Abhishek Aggarwal v. Rivian, LLC, et al.

III. ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, Plaintiff argues the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”) (15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq.) precludes the enforcement of binding arbitration for claims under a written warranty. (Opposition at pp. 5:7-6:18.) Plaintiff cites nonbinding authorities from non-California state jurisdictions. (Ibid.) But the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that the MMWA does not preclude nonbinding arbitration. (See, e.g., Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC (5th Cir. 2002) 298 F.3d 470, 473-479.)

The court noted that “binding arbitration is not normally considered to be an ‘informal dispute settlement procedure,’ and it therefore seems to fall outside the bounds of the MMWA and of the FTC’s power to prescribe regulations.” (Id. at p. 476.) The court concluded that the text, legislative history, and purpose of the MMWA do not show a congressional intent to bar arbitration of MMWA written warranty claims. (Id. at pp. 478-479.) The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has likewise held that the MMWA allows for the enforcement of otherwise valid arbitration agreements. (Davis v.

Southern Energy Homes, Inc. (11th Cir. 2002) 305 F.3d 1268, 1271-1272.) Similarly, California favors arbitration as a matter of public policy. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1280 et seq.) Plaintiff does not cite any binding law that proves to the contrary, and the Court finds these authorities persuasive for concluding that the MMWA does not preclude the enforcement of arbitration agreements. Moreover, none of Plaintiff’s claims arise under the MMWA, and Defendant is not attempting to enforce an arbitration agreement contained within a warranty agreement. (Reply at pp. 2:25, 3:3-7.)

Plaintiff further argues that Defendant has submitted no evidence showing that it has demanded arbitration and that Plaintiff has refused to arbitrate. (Opposition at p. 6:25-27.) But Plaintiff here has filed suit instead of initiating arbitration for the resolution of his claims in violation of the Rivian Automotive Agreement. (Reply at p. 4:18-19.) As a result, Defendant may move to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims.

The Court finds and rules that a valid and binding agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties. Plaintiff signed the terms and conditions of Section 20 to the Rivian Automotive Agreement entitled “Dispute Resolution – Arbitration and Class Action Waiver” on June 22, 2024. (Seimas Decl., Ex. A at p. 9.) “A party’s acceptance of an agreement to arbitrate may be express, as where a party signs the agreement.” (Mendoza v. Trans Valley Transport (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 777.) Plaintiff on the other hand argues there is no evidence that the signature was placed there by him or anyone acting on his behalf. (Opposition at pp. 8:26-9:1.)

But the failure to recall signing an agreement does not create a “factual dispute as to the signature’s authenticity nor affords an independent basis to find that a contract was not formed.” (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 756, 758 (Iyere).)

In any event, Defendant has set forth the procedures that authenticate Plaintiff’s signature. (Reply at pp. 6:13-7:28.) The Declaration of Lauren Seimas, Director in the Product Management Commercial Group, provides that after creating a Rivian Account with a unique username and password, once matched with a vehicle, the Rivian Motor Vehicle Agreement is provided electronically to the customer for signature through OneSpan, a third-party electronic signature vendor similar to DocuSign. (Seimas Decl. at ¶¶ 2, 3.) “Before the customer can make payment to complete the digital leasing process—a customer must electronically sign his or her name on both the Lease Agreement and the Rivian Motor Vehicle Agreement.

Then, the customer must click on the ‘confirm’ button provided by OneSpan’s software to finalize acceptance of the agreement. A time stamp is created by OneSpan documenting the date and time when the customer accepted the agreement.” (Id. at ¶ 3.)

Records show Plaintiff electronically signed the Rivian Motor Vehicle Agreement, and then clicked the confirm button on June 22, 2024 at 11:22 a.m. Pacific Time. (Seimas Decl. at ¶ 5.) “An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The action of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Civ.

Code § 1633.7.) In Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1062, the court found that the defendant sufficiently established the authenticity of the electronic signature by detailing its “security precautions regarding transmission and use of an applicant’s unique username and password, as well as the steps an applicant would have to take to place his or her name on the signature line of the employment agreement[.]” Likewise, Defendant here has detailed the security precautions undertaken in creating a Rivian Account, as well as the steps Plaintiff would have had to take to transmit his electronic signature.

Thus, the Court does not find Plaintiff’s arguments persuasive and concludes that his signature has been properly authenticated.

