Tran v. Esparza, et al.

itself may be liable for such acts, the individual officer or director will be immune unless he authorizes, directs, or in some meaningful sense actively participates in the wrongful conduct.'" (Frances T., supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 503-504, internal citations omitted.)

"To maintain a tort claim against a director in his or her personal capacity, a plaintiff must first show that the director specifically authorized, directed or participated in the allegedly tortious conduct [citations] or that although they specifically knew or reasonably should have known that some hazardous condition or activity under their control could injure plaintiff, they negligently failed to take or order appropriate action to avoid the harm." (Id., at p. 508.)

Under the facts alleged as alleged by Plaintiff, the condo owner defendants knew of the water leak and termite infestation and refused and failed to remediate the issues. (FAC, P.P. 45-47.)

Plaintiff alleges that the condo owner defendants conspired with the "Board not to remediate, repair and reimburse Plaintiff for common area damage which spread into her private area." (FAC, P. 87.)

Plaintiff has thus alleged that the condo owner defendants, including Gaeta, breached a duty of care owed to her by failing to take action to repair the plumbing and termite problems.

"Directors and officers have frequently been held liable for negligent nonfeasance where they knew that a condition or instrumentality under their control posed an unreasonable risk of injury to the plaintiff, but then failed to take action to prevent it." (Frances T., supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 510, collecting cases.)

However, since only "a director who actually votes for the commission of a tort is personally liable, even though the wrongful act is performed in the name of the corporation," (Id. at p. 511) Plaintiff will have to prove that Gaeta acted negligently as an individual. (Ritter & Ritter, Inc. Pension & Profit Plan v. The Churchill Condominium Assn. (2008) 166 Cal.App.103, 121 ["California has adopted the rule that while a condominium association may be liable for its negligence, a greater degree of fault is necessary to hold unpaid individual condominium board members liable for their actions on behalf of condominium associations."].)

For pleading purposes, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a cause of action for negligence against Gaeta. The demurrer to the sixth cause of action is OVERRULED.

Ninth Cause of Action, Injunctive Relief

"The elements of a cause of action for injunctive relief are (1) a tort or other wrongful act constituting a cause of action; and (2) irreparable injury, i.e., a factual showing that the wrongful act constitutes an actual or threatened injury to property or personal rights which cannot be compensated by an ordinary damage award." (Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 405, 410, citation omitted.)

Notably, "injunctive relief is a remedy and not, in itself, a cause of action, and a cause of action must exist before injunctive relief can be granted." (Camp v. Board of Supervisors (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 334, 356.)

Gaeta demurs to the ninth cause of action for injunctive relief on the ground that injunctive relief is a remedy, not an independent cause of action.

Plaintiff concedes that injunctive relief is not a standalone cause of action and that the demurrer is proper as to this claim. (Opp., p. 2:18.)

The demurrer to the ninth cause of action is SUSTAINED, without leave to amend.

RULING: Defendant Julie Gaeta's Demurrer is OVERRULED as to the fourth and sixth causes of action and SUSTAINED, without leave to amend, as to the ninth cause of action. Gaeta is to file an answer within 10 days of this ruling.

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Case Number: 24NNCV05053 Hearing Date: August 21, 2026 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 9

Date: August 21, 2026 Case No: 24NNCV05053 Trial Date: May 10, 2027 Case Name: Tran v. Esparza, et al. MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES [CCP Sec. 2030.300] Moving Party: Plaintiff, Henry Chi Tran, by and through Hung Tran, his conservator Responding Party: Defendant, Martin Vera RELIEF REQUESTED: Compel further responses to Form Interrogatories Nos. 2.6, 12.1, 12.6, 15.1, 16.2 and 16.3 and request for sanctions.

