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MOTION: Leave to Amend
SUPERIOR COURT, STATE OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA Department 12 Honorable Nahal Iravani-Sani, Presiding Courtroom Clerk, Ryan Nguyen 191 North First Street, San Jose, CA 95113 Telephone: (408) 882-2230
DATE: 05/13/2026 TIME: 9:00 A.M. and 9:01 A.M.
LINE 4 25CV470867 Michael Leobo DEMURRER v. Kaiser Permanente et al. Demurrer to the FAC is Unopposed and Sustained with 15 days leave to amend LINE 5 25CV475894 Santa Clara Valley MOTION: ORDER Water District v. The City of San Jose, et Plaintiff Santa Clara Valley Water District’s Motion for Prejudgment al. Possession
Notice is proper. Unopposed. Good cause appearing, the Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff to prepare the proposed order, accompanied by the necessary Form EFS-020, within 7 days of the hearing. LINE 6 25CV477676 Linda Johnson et al. MOTION: Leave to Amend v. Hanford Hotels Inc. et al. Please control click or scroll down to Line 6 LINE 7 23CV426893 Surface Art MOTION TO COMPEL Engineering, Inc. v. Kent, Kim Please control click or scroll down to Line 7 LINE 8 25CV460776 Robert Bigler et al. MOTION TO COMPEL v. Xie Tan Lee, et al. Settlement agreement pending. Off Calendar 9:01 21CV376210 Ku et al Hearing: Order of Examination v. Herchen et al
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Calendar Line 6 Case Name: Linda Johnson, et al. v. Hanford Hotels, Inc., et al. Case No.: 25-CV-477676
Factual and Procedural Background
On October 15, 2025, plaintiffs Linda Johnson, individually, and as successor-in-interest to Terril Wade Johnson, Sr., deceased, Terril Wade Johnson II, Deshun Johnson, and Terrilynn Johnson, a minor, by and through her Guardian ad Litem, Terril Wade Johnson II (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against defendants Hanford Hotels, Inc., Hanford Hotels, LLC, Fairfield By Marriott Inn & Suites San Jose Airport, Marriott International, Inc. and Interstate Hotels & Resorts, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging causes of action for: (1) Wrongful Death (Premises Liability/Negligence Per Se); (2) Survival Action; and (3) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress.1
Currently before the court is Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend to add a claim for punitive damages in a first amended complaint (“FAC”). Defendants filed written opposition. Plaintiffs filed reply papers.
Trial is scheduled for May 18, 2026.
Legal Standard
“Any judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.” (
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“While a motion to permit an amendment to a pleading is one addressed to the discretion of the court, the exercise of this discretion must be sound and reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. [Citations.] And it is a rare case in which ‘a court will be justified in refusing a party leave to amend his pleadings so that he may properly present his case.’ [Citations.] If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion. [Citations.]” (Morgan v. Super. Ct. (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.)
A motion to amend a pleading before the trial court must include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a)(1).) A separate declaration must also accompany the motion and must specify: (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b)(1) – (4).)
1 Renetta Johnson, Heaven Johnson, and Trinity Johnson are no longer named plaintiffs as they were dismissed without prejudice from this action.
Attorney Declaration
In support of the motion for leave to amend to add a claim for punitive damages, Plaintiffs submit a declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, from their counsel of record, John W. Shaller (“Shaller”). The declaration includes a copy of the proposed FAC alleging a punitive damages claim. (Shaller Decl. at ¶ 4, Ex. 1.) The declaration identifies depositions taken in April 2026 of Defendants’ employees and agents which provide the factual basis for Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-17.) Plaintiffs acted diligently in noticing and taking the depositions at the earliest possible date. (Id. at ¶ 12.) The amendment was not made sooner as the facts giving rise to the claim for punitive damages could not have been developed through written discovery but only through depositions that did not occur until April 2026. (Id. at ¶ 11.)
Here, the declaration from Plaintiff’s attorney satisfies the rules of court as it properly demonstrates (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.
In opposition, Defendants concede that Plaintiffs have met the procedural requirements necessary for a motion to amend. Instead, Defendants argue the motion should be denied because it is grossly prejudicial and the proposed allegations do not satisfy the punitive damages standard against any defendant.
Prejudice
“ ‘Although courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial [citations], this policy should be applied only “[w]here no prejudice is shown to the adverse party. ...” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 761.) Prejudice to the opposing party includes a delay in trial, loss of critical evidence, or added costs of preparation. (Solit v. Tokai Bank (1999) 68 Cal.App.4th 1435, 1448.)
