SMITH, AN INDIVIDUAL VS SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA GAS COMPANY

1. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF BARKER VS PALM CVPS2400208 GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT BY SPRINGS AIR VICTORY CANTEEN, CORP. Tentative Ruling: Granted.

No opposition filed.

Moving party to submit proposed order consistent with the moving papers within 5 days of this order becoming final.

Moving party to provide notice pursuant to CCP 1019.5.

2. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION FOR ORDER TO SEAL CVPS2507588 MEYER VS BALON DOCUMENT(S) BY NATHANIEL B. MEYER Tentative Ruling: Granted.

No opposition filed.

The court orders the original complaint filed 10/9/25 is ordered sealed until further order of the court.

Operative complaint is now the 1st Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff to provide notice pursuant to CCP 1019.5.

3. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME LASR ENTERPRISES INC., HEARING ON ANTI-SLAPP MOTION A CALIFORNIA (SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE) BY CORPORATION VS CHC CVPS2601090 CHC GROUP INC., A CALIFORNIA GROUP INC., A CORPORATION, CHANGHO CHUNG, CALIFORNIA MIHWA BANG CORPORATION Tentative Ruling: Matter taken off calendar pursuant to stipulation filed May 14, 2026.

4. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT OF SMITH, AN INDIVIDUAL VS AMBER NICOLE SMITH, AN CVPS2601155 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA INDIVIDUAL BY SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY CALIFORNIA GAS COMPANY Tentative Ruling: Moot.

Based on court’s ruling on accompanying demurrer, the instant motion to strike is moot.

Moving party to provide notice pursuant to CCP 1019.5.

Nicole Smith and Sylvia Perfecto (“Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint against Defendants Southern California Gas Company (“SoCal Gas”) and Ernesto Partida-Granados (“Partida-Granados”) (together “Defendants”) for: (1) negligence (against Partida-Granados); (2) negligent entrustment (against SoCal Gas); and (3) negligent hiring, supervision, and/or retention (against SoCal Gas).

In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that on October 22, 2025, they were driving/riding in a vehicle that was hit by a truck driven by Partida-Granados, causing them severe injuries. (Complaint at ¶¶ 8-9, 21.) Partida-Granados was negligently driving the truck at the time of the accident, including failing to check for other vehicles, driving with excessive speed, and failing to slow down. (Complaint at ¶¶ 9, 12, 22.) Partida-Granados knew or should have known that driving in this manner created an unreasonable risk of injury to Plaintiffs and others. (Complaint at ¶ 12.)

Partida-Granados was employed by SoCal Gas at the time of the accident. (Complaint at ¶ 35.) SoCal Gas failed to exercise reasonable care in hiring, training, retaining, and supervising Partida- Granados. (Complaint at ¶ 37.) SoCal Gas also owned, leased, or controlled the truck Partida- Granados was driving, and entrusted the truck to him for use in the course and scope of his employment with SoCal Gas. (Complaint at 26-27.) SoCal Gas knew or should have known of Partida-Granados’s unfitness prior to entrusting the truck to him, but did it anyway. (Complaint at ¶¶ 28-29.)

At the time of the accident, Partida-Granados was an agent of and/or in the course and scope of his employment with SoCal Gas. (Complaint at ¶ 20.)

SoCal Gas moves to strike Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, arguing Plaintiffs’ fail to allege facts showing fraud, oppression, or malice.

Plaintiffs argue that their allegations that Partida-Granados engaged in high-speed distracted driving with knowledge and disregard of the associated risks are sufficient to support their punitive damages claim.

Motion to Strike

The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to C.C.P. §435:

(a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.

(b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.

(C.C.P. § 436). On a motion to strike, as with a demurrer, “the court treats as true the material facts alleged in the complaint, as well as any facts which may be implied or inferred from those expressly alleged.” (Washington Int’l Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 981, 984, n. 2). Given the ruling sustaining the demurrer with leave to amend, the motion to strike is moot.

5. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME HEARING RE: DEMURRER ON SMITH, AN INDIVIDUAL VS COMPLAINT OF AMBER NICOLE CVPS2601155 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA SMITH, AN INDIVIDUAL BY SOUTHERN GAS COMPANY CALIFORNIA GAS COMPANY Tentative Ruling: Overruled and sustained in part.