Plaintiff also challenges the authenticity of the Rivian Automotive Agreement itself. Plaintiff argues “Rivian has failed to properly authenticate the document by showing that the document is what it purports to be, and thus is not admissible.” 5 (Opposition at pp. 7:27-8:1.) “For purposes of a petition to compel arbitration, it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of authentication.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158 (Gamboa); Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219 (Condee).) Rather, the process for challenging the authenticity of an agreement to arbitrate has been summarized as follows:

5 Plaintiff cites to “Evidentiary Objections”; however, none are submitted with his opposition papers.

[T]he moving party bears the burden of producing “prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.” [Citation.] The moving party “can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party’s] signature.” [Citation.] Alternatively, the moving party can meet its burden by setting forth the agreement’s provisions in the motion. [Citations.] For this step, “it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” [Citation.] If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party does not dispute the existence of the arbitration agreement, then nothing more is required for the moving party to meet its burden of persuasion.

If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement. [Citations.] The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement. [Citations.]

If the opposing party meets its burden of producing evidence, then in the third step, the moving party must establish with admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. The burden of proving the agreement by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the moving party.

(Id. at pp. 165-166 [citing and quoting Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413; Bannister v. Marindence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543-544; Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 219; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330].)

Defendant here has attached a copy of the Rivian Automotive Agreement containing the arbitration clause to the Declaration of Lauren Seimas. (Seims Decl., Ex. A.) Thus, Defendant has met its initial burden of proving an agreement to arbitrate exists. (Reply at p. 7:21-28.) It is of no import whether Ms. Seimas was present for the signing of the document. “[T]he custodian of a document need not have been present or employed when the document was created or signed to authenticate a document in a company’s files.” (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 758-759.) As noted above, Plaintiff’s inability to recall signing the agreement does not create a factual dispute as to its authenticity. (Id. at pp. 747, 756, 758.) Plaintiff has, therefore, failed to meet his burden of production. Accordingly, a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties.

The scope of Plaintiff’s claims is also covered by the arbitration agreement. The agreement provides:

you and Rivian agree to resolve any claims, demands, disagreements, or disputes between us whether based in contract, tort, statute, or otherwise arising from or related to this Agreement or our relationship, including advertising and other communications between you and Rivian, Rivian products or services, and as applicable, your credit application, or the purchase or condition of the Vehicle (a “Dispute”) by binding arbitration conducted by the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) in accordance with the AAA Consumer Arbitration Rules, unless you and we agree otherwise.

(Seimas Decl., Ex. A at p. 7.) Plaintiff’s claims here concern the condition of the Vehicle. Plaintiff alleges the Vehicle contained or developed defects “including but not limited to, defects which cause the vehicle to fail to start, defects which cause the vehicle to come to an emergency stop while driving, defects which cause the rearview mirror to not open or close, defects which cause the vehicle to be unresponsive, and defects which cause notifications stating that the vehicle has a bad battery to appear.” (Complaint at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff’s claims for breach of warranty sound in contract, tort, and statute and are, therefore, covered by the agreement—which must be arbitrated under the agreement.

Regardless, Defendant argues the parties have given the arbitrator exclusive authority to determine threshold questions of arbitrability. (Mtn. to Compel Arbitration at pp. 7:2-8:7.) The question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a particular dispute is generally to be decided by the court. (AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America (1986) 475 U.S. 643, 649.) The parties may, however, agree to submit the arbitrability question itself to arbitration. (First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan (1995) 514 U.S. 938, 943.) Courts should find that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability only when there is clear and unmistakable evidence that they did so, resolving any ambiguity in favor of a finding that the issue is for the court to determine. (Id. at pp. 944-945.)

Here, the parties have clearly and unmistakably agreed to arbitrate arbitrability. The agreement provides for the arbitrator’s powers as follows:

The arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve all disputes arising out of or relating to the interpretation, applicability, enforceability, or formation of this Section, including but not limited to any claim that all or any part of this Section is void or voidable, whether a claim is subject to arbitration or the question of waiver by litigation conduct.

(Seimas Decl., Ex. A at p. 8.) In light of this clause, it is only proper for the Court to compel this matter to arbitration. Accordingly, the Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED. This action is hereby stayed pending the conclusion of arbitration. (9 U.S.C. § 3.)

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

The Motion to Compel Arbitration is GRANTED. And this civil action is STAYED pending the completion of this arbitration.

SO ORDERED.

Date: May 15, 2026 Hon. Vincent I. Parrett Superior Court of the State of California, County of Santa Clara

Line 5 Case Name: Crown Asset Management, LLC v. Dinesh Purbey