CAUSES OF ACTION: from First-Amended Complaint 1) Physical Abuse of Dependent Adult - Battery 2) Physical Abuse of Dependent Adult - Assault 3) Neglect of Dependent Adult 4) Negligence 5) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 6) False Imprisonment 7) Abandonment 8) Isolation 9) For Unlawful, Deceptive and/or Unfair Business Practices

CHRONOLOGY: Discovery Served: May 16, 2025 Responses Served: March 5, 2026 / July 31, 2026 Motion Served: May 18, 2026

SUMMARY OF FACTS: Plaintiff Hung Tran, Conservator for Henry Chi Tran, brings this action against Defendants Efren Esparza ("Esparza"), Martin Vera ("Vera"), Xclusive Services LLC, Eastern Los Angeles Regional Center for the Developmentally Disabled, Inc and Adan Canas.

The Complaint alleges that Henry is a thirty-six-year-old male who suffers from developmental disabilities and is a dependent adult within the meaning of Welfare & Institutions Code section 15610.23.

Plaintiff alleges that Henry received in-home caregiving services from Xclusiv Services between 2020 and 2022, during which time Henry suffered ongoing and grievous injuries and damages.

The Complaint alleges that Defendants and each of them intentionally isolated Henry from his mother and brothers, by manipulation and false statements. Plaintiff alleges that this maneuver was done with the intent of preventing Henry's family from knowing the harm Henry was suffering.

The Complaint alleges that while Defendants were responsible for Henry's care and wellbeing, they left him unattended, unsupervised, and in need of care. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to provide Henry with adequate nutrition or medical treatment and subjected Henry to physical abuse. As a result, Henry allegedly suffered multiple physical injuries, including visible marks on his back apparently inflicted by belt whips or blunt objects.

The Complaint further alleges that on July 12, 2022, Henry sustained a large laceration above his right eyebrow, a black eye, and an abrasion on his forehead.

Plaintiff also alleges that on October 14, 2022, Defendants locked Henry in a room unattended for several hours, after which he was eventually found by the property manager in the backyard, alone and without any clothes on.

Two days later, on October 16, 2022, Henry's mother visited and allegedly observed multiple bruises and scars on Henry's back.

The Complaint alleges that Henry has sustained injuries to his person and nervous system, which have adversely affected his health, strength, and activity. As a result of these injuries, Plaintiff alleges that Henry has suffered, and continues to suffer, significant mental, physical, and nervous pain and suffering.

ANALYSIS: A motion to compel a further response is used when a party gives unsatisfactory answers or makes untenable objections to interrogatories, demands to produce, or requests for admission. (CCP, Sec. 2031.310, subd. (a); Sinaiko Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Pacific Healthcare Consultants (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 390, 403.)

To compel a further response to interrogatories, the movant can show that: (1) the responding party's answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete (CCP, Sec. 2030.300, subd. (a)(1)); (2) the responding party's exercise of the option to produce documents in response to an interrogatory was unwarranted or the required specification of those documents was inadequate (CCP, Sec. 2030.300, subd. (a)(2)); and (3) the responding party's objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general (CCP, Sec. 2030.300, subd. (a)(3); see, e.g., Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 550 [defendant's argument that plaintiff was required to establish good cause or prove merits of underlying claim before propounding interrogatories without merit]).

Plaintiff moves to compel further responses to FROGs Nos. 2.6, 12.1, 12.6, 15.1, 16.2 and 16.3.

Vera asserts that he attempted to serve supplemental responses on May 15, 2026, but the email containing the supplemental responses got stuck in the outbox and was inadvertently not delivered. (Eyler Decl., P.P. 5-14.) Vera successfully re-served the supplemental responses on July 31, 2026. (Eyeler Decl., P. 15.)

In the reply, Plaintiff asserts that the response to FROG No. 15.1 remains deficient. (Reply, p. 1:6-8.)

FROG No 15.1 states: "Identify each denial of a material allegation and each special or affirmative defense in your pleadings and for each: (a) state all facts upon which you base the denial or special or affirmative defense; (b) state the names, ADDRESSES, and telephone numbers of all PERSONS who have knowledge of those facts; and (c) identify all DOCUMENTS and other tangible things that support your denial or special or affirmative defense, and state the name, ADDRESS, and telephone number of the PERSON who has each DOCUMENT" (Sep. Statement, p. 5:16-24.)

