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CIVSB2411524·sanbernardino·Civil·Motor Vehicle Accident
Hearing todayDENIED

Huafu Zhang v. Guzman Grading and Paving Corp.; Heriberto Quinonez

Motion for Reconsideration

Hearing date
Aug 20, 2026
Department
S36
Prevailing
Opposing Party

Motion type

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Causes of action

Monetary amounts referenced

$2,232.50

Parties

PlaintiffHuafu Zhang
DefendantGuzman Grading and Paving Corp.
DefendantHeriberto Quinonez

Attorneys

Adam Popkowskifor Defendant

Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

HUAFU ZHANG, Case No.: CIVSB2411524

Plaintiff, [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR v. RECONSIDERATION

GUZMAN GRADING AND PAVING CORP.; HERIBERTO QUINONEZ; and DOES 1 to 25, Defendants.

V. INTRODUCTION

In this motor vehicle accident litigation, Plaintiff Huafu Zhang moves for reconsideration

of the Court’s order granting monetary sanctions on Defendants’ motion to quash subpoenas.

On April 15, 2024, Plaintiff Huafu Zhang (“Plaintiff” or “Zhang”) filed a Judicial

Council form Complaint against Defendants Guzman Grading and Paving Corp. (“Guzman”) and

Heriberto Quinonez (“Quinonez,” collectively “Defendants”). The form Complaint fails to

include any attached cause of action, but Defendants’ liability is marked as based on negligence

and motor vehicle liability.

Defendant Guzman answered on May 30, 2024, asserting a general denial and ten (10)

affirmative defenses. Defendant Quinonez answered on September 19, 2024, asserting a general

denial and ten (10) affirmative defenses.

On November 14, 2025, Defendants moved to quash the Plaintiff’s subpoena for

production of business records and for sanctions.

After opposition and reply, the Court on January 28, 2026, granted the motion to quash

the subpoena in part and awarded Defendants sanctions. The decision stated in part:

Defendants request sanctions. Considering the majority of the subpoenas sought irrelevant and private material and were overbroad, the Court finds that sanctions are warranted. The Court finds that attorney Popkowski's hourly rate of $235 and the amount of time billed [for] the defense’s motion practice, a total of 9.5 hours, are reasonable. Accordingly, the Court awards sanctions in the amount of $2,232.50.

Defendants filed a notice of ruling on January 29, 2026, which was served by electronic mail that

day.

On February 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed this present motion for reconsideration. On July 22,

2026, Defendants filed an opposition to this present motion for reconsideration. On August 13,

2026, Plaintiff filed a reply to the motion for reconsideration. After issuing a tentative ruling and

holding a hearing on the motion, the Court now issues its final ruling.

VI. APPLICABLE LAW

Code of Civil Procedure, section 1008, subdivision (e), states “[t]his section specifies the

court’s jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration of its orders and renewals of

previous motions, and applies to all applications to reconsider any order of a judge or court, or

for the renewal of a previous motion, whether the order deciding the previous matter or motion is

interim or final. No application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion

may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section.”

Section 1008 governs all motions for reconsideration, whether brought by a party or sua

sponte by the court. (Morite of California v. Superior Ct. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 485, 490.)

However, more recent decisions have held that, based on the separation of powers doctrine, the

procedural restrictions of section 1008 cannot deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to reconsider

its own interim orders sua sponte. (Kerns v. CSA Ins. Group (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 368.)

A motion for reconsideration must be (1) brought before the same judge that made the

order, (2) made within 10 days after service upon the party of notice of entry of the order, and

(3) be based on new or different facts, circumstances, or law than those before the court at the

time of the original ruling. Additionally, the motion must be supported by a declaration

identifying the previous order, identifying the judge that made the order, and identifying the new

or different facts, circumstances, or law claimed to exist. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a).)

The moving party must offer the court some fact, law, or circumstance not previously

considered, and some valid reason for not offering it earlier. (Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32

Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.) Even if reconsideration is granted, the court may simply reaffirm its

original order. (Corns v. Miller (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 195, 202.) Motions for reconsideration

cannot be based on an argument the court misinterpreted the law or failed or refused to consider

evidence previously presented in its prior ruling. (Gilberd, supra, 32 Cal.App.4th at p. 1500.)

