting her ordinary correspondence-review protocols. (Kahf Decl., P. 4.) Moreover, Defendant's counsel asserts that shortly after service, Defendant's working hours were reduced in accordance with legal requirements during the month of Ramadan, and that thereafter, the war with Iran started, resulting in significant operational disruption to Defendant and its legal department. (Kahf Decl., P.P. 5-6.)

Plaintiff argues that Defendant's counsel's declaration does not sufficiently establish that the default was the result of counsel's inadvertence or excusable neglect. (Opp., pp. 2-4.) This argument is unavailing. The affidavit need only attest to the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect in causing the default or default judgment--the reasons for it need not be explained. (Martin Potts & Associates, Inc. v. Corsair, LLC (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 432, 439.) Attestation that one of these reasons existed is sufficient to obtain relief unless the trial court finds that the dismissal did not occur because of these reasons. (Graham v. Beers (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1656, 1660.)

The declaration here is sufficient. The Court finds that the dismissal was the result of Defendant's counsel's mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. The motion was timely filed within six months of the entry of default. In addition, the motion is accompanied by counsel's sworn affidavit attesting to the mistake and a copy of the proposed Answer. (Mot., Attach. 1.) Thus, the motion is GRANTED.

RULING: Defendant Qatar Airways Group's Motion to Vacate Default is GRANTED. Defendant is ordered to file an answer to the Complaint within 10 days of this order. Plaintiff's Evidentiary Objections to the Declaration of Nicole Poltash: Nos. 1-3: OVERRULED

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Case Number: 26NNCV00280 Hearing Date: August 21, 2026 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 5 Date: August 21, 2026 Case No: 26NNCV00280 Trial Date: Not yet set Case Name: Mont Blanc Aviation, Ltd. v. Associated Entertainment Releasing d/b/a Associated Television International, et al. DEMURRER WITH MOTION TO STRIKE [CCP Sec. 430.10] Moving Party: Defendants, David Leon Stanton and Associated Entertainment Releasing, dba Associated Television International Responding Party: Plaintiff, Mont Blanc Aviation, Ltd. RELIEF REQUESTED: Sustain demurrer to Complaint and grant motion to strike. CAUSES OF ACTION: from First Amended Complaint 1) Breach of Contract (Agreement) 2) Breach of Contract (Note) 3) Fraud in the Inducement 4) Promissory Estoppel

SUMMARY OF FACTS: This action arises from the alleged breach of an oral agreement and promissory note related to the sale of a certain Gulfstream Aerospace G200 aircraft owned by Mont Blanc Aviation, LTD ("Plaintiff"). Defendant David Leon Stanton ("Stanton") is an officer, employee, agent, representative, owner, director, and/or shareholder of defendant Associated Entertainment Releasing, dba Associated Television International ("ATI"). The Complaint alleges that Defendants convinced Plaintiff to enter into an oral agreement, in which ATI would acquire the aircraft from Plaintiff and then Defendants would sell the aircraft. Defendants were then to distribute the proceeds, less costs, evenly between Plaintiff and a charity donation to be made on Plaintiff's behalf.

The Complaint alleges that as part of that agreement, on May 22, 2022, the parties entered into a promissory note and security agreement (the "Note") in the amount of $1,950,000.00, which was to be secured against the aircraft. Plaintiff alleges that it never recorded the Note against the aircraft because Plaintiff fully trusted Stanton based on their longstanding personal and business relationship. In March 2023, rather than sell the aircraft, ATI allegedly entered into a management agreement with Luxwing, Ltd. ("Luxwing"). Plaintiff alleges that thereafter, ATI used the aircraft for its own benefit and incurred upkeep and maintenance expenses that had nothing to do with preparing the aircraft for sale.

The Complaint alleges that in January 2024, ATI took out a loan secured by the aircraft in the amount of approximately $4,000,000.00 and kept the proceeds from the loan for its own benefit. Ultimately, Plaintiff alleges that ATI sold the aircraft in May 2024 for $5,750,000.00. Plaintiff alleges that despite the aircraft's sale, Defendants have not honored the agreement, and to date, remain in possession of the proceeds from the sale and have failed to make any payment towards the Note.