Overruled as to 2nd cause of action. Sustained with leave to amend as to 3rd cause of action.

Plaintiff granted leave to file 1st Amended Complaint within 10 days of this order becoming final.

Moving party to provide notice pursuant to CCP 1019.5.

This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident. On February 11, 2026, Plaintiffs Amber Nicole Smith and Sylvia Perfecto (“Plaintiffs”) filed a Complaint against Defendants Southern California Gas Company (“SoCal Gas”) and Ernesto Partida-Granados (“Partida-Granados”) (together “Defendants”) for: (1) negligence (against Partida-Granados); (2) negligent entrustment (against SoCal Gas); and (3) negligent hiring, supervision, and/or retention (against SoCal Gas).

In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that on October 22, 2025, they were driving/riding in a vehicle that was hit by a truck driven by Partida-Granados, causing them severe injuries. (Complaint at ¶¶ 8-9, 21.) Partida-Granados was negligently driving the truck at the time of the accident, including failing to check for other vehicles, driving with excessive speed, and failing to slow down. (Complaint at ¶¶ 9, 12, 22.) Partida-Granados knew or should have known that driving in this manner created an unreasonable risk of injury to Plaintiffs and others. (Complaint at ¶ 12.)

Partida-Granados was employed by SoCal Gas at the time of the accident. (Complaint at ¶ 35.) SoCal Gas failed to exercise reasonable care in hiring, training, retaining, and supervising Partida- Granados. (Complaint at ¶ 37.) SoCal Gas also owned, leased, or controlled the truck Partida- Granados was driving, and entrusted the truck to him for use in the course and scope of his employment with SoCal Gas. (Complaint at 26-27.) SoCal Gas knew or should have known of Partida-Granados’s unfitness prior to entrusting the truck to him, but did it anyway. (Complaint at ¶¶ 28-29.)

At the time of the accident, Partida-Granados was an agent of and/or in the course and scope of his employment with SoCal Gas. (Complaint at ¶ 20.)

Defendant SoCal Gas demurs to the 2nd (negligent entrustment) and 3rd (negligent hiring, supervision, and/or retention) causes of action on the grounds that they fail to allege sufficient facts to state a cause of action and are uncertain. It argues that all of the allegations are conclusory and based on information and belief; there are no facts showing SoCal Gas knew or should have known that Partida-Granados was unfit to drive; and there are no facts showing it knew or should have known hiring or retaining Partida-Granados created a particular risk.

Demurrer

A general demurrer lies where the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (C.C.P. § 430.10(e).) In evaluating a demurrer, the court gives the pleading a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and all of its parts in their context. (Moore v. Regents of University of California (1990) 51 Cal.3d 120, 125.) The court assumes the truth of all material facts which have been properly pleaded, of facts which may be inferred from those expressly pleaded, and of any material facts of which judicial notice has been requested and may be taken. (Crowley v.

Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 672.) However, a demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Daar v. Yellow Cab Company (1967) 67 Cal.2d 695, 713.) If the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the court must grant the plaintiff leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)

A special demurrer lies where a pleading is uncertain, ambiguous and unintelligible. (CCP § 430.10(f).) Demurrers for uncertainty, however, are typically sustained only where the defendant cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against him. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Uncertainty

While SoCal Gas specially demurs to the Complaint on the ground of uncertainty under C.C.P. § 430.10(f), it fails to explain how any of the claims are uncertain such that it cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what claims are directed against it. (Khoury, supra, 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) OVERRULED

2ND Cause of Action - Negligent Entrustment

“California [] recognizes the liability of an automobile owner who has entrusted a car to an incompetent, reckless, or inexperienced driver . . . through the tort of negligent entrustment.” (McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 565–66 [internal quotation marks & quotation omitted].) “In cases involving negligent entrustment of a vehicle, liability ‘is imposed on [a] vehicle owner or permitter because of his own independent negligence and not the negligence of the driver.’” (Ghezavat v. Harris (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 555, 559.) “Liability for the negligence of the incompetent driver to whom an automobile is entrusted does not arise out of the relationship of the parties, but from the act of entrustment of the motor vehicle, with permission to operate the same, to one whose incompetency, inexperience, or recklessness is known or should have been known by the owner.’” (Id.)