In response, Vera states: "Responding Party cannot fully respond to this interrogatory at this time because discovery and investigation are ongoing. Responding Party reserves the right to supplement and amend this response as additional information becomes available." (Sep. Statement, p. 5:26-28.)

Vera provided no further response to this discovery request in his supplemental responses. (Lo Decl., Ex. E.)

Vera's response is not sufficient. "Each answer in a response to interrogatories shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits." (CCP, Sec. 2030.220 subd. (a).) "If an interrogatory cannot be answered completely, it shall be answered to the extent possible." (CCP, Sec. 2030.220 subd. (b).) Moreover, if "the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information." (CCP, Sec. 2030.220 subd. (c).)

Vera does not state that a reasonable and good faith effort has been made to obtain the information. The fact that discovery is ongoing is neither a cognizable objection nor a justification for failure to respond to the extent possible. Thus, the motion is GRANTED as to FROG No. 15.1.

Requests for Sanctions

"The court shall impose a monetary sanction ... against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust." (CCP, Sec. 2033.290, subd. (d).)

"The court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed, or opposition to the motion was withdrawn, or the requested discovery was provided to the moving party after the motion was filed." (Rules of Court, rule 3.1348, subd. (a).)

Even after a party provides discovery responses, a party can keep its motion on calendar and the court has authority to grant sanctions, even if it denies the motion to compel responses "as essentially unnecessary, in whole or in part." (Sinaiko, supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at 409.)

The burden is on the party subject to sanctions to show substantial justification or injustice. (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429, 1436.)

Plaintiff requests sanctions in the amount of $3,676.00. The amount requested is high, given that the motion is granted as to only 1 of the 6 discovery requests. The sanctions are adjusted accordingly. Sanctions are awarded as follows: 5 hours at $600.00 per hour for a total of $3,000.00.

RULING: Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Further Responses to Form Interrogatories is GRANTED as to FROG No. 15.1, and MOOT as to the remaining requests. Defendant Martin Vera is ordered to provide a full, Code-compliant, verified response to FROG No. 15.1 within 20 days of this order.

Monetary sanctions sought by the moving party: Utilizing a lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the total and reasonable amount of attorney's fees and costs incurred for the work performed in connection with the pending motion is $3,000.00 (5 hours @ $600.00/hour [7.2 hours requested] plus $96.00 in filing fees [Amount Requested $3,676.00], which sum is to be awarded in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Martin Vera and counsel Philip H. Lo and Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, jointly and severally, payable within 20 days. (CCP, Sec. 2030.300, subd. (d); CRC Rule 3.1348(a).)

Counsel for moving party is ordered to prepare an order for sanctions and submit it on eCourt by noon today in accordance with this order.

DEPARTMENT D IS CONTINUING TO CONDUCT AND ENCOURAGE VIDEO APPEARANCES

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Case Number: 25NNCV08623 Hearing Date: August 21, 2026 Dept: D TENTATIVE RULING Calendar: 4

Date: August 21, 2026 Case No: 25NNCV08623 Trial Date: Not yet set Case Name: Aghajanyan v. Galstyan, et al. DEMURRER [CCP Sec. 430.30] Moving Party: Defendant, Zaven Galstyan Responding Party: Plaintiff, Tigran Aghajanyan [Unopposed] RELIEF REQUESTED: Sustain demurrer to the Complaint

CAUSES OF ACTION: from Form Complaint 1) Motor Vehicle

SUMMARY OF FACTS: This action arises from an alleged motor vehicle accident occurring on December 4, 2023 near Kenwood and Harvard Street in Glendale, CA 91205 between Tigran Aghajanyan ("Plaintiff") and Zaven Galstyan ("Defendant"). The Complaint alleges that Defendant negligently operated a motor vehicle, causing injury and damages to Plaintiff.

ANALYSIS: A demurrer is an objection to a pleading, the grounds for which are apparent from either the face of the complaint or a matter of which the court may take judicial notice. (CCP, Sec. 430.30, subd. (a); see also Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)