Defendants contend the proposed amendment would be prejudicial as it includes an expansion of claims brought by Plaintiffs while also denying Defendants the opportunity to challenge the punitive damages claim by motion to strike or motion for summary adjudication. These contentions are not persuasive as the inclusion of a punitive damages claim will not result in any additional causes of action. Also, these points do not support any ground for prejudice which, as stated above, include a delay in trial, loss of critical evidence, or added costs of preparation.
Furthermore, Defendants do not submit any evidence to the court to establish their claim of prejudice. (See L&S Framing, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 995, 1012 [“Prejudice will not be presumed but must be affirmatively demonstrated through production of evidence.”]; see also Highland Springs Conference & Training Center v. City of Banning (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 267, 273 [“We agree the motion to amend was erroneously denied based solely on plaintiffs’ delay in filing the motion, because SCCA made an insufficient evidentiary showing that it was prejudiced by the delay.”].)
Therefore, prejudice is not a sufficient ground for denying the proposed amendment.
Futility of Proposed Amendment
“[L]eave to amend may be denied where permitting an amendment would be futile [citation], e.g., where the amendment does not state a cause of action. [Citations.]” (Singh v. Lipworth (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 828; see Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986) 42 Cal.3d 481, 489 [leave to amend should be denied where no liability exists under substantive law].)
The issue here is whether Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment satisfies the pleading standard necessary to impose punitive damages against Defendants.
“In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294. [Citation.] These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. [Citation.] ‘ “Malice” ’ is defined in the statute as conduct ‘intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.’ [Citations.] ‘ “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.’ [Citation.] ‘ “Fraud” ’ is ‘an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.’ [Citation.]” (Turman v.
Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)
“Where nonintentional torts involve conduct performed without intent to harm, punitive damages may be assessed ‘when the conduct constitutes conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.’ [Citations.] ‘ “[A] conscious disregard of the safety of others may [thus] constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code. In order to justify an award of punitive damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” ’ [Citations.] Consequently, to establish malice, ‘it is not sufficient to show only that the defendant’s conduct was negligent, grossly negligent or even reckless.’ [Citation.]” (Bell v. Sharp Cabrillo Hosp. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1034, 1044.)
Also, “[a]n employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).)
“In determining whether a complaint states facts sufficient to sustain punitive damages, the challenged allegations must be read in context with the other facts alleged in the complaint. Further, even though certain language pleads ultimate facts or conclusions of law, such language when read in context with the facts alleged as to defendants’ conduct may adequately plead the evil motive requisite to recovery of punitive damages. [Citation.]” (Monge v. Super. Ct. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 503, 510.)
“When a defendant must produce evidence in defense of an exemplary damage claim; fairness demands that he receive adequate notice of the kind of conduct charged against him.” (G.D. Searle & Co. v. Super. Ct. (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29.)
Here, the FAC sets forth factual allegations supporting punitive damages in paragraphs 33 through 130. Such allegations include Defendants’: (1) knowledge of a dangerous condition (hot water delivered at temperatures in excess of approximately 120 degrees) creating a high risk of severe scalding injury and death; (2) deliberate failure to implement basic safety measures; and (3) conscious disregard through failure to train and supervise personnel. (See FAC at ¶¶ 33-58, 105-109.)
In opposition, Defendants argue the proposed allegations constitute conclusions without supporting facts amounting to nothing more than simple or gross negligence. While the proposed FAC includes allegations of malice, oppression, and conduct carried out with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of decedent and Plaintiffs, the court finds sufficient facts have been pled in support of these conclusions. Defendants also spend much of their opposition disputing the merits of the punitive damages allegations.
Defendants however will have an opportunity to test the merits of these allegations through proper objections to Plaintiffs’ evidence, the presentation of contrary evidence and cross-examination of witnesses at trial. The court, at this juncture, is not concerned with Plaintiffs’ ability to actually prove punitive damages, only whether such facts have been pled to support those damages. The court concludes sufficient facts are present here and thus defers to the trier of fact to determine whether Plaintiffs ultimately prevail on their claim for punitive damages at trial.
Disposition
Therefore, given the policy of liberality in allowing amendments, the motion for leave to amend to add punitive damages is GRANTED. The FAC attached as Exhibit 1 to the Shaller Declaration supporting the motion is deemed filed as of the date this order is filed.
The court will prepare the Order.
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