VII. WHY THE MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED Although Plaintiff timely filed this motion before the issuing judge, he presents no new

facts, circumstances, or law to warrant reconsideration. [Morris v. AGFA Corp. (2006) 144

CA4th 1452, 1460; Hennigan v. White (2011) 199 CA4th 395, 406.] The original motion

requested sanctions and the time spent and included the declaration of Adam Popkowski, Esq.

which stated the following at ¶ 6:

6. In pursuing the instant motion, attorneys at my office have spent more than 6 hours attempting to meet and confer, drafting the objections, and drafting and finalizing the motion and supporting papers. I expect to spend another 3.5 hours drafting any reply that might be necessitated and appearing at the hearing of this motion. Based on a billing rate of $ 235 per hour, my office’s lowest rate for these types of cases, defendants request that requests plaintiff be ordered to pay monetary sanctions in the sum of $2,232.

Plaintiff’s counsel admits he did not scrutinize Defendant’s argument and was convinced the

Court would not award sanctions:

In light of California’s liberal approach in civil discovery favoring the disclosure of potentially relevant information, Plaintiff was convinced that the court would not impose any sanctions even if he was casting a wide net in discovery in accordance with the long-standing policy favoring disclosure. As a result, he did not scrutinize Defendant’s argument or evidence seeking sanctions even though there appears to be apparent flaws.

(Motion at p. 6 of 8 at line: 8-12.)

Moreover, counsel’s mistake based on ignorance of the law is not a proper basis for

reconsideration. [Pazderka v. Caballeros Dimas Alang, Inc. (1998) 62 CA4th 658, 670]. This

appears to be the situation here. There is nothing new presented. Counsel could have argued this

point earlier, and being “convinced” or failing to “scrutinize” is not a sufficient basis for this

motion. His ignorance or lack of diligence is not sufficient for a motion for reconsideration.

Finally, reconsideration cannot be granted based on claims the court misinterpreted the

law in its initial ruling (as opposed to a change in the law in the interim). That is not a “new” or

“different” matter. [Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 CA4th 1494, 1500, 38 CR2d 626, 630].

Since there are no new or different facts or circumstances, Plaintiff could have made his

arguments previously and chose not to, and the law has not changed.2

2 Nothing in Code Civ. Proc., §1987.2, the statute authorizing sanctions in connection with a discovery motion, states that time for meeting and conferring is not (footnote cont’d on next page)

VIII. CONCLUSION

The motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Plaintiff has not met the requirements of

“new or different facts, circumstances, or law.” Plaintiff has not provided a satisfactory

explanation for failing to present the information or argument at the first hearing.3

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: [TENTATIVE – NOT FINAL] Hon. Joseph B. Widman Judge of the Superior Court

recoverable as an attorney fee. Plaintiff has cited no authority for his claim that the time spent engaging in meet and confer correspondence is not “reasonable.” In any event, such correspondence is particularly reasonable given that it was an attempt to avoid having to expend additional time on the motion to quash and expedited the drafting of the motion to quash. The Courts want to encourage parties to settle their difference without resorting to motion practice. 3 The Court exercises discretion to decline to award sanctions pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (d), against Plaintiff for making this motion.

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

ANNETTE SAKELLARIDIS, TRUSTEE OF Case No.: CIVSB2520985 THE FAMILY TRUST OF ANNETTE SAKELLARIDIS DATED OCTOBER 20, 2016, [TENTATIVE] ORDER CONTINUING HEARING AND Plaintiff, ORDERING SUBMISSION OF FURTHER AMENDED REPORT v. BY THE REFEREE

KONSTANTINOS C. BAKOLAS AND ALICIA BAKOLAS-BOUKAS, SUCCESSOR CO- TRUSTEES OF THE BAKOLAS FAMILY TRUST U/D/O MAY 5, 2004, Defendants.

IX. INTRODUCTION This is a partition action. On July 21, 2025, Plaintiff Annette Sakellaridis, Trustee of the

Family Trust of Annette Sakellaridis dated October 20, 2016, filed a Complaint against

Defendants Christos K. Bakolas and Vasiliki C. Bakolas, Co-Trustees of the Bakolas Family

Trust dated May 5, 2004, alleging four (4) causes of action for Partition of four (4) parcels of real

property.

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