VERONICA BYNUM, AN INDIVIDUAL RESIDING IN CALIFORNIA, et al. vs GARDAWORLD SECURITY SERVICES OF CALIFORNIA, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al.

Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255. (Underscoring added.) Accord, Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1055; Blegen v. Superior Court (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 959, 962.) "[I]f the action is one in tort, punitive damages may be recovered upon a proper showing of malice, fraud or oppression even though the conduct constituting the tort also involves a breach of contract." (Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 400.) Here, the Court determines that the FAC adequately alleges ultimate facts of fraudulent inducement of forbearance and promissory fraud, as analyzed with regard to the Demurrer. IV. CONCLUSION The Court overrules the Demurrer, and denies the Motion, while allowing 20 days' to answer.

COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Civil Division Central District, Stanley Mosk Courthouse, Department 311 Tentative Ruling

VERONICA BYNUM, AN INDIVIDUAL RESIDING IN CALIFORNIA, et al. vs GARDAWORLD SECURITY SERVICES OF CALIFORNIA, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. | August 20, 2026 8:30 AM | | | NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: PLAINTIFF VERONICA BYNUM'S MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER. PLAINTIFF LETICA IRVIN'S MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER. RULING: The Court grants both Motions. The Court enters a Protective Order precluding Defendants from inspecting, and/or accessing data

from, Plaintiffs' mobile devices. Plaintiffs to give notice. I. BACKGROUND On December 11, 2025, VERONICA BYNUM and LETICA IRVIN (Plaintiffs) filed a Complaint against GARDAWORLD SECURITY SERVICES OF CALIFORNIA, INC. and JOHN BULLOCK (Defendants), listing Causes of Action for: 1) HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT (SEXUAL HARASSMENT) IN VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE Sec.Sec. 12923, 12940(J) (FEHA), ET SEQ. 2) FAILURE TO PREVENT AND/OR REMEDY HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT IN VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE Sec. 12940(K) (FEHA), ET SEQ.

Plaintiffs allege unwelcome sexual advances by a supervisor during employment. On July 17, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their Motions for Protective Order, on grounds that "inspection of and retrieval of data from both Plaintiffs' mobile devices" would include irrelevant data and constitute a fishing expedition into private information, designed to harass and oppress. Defendants oppose, contending that there is no less intrusive means to obtain directly relevant information other than forensic examinations of the cellphones limited to relevant information.

II. LEGAL STANDARD Courts have discretion to enter a protective order protecting information on computer after an objecting party particularly identifies information that should be excluded. (Tbg Ins. Serv. Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, 454.) Once good cause for production has been shown, the objecting party has the burden to file evidence to justify objections including those based upon privacy. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 97-98.) Parties seeking protective orders regarding electronically stored information on the basis that it is from a source not reasonably accessible, because of undue burden or expense, bear the burden of demonstrating those factors, and courts may nonetheless order the discovery, subject to any limitations imposed under section 2031.060, subdivision (f), if the demanding parties show good cause. (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 2031.060, subds. (c)-(g).)

III. ANALYSIS According to Plaintiff VERONICA BYNUM, Defendants have no basis to believe that additional electronically stored information exists beyond that produced, as to Instagram messages between Plaintiff VERONICA BYNUM and Defendant JOHN BULLOCK. As for LETICA IRVIN, Plaintiff's criticism is that Defendants' discovery is not limited to Snapchat messages between Plaintiff and Defendant JOHN BULLOCK but involves the whole cellphone. Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants never informally agreed to discovery through less intrusive means and narrower than a drastic forensic examination of entire cell phones.

Regarding one Opposition, Defendant alleges "[Plaintiff] Irvin's device may be the only reasonably available source of the communications themselves and related forensic evidence regarding their existence, content, timing, and completeness. Garda therefore seeks a narrowly tailored inspection of Irvin's cellphone for Snapchat messages exchanged between Irvin and Bullock during their employment, as well as associated application data and other artifacts of those communications." (Opposition, 2:21-26.)

As for the other Opposition, concerning Plaintiff BYNUM: "The incomplete production raises serious questions as to what relevant communications have been withheld and underscores the need for discovery sufficient to verify all responsive communications have been identified and produced." (Opposition, 2:22-25.) There is a privacy interest in cell phone content, including texts, which entails balancing competing interests against any public right of access. (Saunders v. Superior Court (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 22.) "[V]iewing confidential computer files implicates dignity and privacy interests." (People v.

Endacott (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1350.) Metadata is hidden information, electronically stored, and may include information about the computer file author, and times of creating and modifying the file, and can be discoverable, if relevant and not privileged. (Ellis v. Toshiba Am. Info. Sys., Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 853, 859 fns. 5-6.) Courts must carefully balance a right of privacy against the interest in having just litigation. (Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360, 371; Valley Bank of Nevada v.

Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 652, 657.) "Mere speculation as to the possibility that some portion of the records might be relevant to some substantive issue does not suffice" for showing direct

relevance as to private information sought in discovery. (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1017-1020 [directing trial court to grant motion to quash as to discovery request that was not narrowly drawn to enable the court to evaluate the appropriate extent of disclosure]. Cf. Bd. of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App. 5th 1011, 1038 ["defendants have not shown that these broad categories are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Moreover, even if these categories do contain some records that would be discoverable, their probative value is vastly outweighed by the privileged and private nature of the other records swept up in the production."].) Absent showings of direct relevance, compelling need, and unavailability of alternative sources, a trial court only could find that a privacy interest prevails. (Ombudsman Services of No. Cal. v. Superior Court (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1251, disapproved on other grounds by Williams v.

Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557.) While Defendants propose limited forensic searches, broad access to data would occur in the process. For instance, Defendants state: "Because Snapchat data may be reflected not only in visible messages but also in application databases, cached files, logs, notifications, metadata, backups, and other device artifacts, a targeted forensic review is reasonably likely to reveal relevant information concerning the existence, timing, content, and preservation of the communications at issue." (Opposition re LETICIA IRVINS, 8:7-12.)

Similarly, Defendant "has narrowed the scope of its requested Demand for Inspection by limiting the request to Bynum's Instagram communications with Bullock during the period of their employment and her communications with the individuals she identifies as having knowledge as to the allegations in her complaint." (Opposition, 7:18-21.) However, that would still entail a forensic inspection with the whole cellphone. (Ibid., 7:28). The Court's own research regarding forensic searches reveals a dearth of California citable law on point.

One defense-cited opinion distinguishably involved discovery sanctions issues, and "[t]he trial court, however, entered a stipulated protective order providing that the production of any electronic information did not waive any of the producing party's claims of privacy,..." (Ellis v. Toshiba America Information Systems, Inc. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 853, 878.) (Underscoring added.) There is no such stipulation here. And there is no agreement to any neutral expert to do a confidential and unbiased forensic examination.

Another cited case is similar. (See Electronic Funds Solutions, LLC v. Murphy (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1168 ["The stipulation expressly required the production of all

electronic data, including e-mail messages. The trial court entered the stipulation as a court order."].) Also, Defendants cite a federal trial court ruling, Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles (S.D. Cal. 1999) 60 F.Supp. 2d 1050, 1051, 1053-1054, which does not govern in California courts. "California law governs discovery disputes that arise in our courts." (Unzipped Apparel, LLC v. Bader (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 123, 130.) Further, District Court rulings can be cited going both ways in favor of either side in this case. (Cf., e.g., Villarroel v.

Staples, Inc. (N.D.Cal. Sep. 20, 2024, No. 23-cv-03717-PCP (VKD)) 2024 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 170412, at *9 ["Staples does not explain why records of Ms. Villarroel's cell phone communications to or from Staples' personnel for nearly a year preceding her resignation are relevant to a claim or defense in this action."].) Here, the Court finds that Defendants have not shown that all private content on the cell phones contains directly relevant evidence regarding alleged harassment but only speculate that some may exist, which does not suffice for overbroad privacy intrusions while attempting to limit the discovery access to all data to just directly relevant data regarding alleged harassment.

Also, the Court determines that there are less drastic alternative discovery options. Defendants need not be the ones to do unlimited searches of the cellphones, because Plaintiffs are statutorily required to confirm doing so in their discovery responses. Specifically, with regard to document requests, a response expressing an inability to comply shall state that a diligent search and reasonable inquiry was made to locate the items, and the reason for an inability to comply, including that the item never existed, was lost or stolen, was destroyed, or is not in respondent's possession, along with the identity and address of anyone believed to have the document. (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 2031.230.) Defendants impermissibly also seek to, "question the completeness and integrity of Bynum's production...." (Opposition, 9:19-20.) However, a motion to compel further discovery responses cannot be granted based on the reason that verified answers served are untrue. (Holguin v. Superior Court (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 812, 820, 821.) The service of willfully false discovery responses is not covered by the current version of the Civil Discovery Act. (Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 333.)

There is no statutory requirement for respondents to correct untruthful discovery responses, but instead an intentional failure to amend the responses creates the risks of prosecution for perjury, or monetary sanctions. (Guzman v. General Motors Corp. (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 438, 442-443, fn. 4.) A respondent cannot be compelled to

admit a fact in discovery, even where its truth is obvious. (Wimberly v. Derby Cycle Corp. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 618, 634; Smith v. Circle P Ranch Co. (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 267, 273.) And discovery of information about credibility must be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, which requires the existence of a contradictory statement that is not collateral to the merits, particularly where direct relevance is required to overcome a right of privacy. (Mendez v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 557, 576-577, disapproved of on other grounds by Williams v.

Superior Court (2023) 3 Cal. 5th 531, and abrogated by Doe v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 40.) In summary, Defendants do not qualify for conducting forensic examinations of Plaintiffs' cell phones. IV. CONCLUSION Accordingly, the Court grants both Motions for Protective Order, for reasons stated herein. | Home -->)" -->