The elements of negligent entrustment of a vehicle are: (1) the driver was negligent in operating the vehicle; (2) the defendant owner owned the vehicle operated by the driver or had possession of that vehicle with the defendant owner’s permission; (3) the defendant owner knew, or should have known, the driver was incompetent or unfit to drive the vehicle; (4) defendant owner permitted the driver to operate the vehicle regardless; and (5) the driver’s incompetence or unfitness to drive was a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff. (McKenna, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at 566; Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 853, 864.)

Here, Plaintiffs allege that SoCal Gas owned, leased, or controlled the truck Partida-Granados was driving; it entrusted the truck to Partida-Granados for use in the course and scope of his employment with SoCal Gas; SoCal Gas knew or should have known of Partida-Granados’s unfitness prior to entrusting the truck to him, but entrusted it to him anyway; and Partida- Granados’s unfitness resulted in the accident causing Plaintiffs’ injuries. (Complaint at ¶¶ 20-21, 24, 26-30.)

SoCal Gas first attacks these allegations on the ground that they are alleged on information and belief. However, the fact that allegations are based on information and belief does not make a pleading insufficient for purposes of a demurrer. (Wuest v. Wuest (1942) 53 Cal.App.2d 339, 344.) It then argues that the allegations are insufficient because they are conclusory. However, while a complaint must contain “a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language” to withstand a demurrer [C.C.P. § 425.10], the rules of pleading only require ultimate facts to be alleged; evidentiary facts supporting the allegation of ultimate fact need not be pleaded. (C.A. v.

William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872; McKelly v. Washington Mut., Inc. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1469.) “Ultimate facts” are those “facts” upon which liability depends, i.e., “the facts constituting the cause of action.” (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 549-550). The distinction between “ultimate facts” and “conclusions” depends on whether the pleading gives adequate notice of the claims to be presented. (Estate of Lind (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1424, 1434.)

Generally, a plaintiff need only plead facts necessary “to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his claims.” (Doe, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 549-550; see also, Estate of Lind (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1424, 1434.) Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to provide SoCal Gas with notice of the nature and extent of Plaintiffs’ claims. OVERRULED

3rd Cause of Action - Negligent Hiring, Supervision, and/or Retention

An employer can be held liable for the negligent hiring, supervising or retaining of an unfit employee if the employer knew or should have known that the employee created a particular risk and that particular harm materializes. (Doe v. Capital Cities (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 1038. “[A]n employer's duty, as defined by California authority, is breached only when the employer knows, or should know, facts which would warn a reasonable person that the employee presents an undue risk of harm to third persons in light of the particular work to be performed.” (Federico v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal. App. 4th 1207, 1214.)

The elements for a cause of action for negligent hiring, training and supervision are: (1) employer’s hiring or retention of an employee; (2) who is incompetent or unfit; (3) employer had reason to believe undue risk of harm would exist because of the employment; and (4) the harm occurs. (Federico v. Sup. Ct. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1213–14.) To establish a cause of action for negligent hiring and supervision, a plaintiff must show that the employer had notice of “the particular risk” at issue based on “a history of this specific conduct,” and it “does not encompass . . . consequences involving less particular, even speculative, hazards.” (Evan F. v.

Hughson United Methodist Church (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 828, 837 [emphasis added].) “Liability for negligent hiring and supervision is based upon the reasoning that if an enterprise hires individuals with characteristics which might pose a danger to customers or other employees, the enterprise should bear the loss caused by the wrongdoing of its incompetent or unfit employees.” (Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339.)

Here, Plaintiffs allege only that Partida-Granados was employed by SoCal Gas at the time of the accident, and SoCal Gas failed to exercise reasonable care in hiring, training, retaining, and supervising Partida-Granados. (Complaint at ¶¶ 35, 37.) There are no allegations regarding SoCal Gas’ alleged knowledge or reason to believe that hiring or retaining Partida-Granados created a particular risk that occurred. SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND